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TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet Documents

Reference	Date
MISC 150(67) 4th meeting	5.6.67
CC(67) 36th Conclusions, Minute 2	6.6.67
CC(67) 37th Conclusions, Minute 1	8.6.67

Cypher/Cat.A

FLASH TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 474 5 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 474 of 5 June. Repeated for information to MOD (DI4) JIG Cyprus, Washington, UKMIS New York and Amman.

My telegram No. 473.

I have just seen Eban. Main burden was to stress that in recent days Arabs had put themselves into an overall offensive posture. At about 7 a.m. this morning Egyptian tanks and aircraft had moved against Israel. Full radar plots were available. Clearly Nasser had decided his chance had come and wished to involve his allies as soon as possible.

2. The land attack had been repelled or was in course of being repelled. Israeli Air Force had engaged Egyptians in the air and on their airfields. Latest news was that the air battle had been a great success and that Egyptian Air Force was for moment ineffective.

3. Mr. Eshkol will be sending Prime Minister a message in two or three hours' time. This would show appreciation of friendship and steadfastness of Britain and set out the case for Israel's righteous use of force. Israel did not regret her patience in the face of pressure. The free passage issue was not in the forefront at the moment. Israel had had to repel an assault in strength and her decision was one which would be of national, international and historic importance.

4. Israel's representative in New York had informed the President of Security Council and he thought the Council would be meeting at about 9 a.m. New York time.

5. At 8 a.m. he had asked General Bull to pass a message to the Jordanians to the effect that the Israelis had no wish to engage in battle with Jordan and would not do so unless attacked first. Bull had subsequently said that he had been able to pass this message. The Jordanians had since announced that Mafraq was under heavy bombardment. This was so patently untrue that it encouraged Israeli hope that the Jordanians were using this as an excuse for inaction.

6. The Syrians had not moved.

7. Israel had no objective at the moment but to deal with the military threat. The question of the blockade could be dealt with later, preferably though diplomatic means.

/8. Israel hoped

8. Israel hoped that the Western Powers would concentrate on preventing an enlargement of the conflict.

9. See my immediately following telegram (not to all).

Foreign Office pass JIG Cyprus 73, Washington 103, UKMis.New York 92, Amman 92 and to MOD (DI 4).

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1100Z/5 June 1967

Recd. 1200Z/5 June 1967

[Repeated as requested]

[Sent to D.C.C.]

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Eastern Dept.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 256 5 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 256 of 5 June.

Repeated for information to: UKMis New York

And Saving to: Washington Ottawa Paris
Rome The Hague Moscow
Tel Aviv.

Your telegram No. 78 to Abidjan: Gulf of Aqaba.

I communicated the Draft Declaration to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning with the appropriate explanations. Herr Nilsson could give me no official reply but it seemed to him that our proposal had been overtaken by the extremely dangerous events of the past 24 hours. The Swedish Government would be making a statement later in the day. This, however, would be concerned with the whole question of Arab-Israel conflict and the Minister could give me no assurance that it would cover navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. He volunteered that the terms of the Draft Declaration reflected exactly the Swedish Government's views on the latter point.

2. Herr Nilsson was evidently so pre-occupied with situation as a whole that he was reluctant to discuss one aspect of it, though he recognised that it was an important aspect. He suggested that we should concentrate on the Security Council debate, which was now to be resumed earlier than expected. I reminded him of your desire to act through the United Nations if possible while reserving the right to proceed with the Declaration outside if necessary. I readily agreed however, that policies and statements would now have to cover a much wider field.

3. Subject to further consideration in the light of the impending Swedish Government's statement I think it unlikely that the Swedish Government will agree to subscribe to the Declaration should you in fact proceed with it, more particularly as the Norwegian Government's attitude is so negative. Swedish officials have been showing marked lack of enthusiasm during the past few days.

4. Only my Netherlands colleague has arranged to support me. My United States colleague's instructions require him first to consider

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the Swedish Government's reaction to my démarche. No support whatsoever from any others but the Canadian Ambassador understands that his Government's support for the Declaration will, by agreement with Prime Minister, be given in New York.

Foreign Office pass Immediate to UKMis New York No. 9 and Saving to Washington No. 8, Ottawa No. 3, Paris No. 6, Rome No. 5, The Hague No. 5, Moscow No. 2 and Tel Aviv No. 1.

Sir A. Ross

Sent 1508Z 5 June
Recd 1509Z 5 June

[Repeated as requested].

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CYPHER/CAT.A.

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO ANKARA

TELNO. 918 5 JUNE, 1967. (P.U.S.)

CONFIDENTIAL.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 638.
MIDDLE EAST.
TURKISH AMBASSADOR CALLED 5 JUNE ON PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY AND ASKED WHAT HE COULD TELL HIS GOVERNMENT ABOUT H.M.G.'S ATTITUDE TO CURRENT CRISIS.
2. SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH SAID THAT OUR ONE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE WAS TO USE EVERY POSSIBLE MEANS TO BRING ABOUT A GENERAL CEASE-FIRE. ALL OUR OTHER ACTIVITIES WERE AT THE MOMENT SUBORDINATED TO THIS ONE OBJECTIVE.
AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS SURE HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE DOING THE SAME.
3. SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH ALSO EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD TAKEN CONSIDERABLE RISKS IN OUR RELATIONS VIS-A-VIS BOTH SIDES, PARTICULARLY THE ARABS, IN PURSUIT OF PEACE AND THAT WE WERE EXTREMELY ANXIOUS FOR EVERYBODY TO UNDERSTAND NOW THAT WE WERE NOT TAKING SIDES, EXCEPT THAT WE WERE ON THE SIDE OF PEACE. AMBASSADOR'S ATTITUDE SHOWED SOME SUSPICION OF ISRAEL, THOUGH HE CONCEDED THAT, EVEN IF IT TURNED OUT TO BE THE ISRAELIS WHO HAD FIRED FIRST, THE TENSION SINCE 16 MAY HAD TENDED TO MAKE WAR INEVITABLE.

SOSFA SENT 0518Z 6 JUNE.

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CYPHER/CAT A

V FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO. 5973 5 JUNE 1967 (PUS)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDSD TO WASHINGTON TEL NO 5973 OF 5 JUNE AND TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR AND LORD CARADON.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

PLEASE FIND OUT URGENTLY FROM THE AMERICANS WHAT ACTION THEY PROPOSE TO TAKE. I PRESUME THERE WILL BE AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE AMERICANS MAY FEEL THAT THE FIRST ACTION OF THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE TO SEND, PERHAPS IN THE NAME OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, OR OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, AN APPEAL TO BOTH SIDES TO CEASE HOSTILITIES FORTHWITH. WE SHOULD CERTAINLY SUPPORT THEM IN PRESSING FOR THIS.

2. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, WE DO NOT WANT TO GET OUT TOO FAR IN FRONT OURSELVES SO THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER IF THE APPEAL WENT FROM U THANT OR TABOR.

SOSFA SENT 1020Z 5 JUNE

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CYPHER/CAT 'A'
F L A S H WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO. 1910
SECRET.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
5 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1910 OF 5 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL. 1909 AND YOUR TEL. NO. 5973.

MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES.

I HAVE JUST SPOKEN TO RUSK. HE SAID THAT U.S. POLICY WAS TO MAKE THE MOST STRENUOUS EFFORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE. THE AMERICANS HAD JUST HEARD THAT A CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN ARRANGED IN JERUSALEM FROM 12 NOON JERUSALEM TIME.

2. I PUT TO HIM YOUR SUGGESTION FOR AN IMMEDIATE APPEAL FROM U THANT OR TABOR. HE SAID THAT WAS FINE BUT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A VERY GOOD CHANCE OF GETTING A RESOLUTION TO THIS EFFECT THROUGH VERY QUICKLY AND WE SHOULD TRY THIS FIRST.

3. RUSK SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN IN TOUCH IN MOSCOW AND HAD EXPRESSED THEIR ASTONISHMENT AND DISMAY AT WHAT HAD HAPPENED. THEY HAD SAID THAT THEY HOPED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AGREED THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO BRING ABOUT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS COULD COOPERATE TO THIS END. SO FAR THERE HAD BEEN NO RUSSIAN REACTION.

4. RUSK SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD HAD NO INKLING OF THE HOSTILITIES FROM EITHER SIDE. HE ASSURED ME THAT THERE WAS NOT A THING ABOUT THE OUTBREAK ABOUT WHICH YOU HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED ALREADY.

5. RUSK SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD AS YET FORMED NO JUDGEMENT ABOUT WHICH SIDE HAD STARTED THE FIGHTING. THIS WAS STILL MURKY.

6. RUSK SAID THAT THE FIGHTING SEEMED TO CANCEL OUT MOST OF WHAT WE HAD BEEN DOING TOGETHER IN RECENT DAYS.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT 1140Z 5 JUNE
RECD AT 1140Z 5 JUNE

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EN CLAIR

F L A S H WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1912 5 JUNE 1967.

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED FLASH TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 1912 OF 5/6 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UK MISSION NEWYORK.

MY TEL NO 1909 : MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENTS'S STATEMENT.

STATEMENT BY PRESS SECRETARY GEORGE CHRISTIAN.

WE ARE DEEPLY DISTRESSED TO LEARN THAT LARGE SCALE FIGHTING HAS BROKEN OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AN EVENTUALITY WE HAD SOUGHT TO PREVENT.

EACH SIDE HAS ACCUSED THE OTHER OF LAUNCHING AGGRESSION. AT THIS TIME THE FACTS ARE NOT CLEAR, BUT WE DO KNOW THAT TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES WILL FLOW FROM THIS NEEDLESS AND DESTRUCTIVE STRUGGLE IF THE FIGHTING DOES NOT CEASE IMMEDIATELY.

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN CALLED INTO URGENT SESSION.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS POLICY INSTITUTED EARLIER TO KEEP THE CONGRESS ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED SECRETARY RUSK AND SECRETARY MCNAMARA TO BRIEF THE SENATE AND HOUSE LEADERS AT 9.30 AM TODAY. AT 8.30 THIS MORNING THE PRESIDENT WILL MEET THE SECRETARIES RUSK AND MCNAMARA, WALT ROSTOW AND GEORGE CHRISTIAN.

THE UNITED STATES WILL DEVOTE ALL ITS ENERGIES TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND A NEW BEGINNING OF PROGRAMS TO ASSURE THE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENTIRE AREA. WE CALL UPON ALL PARTIES TO SUPPORT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN BRINGING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE CEASE FIRE.

SIR P DEAN

SENT 1535Z 5.6.67
RECD 1537Z 5.6.67

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CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1913 5 JUNE 1967.

SECRET.

MY TEL NO 1910 : MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES.

GENE ROSTOW GAVE ME FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT RUSSIAN/U.S. EXCHANGES. KOSYGIN HIMSELF HAD ANSWERED IN MILD TONES THE MESSAGES MENTIONED BY MR. RUSK IN MY TEL. UNDER REFERENCE AND HAD AGREED THAT IT WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GREAT POWERS TO BRING HOSTILITIES TO AN END. ROSTOW SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME SIGNS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO TAKE A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE LINE.

2. THE RUSSIANS HAD ALSO BEEN INFORMED OF A STATEMENT MADE BY EBAN, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH ESHKOL, TO U.S. AMBASSADOR, TEL AVIV, THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAD NO INTENTION OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION TO ENLARGE THEIR TERRITORY AND THAT ISRAEL HOPED PEACE COULD BE RESTORED WITHIN THE PRESENT BOUNDARIES AND THE CONFLICT LOCALIZED.

3. INSTRUCTIONS WERE BEING SENT TO ALL U.S. POSTS IN THE AREA ON THE LINES OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT EMPHASIZING THAT THE U.S. HAD WORKED HARD TO PREVENT HOSTILITIES AND KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THEM IN ADVANCE.

4. ROSTOW WILL BE SEEING THE ARAB AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON TODAY AND ASKING THEM FOR FULL PROTECTION FOR U.S. CITIZENS IN THEIR COUNTRIES. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION HE SAID THAT HE WOULD GIVE THE ARAB AMBASSADORS THE CONTENTS OF MR. EBAN'S ASSURANCE (PARA 2 ABOVE) AND WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ENTIRELY EVEN-HANDED IN ITS ATTITUDE.

SIR P DEAN

SENT 1543Z 5.6.67

RECD 1546Z 5.6.67

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CYPHER/CAT A
F L A S H WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1914 5 JUNE 1967.
SECRET.
MY I.P.T.
MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES.
CONTRARY TO RUSK'S REMARKS (MY TEL 1909), ROSTOW SEEMED TO THINK THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME ADVANTAGE TO CONTINUING EFFORTS TO GET A DECLARATION BY MARITIME POWERS. I SAID I THOUGHT THAT THIS MIGHT CUT RIGHT ACROSS ATTEMPTS TO GET THE SOVIET UNION TO BE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE BUT UNDERTOOK TO ASK FOR YOUR VIEWS. ROSTOW EMPHASISED THAT HE HAD NOT SPOKEN TO HIS SUPERIORS. ROSTOW AGREED THAT WE SHOULD GIVE UP ANY IDEA OF ASSEMBLING A MARITIME FORCE, AND SHOULD DO NO FURTHER MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING. M.O.D. ARE BEING INFORMED SEPARETLY THAT ADMIRAL BARTOSIK'S TRIP SHOULD BE CANCELLED.
2. ROSTOW AGREED THAT OIL TALKS SHOULD CONTINUE (WE ARE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY TO MINISTRY OF POWER).
SIR P DEAN

SENT 1550Z 5.6.67
RECD 1554Z 5.6.67

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CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1915 5 JUNE 1967.
SECRET.
MY TWO I.P.T.
MIDDLE EAST.
ROSTOW REVERTED YET AGAIN TO THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL GROUP IN NATO. HE CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS A STRONG INTEREST AND ANXIETY IN EUROPE OVER THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THAT IT WAS A BASIC RESPONSIBILITY OF NATO TO DO WHAT IT COULD TO DEFEND ITS INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID THAT, BY ACCIDENT OR DESIGN, THERE WERE SERIOUS LONG RANGE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE SOVIET UNION COULD ACQUIRE A POSITION WHICH COULD SERIOUSLY THREATEN WESTERN NAVAL STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERREANEAN AND THE RED SEA. IT WAS A VERY SERIOUS LONG-RANGE U.S. POLICY TO TRANSFORM NATO SO THAT IT TOOK WIDER RESPONSIBILITY IN THE WORLD. THE MIDDLE EAST WAS AN AREA THAT THIS GROUP OF COUNTRIES SHOULD LOOK AT TOGETHER.
2. ROSTOW SAID THAT DEAN RUSK WOULD SPEAK SERIOUSLY TO THIS POINT AT THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING AND THAT IT WOULD THEREFORE BE A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE A MEETING OF A SPECIAL GROUP OR AT LEAST TO ARRANGE FOR ONE BEFORE THE MINISTERIAL MEETING.
3. AM I RIGHT TO ASSUME THAT PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE NOT CHANGED YOUR VIEWS ABOUT THIS SORT OF GROUP.
SIR P DEAN

SENT 1606Z 5.6.67
RECD 1608Z 5.6.67

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PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1932

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
5 JUNE 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

MIDDLE EAST.

EUGENE ROSTOW SUMMONED A MEETING THIS EVENING OF ALL THE EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING NEUTRALS AND EXCLUDING GREECE AND TURKEY WHO ARE BEING SEPARATELY CATERED FOR.

2. ROSTOW GAVE A LUCID AND ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE LAST TEN DAYS INCLUDING THE MARITIME DECLARATION AND THE EFFORTS MADE BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS TO URGE RESTRAINT ON THE ISRAELIS AND TO FIND SOME MEANS OF GETTING THE UAR TO AGREE TO THE OPENING OF THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. HE SHED NO LIGHT UPON THE MILITARY EVENTS OF THE DAY OR UPON WHICH SIDE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SHOOTING FIRST. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS THE TIME FOR RENEWING AND INTENSIFYING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO END THE FIGHTING AND TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING POLITCAL AND SECURITY PROBLEMS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT ''THE MILITARY EVENTS OF THE NEXT FEW DAYS'' WOULD DETERMINE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR DIPLOMACY TO SOLVE THE WIDER PROBLEMS. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, ROSTOW SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET STOPPED SUPPLYING ARMS TO EITHER OF THE TWO SIDES BUT WAS URGENTLY REVIEWING THEIR PRESENT DELIVERY PROGRAMMES WHICH HE CLAIMED TO BE QUITE SMALL. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE US MESSAGE EARLY TODAY HAS BEEN TEMPERATE IN TONE. HE WAS ASKED ABOUT A QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OR DISCUSSIONS AND, WHILE NOT OPPOSING THESE HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD TAKE PLACE INSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS AND THAT. IN ANY CASE, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROBABLY WOULD PREFER TO DEAL BILATERALLY. HE STRESSED THAT THE US HAD NOT DECIDED WHO WAS THE ORIGINAL AGGRESSOR AND WERE CERTAINLY NOT TAKING SIDES IN THE CONFLICT.

SIR P DEAN

SENT AT Ø158Z/Ø6 JUNE 1967.
RECD AT Ø159Z/Ø6 JUNE 1967.

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FOS

EN CLAIR
FLASH UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1221 5 JUNE 1967
UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1221 OF 5 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MIDDLE EAST.
FOLLOWING ARE THE TWO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION AND REFERRED TO IN THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WHICH I HAD WITH HAYMAN AT 5. 20 BST TODAY.
2. FIRST TEXT BEGINS:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
HAVING HEARD THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE RECENT OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING AND WITH THE MENACING SITUATION IN THE AREA,
1. CALLS UPON ALL THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO TAKE FORTHWITH ALL STEPS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE:
2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE COUNCIL PROMTLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION.
ENDS.

3. SECOND (INDIAN TEXT): BEGINS:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
HAVING RECEIVED THE GRAVE NEWS OF WIDESPREAD ARMED CLASHES BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL,
HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE

/ DEVELOPMENTS

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA,
1. DETERMINES THAT THERE HAS BEEN A BREACH OF THE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
2. CALLS UPON ALL THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO TAKE ALL STEPS NECESSARY TO EFFECT A CEASE-FIRE FORTHWITH AND WITHDRAW THEIR ARMED FORCES IMMEDIATELY TO THE POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED ON 4 JUNE 1967,
3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED PROMTLY OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA.
ENDS.

LORD CARADON

SENT 1717Z 5.6.67
RECD 1749Z 5.6.67

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1222 5 JUNE 1967.

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1222 OF 5 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, COPENHAGEN, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, ADDIS ABABA, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, LAGOS, JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MY TELNO. 1203: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

THE COUNCIL MET IN EMERGENCY SESSION AT 10.20 LOCAL TIME. ISRAEL, U.A.R., LEBANON, IRAQ, MOROCCO, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT. SYRIA AND JORDAN WERE SEATED AT THEIR OWN REQUEST WITHOUT RIGHT OF VOTE.

2. IN AN EXPLANATORY STATEMENT THE PRESIDENT (TABOR, DENMARK) SAID THAT AT 3.10 AM. TO DAY THE ISRAELI DELEGATE INFORMED HIM THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A REPORT THAT EGYPTIAN LAND AND AIR FORCES HAD MOVED AGAINST ISRAEL. ISRAELI FORCES WERE NOW REPELLING U.A.R. AGRESSION. RAFAEL ASKED TO MAKE AN URGGENT COMMUNICATION TO THE COUNCIL ON THIS SUBJECT. TABOR CONTINUED THAT AT 3.30 A.M. THE U.A.R. DELEGATE HAD INFORMED HIM OF AN ACT OF PREMEDITATED ISRAELI AGRESSION AGAINST HIS COUNTRY. (TEXT OF U.A.R. COMPLAINT WAS CIRCULATED AS DOCUMENT S/7926 THIS MORNING AND IS GIVEN IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM). TABOR ADDED THAT INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN EXCHANGES OF FIRE SINCE EARLY THIS MORNING. HE HAD THEREFORE DECIDED TO CONVENE A MEETING AND CALLED UPON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT ON THE SITUATION.

3. U THANT SAID THAT U.N. SOURCES HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ASCERTAIN HOW HOSTILITIES BEGAN. REPORTS WERE CONFLICTING BUT IT WAS CLEAR THERE WAS SERIOUS FIGHTING ON LAND AND IN THE AIR, AND THAT IT WAS SPREADING. HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF UNTSO AND THE COMMANDER OF UNEF TO REPORT DEVELOPMENTS AND UNDERTOOK TO KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED. HE STRESSED HOWEVER THE UNEF

/WAS

WAS NO LONGER POSITIONED ON THE ARMISTICE LINE, BUT IN CAMPS AND WITHDRAWING. THE FOLLOWING REPORTS MUCH OF WHICH WERE BASED ON INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY THE (EGYPTIAN) LIASON OFFICER ATTACHED TO GENERAL RIKHYE'S STAFF, HAD COME IN:-

(A) COMMANDER UNEF SAID THAT AT 0800 HOURS LOCAL TIME TWO ISRAELI AIRCRAFT HAD APPEARED OVER GAZA. ONE WAS SHOT DOWN AND FELL INTO THE SEA: THE PILOT HAD BEEN RESCUED.

(B) AT THE SAME TIME TWO ISRAELI AIRCRAFT HAD VIOLATED U.A.R. AIRSPACE AT EL ARISH. U.A.R. AUTHORITIES CLAIMED ONE AIRCRAFT DESTROYED.

(C) SHORTLY AFTER 0800 HOURS EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES INFORMED GENERAL RIKHYE OF LAND AND AIR RAIDS ON A WIDE SCALE, INCLUDING AN AIR RAID ON CAIRO. (THE LATTER HAS SINCE BEEN DENIED BY ISRAEL). THE EGYPTIANS ALSO ALLEGED ISRAELI MOVEMENTS TOWARDS EL KOSIMA IN SINAI. AT 0915 HOURS U.A.R. ARTILLARY COMMENCED FIRING: AFTER A SHORT BREAK THIS HAD RECOMMENCED AT 1000 LOCAL TIME, AND WAS CONTINUING.

(D) GENERAL BULL, CHIEF OF STAFF UNTSO, STATED FIRING BEGAN AT JERUSALEM AT 1125 LOCAL TIME. AFTER CONTACTING BOTH SIDES, HE HAD ARRANGED A CEASE-FIRE TO BEGIN AT NOON. AT 1145 THE ISRAELIS INFORMED GENERAL BULL THEY WOULD COMPLY. MOST OF THE FIRING HAD CEASED BY 1215 BUT SINCE SPORADIC MOTARING WAS STILL CONTINUING, A SECOND CEASE-FIRE WWAS PROPOSED FOR 1230 AND ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES.

(E) ON THE SYRIAN/ISRAELI ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE, A SENIOR ISRAELI OFFICER HAD INFORMED UNTSO (TIBERIAS) OF AIR BATTLES AND EXPLOSIONS, AND STATED THAT ISRAEL WAS AT WAR WITH SYRIA. THE CHIEF SYRIAN DELEGATE TO UNTSO HAD REPORTED THAT DAMASCUS AIRPORT WAS UNDER ISRAELI ATTACK.

(F) AN INDIAN UNIT OF UNEF STATIONED NEAR KHAN YUNIS HAD BEEN STRAFED BY ISRAELI AIRCRAFT. A PRELIMINARY REPORT SAID THAT THREE INDIAN SOLDIERS HAD BEEN KILLED IN THIS RAID. AN URGENT APPEAL HAD BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ISRAELI DEFENCE STAFF REQUESTING THEM TO STOP FIRING ON CLEARLY MARKED UNEF UNITS.

/(G)

(G) GENERAL BULL STATED THAT A COMPANY OF JORDANIAN TROOPS AT 1300 LOCAL TIME ENTERED AND OCCUPIED A PART OF GOVERMENT HOUSE GARDEN, HIS HEADQUARTERS. HE HAD REQUESTED THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM THIS PRIVILEGED AREA WITHIN HALF AN HOUR. LATER, FIGHTING BROKE OUT BETWEEN JORDANIAN AND ISRAELI TROOPS IN THE GARDEN, AND MORTAR BOMBS STARTED LANDING IN GOVERNMENT HOUSE COMPOUND. AT 0852 HOURS NEW YORK TIME JORDANIAN TROOPS OCCUPIED GOVERNMENT HOUSE AND COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN UNTSO AND U.N. HEADQUARTERS CEASED.

4. THE SECRETARY GENERAL CONCLUDED HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BY SAYING THAT HE HAD ADDRESSED AN URGENT MESSAGE TO KING HUSSAIN REQUESTING HIM TO ORDER JORDANIAN TROOPS TO VACATE UNTSO HEADQUARTERS FORTHWITH.

5. PARTHASARATHI (INDIA) CONDEMNED THE ISRAELI AIR ATTACK ON THE INDIAN UNEF CONTINGENT AS REPORTED IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT TO THE COUNCIL. HE RESERVED HIS GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE.

6. IT WAS THEN AGREED, ON A PROPOSAL BY THE PRESIDENT, THAT HAVING HEARD STATEMENTS FROM ISRAEL AND THE UAR THE COUNCIL SHOULD ADJOURN FOR URGENT CONSULTATIONS.

7. RAFAEL (ISRAEL) THEN SPOKE. IN THE EARLY MORNING EGYPTIAN ARMED COLUMNS HAD MOVED AGAINST ISRAEL: EGYPTIAN PLANES FROM SINAI HAD STRUCK AT ISRAEL: AND EGYPTIAN ARTILLERY HAD BOMBARDED ISRAELI VILLAGES. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE HUGE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN SINAI WAS NOW CARRYING OUT ITS ORDERS, THE ORDERS FROM ITS COMMANDER ON 3 JUNE REFERRING TO A QUOTE HOLY WAR UNQUOTE. ISRAEL, WHICH WAS REPELLING THE EGYPTIAN FORCES, WAS NOW BRINGING THE MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COUNCIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. AS THE ISRAELI MINISTER OF DEFENCE, IN A STATEMENT TO THE ISRAELI FORCES HAD MADE CLEAR, ISRAEL HAD NO AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS. THEY WOULD KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

/8.

8. EL KONY (U.A.R.)SAID THAT THE ISRAELI FORCES HAD COMMITTED A COWARDLY AGGRESSION AGAINST THE UAR. A CAPTURED ISRAELI PILOT HAD ADMITTED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO ATTACK CAIRO AIR PORT AT 6 A.M. THE EXTENT OF THE ISRAELI OPERATIONS IN THE GAZA STRIP, IN SINAI, AGAINST EGYPTIAN AIR PORTS, AND AGAINST SHARM EL SHAIKH SHOWED THAT THEY WERE PREMEDITATED. ISRAEL HAD REPEATED HER PAST AGGRESSION WHILE THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD BEEN ACTIVELY ENGAGED TO FIND MEANS TO AVOID ACTION WHICH WOULD AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION. THE UAR ON THE OTHER HAND HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF INITIATING AGGRESSIVE ACTION. QUOTING A REPORT FROM CAIRO, EL KONY SAID THAT ISRAELI AEROPLANES HAD ATTACKED A FRENCH SHIP IN THE SUEZ CANAL WITH THE OBJECT OF HAMPERING NAVIGATION THROUGH THE CANAL AND DRAWING THIRD PARTIES INTO THE CONFLICT. HE CONVEYED THE UAR'S DEEP SYMPATHY TO INDIA ON THE LOSSES SUFFERED BY THE INDIAN UNEF CONTINGENT AS A RESULT OF THE ISRAELI ATTACK. THE COUNCIL SHOULD VIGOROUSLY CONDEMN THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST THE UAR WHO HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO DEFEND THEMSELVES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER.

9. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT PREVIOUSLY REACHED, THE COUNCIL THEN WENT INTO RECESS

F O PASS MOSCOW 111 PARIS 116 COPENHAGEN 47 TEL AVIV 121
AND SAVING TO AMMAN 32 BAGHDAD 12 BEIRUT 46 ADDIS ABABA 25
NEW DELHI 17 LAGOS 12 JEDDA 24 CAIRO 44
LORD CARADON

SENT AT 2109Z/05 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 2110Z/05 JUNE 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FLASH U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1226

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
5 JUNE 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1226 OF 5 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, OTTAWA, NEW DELHI, COPENHAGEN AND TEL AVIV, AND SAVING TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD AND CAIRO.

RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE PASS TO HAYMAN AT 7 A.M.

MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

SINCE THE COUNCIL RECESSED AFTER HEARING THE PARTIES THIS MORNING WE HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS ALL DAY ON THE TEXT OF A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL.

2. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. BUT IT QUICKLY BECAME APPARENT THAT THE INDIANS, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE U.A.R., AND SUPPORTED BY THE RUSSIANS, WOULD NOT AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT DEALING AT THE SAME TIME WITH THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL, AND THE DRAFT FLOATED BY THE INDIANS MADE CLEAR THEIR AIM OF HAVING THE COUNCIL CALL FOR A WITHDRAWAL TO THE POSITIONS OCCUPIED ON 4 JUNE. THE INDIANS AT FIRST ALSO SOUGHT TO HAVE THE RESOLUTION DETERMINE THAT THERE HAD BEEN A BREACH OF THE PEACE (WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE ANY SECURITY COUNCIL CALL MANDATORY), BUT THEY DROPPED THIS FAIRLY EARLY WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT IT WOULD NOT GAIN SUPPORT EVEN FROM MEMBERS LIKE THE FRENCH.

3. THE U.S. AND OURSELVES URGED THROUGH THE MORNING THAT THE FIRST ESSENTIAL WAS FOR THE COUNCIL TO CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND THAT IT SHOULD NOT TURN TO OTHER ISSUES UNTIL AFTER IT HAD PASSED A RESOLUTION TO THIS EFFECT. WE LATER CONCEDED THAT THERE COULD BE A CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL IN GENERAL TERMS, BUT THE NEGOTIATIONS STUCK ON THE ISSUE OF DEFINING THE CONDITIONS OF THE WITHDRAWAL. THE U.A.R. REPRESENTATIVE AFTER CONSULTATION THROUGH THE DAY WITH HIS

/GOVERNMENT

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GOVERNMENT IN CAIRO REMAINED ADAMANT THAT THE U.A.R. FORCES WOULD NOT STOP FIGHTING IF THE COUNCIL'S CEASE-FIRE CALL DID NOT SPECIFICALLY DEFINE WITHDRAWAL POSITIONS AS THOSE OCCUPIED ON 4 JUNE. THE U.S. WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE INSERTION OF THE DATE OF 4 JUNE PUT THE COUNCIL IN THE POSITION OF ENDORSING THE SITUATION AS AT THAT DATE.

4. NUMEROUS FORMULAE WERE PUT FORWARD IN TEXTS FLOATED BY THE U.S., THE FRENCH AND THE LATIN AMERICANS. THE INDIANS WERE PROMINENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON BEHALF OF THE U.A.R. THE U.S. WERE ABLE TO RETAIN THE SUPPORT OF OURSELVES, THE TWO OTHER WESTERN MEMBERS AND THE LATIN AMERICANS FOR THEIR POSITION, AND, WITHOUT THE PROSPECT OF GAINING A JAPANESE OR CHINESE VOTE IN OPPOSITION TO THE U.S., THE INDIANS COULD NOT GATHER SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR THEIR RESOLUTION. AT THE SAME TIME THE AFRICAN MEMBERS WOULD NOT TAKE SIDES IN OPPOSITION TO THE U.A.R. THERE WAS THUS INSUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR EITHER THE INDIAN OR THE U.S. APPROACH AND MOST MEMBERS IN ANY CASE FELT THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT GIVE UP HOPE OF A RESOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE COUNCIL AS A WHOLE. THE FRENCH WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE FORCED TO A VOTE WHICH WAS NOT AGREED AMONG THE FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS FOR FEAR OF PREJUDICING THE KIND OF VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION WHICH THE FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS HAD BEEN ABLE TO MAKE IN THE KASHMIR CRISIS.

5. THIS AFTERNOON AT THE SUGGESTION OF INDIA, THE PRESIDENT ENDEAVOURED TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN GOLDBERG AND FEDORENKO. THEY AGREED AND HAD TWO LONG MEETINGS REFERRING TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS FOR INSTRUCTIONS IN THE INTERVAL. AS A RESULT GOLDBERG PREPARED THE TEXT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. WE GATHER THAT FEDORENKO AGREED TO THE CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES BUT WAS UNABLE TO AGREE WITHOUT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW TO THE REMAINDER OF GOLDBERG'S TEXT.

6. CONSEQUENTLY THE COUNCIL WAS ADJOURNED TILL TOMORROW (TUESDAY) AT 11.30 A.M. AND WE ARE TO MEET GOLDBERG FOR PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION AT 9.30 A.M.

/7. IF

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UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1226 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

7. IF GOLDBERG AND FEDORENKO AGREE WE CAN, I THINK, TAKE IT THAT SEYDOUX (FRANCE) WILL ALSO AGREE AND WE MAY THEN BE ABLE TO GET UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT. BUT IT IS STILL NOT POSSIBLE TO BE AT ALL SURE THAT THIS WILL BE ACHIEVED.

8. TODAY WAS EXHAUSTING WITH CONTINUOUS CONSULTATIONS IN AND AROUND THE COUNCIL LASTING FOURTEEN HOURS. WE STARTED OUT WITH HOPES OF AN EARLY AGREEMENT TO CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND IT HAS BEEN A GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT NOT TO GET A RESULT. BUT WE HAVE AN EVEN CHANCE OF FULL AGREEMENT TOMORROW (PARTLY DEPENDING NO DOUBT ON NEWS OF THE WAY THE WAR HAS GONE) AND AGREEMENT WILL OF COURSE BE MUCH MORE VALUABLE THAN TO WIN ON A DIVIDED VOTE.

9. WE HAVE HAD NO DISCUSSION YET ON WHAT SHOULD FOLLOW THE CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. WE HOPE SOON TO PUT SOME IDEAS TO YOU ON THIS.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 114, PARIS 119, NEW DELHI 36, TEL AVIV 124, COPENHAGEN 49, AND SAVING AMMAN 35, DAMASCUS 39, BAGHDAD 16 AND CAIRO 47.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0446Z/06 JUNE 67
RECD AT 0447Z/06 JUNE 67

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS].

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MR. MOORE
HEAD OF COMMUNICATIONS

CYPHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO 296

5 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDED TO TELNO 296 OF 5 JUNE RFI UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ASKED U S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND MYSELF TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON AND GAVE US A PAPER, TRANSLATION OF WHICH IS CONTAINED IN M.E.T.

2. M. HARMEL SAID THAT THE BELGIANS RECOGNISED THAT THE COMBATTANTS WOULD VERY LIKELY REFUSE TO OBEY ANY ORDER TO STOP FIGHTING, BUT IN THEIR VIEW THERE WOULD BE VERY GREAT ADVANTAGE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF FUTURE EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE CONFLAGRATION SPREADING, IF AT THE OUTSET THE FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD BEEN ABLE TO AGREE ON SOMETHING ON THE LINES PROPOSED. HE WOULD BE SEEING THE FRENCH AND SOVIET AMBASSADORS AND URGING THEM TO RECOMMEND THE DOCUMENT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

3. M. HARMEL SAID THAT HE HAD SPENT YESTERDAY CONFERRING WITH THE BELGIAN AMBASSADORS FROM THE POSTS CHIEFLY CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, AND THE MEETING HAD ENDORSED BELGIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE PROPOSED DRAFT DECLARATION ABOUT THE GULF OF AQABA, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS DISAPPOINTING THAT FRANCE, ITALY AND

PARTICIPATION IN THE PROPOSED DRAFT DECLARATION ABOUT THE GULF OF AKABA, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS DISAPPOINTING THAT FRANCE, ITALY AND GERMANY WERE APPARENTLY STANDING ASIDE. HE WAS ALSO ABLE TO TELL US THAT BELGIUM WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROPOSED PLANNING COMMITTEE ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WOULD BE CONCERNED NOT ONLY WITH FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS BUT ALSO WITH TRYING TO FIND SOLUTIONS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. BELGIUM WOULD NOT HOWEVER HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO ANY INTERNATIONAL NAVAL FORCE. (SHE HAD NOT IN ANY CASE ANY SUITABLE SHIPS AVAILABLE.) HE WAS NOT SURE TO WHAT EXTENT THESE PROPOSALS MUST NOW BE REGARDED AS SUPERSEDED BY THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

4. IN REPLY TO MY ENQUIRY, M. HARMEL SAID THAT THE MINISTERS OF THE SIX WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSING THE SITUATION TODAY, SINCE M. COUVE AND M. FANFANI HAD CRIED OFF AND HR. BRANDT WAS A DOUBTFUL STARTER. HE ASSUMED HOWEVER THAT IT WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING NEXT WEEK.

CCNS

PARA 2 LINE 2 TO OBEY AN ORDER ETC

PARA 3 LINE 1 M. HARMEL SAID ETC

PARA 4 LINE 3 SIX WOULD NOT ETC

FO PASS UKMIS NEW YORK 4 WASHTON 30 PARIS 57 MOSCOW 1.

SIR R BARCLAY GPS 320 SENT AT 05/1700 LMH KK

RECD AT 05/1702 C F H

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IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO 297

5 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDSD FO TELNO 297 OF 5 JUNE RFI UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PARIS AND MOSCOW.

M I D D T: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT REFERRED TO :

IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT AN ARMISTICE SHOULD BE ARRANGED WHILE THE OUTCOME OF THE FIGHTING REMAINS UNCERTAIN.

LATER, THE CONFLICT WOULD RUN THE RISK OF ASSUMING EVEN GREATER PROPORTIONS. THE UNITED NATIONS MUST THEREFORE URGENTLY FULFIL THE ROLE WHICH THE CHARTER HAS GIVEN THEM. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ORDER THE CEASEFIRE.

BELGIUM HAS MADE KNOWN THIS POINT OF VIEW TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HAS ADDRESSED A SPECIAL APPEAL TO THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO UNDERTAKE TO BEGIN A DISCUSSION LEADING IMMEDIATELY TO A CEASEFIRE. THEY SHOULD THEN TRY TO ARRANGE A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL.

NO SOULTION CAN BE ENVISAGED, AND A FORTIORI ACCEPTED, WHICH CALLS IN QUESTION RESPECT FOR ORDER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW S/CN THIS IN-VOLVES RESPECT FOR THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE EXIST-ENCE OF STATES WHICH ARE MEMBERS OF THE ORGANISATION AND FOR INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL STRAITS.

P.M. saw + decided that the Foreign Secretary should make the statement. Mr Heath's office informed.

PRIME MINISTER

Mr. Heath's Private Secretary has just telephoned to say that Mr. Heath is of the opinion that, as war has broken out and as much of the questioning must inevitably relate to this weekend's activities, he thinks "very strongly" that this afternoon's Statement to the House should be made by you.

As all P.N.Q.s are now dead the issue is thus simply one of whether you or the Foreign Secretary makes this afternoon's Statement.

June 5, 1967

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10/Co/5th.

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1932 5 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MIDDLE EAST.

EUGENE ROSTOW SUMMONED A MEETING THIS EVENING OF ALL THE EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING NEUTRALS AND EXCLUDING GREECE AND TURKEY WHO ARE BEING SEPARATELY CATERED FOR.

2. ROSTOW GAVE A LUCID AND ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE LAST TEN DAYS INCLUDING THE MARITIME DECLARATION AND THE EFFORTS MADE BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS TO URGE RESTRAINT ON THE ISRAELIS AND TO FIND SOME MEANS OF GETTING THE UAR TO AGREE TO THE OPENING OF THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. HE SHED NO LIGHT UPON THE MILITARY EVENTS OF THE DAY OR UPON WHICH SIDE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SHOOTING FIRST. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS THE TIME FOR RENEWING AND INTENSIFYING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO END THE FIGHTING AND TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING POLITCAL AND SECURITY PROBLEMS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT ''THE MILITARY EVENTS OF THE NEXT FEW DAYS'' WOULD DETERMINE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR DIPLOMACY TO SOLVE THE WIDER PROBLEMS. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, ROSTOW SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET STOPPED SUPPLYING ARMS TO EITHER OF THE TWO SIDES

NOT YET STOPPED SUPPLYING ARMS TO EITHER OF THE TWO SIDES BUT WAS URGENTLY REVIEWING THEIR PRESENT DELIVERY PROGRAMMES WHICH HE CLAIMED TO BE QUITE SMALL. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE US MESSAGE EARLY TODAY HAS BEEN TEMPERATE IN TONE. HE WAS ASKED ABOUT A QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OR DISCUSSIONS AND, WHILE NOT OPPOSING THESE HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD TAKE PLACE INSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS AND THAT, IN ANY CASE, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROBABLY WOULD PREFER TO DEAL BILATERALLY. HE STRESSED THAT THE US HAD NOT DECIDED WHO WAS THE ORIGINAL AGGRESSOR AND WERE CERTAINLY NOT TAKING SIDES IN THE CONFLICT.

SIR P DEAN GROUPS 250 SENT AT 06/0158Z W

5A

SECRET - GUARD

CYPHER/CAT +A+.
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1936

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
5 JUNE 1967.

SECRET.
GUARD.
FOLLOWING FOR SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH FROM AMBASSADOR.
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO YOU TO HAVE THE FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONS OF U.S. THINKING BASED ON TALKS I HAVE HAD TODAY WITH GENE AND WALT ROSTOW, WITH KATZENBACK AND ONE OR TWO OTHER OFFICIALS. INEVITABLY THEY ARE SOMEWHAT SPECULATIVE AND MAY NOT REFLECT THE FULL PICTURE.

2. WALT ROSTOW REITERATED TO ME THAT THE U.S. HAD BEEN CAUGHT COMPLETELY UNAWARE OF ISRAEL'S INTENTION TO ATTACK. NO-ONE I HAVE TALKED TO IS SURE (OR IS PREPARED TO SAY) WHO STARTED HOSTILITIES OFF. THE GENERAL IMPRESSION IS STILL THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL WIN. AMERICAN PRONOUNCEMENTS HAVE STRESSED U.S. EVENHANDEDNESS AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS NEUTRAL ''IN THOUGHT, WORD AND DEED'' WHICH HAS SINCE BEEN HEAVILY GLOSSED BY THE WHITE HOUSE. THE ADMINISTRATION'S FIRST OBJECTIVE IS TO SECURE A CEASE FIRE, BUT THEIR EFFORTS TO THIS END ARE CONCENTRATED FOR THE TIME BEING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND ANY TRACE OF ''REALLY'' STRONG PRESSURE BEING PUT ON THE ISRAELIS TO DESIST. AT HIS BRIEFING OF NATO AMBASSADORS GENE ROSTOW SAID THAT THE U.S. WERE REVIEWING THE QUESTION OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE AREA BUT NO DECISIONS HAD YET BEEN TAKEN.

3. IT IS CLEAR THAT BY THE END OF LAST WEEK A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF OFFICIALS WERE BECOMING CONCERNED AT THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING WIDE SUPPORT FOR A MARITIME DECLARATION AND AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE U.A.R., SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION, MIGHT SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGE THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE EASTERN

/MEDITERRANEAN

MEDITERRANEAN WITHOUT ANYONE BEING ABLE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. FOR THIS REASON THE ISRAELIS' ACTION WAS PROBABLY NOT ENTIRELY UNWELCOME TO A NUMBER OF OFFICIALS HERE, AND THERE IS AN INCLINATION TO BELIEVE THAT TOO STEEP A PRICE MUST NOT BE PAID FOR ANY CEASE-FIRE. GENE ROSTOW REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY EVENTS QUOTE OF THE NEXT FEW DAYS UNQUOTE WOULD DETERMINE WHAT SHOULD BE DONE BY THE WEST AND WALT ROSTOW SAID AT ONE POINT THAT QUOTE IF HE WERE TRYING TO STOP THE WAR TOMORROW HE WOULD..... UNQUOTE. WALT ROSTOW ALSO SAID THAT THE SITUATION WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY MORE SERIOUS IF THERE WAS A SIGN THAT ISRAEL WAS GOING TO BE DRIVEN INTO THE SEA.

4. THERE IS A DISPOSITION TO BELIEVE THAT ISRAELI SUCCESSES MIGHT OPEN THE WAY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE SOVIET UNION TO ACT MORE CONSTRUCTIVELY AND MAY MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO TRY FOR A DEEPER AND MORE LASTING SETTLEMENT OF THE UNDERLYING ISSUES. WALT ROSTOW SPOKE OF THE UNDERLYING ISSUES. WALT ROSTOW SPOKE OF A PACKAGE, INCLUDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, U.N. OBSERVERS, DEMOBILISATION AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES ON BOTH SIDES, AND SOME WIDER ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE REFUGEES, INCLUDING, IN A ROSTOWIAN WAY, A REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK, SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENTS IN THE AREA, ETC. WALT ROSTOW INDICATED THAT ADUMBRATION OF SUCH A PACKAGE MIGHT HELP US TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE FIRE. IN SUM, THE TREND OF THOUGHT SEEMS TO BE THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION, FOR ALL ITS DANGERS AND DIFFICULTIES, MAY PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A FRESH START.

5. I MUST REPEAT THAT THESE IMPRESSIONS ARE VERY SPECULATIVE AND ARE PROBABLY SOMEWHAT ONE SIDED. NEVERTHELESS, THEY MAY BE ATTRACTIVE TO RUSK AND MACNAMARA (I HAVE SEEN NEITHER TODAY) BECAUSE THEY MIGHT ENABLE THE U.S. TO AVOID COMMITMENT OF FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST -BOTH OF THEM STILL SEE VIET NAM AS THE MAIN ISSUE - AND RUSK WOULD ALSO BE ATTRACTED BY THE IDEA OF ACHIEVING SOME SORT OF 'MODUS VIVENDI' WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EVEN AGREEMENT ON ARMS LIMITATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ON THIS READING THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE WILLING TO HELP WITH THE

/COMPROMISE

COMPROMISE, IF IT SEES THAT, FOR ALL THE SOVIET ARMS POURED INTO THE U.A.R., THE U.A.R. IS ABOUT TO SUFFER A CRUSHING DEFEAT. THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY AS USUAL, TO PRESERVE HIS OPTIONS BUT HE MIGHT WELL GO ALONG WITH A POLICY OF THIS KIND.

6. MAY I LEAVE IT TO YOU TO GIVE THESE IMPRESSIONS, WHICH MAY NOT COVER THE WHOLE PICTURE HERE, ANY DISTRIBUTION YOU THINK THEY DESERVE.

SIR P DEAN

SENT AT 0210Z/06 JUNE 1967.
RECD AT 0211Z/06 JUNE 1967.

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Sub ● t

Copied. Defence Sec.
Sir B. Trend.

Translation from Russian

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No T153A/67

10 Downing Street,
London

His Excellency Mr.Harold Wilson,
Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Information has been received about military clashes between Israel and the UAR. The Soviet Government is convinced that it is the duty of all Great Powers to achieve an immediate end to the military conflict.The Soviet Government has acted and will act in this direction. It is hoped that the Government of Great Britain will be doing everything possible to bring an end to the military conflict. This is demanded by the highest interests of peace.

With respect,

A.KOSYGIN,
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR

The Kremlin,
Moscow,
5 June, 1967

Mr Peddisu — Prime Minister

5/6. Received at Foreign Office

at 1800 C. M. H. Lubon. 5/6.

Dear Mr.Secretary,

I am sending you herewith the message I referred to in our telephone conversation from the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Mr.Kosygin, addressed to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr.Harold Wilson.

Sincerely,

M. Smirnovsky

7/6

Лондон, Даунинг-стрит, IO

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
ГОСПОДИНУ ГАРОЛЬДУ ВИЛЬСОНУ,
ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРУ ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ

Получены сообщения о военных столкновениях между Израилем и ОАР. Советское правительство убеждено, что долгом всех великих держав является добиться того, чтобы военный конфликт был немедленно прекращен. Советское правительство действовало и будет действовать в этом направлении. Выражается надежда, что Правительство Великобритании будет делать все возможное для прекращения военного конфликта. Этого требуют высшие интересы мира.

С уважением

А. КОСЫГИН,
ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЬ СОВЕТА МИНИСТРОВ
СССР

Москва, Кремль
5 июня I967 года

CYPH ER/CAT A

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

TELNO. 944 5 JUNE 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO. 944 OF 5 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT DAMASCUS BAGHDAD KUWAIT JEDDA CAIRO KHARTOUM TRIPOLI BENGHAZI TUNIS ALGIERS RABAT JERUSALEM WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV BAHRAIN H.C. ADEN AND PARIS.

THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

THE HEADS OF ARAB MISSIONS IN LONDON CAME TOGETHER TO SEE ME TODAY AT THEIR OWN REQUEST. THEY HAD ASKED FOR THIS MEETING BEFORE THE NEWS OF THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ON H.M.G.'S POSITION AS SET OUT IN MINISTERIAL SPEECHES DURING THE HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE LAST WEEK. THEY BROUGHT WITH THEM AN AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH SET OUT ARGUMENTS WHY H.M.G.'S POSITION, PARTICULARLY OVER THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, WAS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR DECLARED INTENTION OF NOT TAKING SIDES BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL.

2. THE LEBANESE AND SUDANESE AMBASSADORS, AS SPOKESMEN FOR THEIR COLLEAGUES, ADDED TO THIS AN APPEAL THAT H.M.G. SHOULD MAINTAIN NEUTRALITY IN THE LIGHT OF ISRAEL'S QUOTE AGGRESSION UNQUOTE AGAINST THEM IN THE FIGHTING WHICH HAD STARTED TODAY. THEY SAID THEY HAD NOTICED FROM MY STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE THIS AFTERNOON THAT H.M.G. HAD ADOPTED A NEUTRAL POSITION, BUT WISHED ME TO BE AWARE OF THE REASONS WHY THEY FOUND OUR POSITION BEFORE THE FIGHTING BROKE OUT UNSATISFACTORY.

3. I REAFFIRMED H.M.G.'S NEUTRALITY AS BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL. I HAD BEEN AT PAINS THAT AFTERNOON TO MAKE A BALANCED STATEMENT WHICH WOULD KEEP THE POSITION OPEN FROM WHICH I COULD BRING THE MAXIMUM INFLUENCE TO BEAR IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND OF NEGOTIATED

/SETTLEMENT

SETTLEMENT OF THE MAIN ISSUES. ALTHOUGH I HAD NOT HESITATED TO CRITICISE ISRAEL IN THE PAST (E.G. OVER THE SAMU INCIDENT) IT WOULD DO NO GOOD IF I SET MYSELF UP AS AN ADJUDICATOR ON THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CURRENT FIGHTING. OUR AIM MUST BE FIRST TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE AND THEN MAKE OUR SERVICES AVAILABLE TOWARDS THE NEGOTIATION OF A SETTLEMENT.

4. AS REGARDS THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, THERE WAS A SPECIFIC BRITISH INTEREST HERE WHICH IT WAS MY DUTY TO UPHOLD. WHILE I COULD SEE THE ARAB ARGUMENTS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS WAS AN ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO BRITAIN SINCE THERE WERE OTHER NAVIGABLE STRAITS IN THE WORLD WHICH WERE ALSO OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE.

5. LAST WEEK THE FLASHPOINT APPEARED TO BE THE GULF OF AQABA AND IF WE HAD SEEMED TO CONCENTRATE ON THAT PROBLEM IT WAS BECAUSE WE WERE DOING OUR BEST TO HEAD OFF ONE SIDE FROM A PRE-EMPTIVE MOVE. EVEN IF THE ARAB COUNTRIES WANTED TO FIGHT TO THE END, IN THE CONFIDENT BELIEF THAT THEY WOULD WIN, FOR US A WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS VERY DANGEROUS AND BROUGHT ENORMOUS RISKS BECAUSE OF THE INTERESTS INVOLVED OUTSIDE THE REGION.

6. I THEN WENT ON TO MAKE TWO POINTS VERY STRONGLY. FIRSTLY, I SAID THAT I, AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, REACTED BADLY TO BEING THREATENED, AND I WAS DISTURBED BY THE TONE OF MESSAGES WHICH WE HAD BEEN RECEIVING ABOUT WHAT THE ARAB STATES WOULD DO TO OUR INTERESTS IF WE DID NOT FOLLOW THE COURSE THEY WANTED. WE AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES HAD MANY INTERESTS IN COMMON AND WE HAD GONE OUT OF OUR WAY TO HELP SOME OF THEM (E.G. OVER EXPENSIVE DEFENCE COMMITMENTS). THE OIL INDUSTRY AND THEIR STERLING INVESTMENTS WERE BENEFICIAL TO THEM AS WELL AS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.

7. SECONDLY, I WAS MUCH PUT OUT BY THE NEWS OF ATTACKS ON BRITISH DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PREMISES WHICH WAS COMING IN. I WAS CONCERNED TO UPHOLD GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND I CALLED UPON ALL THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE PROPER CARE OF BRITISH EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES TO PREVENT THEM FROM BEING THE SUBJECTS OF ATTACK, JUST AS WE WOULD DO IN THIS COUNTRY. WE WOULD IN THE FUTURE STILL HAVE MANY JOINT INTERESTS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE LOOKED AFTER AND IT WAS VITAL THAT THE FUTURE SHOULD NOT BE

/ PREJUDICED

PREJUDICED BY ATTACKS ON OUR MISSIONS. I HAD TO HOLD THE SITUATION HERE AND PREVENT EMOTIONS FROM SPILLING OVER HERE TOO. THE TUNISIAN AND LIBYAN AMBASSADORS EXPRESSED DEEP REGRET FOR ANY SUCH INCIDENTS IN THEIR COUNTRIES, AND THE HEADS OF MISSIONS PROMISED TO REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS WHAT I HAD SAID.

SOSFA SENT 0940A/6 JUNE

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EASTERN DEPT.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON MONDAY, 5 JUNE

The House will have learned with deep regret that early this morning hostilities broke out in the Middle East.

The situation is still unclear. There has been heavy ground fighting on the borders of Israel and the United Arab Republic. There has been extensive air activity, including attacks on airfields in the United Arab Republic and elsewhere. There has also been air activity over Israel.

There are reports of fighting on other frontiers of Israel. Our Consul-General in Jerusalem reported earlier this morning that the city was "engulfed in war"; ~~but I am happy to say that according to information which has reached us since~~, though the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation attempted to arrange a cease-fire from 12 noon, the latest information reaching me is that after some initial success, sporadic firing has broken out again.

/I should

I should inform the House that instructions are being given to our Forces to avoid any involvement in the conflict.

I cannot emphasise too strongly how much the Government regret this tragic development. It was indeed precisely in an attempt to avert the risk of such a development that the Government took the steps which I put before the House on 31 May. As the House knows we have repeatedly urged both Israel and the Arab States by all meansopen to us to exercise restraint and seek a solution to their problems through peaceful negotiation.

During this morning I have been in touch with the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Italy and, of course, with our Mission to the United Nations. This afternoon I shall be seeing the representatives of the Arab States and we have also been in touch with the Embassy of Israel.

/Our

Our efforts to find a basis for a peaceful settlement have met with much misunderstanding, particularly in Arab countries. We have been accused of favouring one side over the other. But throughout we have favoured neither side, only the side of peace.

Our immediate aim must clearly be to bring about an early and general cease-fire. The Security Council will now have begun its emergency meeting. I hope that it will proceed immediately to the adoption of a resolution calling for this cease-fire.

The House will wish to know the position on British subjects in the area.

On 23 May British subjects in the United Arab Republic, Israel and the West Bank of Jordan were advised to leave unless their presence was essential. This advice was extended shortly afterwards to cover the rest of Jordan. British subjects in neighbouring countries in the area were advised to be ready to leave at short notice.

My information is that following this advice most business visitors and tourists in Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic have left. But the majority of permanent British residents have probably remained. I am in touch with our representatives in all the countries concerned about emergency evacuation plans.

All merchant shipping due to transit the Canal is being advised to delay transit for 24 hours. Advice will be kept under constant review.

I will of course make a further statement in the House tomorrow when the situation should be clearer.

MIDDLE EAST

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Brown): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on the Middle East situation.

The House will have learned with deep concern that, early this morning, hostilities broke out in the Middle East. The situation is still unclear. There has been heavy ground fighting on the border of Israel and the United Arab Republic. There has been substantial air activity, including attacks on airfields in the United Arab Republic and elsewhere. There has also been air activity over Israel. There are reports of fighting on other frontiers of Israel.

Our Consul-General in Jerusalem reported earlier this morning that the city was "engulfed in war". Although the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation arranged a cease-fire from 12 noon in Jerusalem, the latest information reaching me is that, after some initial success, sporadic firing has broken out again.

I cannot emphasise too strongly how much Her Majesty's Government regret this tragic development. It was precisely in an attempt to avert the risk of such a development that the Government took the step I put before the House on 31st May. As the House knows, we have repeatedly urged, by all means open to us, both Israel and the Arab States to exercise restraint and seek a solution to their problems through peaceful negotiations.

During this morning I have been in touch with the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Italy, and, of course, with our mission to the United Nations. This afternoon I shall be seeing representatives of the Arab States and we have also been in touch with the Embassy of Israel.

Our immediate aim must clearly be to bring about an early and general cease-fire. The Security Council has been convened and is about to begin its emergency meeting. I hope that it will proceed immediately to the adoption of a resolution calling for this cease-fire.

The Government's attitude—and the House will, I know, support me in saying this—is that the British concern is not to take sides, but to ensure a peaceful solution to the problems of the area. In this situation, our interest is the same as that of all those in the area as well as the rest of the world. The House will wish to know that instructions are being given to all our forces in the area to avoid any involvement in the conflict.

The House will also wish to know the position of British subjects in the area. On 23rd May, British subjects in the U.A.R. and Israel and on the west bank of the Jordan were advised to leave unless their presence was essential. This advice was extended shortly afterwards to cover the rest of Jordan. British subjects in neighbouring countries in the area were advised to be ready to leave at short notice.

My information is that, following this advice, most business visitors and tourists in Israel, Jordan and the U.A.R. have left, but that the majority of permanent British residents have probably remained. The Government are in touch with our representatives in all the countries concerned about emergency evacuation plans. All merchant shipping due to pass through the Suez Canal is being advised to delay transit for 24 hours. Our advice will be kept under constant review.

I have received reports of mob attacks on our Embassies in Benghazi, Tripoli and Tunis and on the Consulate in Basra. I am maintaining the closest touch with all our posts and will be raising this with the Arab Ambassadors when I see them later this afternoon. We shall make further reports to the House as the situation develops.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The House will be grateful to the Foreign Secretary for making an early statement on this very grave situation. I do not think that anyone who took part in the debate last week will be surprised that this has happened, because we stressed again and again the urgency of the situation.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say any more about the form of the resolution which will be put before the Security Council and about the Government's attitude? First, does it require reinstatement of the United Nations force on both sides of the frontier of Israel and Egypt? Secondly, is there a chance of a four-Power conference being called to limit the scope of the war?

There are many factors of which the House is ignorant, particularly, of course, about the talks which the Prime Minister

[SIR A. DOUGLAS-HOME.]

had with President Johnson and on the declaration as to the keeping open of the Gulf of Aqaba and what action the Governments have agreed to keep the Gulf open.

I had hoped that the Prime Minister would make a statement today, but, as he has not done so, will the Foreign Secretary arrange for a debate, if necessary tomorrow, so that we may examine the case very carefully?

Mr. Brown: I have some doubts, on the spur of the moment, whether a debate as early as tomorrow would at all assist the situation, or be a good thing for the House, but we will consider the right hon. Gentleman's suggestion. It can be discussed through the usual channels.

The right hon. Gentleman asked what form the resolution would take. As I have said, we are at the moment in consultation with the other members of the Security Council and with the other countries to whom I referred about this matter. I would have thought myself that the right thing to do now is to go as quickly as we can for a straightforward resolution of the Security Council, calling on both sides to observe immediately a cease-fire, and not to tangle it up with other questions. This is being discussed at the moment in New York and those are the instructions that I have given to my noble Friend, Lord Caradon.

The question of calling for reinstatement of the United Nations force is, I would have thought, much more a part of a long-term solution to the problems in the area. What we are faced with is not finding a long-term solution now, but with the short-term problem—the immediate problem—of getting the fighting stopped. It is surely better to go straight for that.

On the question of a four-Power conference, I have made it clear this morning to the representatives of the other members of the four Powers how strongly I think this situation calls for the convening of such a meeting—it could be at United Nations level in New York—and that we should get together. That message has been conveyed to my opposite numbers in their capitals.

My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will be making a statement on his talks tomorrow, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, but the talks to a large extent covered matters other than this.

On the question of a declaration about the Gulf of Aqaba, the right hon. Gentleman will be aware that, important as that was last week, what has now happened has somewhat overtaken it.

Mr. Mayhew: Is my right hon. Friend aware that his statement that Her Majesty's Government have no intention of taking sides in this matter will be widely welcomed?

Will my right hon. Friend also note, in relation to the question of the Gulf of Aqaba, raised by the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home), the grave danger in the new situation of the Government identifying themselves too closely with the Israeli point of view on that point? May we assume, therefore, that the Government's policy now is for diplomatic means to limit and shorten the war without showing partiality to either side?

Mr. Brown: What I have said today I said firmly, and meant, last week. Taking sides on the merits of this issue is not required of us. What is required is to get a situation in which the solution to the problems which undoubtedly exist can be obtained by negotiated methods whereby an equitable arrangement can be arrived at which can honourably be advanced on both sides.

Last week, we were talking about the Gulf of Aqaba, which at that stage looked both to me and to the House as being the likely flash-point and the most important issue to try to take care of if we were to avert a war. We have to recognise that this morning's events have to some extent, though not wholly, overtaken that situation. We now have a war in which the starting point was elsewhere than the Gulf of Aqaba.

The right thing for us to do, with our colleagues on the Security Council and others who have interests in the area, is to work as hard as we can to bring about a general cease-fire as quickly as we can in order that we can talk about the problems that exist.

Mr. Thorpe: Is the Foreign Secretary aware that the widest possible support will be given to any initiative to achieve a cease-fire, preferably through the United

...tions, and, in default of that, outside it?

May I ask, first, what is the position at this moment of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation in view of the report put out by the Israeli Government that the office of that organisation has been overrun by Jordanian troops? Secondly, can the right hon. Gentleman say what civilian cities on either side have been attacked? Thirdly, what is the position of shipping in the Suez Canal at the moment?

Mr. Brown: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for what he said about the importance of trying to get a cease-fire. It is with this that at the moment I shall concern myself more than other things.

As to U.N.T.S.O., I have no firm information that the office has been overrun. I saw the report referred to. At the moment, many reports are coming in, and in the very nature of things one has to wait a little while before one is sure that any of them are accurate. Certainly, U.N.T.S.O. was operating in the Jerusalem area this morning without any question and may well be operating elsewhere, but, frankly, at the moment the situation is too confused. I may be able to tell the House a little more about it tomorrow.

I have no reports at the moment of civilian cities being attacked, although there are a number of reports, some of them I think accurate, about airports which are either in or very near civilian cities being attacked, but there does not appear at the moment to have been any confirmed information about an actual attack upon cities.

Shipping, at the moment, seems to be moving through the Canal, but, as the right hon. Gentleman will have noted, I have advised all British shipping to delay any movement towards the Canal for another 24 hours.

Mr. Shinwell: In view of the failure of diplomatic activities and the failure of the Security Council to come to a decision during the last two or three weeks, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether there is any guarantee that the Security Council will at its next meeting come to a decision and that that decision will not be affected by a veto? In any event, will the decision be of a character which will prevent the Arab countries from continuing their act of aggression against the State of Israel? They have been in a state of war against Israel for many years.

If there is a failure by the Security Council to promote a cease-fire are we to witness a situation where the might of the Arab States will overwhelm this small country, to which we have been pledged for many long years against aggression? When people who have recently had discussions with General Nasser talk about not taking sides, is it not more likely that what they mean is **not** taking sides which will affect the intention of the Arab States, which might mean the destruction of the Jews in the State of Israel?

Mr. Brown: I do not think that it is right to talk about the failure of diplomatic activity. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] What produced the situation this morning it is much too early to say. However, I would just say to the House, and to those who murmured just now, that for two weeks now we have, because of very intensive diplomatic activity, held the situation and prevented war from beginning. I must say that I hoped that this could go on. What began it this morning I do not know; we shall have to find out.

In the end the United Nations and the Security Council must be the one real hope of getting a degree of law and order into the world, and I propose that we should go on to use that organisation for this purpose.

Mr. Shinwell: What a hope!

Mr. Brown: I am not willing at this stage to envisage a failure to get a cease-fire resolution through the Council.

As to not taking sides, I simply mean what I say. I understand my right hon. Friend's emotions and feeling and I am not by any means casting any doubts upon them. I recognise why he holds them. But I am certain that anybody standing at this Dispatch Box at this moment will do more good not only in our own national interest, but certainly in the interests of peace in that area, if he avoids being thought to be taking sides of the merits of the issue.

Mr. Sandys: While doing everything in their power to bring about a cease-fire, and avoiding taking sides in this conflict,

[MR. SANDYS.]
will the Government bear in mind that most of us feel very strongly that any eventual settlement must recognise Israel's right to live as an independent nation?

Secondly, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, now that the International Red Cross has confirmed that poison gas has been used in the Yemen, and in view of the possibility of the extensive use of gas against Israel, he will urgently take up this matter at the United Nations?

Mr. Brown: On the first point, the right hon. Gentleman is repeating much of what was said in last week's debate. None of us on either side of the House said that Israel, like any other nation which has recognised the United Nations and is a full member of it, did not have the right to live. That is the very minimum that we can say in this matter. On the other hand, there are many issues involved here, many problems and many arguable points. I still think that we should do far better at this stage not to revert too much to what we were talking about last week, but to concentrate on reducing passions and emotions so that we can get a cease-fire. This is the big issue.

On the question of the use of gas in the Yemen, as the right hon. Gentleman says the International Red Cross has now been able actively to confirm this. The whole House will, I am sure, deplore and condemn the use of this agent by any Power in any cause. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] While I do not join the right hon. Gentleman in anticipating any use of it in this conflict—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"]—because I think that it would be very silly to do so—the right hon. Gentleman may be quite sure that Her Majesty's Government, in the discussions at the United Nations and elsewhere, will see that full account is taken of what we have now discovered.

Mr. Ellis: Can my right hon. Friend say what his policy is with regard to arms shipments to this area, to either side? Can he tell us what arms over which we have still some control are on their way? Can he tell us how much and to whom, if supplies are already in transit? Also, can he say what his policy in future is likely to be?

Mr. Brown: It has never been our policy to discuss in the open shipments of arms that the country makes to anybody, and I do not think that it would be of much value if I were to do so at this point. However, we have contracts already entered into for shipments of arms to various parts of the area, as have other Governments, and I am urgently in touch with them as to the action that could be taken about this in view of what has happened.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that, although many of us would entirely agree that the great Powers would be wise to keep out of this dispute if they possibly can, there is, nevertheless, a very clear distinction to be made between the Palestine Arabs and Egypt, and that the sympathy that some of us may have for the Arab cause is confined to the Palestine Arabs and not to Egypt?

Mr. Brown: Since the purpose at this moment must be to get a cease-fire, and since one of the parties to the cease-fire must be the United Arab Republic, I should have thought that on the whole that question could be regarded as being not too helpful.

Mr. Abse: Does the Foreign Secretary appreciate that the citizens of the State of Israel are composed largely of a remnant of those who were exterminated as a result of the ineffectiveness of international action? Does he further appreciate that if Israel is not to have to depend desperately upon itself it must have some greater assurance that there will be effective international action, particularly in the Gulf of Aqaba?

Mr. Brown: I take note of what my hon. Friend says. I know the area very well, and I know the people very well indeed. I still think that we will serve the cause of peace better by not pronouncing on the merits of the case, as either the Israelis or the Arabs see them at this particular time. Let us get the cease-fire, and then the merits of the case can be argued out. If any of us, whether we are Jews or non-Jews, whether we are Zionists or non-Zionists, whether we have in the past taken a "pro" or "non-pro" Arab attitude, get ourselves into a situation today arguing the merits, we will thereby only reduce our capacity to help bring about a cease-fire.

Mr. Longden: Do not Her Majesty's Government think it a good thing to take sides between international rule of law and international chaos? Was it not precisely because so many nations refused to take any responsibility whatever and pursued what would be called today the permissive policies—what the Germans called the "ohne mich" philosophy—that the League of Nations petered out in impotence and we had to suffer the Second World War? What are our European allies doing about this?

Mr. Brown: I cannot answer for our European allies. What I am doing is to make quite clear to our European allies, as I have done this morning and in the past, what we together ought to do about it. I certainly take the view that we should be on the side of international law and order and not on the side of international chaos. I certainly take the view that we should be prepared to stand up and be counted for that, even when times are difficult.

I still say to the hon. Gentleman, as I said to some of my hon. Friends behind me, that there is a moment when pontificating against these issues can be counter-productive. I urge upon the House that this is one of those moments.

Dr. John Dunwoody: Would my right hon. Friend not agree that, if the reports that Jordanian troops have occupied the United Nations headquarters in Jerusalem, using force against United Nations troops, are true, this casts very grave doubts on the response of the Arab world to the United Nations' representations, and that this underlines the importance of Her Majesty's Government making direct approaches to other involved Governments?

Mr. Brown: We are in danger of passing judgments too soon on reports that might very well turn out only a little while later to be inaccurate. I therefore urge that we do not do so. One of the reasons why I urge this in the case of Jerusalem is that, despite the report, U.N.T.S.O. was able to organise a cease-fire and was able to get this endorsed by both sides. The fact that there has since been sporadic firing suggests that it has not been all that successful.

On the other hand, it certainly sounds as though it is no longer engulfed in war, and, therefore, it could not have been wholly taken over. It must be operating to some extent. I urge my hon. Friends and the House as a whole not to be in too great a hurry to pass judgment on reports which, by their very nature, must be slightly suspect.

Mr. Ian Gilmour: While warmly welcoming the right hon. Gentleman's attitude today, may I ask whether it is not nevertheless the case that the present evidence suggests that the fighting was begun by the Israelis?

Mr. Brown: I do not know how the hon. Gentleman is able to form that judgment. The information available to me would most certainly not put me in a position to decide the answer to that question. All my contacts with my colleagues in other capitals this morning—which have been very extensive—make it quite clear that they are in the same position as I am. The position is anything but clear.

Mr. Heffer: Referring to the suggested four-Power meeting, would my right hon. Friend give us an assurance that if such a meeting is held he will press for a complete embargo on the sale of arms to all sides in this conflict? Would he not also agree that all large Powers bear a great responsibility in this situation, precisely because we have been selling arms over the last few years to various States?

Mr. Brown: As I made clear in my speech last week, we have a very much better record when it comes to not disturbing the balance by the sale of arms than some other countries. My hon. Friend will remember that I gave some evidence for that. As to what one should say at the four-Power meeting, at whatever level we can get it, I can only say that I take note of what he said. I have a good deal of sympathy with what is behind it. My hon. Friend had better leave it to see if I can get the conference organised first.

Sir A. V. Harvey: Is it not highly dangerous for anyone to speculate that the Israelis possibly started this war at this stage? In view of the grave danger of this whole situation, will the Foreign Secretary undertake to keep the House informed as it becomes clearer, if it does, even later this evening?

Mr. Brown: It would be ill-advised to speculate either way about how this

[MR. BROWN.]

began. There are very many possibilities of how it could have begun, and very many possibilities of mismanagement and all kind of things. I canvassed to the House, last Wednesday, the sort of ways in which it could happen without any one really intending it to happen. One has to keep that as a possibility in mind, too. It would not help at all to speculate on the origins of this. History will settle that for us, I have no doubt.

I said in my original statement that we will keep the House fully informed as things develop. Certainly, my right hon. Friend or myself will make another statement tomorrow, when the situation in some respects may be clearer. But if reports are required at even more frequent intervals than that, as the situation develops, we will certainly give them to the House.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I am sure that the House will respond to the request for restraint at this moment. May I return to the resolution before the United Nations. The right hon. Gentleman, perfectly sensibly and rightly, talks in terms of a cease-fire, but the cease-fire will not hold for long unless there is a policing force to maintain it. That is quite certain. Will the right hon. Gentleman at the same time, if he cannot include this in the resolution, see that the machinery is set up for this purpose, or use all his influence in this respect?

Mr. Brown: One of our difficulties over the last week or so, when we did buy a bit of breathing space, was that of getting the necessary number of votes —the right hon. Gentleman is well aware of the mechanics of all this—for carrying any resolution of that detailed kind through the Security Council. This is one of the things that has held it up.

If we were to try to include something of that sort into a cease-fire resolution we shall run into the same situation, whereas the immediate need is for a call to all parties to cease fire. It would be wiser to go for that as being likely to be obtainable rather quickly and then to use the time that that buys us to see what arrangements we can then make, by negotiations and in what form a United Nations presence can be restored to that area, from where, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, I regret so much that was ever removed.

Sir B. Janner: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether, during the negotiations, he will keep in mind the provisions of the Charter, and also the fact that for many years Nasser has said that his intention is to destroy Israel and that the method that he has adopted during the last few weeks, the plans that he has made, appear to be in accordance with that determination, as was the case under other circumstances elsewhere within our own memory? Will he please see to it that the United Nations emphasises what the Charter requires and ensures that it is put into proper operation?

Mr. Brown: I certainly believe that action in the U.N. and elsewhere should be based upon the provisions of the Charter, and for that we shall argue and work.

As to the reference to President Nasser, there are many ways in what he has said from time to time can be interpreted. I still say to my hon. Friend, knowing very well his deep interest in this, that we shall help the cause he has at heart, as well as the cause of peace most, by not getting involved in this at the moment.

Mr. Tilney: Is not what is happening here the strongest possible argument so far for the establishment of a permanent United Nations international peace force, with some teeth?

Mr. Brown: I would have not the slightest difficulty in signing a resolution to that effect. The greater difficulty is to bring it about.

Mr. Raphael Tuck: As the Prime Minister himself has stated that this is a case of one nation being determined to annihilate another nation, that other nation being a member of the United Nations, how can my right hon. Friend talk of the impossibility of taking sides?

Mr. Brown: Because I do not believe that the issue is as black and white or as simple as that.

Mr. Tuck: The Prime Minister said that it was.

Mr. Brown: I have been very careful today, and I was last week, as was my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, to avoid taking positions that would have inflated emotions. I am, however, bound to say to my hon. Friend that there is a case which the Arabs can

deploy. It is a case which has not only plausibility, but legality and force. If one is to emphasise, as my hon. Friend has done, one side, one is bound to have to put the other side as well. I do not think that doing this helps very much in a situation in which I want to get the emotions down so that we can get a cease-fire.

Mr. Campbell: Will the Government immediately propose the urgent strengthening of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, because it contains the U.N, observers who are now on the ground—this is a practical suggestion —and they will have a vital rôle in obtaining and maintaining the cease-fire?

Mr. Brown: Yes. I do not disagree with that at all, although I am not willing at this moment to pronounce on what form the restored United Nations presence should take. It might be one of a number of forms. There might be a chance of getting the force back on both sides of the border this time instead of one side. It might be that through either a strengthened U.N.T.S.O., or by a combination of both, we can restore it.

It might be that the Secretary-General, either in addition to those two things or as a beginning, should have his own representative in the area. This is not the moment to pronounce upon what the form should be or to assume that any one form is mutually exclusive. These are all possibilities.

Mr. Bellenger: While the whole House recognises the genuine attempts of my right hon. Friend to call a halt to this conflict by diplomatic measures, nevertheless we are quite conscious that they may not succeed. Does not my right hon. Friend therefore think that it would not only be courageous, but would help his efforts, if Britain at this time announced that, while the conflict is on, she will cease to supply arms to either side?

Mr. Brown: I answered that question earlier. There are a number of suppliers of arms, a number of countries with contracts not only signed but in many cases already entered into. This is a problem which affects more than ourselves. I am consulting the others urgently about the action that we should take.

Earl of Dalkeith: Has the Foreign Secretary considered the advisability of the Prime Minister flying out to Cairo forthwith to have personal talks with President Nasser with a view to seeing whether he can assist him to find a solution to the question of withdrawing without losing face, or does he think that that would be a complete waste of time?

Mr. Brown: I am bound to say that a little mischief in me wondered what was the motive in that question.

Mr. Paget: Does my right hon. Friend remember that we tried intervention once in Spain? [HON. MEMBERS: "Non-intervention."] Non-intervention. When he says that the Arab aggressor may have something to be said for him, does he also remember Neville Chamberlain saying that there was something to be said for the Sudeten case in Czechoslovakia? Does he realise that I have horrible memories of the 1930s coming back to me?

Mr. Brown: My hon. and learned Friend may well have horrible memories of the 1930s. So have I. But I believe that we do not make things better for ourselves by assuming that history always repeats itself. There are always differences in the situation, and there are very great differences in this one from the situation with which my hon. and learned Friend is seeking to compare it.

Mr. Heath: I think that the whole House has shared the Foreign Secretary's view that in this confused situation it is too early yet to judge the situation and that he is absolutely right at the United Nations to aim at bringing about a cease-fire at the earliest opportunity. At the same time, I am sure that he is the first to recognise that the cease-fire itself will have to be followed by measures for what the Government described in the debate last week as an equitable settlement.

As so much is at stake in this matter, I humbly suggest to the House that we should share the Foreign Secretary's restraint today. The right hon. Gentleman has recognised that we shall want to debate this issue and its ramifications at a very early opportunity, and we welcome the chance of discussing this now through the usual channels.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order.

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT +A+.
PRIORITY U.K. DELEGATION NATO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 229.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
5 JUNE 1967.

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO FO TEL NO 229 OF 5 JUNE RFI TO WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO PARIS.

MIDDLE EAST

THE COUNCIL HAD A DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION THIS MORNING, SHORTLEY AFTER THE RECEIPT OF NEWS OF THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING. IN HIS INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUGGESTED THAT WHILE THE MOST IMPORTANT AIM NOW WAS TO LIMIT THE CONFLICT, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF REPERCUSSIONS WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE NATO DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. HE REFERRED VERY BRIEFLY IN THIS CONNEXION TO THE QUESTION OF NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING, BUT THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF THIS.

2. I SAID THAT IN SPITE OF THE LATEST NEWS I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO EXPLAIN THE RECENT DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY OF HMG WITH REGARD TO THE DECLARATION AND THEIR GENERAL ATTITUDE TO THE CRISIS. WE WISHED NATO TO BE INFORMED BUT NOT TO CROSS WIRES WITH WHAT WAS BEING DONE BILATERALLY AND AT THE U.N. I CIRCULATED THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE DECLARATION AND MENTIONED IN GENERAL TERMS THE APPROACHES BEING MADE BY US IN CONCERT WITH THE U.S. I SAID THAT WE PREFERRED TO ACT THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN DOUBTFUL WHETHER THIS WOULD PRODUCE RESULTS IN TIME: WE HAD ALSO WELCOMED THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR FOUR-POWER DISCUSSIONS, WHICH HOWEVER HAD NOT MET WITH A FAVOURABLE RESPONSE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. IN THESE CIRCS WE HAD FELT THAT OTHER EFFORTS HAD TO BE MADE TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL FROM UNILATERAL ACTION, WITH ITS INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES. WE HAD THOUGHT THAT THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED IF IT COULD BE SHOWN THAT A NUMBER OF MARITIME POWERS

/SUPPORTED THE

SECRET

SUPPORTED THE POSITION EXPRESSED IN THE DRAFT DECLARATION. WE ALSO BELIEVED THAT THIS DECLARATION WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE LEGAL POSITION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. THESE VIEWS DID NOT MEAN THAT WE HAD GENERALLY TAKEN SIDES WITH ISRAEL, AND I QUOTED FROM YOUR HOUSE OF COMMONS SPEECH IN SUPPORT OF THIS. OUR OBJECT HAD BEEN TO GAIN TIME SO THAT ARAB-ISRAEL RELATIONS AS A WHOLE COULD BE CONSIDERED IN AN IMPARTIAL SPIRIT.

3. MY U.S. COLLEAGUE SAID THAT IN THE U.S. VIEW, THE EGYPTIAN CLAIM TO CONTROL ISRAEL'S SOLE SEAWARD ACCESS TO THE SOUTH WAS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER INDEED. ISRAEL REGARDED IT AS A THREAT TO HER EXISTENCE, AND THE TRUTH OF THIS HAD, TO SOME EXTENT, BEEN CONFIRMED BY NASSER'S STATEMENTS. THE DRAFT DECLARATION HAD BEEN CONSIDERED AS A PIECE OF DIPLOMATIC DETERRENCE. THE VIEW THAT THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE GULF OF AQABA WERE AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY WAS SUPPORTED BOTH BY CUSTOMARY USAGE AND THE 1958 CONVENTION. THE ISSUE OF A DECLARATION ON THIS WITH BROAD SUPPORT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL. HE AGREED THAT THE ALLIANCE MUST KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER CLOSE STUDY. IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW ALLIED INTERESTS WOULD BE AFFECTED.

4. THE NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE SPOKE TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN DRAFT DECLARATION. THE BELGIAN AND ICELANDIC REPRESENTATIVES ALSO INDICATED SUPPORT.

5. THE GREEK REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT WHILE HIS GOVERNMENT HAD URGED THE ARAB COUNTRIES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE ALLIANCE NOT TO ALIENATE THE SYMPATHIES OF THE ARAB WORLD. THE GREEK ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE DRAFT DECLARATION WAS RESERVED. GREECE WOULD BE MOST ANXIOUS THAT THE CONFLICT SHOULD BE LOCALIZED.

6. THE CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT REGARDED THE GULF OF AQABA AS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY AND HAD MADE THIS CLEAR. THEY HAD NOT HOWEVER TAKEN UP A POSITION ON THE DRAFT

/DECLARATION.

DECLARATION. THIS WAS A MATTER OF TACTICS. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE U.A.R. WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT. THEY SEEMED HOWEVER TO CONTEMPLATE OPENING THE WAY TO SOME LAWFUL PROCESS, E.G. RECOURSE TO THE INTER-NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. CANADA WAS MOST ANXIOUS TO PRESERVE THE PRINCIPLE OF USING U.N. ORGANS. THE FUTURE OF THE U.N. WAS AT STAKE. CONCESSIONS BY THE U.A.R. WOULD HAVE TO BE BALANCED BY COUNTER-CONCESSIONS BY ISRAEL, E.G. ACCEPTANCE OF A U.N. PRESENCE ON ISRAELI TERRITORY.

7. THE ITALIAN SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND ITS APPLICATION TO AQABA AND WOULD SUPPORT A DECLARATION TO THIS EFFECT IN THE U.N. THEY FEARED THAT THE BRITISH INITIATIVE WOULD NOT OBTAIN THIS RESULT AND MIGHT OPEN THE WAY TO UNFORESEEABLE DEVELOPMENTS. THE DANISH POSITION WAS SIMILAR TO THAT OF CANADA. THE GERMAN SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE IN FAVOUR OF THE RIGHT OF FREE PASSAGE BUT THAT THE DRAFT DECLARATION WOULD NOW HAVE TO BE STUDIED IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW SITUATION.

8. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE DESCRIBED ONCE AGAIN HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, NAMELY THAT IT WAS UNDESIRABLE TO PRONOUNCE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND THAT NO SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. AFTER REFERRING TO THE STATEMENT ISSUED ON BEHALF OF GENERAL DE GAULLE, HE SAID THAT WHILE HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS, HE THOUGHT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WOULD BE THAT THE CONFLICT MUST, IF POSSIBLE, BE LIMITED TO A REGIONAL ONE AND NOT PLACED IN AN EAST-WEST CONTEXT. THE ALLIANCE AS SUCH, THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT TAKE UP A POSITION. THE TURK, AFTER LISTING THE MOVEMENT OF RUSSIAN NAVAL REINFORCEMENTS, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS UNUSUAL BUT NOT EXTRAORDINARILY SO, SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE HESITANT ON THE DECLARATION. THE DUTCHMAN AND THE ITALIAN URGED THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CLOSELY FOLLOW THE NAVAL ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION, SINCE NATO WAS DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

/9. SUMMING UP,

SECRET

U.K.DEL. NATO TELEGRAM NO. 229 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

9. SUMMING UP, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AGREED WITH THE FRENCH VIEW THAT NATO AS SUCH WAS NOT INVOLVED. IT WAS HOWEVER DEEPLY INTERESTED AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID A SPLIT IN THE ALLIANCE SUCH AS HAD ALMOST OCCURRED AT THE TIME OF SUEZ. WE SHOULD NOT IGNORE THE FACT THAT THERE WAS ALREADY SOME ELEMENT OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION. HE EMPHASISED THAT NATO DISCUSSIONS ON THIS MATTER SHOULD REMAIN SECRET, BUT THOUGHT THERE WAS NO HARM IN LETTING IT BE KNOWN THAT NATO WAS WATCHING THE CRISIS CLOSELY.

FO PASS TO WASHINGTON 141.

SIR B BURROWS.

SENT AT 2344Z/Ø5 JUNE 1967.
RECD AT 2345Z/Ø5 JUNE 1967.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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(Signed) ..... J.R. Cree

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO ROME

TELNO 1599 5 JUNE,1967 (V)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO ROME TELEGRAM NO 1599 OF 5 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 496: MIDDLE EAST.

THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR CALLED THIS MORNING AT HIS OWN REQUEST AFTER SAYING THAT HE REALISED HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROBABLY OVERTAKEN BY THE NEWS THAT FIGHTING HAD BROKEN OUT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE U.A.R., HE WENT ON TO SPEAK ON THE LINES OF PARAS. 2 AND 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. HE SAID THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT THOUGHT IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO WORK TOWARDS A DECLARATION ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION EVERYWHERE, INCLUDING THE GULF OF AQABA, WHICH COULD BE APPROVED AND ENFORCED BY ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES. BUT THIS SHOULD ONLY BE DONE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

2. I TOLD SIGNOR GUIDOTTI THAT WE OURSELVES HAD GREATLY PREFERRED ACTION TO BE WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS. THE RIGHT PLACE FOR THE MATTER WAS INDEED THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT THAT HAD TO BE ON THE BASIS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD DO THE JOB AND NOT SHUFFLE OFF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. WE HAD FELT THAT IF HOSTILITIES WERE TO BE HEADED OFF IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS, ESPECIALLY THE ISRAELIS SHOULD SEE THAT SOME INTERNATIONAL ACTION WAS PROBABLE. OUR MAIN AIM HAD BEEN TO HEAD OFF A RESORT TO ARMS AND WIN TIME FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. THIS WAS WHY WE HAD CONTEMPLATED THAT ACTION MIGHT BE NECESSARY OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS. WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN VERY GLAD IF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN ABLE TO HELP US.

/3. I WENT

3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT NOW HOSTILITIES APPEARED TO HAVE BROKEN OUT WE HAD TO SEE HOW WE COULD LIMIT THEM AND BRING THEM TO A HALT. I ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO ENQUIRE OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HOW THEY SAW THE SITUATION. I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON HOW THE SITUATION SHOULD BE HANDLED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL SO THAT WE COULD LIMIT THE CONFLICT AND AVOID GETTING DRAWN INTO IT. I WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHAT SIGNOR FANFANI THOUGHT ABOUT THIS. I ALSO HOPED THAT THE ITALIAN DELEGATE TO THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH LORD CARADON.

SOSFA SENT 2006Z/5 JUNE

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RD

JKS 998 TK F 74 76 TK 276 FL ZZ 790 FL

ISRAELI SHIPS SAILS WITH ARMS CARGO

AN INSRAELI CARGO SHIP, THE MIRYAM, LEFT FELIXSTOWE, SUFFOLK , UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS DURING THE NIGHT WITH A CARGO OF ARMS.

IT INCLUDED CASES OF 105 MILLIMETRE SHELLS AND STEN GUNS LOADED INTO HER HOLDS AND ARMOURED CARS LCASHED TO HER DECK.

THE MIRYAM IS OWNED BY THE ZIM ISRAEL NAVIGATION COMPANY, A PRIVATE SHIPPING COMPANY.

REPORTERS WERE BARRED FROM THE QUAY DURING LOADING OPERATIONS AND OFFICIAL INFORMATION WAS REFUSED THEM. UNITED STATES MILITARY POLICEMEN STOOD ON GUARD AT AN ARMS DUMP AT THE DOCKS.

THE MASTER OF THE MIRYAM, CAPTAIN MICHA COMERINER, WOULD NOT NAME HIS DESTINATION. HE SAID HIS SHIP HAD OFTEN CALLED IN AT BRITISH PORTS ALTHOUGH THIS WAS HER FIRST VISIT TO FELIXSTOWE.

A MINISTRY OF DEFENCE SPOKESMAN SAID" IT IS NOT OUR POLICY TO COMMENT ON MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED TO OVERSEAS CUSTOMERS. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN OUR POLICY TO SUPPLY OVERSEAS CUSTOMERS, AND WE ARE CONTINUING TO MEET LONG- TERM CONTRACTS".

11.16 AM

ADD: TEL AVIV

GENERAL DAYAN SAID: "THEY ARE MANY BUT WE SHALL DEFEAT THEM. WE ARE A SMALL PEOPLE BUT A GREAT ONE, PEACELOVING BUT PREPARED TO FIGHT FOR OUR LIFE AND COUNTRY.

"THE PUBLIC AT HOME WILL HAVE TO SUFFER BUT THE MAIN BURDEN WILL BE DEMANDED FROM YOU SOLDIERS IN THE AIR, ON THE LAND AND AT SEA.

"SOLDIERS OF THE ISRAEL DEFENCE ARMY, TODAY OUR HOPES AND OUR SECURITY ARE WITH YOU."

11.17 AM

Subject

CONFIDENTIAL COPY NO:

Cypher/Cat A

FLASH TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 477 5 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No I 154/67

Following is message referred to in my telegram No. 474. Mr. Eshkol's message to Prime Minister taken over telephone by Ambassador's P.A.

Begins.

Dear Prime Minister, After weeks in which our peril has grown day by day we are now engaged in repelling the aggression which Nasser has been organising against us. Israel's existence and integrity have been in danger, a massive and provocative troop concentration in Sinai, now amounting to five infantry and two armoured divisions, the placing of more than 900 tanks against our Southern frontier; a massing of 200 tanks opposite Eilat in an attempt to sunder the Southern Negev of Israel; the lawless blockade in the Straits of Tiran; the insolent defiance of the international and maritime community; the policy of strangling encirclement of which the first stage was the intimidation of Jordan and the most recent - the despatch to Jordan of Iraqi troops and of MiG 21 aircraft; Nasser's announcement of total war against Israel and of his "basic" aim to annihilate Israel, the Order of the Day by the Egyptian Commander, General Murtagi, calling on his troops in Sinai to wage a Holy War against Israel; the acts of sabotage and terrorism from Syria and Sinai; the recent air encroachment culminating in this morning's movement of forces against Israel by air and land and the bombardment by Egypt of Kisusim, Nahal Oz and Tsur Maon in the Northern Negev - all of this amount to an extraordinary catalogue of aggression which has evoked a world wide opinion. Nothing whatever has been done by the United Nations against the ruthless attempt to destroy the State of Israel which embodies the memories, sacrifices and hopes of an ancient people whose recent torment is without parallel in history.

Our Foreign Minister has told your Ambassador of our attempt to avoid any engagement with Jordan, unless Jordan makes conflict inevitable. I hope that this can still be avoided. When Mr. Eban came back from London last week he told me and our colleagues that the Prime Minister of Britain could be counted upon for friendship and steady resolve. I should welcome the closest contact between our Governments at all levels. We place reliance and [sic] the courage and determination of our soldiers and citizens. Indeed, maximal self-reliance is the central purpose of our national revival. Our defence has already had some success. I am certain that our small nation can count in its hours of trial on the support and understanding of the British Government and

/people

people. I will only add two points. We seek nothing except a peaceful life in our own territory and the exercise of our legitimate international rights. And we earnestly hope that everything will be done by the United States and Britain to prevent outside forces from exploiting and enlarging the conflict. The hour of danger is also an hour of opportunity for the promotion of peace and the strengthening of forces of freedom in the Middle East.

Ends.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1320Z/4 June
Received 1457Z/5 June

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street]

PRISEC (F.O.)

PPPPP

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister.

I have asked Defence to consult their FCO, Southern Defence &c. can let you know the position on this when he comes at 1230.

JR
5/6.

PRIME MINISTER

Cairo radio have just put out statement from the "Arab Command" that "in view of the British and U.S. involvement in the fighting, now established, the Suez Canal will be closed to navigation."

F.O. have been considering already a statement categorically denying our involvement (in addition to what For. Soc. said y'day)

HLH

B54 NASSER MESSAGE TO [illegible] ON U.S.-BRITISH +INTERVENTION+

(CAIRO RADIO) IT HAS [illegible] OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT NASSER THIS MORNING SENT MESSAGES TO KING FEISAL OF SAUDI ARABIA, KING IDRIS OF LIBYA, AMIR SABAH AL-SALIM AL-SABAH OF KUWAIT, PRESIDENT ARIF OF IRAQ, PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENNE OF ALGERIA, PRESIDENT AL-ATASI OF SYRIA AND THE LEBANESE PRESIDENT, CHARLES HILU, IN WHICH HE INFORMED THEM OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH MILITARY INTERVENTION BY AIR IN SUPPORT OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION.

MF BBC MON 6/6 CDF

''''''U R G E N T'''

B61 UAR STOPS NAVIGAT SUEZ CANAL

(AMPL. B58)

(CAIRO RADIO: VOICE OF THE ARABS) THE FOLLOWING OFFICIAL STATEMENT HAS BEEN ISSUED BY THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE UAR FORCES:

"IN VIEW OF WHAT HAS COME TO BE CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED ABOUT THE INTERVENTION OF THE U.S. AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS IN THE MILITARY AGGRESSION LAUNCHED BY THE ISRAELI ENEMY - A FACT THAT HAS BEEN SEEN AT ITS UGLIEST ON THE JORDANIAN FRONT, WHERE JOINT JORDANIAN AND IRAQI FORCES ARE FIGHTING A FACT WHICH HAS ALSO BEEN SEEN IN THE ENEMY AIR OPERATIONS ON THE EGYPTIAN FRONT AND IN THE PROTECTIVE AIR COVER FOR THE ISRAELI ENEMY, IN THE SHAPE OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIERS - IN VIEW OF ALL THIS IT HAS OFFICIALLY BEEN DECIDED TO STOP NAVIGATION IN THE SUEZ CANAL.

MF BBC MON 6/6 1036 CDF (TVN)

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

TELNO 1551 5 JUNE, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO MOSCOW TELEGRAM NO 1551 5/6 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKDEL NATO.

MIDDLE EAST.

I ASKED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO CALL TODAY. I SAID THAT I DEPLORED THE FIGHTING THAT HAD BROKEN OUT. WE HAD NO CLEAR IDEA HOW IT HAD STARTED BUT OUR INFORMATION WAS THAT IT WAS ON A CONSIDERABLE SCALE. OUR CHIEF CONCERN NOW WAS THAT OUR JOINT EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO ACHIEVING A CEASEFIRE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I SAID THAT WHEN I HAD DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION IN MOSCOW: WHATEVER DIFFERENT VIEWS MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT TENSION, BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED THAT A CONFLAGRATION WOULD BE AGAINST ALL OUR INTERESTS. I PROPOSED THAT WE SHOULD NOW CONSULT URGENTLY ABOUT WHAT TO DO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL: OUR PRELIMINARY IDEA WAS TO AIM FOR AN EARLY RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A CEASEFIRE. I TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT I WOULD BE GLAD TO HEAR MR. GROMYKO'S VIEWS ABOUT THIS AND ABOUT HOW TO USE THE INFLUENCE OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO PREVENT MATTERS GETTING OUT OF HAND. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO GET 4-POWER CONSULTATIONS GOING, POSSIBLY IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

2. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE HAD NO DIRECT ADVICE OR INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW. THE SOVIET VIEWS ABOUT THE SITUATION WERE WELL-KNOWN. HE ADDED THAT MR. GROMYKO HAD SPOKEN TO THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR ON 2 JUNE DRAWING HIS ATTENTION TO THREATENING STATEMENTS BY MR. EBAN. MR. GROMYKO HAD ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION AND WARNED

/AGAINST

AGAINST ANY MOVE WHICH DID NOT ACCORD WITH A POLICY OF RESTRAINT. FROM THE NEWS REPORTS IT APPEARED THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT HEEDED THE CALLS FOR RESTRAINT. MR. SMIRNOVSKY UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY MY THOUGHTS TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

3. I TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT ACCORDING TO THE ISRAELIS, THEY WERE ATTACKED FIRST. THEY HAD CALLED FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, WHICH WAS JUST ABOUT TO TAKE PLACE: THIS DID NOT FIT ENTIRELY WITH THE IDEA THAT SHE WAS THE AGGRESSOR. IN ANY CASE IT WAS TOO EARLY TO DECIDE EXACTLY WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND WHICH SIDE WAS RESPONSIBLE. THE FIRST THING WAS TO GET THE FIGHTING STOPPED. I ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT WE HAD ABSOLUTELY NO FOREKNOWLEDGE OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED. SIMILARLY THE AMERICANS HAD ASSURED US THAT THEY WERE EQUALLY TAKEN BY SURPRISE. WE SHOULD LIKE TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN BRINGING HOSTILITIES TO AN END. EACH OF THE FOUR GREAT POWERS HAD VAST INTERESTS AT STAKE: IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE MR. GROMYKO'S VIEWS AND IN PARTICULAR TO KNOW HOW HE THOUGHT WE MIGHT EFFECTIVELY CONCERT OUR EFFORTS AND WHAT KIND OF RESOLUTION HE CONSIDERED MIGHT MOST USEFULLY BE OUR AIM AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. MR. SMIRNOVSKY CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD SEEK MR. GROMYKO'S VIEWS.

SOSFA SENT 2130Z/5 JUNE

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

Subject

S E C R E T

CYPHER/[redacted]T A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

TEL. NO. 1553 5 JUNE, 1967

(NORTHERN)

SERIAL No. T152/67

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO MOSCOW TELEGRAM NO. 1553 OF 5 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1552.

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING REPLY TO MR. KOSYGIN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS:-

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE. I APPRECIATE THE SPIRIT IN WHICH IT WAS SENT. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WILL DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE STATED BY YOU, NAMELY TO BRING AN END TO THE MILITARY CONFLICT. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, I HOPE THAT YOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND OURS CAN WORK TOGETHER WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OTHER GREAT POWERS CONCERNED TO OBTAIN AN AGREED RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE.

I THINK WE SHOULD ALSO AGREE THAT IF EITHER OF US FEELS THERE IS ANYTHING THAT CAN BE DONE BY THE OTHER OR BY BOTH OF US ACTING JOINTLY WITH THE SAME END IN VIEW, WE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY MAKE CONTACT: IN PARTICULAR I WOULD, AS YOU KNOW, SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL FOR A FOUR POWER MEETING OF OUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AT THE UNITED NATIONS, OR, IF THIS SEEMS DESIRABLE, AT A HIGHER LEVEL.

WARM REGARDS.

ENDS.

SOSFA SENT 2301Z/5 JUNE

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U.N. DEPT.
J.R.D.

S E C R E T

CONFIDENTIAL

now received
& sent to Mr Palliser 8/6/67

Foreign Office
S.W.1

6 June, 1967.

Dear Michael,

...

I enclose a draft of a message to the Israel Prime Minister, which the Foreign Secretary thinks the Prime Minister might like to send in answer to the message contained in Tel Aviv telegram No. 477. It follows lines indicated by the Foreign Secretary.

Yours ever,

Paul.

A.M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.,
10 Downing Street.

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DRAFT REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE MESSAGE OF 5 JUNE FROM THE ISRAEL PRIME MINISTER, MR. ESHKOL

Thank you for your message of 5 June . The news that fighting had broken out in Sinai yesterday came to us as a great shock. We are inevitably faced with conflicting reports of how it began, and I can only repeat what we have always said: that the methods of peaceful negotiation and not force must be applied to finding a solution to this problem. This is no less true today than it was yesterday.

As you are aware from the speeches made by the Foreign Secretary and myself in Parliament last week, from my conversation with your Foreign Minister on 24 May, and from our many other diplomatic contacts, we were deeply apprehensive that events might be moving towards such a climax and it was to avoid this that all our efforts have been bent during the last few weeks.

/Now that

Now that conflict has come, in spite of our efforts, H.M. Government will certainly do everything we can to prevent outside forces exploiting and enlarging the conflict. But so long as fighting continues there can be no certainty that the conflict will be contained, and the possibilities are frightening to contemplate.

It is therefore imperative that ~~an early and general~~ ceasefire ~~should be agreed.~~ for which the Security Council has now called should be put into effect. ~~We shall be using all the influence at our command to get the maximum support for this.~~ I hope we shall be able to rely on your co-operation for this, ~~both on the ground and in New York~~. Yours ever

6 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY RIO DE JANEIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 266 6 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 266 of 6 June
Repeated for information to U.K.Mission New York and Washington

Your VS 235/67 and 241/67.

Middle East.

I left today with Secretary General, texts of your statements refuting Egyptian allegations of British involvement in Israeli air operations. (We are also getting this wide publicity in Brazilian Press, in reply to campaign by Egyptian Embassy here). Secretary General commented that this was crude Egyptian propaganda to save face over their heavy losses at the hands of Israeli Air Force.

2. He added the personal hope that the Israelis would achieve the maximum advance this time before they were stopped so as to have more to bargain with at the eventual conference table and thus force the Arabs into accepting a reasonable settlement.

3. Meanwhile the Brazilian Government will continue (jointly with Argentina) their efforts to secure an unconditional cease-fire Resolution at the United Nations (without the unacceptable Indian stipulation for a return to the status quo ante 4 June).

4. Later they will resume efforts to call a 20 Power peace conference (4 Great Powers plus 11 non-permanent plus 4 others Arabs plus Israel). There they will try a long term settlement (to include acceptance by Israel of the return of a substantial number of Palestine refugees perhaps in exchange for guaranteed freedom of Gulf of Aqaba).

5. Secretary General volunteered the impression that we are now closer in policy and expressed satisfaction at our own delegations' active co-operation in New York.

Foreign Office pass U.K.Mission New York as my telegram 21 and Washington as my telegram No. 20.

Sir J. Russell

Sent 0638Z 7 June 1967
Recd 0657Z 7 June 1967

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION [Repeated as requested]
N.E.A.D. CONFIDENTIAL ADVANCE COPIES SENT:

[redacted] Clair

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 697 6 June 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 697 of 6 June, Repeated for information Immediate to Washington and Routine to Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jedda, Benghazi, Tripoli, Algiers,Paris, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv, The Hague, Rome and Doha.

My telegram No. 682.

Following is text of two Resolutions passed yesterday by Arab Oil Producing Countries Conference.

Firstly, Arab oil shall be denied to, and shall not be allowed to reach directly or indirectly any State committing aggression or participating in aggression on the sovereignty of any Arab State or its territories or its territorial waters, particularly the Gulf of Aqaba. By aggression that will lead to oil embargo, the conference means:

(1) any direct armed attack by any State in support of "Israel";

(2) supplying military aid to the enemy in any way;

(3) attempting to secure the passage of merchant ships through the Gulf of Aqaba under military escort of any kind.

The conference recommends the creation of a permanent Committee of Foreign Ministers of Arab States to meet at 48 hours notice to discuss what new attitudes might be classed as hostile to Arab national.

Secondly, the conference resolved:

(1) That the involvement of any State directly or indirectly, in an armed aggression against the Arab States will make the assets of its companies and of its Nationals inside the territories of the Arab countries subject to the laws of war. This includes the assets of the oil companies.

(2) The conference recommends the Arab States to call for an emergency meeting to enforce the same Resolution in respect to all assets invested by the companies and Nationals of the aggressor countries.

The conference warns all foreign petroleum companies operating in the Arab countries of the consequences of getting oil to the Zionist gangs in occupied Palestine regardless of its origin and whether this is done directly or indirectly or in cooperation with others. The said companies would thus be liable to have the Rules of the Standard Boycott Law enforced against them.

/The

The conference also considers the signing of any declaration affecting the sovereignty of the Arab States over the Gulf of Aqaba as constituting an act which would justify the banning of the tankers of the signatory countries from transporting Arab oil. A committee of Oil Ministers of Arab oil producing countries shall be formed to adopt the necessary Resolution.

The conference calls upon all Islamic and friendly oil producing countries, especially Iran, to take the necessary steps to prevent oil from reaching the Zionist gangs in occupied Palestine in any way.

Foreign Office pass Immediate to Washington 85 and Routine Paris 55.

Sir R. Beaumont

Sent 1030Z 6 June

Recd 1406Z 6 June

[Repeated as requested]

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Oil Dept.

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C[redacted]her/Cat A

FLASH KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 217 6 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

I was summoned to the Foreign Ministry at 11 yesterday evening to be informed that the Council of Ministers had just taken a decision to break diplomatic relations with Britain "forthwith".

2. The Permanent Secretary in answer to my enquiries gave me firm assurances that the British community would be well looked after and that they fully realised the importance of retaining their confidence.

3. He was not able to give me firm answers on various procedural points that I raised with him but suggested that if we could take an early decision on the protecting Power all detailed arrangements could be worked out, he believed, without difficulty. He expressed personal regret at the break and assured me that there would be no wish to rush the Embassy staff away. He spoke in terms of three weeks for my own departure.

4. I reminded him that the airports were closed and civil air services suspended, and he said that he foresaw no difficulty in making appropriate arrangements either by scheduled services or special aircraft to evacuate either members of the Embassy staff or women and children of the British community if there were any who wished to leave.

5. All this, of course, will have to be discussed and settled more firmly when we have re-opened contact through the protecting Power.

6. Your telegram No. 224 arrived after my interview and it was therefore too late to deliver your personal message to the Prime Minister. The Permanent Secretary assured me, however, that he himself had given Mahgoub the letter I sent yesterday afternoon with the text of the F.O. Press hand-out. Relations have also been broken with the U.S. Government and I feel sure that with the present Council of Ministers there was virtually no prospect of changing their minds about the break.

7. I find it difficult to add to the recommendations in my telegram No. 195 about the choice of protecting Power. The Canadian Ambassador in Cairo is, of course, accredited to the Sudan but they have no staff in Khartoum and I imagine would be most unwilling to set up an Embassy in order to look after our interests.

/8

CONFIDENTIAL

8. I realise of course that one of the first questions for decision will be whether we should seek to retain a British interests section in present circumstances. If, as I hope, we can accept this, I am sure it would greatly re-assure the British community which still plays the most important role among all the foreign communities.

9. It is difficult to crystal-gaze at the moment but many Sudanese and foreign observers here doubt whether the present highly unsatisfactory Coalition Government can remain long in power and there is fairly general hope that Sadiq will come back with a Government which might transform the political situation in the Sudan and would almost certainly hope to find an early opportunity to establish the old relationship with Britain.

10. Grateful for early guidance on protecting Power.

Sir R. Fowler

Sent 2350Z 6 June
Recd 0123Z 7 June

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Subject

PRIME MINISTER

SECRET PERSONAL TELEGRAM NO....

SERIAL No T452/67

CYPHER/CAT. A

F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON
TELNO. 5996 5 JUNE 1967
SECRET.
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE AT ONCE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS.

I REMEMBER THAT IN OUR LAST TALK TOGETHER BEFORE WE LEFT THE WHITE HOUSE ON FRIDAY NIGHT, YOU EXPRESSED YOUR SOMBRE BELIEF THAT WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS COULD NOT BE AVOIDED, DESPITE THE EFFORTS WE HAD BEEN MAKING AND DISCUSSING TOGETHER EARLIER THAT DAY. THIS MORNING'S NEWS APPEARS TO CONFIRM YOUR ESTIMATE. I HAVE JUST DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH GEORGE BROWN AND DENIS HEALEY. WE ALL AGREE ON THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS KEEPING IN THE CLOSEST CONCERT. GEORGE HAS ALREADY SEEN PHILIP KAISER AND I KNOW YOU AND YOUR PEOPLE WILL BE IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH PAT DEAN.

THE FIRST THING WE CAN TRY TO DO, I SUGGEST, IS TO AVOID THE SECURITY COUNCIL BECOMING HOPELESSLY BOGGED DOWN IN STERILE ARGUMENT ABOUT WHICH SIDE IS THE AGGRESSOR. WHAT WE NEED IS A CLEAR DEMAND FROM THE COUNCIL FOR A CEASE FIRE: AFTER WHICH A FRESH ATTEMPT TO THRASH OUT A LONGER TERM SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE MADE.

THE FRENCH ATTITUDE IS IMPORTANT IN ALL THIS AND WE SHALL DO OUR BEST TO MAKE THEM FACE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AS A PERMANENT MEMBER AND NOT SIMPLY BACK THE SITUATION BOTH WAYS.

BUT OF COURSE WE HAVE NO PARTICULAR ILLUSIONS. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL SUCCEED IN REACHING AN AGREED VIEW AND WE SHALL PROBABLY NEED TO PLAN JOINTLY FOR OTHER POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES. THIS UNDERLINES THE VALUE OF OUR MEETING LAST WEEK. I AM INDEED GLAD THAT YOU AND I WERE ABLE TO GO OVER THE GROUND SO EXHAUSTIVELY, SO THAT, IN THIS SITUATION OF CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY WE AT LEAST ARE CLEAR IN OUR MINDS ABOUT EACH OTHER'S ATTITUDE.

MANY THANKS AGAIN FOR ALL YOU DID TO MAKE OUR VISIT SO INTERESTING AND MEMORABLE.

ENDS.

2. THE DIRECT LINE TO THE WHITE HOUSE IS AT PRESENT OUT OF ORDER.

SOSFA SENT 1516Z/5 JUNE 1967

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
AND BY BAG

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO KHARTOUM

TELNO 224 6 JUNE, 1967 (V)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO KHARTOUM TELEGRAM NUMBER 224 OF 6 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO CAIRO BEIRUT TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 209: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO SUDANESE PRIME MINISTER:

BEGINS:

QUOTE I MUST ASSURE YOUR EXCELLENCY PERSONNALY THAT THE REPORTS THAT THE U.S. AND BRITISH AIRCRAFT WERE PROVIDING AIR COVER ARE UTTER NONSENSE. THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HAS ANNOUNCED IN PARLIAMENT TODAY THAT SUCH REPORTS ARE A COMPLETE FABRICATION. ALL BRITISH FORCES HAVE THE STRICTEST INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN THE FIGHTING. FAR FROM WISHING TO TAKE SIDES IN THE CONFLICT, THE POLICY OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IS TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO HELP BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I HOPE THAT THESE FANTASIES WILL NOT AFFECT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. UNQUOTE.

ENDS.

SOSFA SENT 1953Z/6 JUNE

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N.E.A.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

En Clair

PRIORITY NEW DELHI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno. 1172 6 June 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 1172 of 6 June
Repeated for information to UKMission New York, Washington and Rawalpindi.

Arab/Israel.

In a statement to Parliament this afternoon about the Middle East situation, Mrs. Gandhi said "I do not wish to utter harsh words or use strong language" but "on the basis of the information available there can be no doubt that Israel has escalated the situation into an armed conflict which has now acquired the proportions of a fullscale war". Mrs. Gandhi went on "if not stopped this war is likely to expand into a much wider one drawing into its vortex other countries and developing perhaps into a world war. World peace is in grave peril". The Prime Minister said that India was making earnest efforts in the Security Council for a cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed forces to the positions they occupied on 4 June we "shall persevere in these efforts".

2. Mrs. Gandhi then referred to the casualties caused among the Indian contingent in the UNEF by Israeli artillery and aircraft: "these attacks were deliberate and without provocation and in spite of the clear and unmistakable United Nations markings and identification of our contingent". Mrs. Gandhi said that she had addressed a message to the Secretary General of the United Nations on this subject expressing India's "grief and indignation at these incidents" and asking that effective steps be taken to ensure the safety of the contingent and their early evacuation from the area of hostilities.

Mr. Scott

Sent 1400Z/6 June 1967
Recd 1459Z/6 June 1967

CO/FO/WH DISTRIBUTION

M.E.W. & U.N. Dept.

SSSSS

En Clair

PRIORITY MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 966 6 June 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 966 of 6 June Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Cairo, Damascus, UKMIS New York, Paris and Washington.

Middle East.

Following is text of Soviet Government statement published in Pravda of 6 June.

2. "To-day on 5 June, 1967, Israel began military action against the U.A.R. and thus committed aggression. Armed forces of the U.A.R. are fighting against the Israeli forces who have invaded the territory of that State. Tanks, artillery and aircraft units of both sides are taking part in the military action.

3. The Syrian Arab Republic has come out on the side of the U.A.R. and is giving it armed help in repelling aggression. Jordan has announced that it is in a State of War with Israel and that it will give military support to the U.A.R. Iraq, Algeria and other Arab States have also announced support for the U.A.R. with their armed forces and resources.

4. Thus, because of the adventurism of the Rulers of one country, Israel, which has been encouraged by the secret and open actions of certain imperialistic circles, military conflict has broken out in the Middle East.

5. The country has been pushed towards such adventurous acts by Rulers who constantly claim that they are fighting for the existence of Israel as a State. But if anything is more capable of undermining the bases of development and the very existence of the Israeli State, then it is just such a path of recklessness and adventurism in policy which the ruling circles of Israel have chosen.

6. The Government of Israel, having committed aggression against the neighbouring Arab States has breached the Charter of the United Nations and the elementary norms of International Law.

7. The Government of Israel cannot say that it does not understand towards what it is heading. It cannot say that the position of the peace loving States, in the event of its starting an aggressive war, was unclear to it.

8. The Government of Israel knew that war was avoidable. It was called upon by the Soviet Union and other peace loving States to precisely this end. But it chose the path of war. There can be no doubt that the adventure undertaken by Israel will rebound first and foremost against itself.

/9.

9. The Soviet Union, true to its policy of extending help to peoples who are victims of aggression and help to States freeing themselves from the yoke of colonialism, announces its determined support for the Governments and peoples of the U.A.R., Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Jordan and other Arab States and expresses its confidence in the success of their just struggle for their independence and sovereign rights.

10. Condemning the Israeli aggression, the Government of the U.S.S.R. demands that the Israeli Government, as the first urgent step to liquidate the military conflict, immediately and unconditionally cease military acts against the U.A.R., Syria, Jordan and other Arab States and withdraw its forces beyond the truce line.

11. The Government of the U.S.S.R. expresses the hope that the Governments of other States, including the Great Powers, will for their part do everything in order to extinguish the military flare-up in the Middle East and re-establish peace.

12. The United Nations Organisation must fulfil its direct duty: it must condemn the Israeli actions and urgently take the measures which are essential for the re-establishment of peace in the Middle East.

13. The Soviet Government reserves the right to undertake all necessary measures arising out of this situation.

Sir G. Harrison

Sent 1145Z/6 June
Received 1342/6 June

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Eastern Dept.

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO KUWAIT

TELNO 275 6 JUNE, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESS TO KUWAIT TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 6 JUNE AND TO BAGHDAD
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, HAGUE, JEDDA,
BAHRAIN.

OIL CLOSURES.

I SUMMONED THE KUWAIT AMBASSADOR AND IRAQI CHARGE THIS AFTERNOON AND SPOKE TO THEM VERY STRONGLY.

2. I SAID THAT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO TRUTH IN THE STORIES OF BRITISH AIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT. I WAS AMAZED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS HAD GIVEN SUCH FABRICATIONS ANY CREDENCE. WHY HAD THEY NOT CHECKED WITH ME INSTEAD OF TAKING UNILATERAL ACTION? I COULD HAVE TOLD THEM THAT THE STORIES WERE BOTH UNTRUE AND PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE . BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIERS HAD BEEN OVER 1,000 MILES AWAY AND STATIC IN HARBOUR AT MALTA AND ADEN. MODERN AIRCRAFT COULD NOT EVEN TAKE OFF FROM STATIC CARRIERS.

3. I URGED THAT THE UNILATERAL ACTION TAKEN SHOULD BE REVERSED RAPIDLY AND GAVE A CLEAR WARNING THAT IF THIS WERE NOT DONE WE SHOULD NEED TO CONSIDER HOW WE COULD AVOID BEING EXPOSED TO POLITICAL BLACKMAIL OF THIS KIND IN FUTURE. THEY SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT OIL WAS A SURPLUS COMMODITY.

4. BOTH REPRESENTATIVES UNDERTOOK TO REPORT WHAT I HAD SAID URGENTLY TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

/5. MR

5. MR BRENCHLEY SUBSEQUENTLY TELEPHONED THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR AND SPOKE TO HIM ON THE LINES OF PARA 2 ABOVE, EXCEPT THAT HE SAID WE WERE GLAD THERE HAD BEEN NO REPORT OF SIMILAR PRECIPITATE ACTION BY HIS GOVERNMENT. HE TOO UNDERTOOK TO REPORT URGENTLY MY ASSURANCES ABOUT OUR NON-INVOLVEMENT.

SOSFA SENT 2212Z/6 JUNE

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SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. REMAC 43 6 JUNE 1967
SECRET

MIDDLE EAST: U.S./U.K. FINANCIAL TALKS.

STEVENS AND PARSONS HAD FURTHER TALKS TODAY WITH U.S. TREASURY, STATE DEPARTMENT AND WHITE HOUSE ABOUT THE FINANCIAL SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS. THE AMERICANS SEEMED GLAD TO USE US AS A SOUNDING-BOARD FOR THEIR IDEAS.

2. IT EMERGED THAT THEY WERE AT PRESENT THINKING OF (A) NO BLOCKING OF BALANCES, (B) UNRESTRICTED SUPPLY OF GOLD TO THE MARKET, AS THE BEST METHOD OF HANDLING THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND WE UNRESERVEDLY SUPPORTED THIS. THEY MAY RAISE LONGER-TERM PROBLEMS TOMORROW BUT THEIR MAIN PREOCCUPATION AT TODAY'S MEETING WHICH CONSISTED OF MULLING OVER THE AGENDA MENTIONED IN MY 1926 WAS THE VOLATILITY OR OTHERWISE OF KUWAIT'S BALANCES. ON THIS THEY ASKED MANY QUESTIONS AND HALLOWS' PRESENCE TOMORROW SHOULD BE VERY USEFUL.

3. ON MORE DETAILED MATTERS:

(A) THE AMERICANS REVEALED THAT THEY HAD SET UP A WARNING SYSTEM WITH THE MAIN COMMERCIAL BANKS IN NEW YORK SO AS TO BE FULLY IN THE PICTURE ABOUT MOVEMENTS OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES OUT OF DOLLARS. SO FAR THERE WAS LITTLE TO REPORT. THE SUDANESE HAD TRANSFERRED DOLLARS 1 MILLION AND WERE TRYING TO MOVE A FURTHER DOLLARS 3 MILLION WHICH WAS, HOWEVER, LOCKED UP IN TIME DEPOSITS. THE IRAQIS HAD TRANSFERRED SOME DOLLARS 30 MILLION AND A FURTHER DOLLARS 5 MILLION WAS DUE TO GO TODAY. SAUDI ARABIA WAS UNDERSTOOD TO BE SEEMING TO MOVE DOLLARS 10 MILLION FROM A LONDON DEPOSIT TO ONE IN ZURICH. THE AMERICANS WERE CLEARLY NOT TOO WORRIED BY THIS ACTIVITY AND THEREFORE WERE NOT CONTEMPLATING BLOCKING THE BALANCES OF ANY BELLIGERENTS.

/ THE ONE

THE ONE ARGUMENT THEY THOUGHT MIGHT EXIST FOR BLOCKING DOLLAR BALANCES WAS TO GIVE THEMSELVES A NEGOTIATING POSITION IN THE EVENT THAT ANY OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES SEIZED U.S. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS. BUT THEIR PRESENT VIEW WAS THAT ANY SUCH BLOCKING, QUITE APART FROM ITS EFFECT ON CONFIDENCE IN THE DOLLARS AS A RESERVE CURRENCY, MIGHT PROVOKE SEIZURE OF U.S. PROPERTY.

(B) AS REGARDS THE GOLD MARKET, THE AMERICANS WERE QUITE RELAXED AND DESPITE WHAT THEY SAID YESTERDAY, WELL CONTENT WITH THE RALLONGES FOR THE GOLD POOL WHICH HAD RECENTLY BEEN ARRANGED. THEY REALISED THAT IF THE KUWAITIS DECIDED TO CONVERT THEIR STERLING HOLDINGS INTO GOLD THERE WOULD BE STRONG PRESSURE ON THE GOLD POOL. THIS PRESSURE, HOWEVER, MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF ALLOWING THE PRICE OF GOLD TO RISE SHARPLY TO ACCOMMODATE A SUDDEN DEMAND. ALTERNATIVE-LY, FURTHER RALLONGES MIGHT, THEY THOUGHT, BE NEGOTIATED. THEY WERE CONTEMPLATING THE POSSIBILITY OF ANNOUNCING AN INCREASE IN THE SIZE OF THE POOL AND WE SAID WE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL THAT ANY SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD NOT GIVE AN INDICATION OF THE ACTUAL FIGURE.

(C) AS REGARDS THEIR SWAP NETWORKS, THEY SEEMED REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT THE EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS WERE ADEQUATE THOUGH THEY MIGHT LOOK TO SOME ENLARGEMENT OF THEIR SWAPS WITH THE SWISS NATIONAL BANK AND POSSIBLY THE B.I.S. FROM CONTACTS DEMING HAD HAD WITH IKLE LAST WEEK, THEY THOUGHT THAT THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. THE AMERICANS SAID THAT THE SWISS HAD TOLD THEM THAT AT THE MOMENT NON-SWISS BALANCES OF FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITED WITH SWISS BANKS WERE NOT INCREASING. IT HAD BEEN RECKONED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS SITUATION MIGHT CHANGE.

(D) THE AMERICANS WERE INTERESTED TO KNOW WHETHER WE THOUGHT / THAT OUR

THAT OUR EXISTING SWAP ARRANGEMENTS WERE ADEQUATE. WE SAID THAT WE THOUGHT THAT OUR MAIN WORRY WOULD PROBABLY BE WITH THE KUWAITIS, BUT IF ANY LARGE SCALE CONVERSION WERE TO TAKE PLACE OF KUWAITI BALANCES, THE BASLE ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE INVOKED. IN AGGREGATE THEY MIGHT NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO DEAL WITH THE CONVERSION OF ALL THE KUWAITI BALANCES, BUT THEY WOULD GO A LONG WAY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT BECAME KNOWN THAT THE KUWAITIS WERE MOVING OUT OF STERLING THIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY PRECIPITATE OTHER LARGE MOVEMENTS. IN AGGREGATE, THEREFORE, THEY WOULD NOT ONLY NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO DEAL WITH A TOTAL CONVERSION OF KUWAITI BALANCES, BUT WOULD NEED RE-INFORCEMENT. IT MIGHT, IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED BE POSSIBLE FOR THE BANK OF ENGLAND SWAPS. WE ALSO THOUGHT THAT IF NEED BE, BANK OF ENGLAND SWAPS WITH OTHER CENTRAL BANKS ON THE LINES OF THOSE NEGOTIATED LAST SEPTEMBER COULD BE REVIVED. BUT FOR THE MOMENT WE DID NOT THINK THAT THIS COULD BE NECESSARY.

4. A FURTHER MEETING HAS BEEN ARRANGED WITH THEM FOR 11 A.M (EDT) TOMORROW (WEDNESDAY).

SIR P DEAN

SENT AT 2311 6 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 2312 6 JUNE 1967

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E.R.D.
EASTERN DEPT.
AMERICAN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 977 6 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.977 of 6 June,
Repeated for information to Washington, UKMIS New York.

My telegram No.976: Middle East.

I handed this afternoon to Mr. Kozyrev, Deputy Minister at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister's message to Mr. Kosygin. He undertook to pass it on forthwith.

2. I took the occasion to refer to your conversation yesterday with Mr. Smirnovsky (your telegram No.1551) and, after a brief recapitulation of what you had said, I asked Mr. Kozyrev if he could give me any indication of Mr. Gromyko's reaction. Mr. Kozyrev said that he was not yet in a position to do so. But he said it was clear from Mr. Kosygin's message to Mr. Wilson that the Soviet Government would do their best to secure a cessation of hostilities. He then expounded the Soviet position in the terms of the Soviet statements of 23 May and today. He hoped that the Security Council would fulfil its functions in accordance with the United Nations Charter i.e., it should condemn the Israeli aggression and call upon them to cease military activities. As regards a suitable resolution, the Egyptian proposal was acceptable to the Soviet Government. As for cooperation, we have already, he said, seen such cooperation in the Security Council - but if there is talk of convening a four-power conference, one must consider whether it would be useful and what attitude other powers concerned would have towards it. Up to now there had been objection to such a conference. In short, Mr. Kozyrev had nothing new to say but said it in an affable manner.

Foreign Office please pass Priority to Washington 164,
UKMIS New York 40.

Sir G.Harrison

Sent 1615Z/6 June
Recd 1737Z/6 June

[Repeated as requested]

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Eastern Dept.

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CYPHER/CAT A
F L A SH UK MISSION NEWYORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO 1232 6 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1232 OF 6 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, AND TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, AND BAGHDAD.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1226.

THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, DENMARK, CANADA, JAPAN, BRAZIL AND THE ARGENTINE MET THIS MORNING AND GOLDBERG SAID THAT HE WISHED TO GIVE A CONFIDENTIAL ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSION YESTERDAY EVENING WITH FEDORENKO.

2. EARLIER IN THE DAY WHEN GOLDBERG APPROACHED FEDORENKO FEDORENKO'S REPLY WAS THAT GOLDBERG HAD BETTER SPEAK TO EL KONY (UAR). GOLDBERG DID SO BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT EL KONY WOULD ACCEPT NONE OF THE ALTERNATIVE WORDINGS SUGGESTED AND INSISTED ON A WITHDRAWAL TO POSITIONS ON 4 JUNE. GOLDBERG ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ONLY CHANGE WHICH EL KONY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER WAS A WITHDRAWAL TO POSITIONS BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

3. THEN LATER IN THE AFTERNOON THE TASS ANNOUNCEMENT OF SOVIET POLICY WAS MADE AND GOLDBERG THEN SAW FEDORENKO AND HAD TWO LONG DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. GOLDBERG'S FIRST SUGGESTION WAS THAT ALL TROOPS SHOULD RETURN TO THEIR TERRITORIES BUT FEDORENKO SAID THIS WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION GOLDBERG PUT FORWARD WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A PACKAGE DEAL IN THE FORM OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 1227. ON THIS DRAFT GOLDBERG MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

1) IT WAS ESSENTIAL IN THE PREAMBLE TO REFER TO ALL THE REPORTS AND STATEMENTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

2) THE CALL FOR ''PROMPT WITHDRAWAL'' WAS TAKEN FROM THE KASHMIR RESOLUTION. THE REFERENCE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITION OF (UNDERLINE FOLLOWING WORD) ANYONE WAS MEANT TO INCLUDE THE RIGHTS OF THE MARITIME POWERS.

3)....

3) THE PHRASE ''ARMED PERSONNEL'' (ALSO TAKEN FROM THE KASHMIR RESOLUTION) WAS MEANT TO COVER THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ARMY.

4) ''DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES'' WAS IMPORTANT TO PREVENT OPPOSING ARMIES REMAINING EYEBALL TO EYEBALL.

5) THE WORDS ''REGARDLESS OF THEIR NATURE'' WERE KEY WORDS MEANT TO PRECLUDE UAR ACTION TO ENFORCE THE BLOCKADE.

4. FEDORENKO'S REPLY WAS THAT HE HAD DOUBTS ABOUT SOME OF THESE PROVISIONS AND IT WAS HE WHO SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD ADJOURN AND MEET AGAIN TODAY.

5. GOLDBERG WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ISRAELIS OPPOSED ANY CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL (THOUGH THEY COULD NOT OPPOSE A CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE) (GOLDBERG ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT EBAN WAS ARRIVING IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY TO PRESS THE ISRAELI CASE).

6. GOLDBERG THEN ASKED FOR OUR REACTIONS AND I STATED THE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE RESOLUTION PRESENTED FOR US (AS REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 1231 I HAD SEEN HIM ALONE BEFORE THE MEETING AND ACTED ON THE INSTRUCTION IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2609). DENMARK, CANADA, JAPAN, BRAZIL AND THE ARGENTINE SAID THAT THEY COULD FULLY SUPPORT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH GOLDBERG HAD SHOWN TO US.

7. TABOR (DENMARK) SUGGESTED THAT IF WE REACHED AGREEMENT ON A RESOLUTION IT WOULD BE BEST TO HAVE NO SPEECHES IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE BUT GOLDBERG AND I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. WE ALL AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT STATEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE NOT BEFORE THE VOTE BUT AFTER IT.

8. GOLDBERG EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS STILL VERY DOUBTFUL IF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ACCEPT HIS PACKAGE RESOLUTION AND FURTHER

/DELAY

DELAY AND BARGAINING WAS PROBABLE.

FO PASS PARIS NO. 123, MOSCOW NO. 118, COPENHAGEN NO. 53 AND TEL AVIV NO. 128 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO. 37, DAMASCUS NO. 41, CAIRO NO. 50 AND BAGHDAD NO. 18.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 06/1658Z
RCVD AT 06/1659Z

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION. REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1238 6 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1238 OF 6 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION AGREED BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS THIS EVENING. THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL IS NOW SEEKING THE AGREEMENT OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS. I HAVE TOLD HIM THAT IT IS ACCEPTABLE TO US. IF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS AGREE THE PRESIDENT WILL PRESENT IT TO THE COUNCIL AS A TEXT AGREED AFTER CONSULTATION AND WILL IMMEDIATELY PUT IT TO THE VOTE.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

NOTING THE ORAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THIS SITUATION,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE COUNCIL,

CONCERNED AT THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING AND WITH THE MENACING SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST,

1. CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED AS A FIRST STEP TO TAKE FORTHWITH ALL MEASURES FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND FOR A CESSATION OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA,

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE COUNCIL PROMPTLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED ON THE SITUATION.

ENDS

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 2257 6 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 2258 6 JUNE 1967

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EN CLAIR

FLASH U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1239 6 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1239 OF 6 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, NEW DELHI, JEDDA AND RIO DE JANEIRO.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION PASSED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS EVENING.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

NOTING THE ORAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN THIS SITUATION,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE COUNCIL,

CONCERNED AT THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING AND WITH THE MENACING SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST,

1. CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED AS A FIRST STEP TO TAKE FORTHWITH ALL MEASURES FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND FOR A CESSATION OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA:

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO KEEP THE COUNCIL PROMPTLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED ON THE SITUATION.

ENDS

2. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE PASS TO HAYMAN AT 8 A.M.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV 132, AMMAN 83, DAMASCUS 88, BAGHDAD 19, PRIORITY TO MOSCOW 120, COPENHAGEN 55, NEW DELHI 40, JEDDA 49 AND RIO DE JANEIRO 31.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0058 7 JUNE 1967

RECD AT 0059 7 JUNE 1967

[REPETITION TO DAMASCUS REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO 1240
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
6 JUNE 1967

FOLLOWING FOR RESIDENT CLERK FOR ACTION FIRST THING WEDNESDAY MORNING - 7 JUNE.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY SPEECH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS EVENING, 6 JUNE.

BEGINS:

MR PRESIDENT

I MUST FIRST ASK YOUR INDULGENCE IF I MAKE A SHORT STATEMENT ON A MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO MY GOVERNMENT AND MY COUNTRY. SPEAKING TODAY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS MY PRIME MINISTER REFERRED TO FALSE ACCUSATIONS THAT BRITISH AIR FORCES HAVE TAKEN PART IN THE FIGHTING ON THE SIDE OF ISRAEL. THESE ARE THE WORDS THAT MY PRIME MINISTER USED:- ''HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE ALREADY CATEGORICALLY DENIED THIS MONSTROUS STORY, AND ALL OUR AMBASSADORS IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THAT THIS IS A MALICIOUS AND MISCHIEVOUS INVENTION. ONE STORY ALLEGES THAT AIRCRAFT FROM BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIERS HAVE TAKEN PART IN THE FIGHTING. DURING THE PAST WEEK THE ONLY BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN THE AREA HAVE BEEN H M S VICTORIOUS, WHICH HAS BEEN IN MALTA, AND H M S HERMES, WHICH HAS BEEN IN ADEN - WHICH ARE A THOUSAND MILES AWAY.''

AND I HAVE TODAY, SIR, ADDRESSED TO YOU A LETTER ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER DEALING WITH THESE LIES WHICH HAVE BEEN CIRCULATED BY VARIOUS FORMS HERE IN NEW YORK. I WILL READ THIS SHORT LETTER IF I MAY BECAUSE IT IS NECESSARY THAT THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE FINALLY DISPOSED OF: (HERE INSERT TEXT IN MYTEL 1242).

I THANK YOU, SIR, FOR ALLOWING ME TO DEAL WITH THAT URGENT AND IMPORTANT MATTER FIRST.

AND I WOULD ALSO WISH, TURNING TO THE RESOLUTION WHICH WE HAVE JUST PASSED UNANIMOUSLY, TO EXPRESS GRATITUDE TO YOU, SIR,

/ FOR THE

FOR THE PATIENCE AND STEADY DETERMINATION WHICH YOU HAVE SHOWN IN LEADING US THROUGH DIFFICULT AND MOST ANXIOUS DISCUSSIONS SINCE YOU TOOK OVER THE DUTIES OF YOUR HIGH OFFICE.

WE EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TOO TO ALL WHO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE RESULT WHICH WE HAVE NOW RECORDED. IN EXPRESSING MY GOVERNMENT'S WARM WELCOME FOR THE RESOLUTION FOR WHICH WE HAVE JUST VOTED, I HAVE NO INTENTION OF GOING NOW OVER ALL THE GROUND COVERED IN OUR DEBATES IN RECENT WEEKS. IT IS QUITE UNNECESSARY TO DO SO, SINCE THE POSITION OF MY GOVERNMENT ON ALL THE MAIN ISSUES HAS BEEN MADE ABSOLUTELY PLAIN, BOTH IN STATEMENTS IN THIS COUNCIL AND IN SPEECHES BY MY PRIME MINISTER AND MY FOREIGN SECRETARY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. OUR POSITION ON THOSE MAIN ISSUES REMAINS UNCHANGED.

MR PRESIDENT, I HAVE ONLY ONE OTHER COMMENT TO MAKE NOW FOLLOWING THE DECISION WE HAVE JUST TAKEN TOGETHER. THOSE OF US WHO HAVE SUPPORTED THE UNITED NATIONS AND THOSE OF US WHO HAVE FAITH THAT ONLY IN INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION CAN THE WORLD HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN PEACE - WE HAVE REALISED THAT IN THIS CRISIS THE HOPES OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY HAVE BEEN IN JEOPARDY. THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THOSE HIGH HOPES WOULD BE BETRAYED AND DESTROYED.

ONE THING I AM SURE IS UPPERMOST IN ALL OUR MINDS NOW - AN OVERWHELMING SENSE OF THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITY, A RESPONSIBILITY FROM WHICH WE AROUND THIS TABLE CANNOT ESCAPE, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO GO FORWARD TO TAKE THE OTHER STEPS NOW SO URGENTLY REQUIRED. NEITHER CAN WE ESCAPE THE REALISATION THAT IF WE FAIL NOW OUR FAILURE WILL RESULT IN MORE BLOODSHED AND MORE SUFFERING. AND INNOCENT PEOPLE WILL SUFFER - AND WE NEED NOT LOOK FURTHER THAN THE NEAR EAST TO SEE EVIDENCE THAT WHEN CONFLICT COMES IT IS ALWAYS THE INNOCENT WHO SUFFER MOST AND SUFFER WORST.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO JOIN WITH MY FELLOW MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL IN EXPRESSING TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF INDIA AND BRAZIL OUR SORROW AND OUR CONCERN THAT THEIR SOLDIERS WHO HAVE REPRESENTED

/ FOR SO

FOR SO LONG THE CAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND THE REPRESENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE BEEN LOST. I WISH TO EXPRESS TO THEM THE SYMPATHY AND RESPECT AND GRATITUDE OF MY GOVERNMENT.

HAVING TODAY TAKEN THIS FIRST ESSENTIAL STEP, WE REALISE THAT ONLY A SUPREME EFFORT CAN ENABLE US TO RISE TO OUR OBLIGATION, OUR OBLIGATION TO SEARCH FOR AND ESTABLISH A JUST SETTLEMENT AND TO RESTORE THE AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. I TRUST THAT WE SHALL NOT FAIL TO MAKE THAT SUPREME EFFORT TOGETHER NOW.

ENDS.

2...FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT Ø414 7 JUNE 1967
RECD AT Ø415 7 JUNE 1967

FO/CO/WH. DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1242 6 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DATED 6 JUNE:-

BEGINS

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN SHOCKED BY REPORTS EMANATING FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND CARRIED BY OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA ALLEGING THAT BRITISH AIRCRAFT HAVE TAKEN PART IN THE RECENT FIGHTING IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE SIDE OF ISRAEL. THESE REPORTS ARE MALICIOUS FABRICATIONS. THERE IS NO GRAIN OF TRUTH IN THEM.

2. IT IS THE POLICY OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO AVOID TAKING SIDES IN THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THEY HAVE DONE EVERY-THING THEY CAN TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS STATED BY MY SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY, ALL BRITISH FORCES IN THE AREA HAVE BEEN UNDER THE STRICTEST INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY.

3. ALL UNITED KINGDOM AMBASSADORS IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCRED-ITED THAT THESE REPORTS ARE MALICIOUS AND MISCHIEVOUS INVENTIONS AND THAT NO BRITISH AIRCRAFT WHETHER CARRIER-BASED OR LAND-BASED, NOR ANY OTHER BRITISH FORCES, HAVE TAKEN ANY PART WHATSOEVER IN THE REC-ENT FIGHTING.

4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOUR EXCELLENCY WOULD HAVE THIS LETTER CIRCULATED IMMEDIATELY AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT.

ENDS

LORD CARADON

SENT AT Ø7/Ø417Z

RECD AT Ø7/Ø419Z

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO 1243

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
6 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1243 OF 6 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MIDDLE EAST: ACCUSATIONS OF UNITED KINGDOM INVOLVEMENT.

M I F T CONTAINS AN EXTRACT FROM THE SPEECH BY MR GOLDBERG IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS EVENING IN WHICH HE OFFERED TO ARRANGE UNITED NATIONS INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES MADE OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING AN INVITATION TO U N PERSONNEL TO BOARD U S AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

2. IF YOU WISH ME TO MAKE A SIMILAR OFFER IN RESPECT OF UNITED KINGDOM AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND OUR BASES IN CYPRUS, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW THE TERMS IN WHICH YOU WOULD WISH IT MADE.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 0425 7 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 0426 7 JUNE 1967

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1244. UNCLASSIFIED. 6 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1244 OF 6 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MIDDLE EAST: ACCUSATIONS OF U K INVOLVEMENT.

M I P T.

FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM THE SPEECH BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE OFFERING TO ARRANGE A U N INVESTIGATION INTO THE CHARGES OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF U S AIRCRAFT IN THE FIGHTING IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

BEGINS.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, MY GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO TAKE PROMPT STEPS TO PREVENT THE FURTHER SPREAD OF THESE DANGEROUS FALSEHOODS. WITH THIS IN MIND I AM AUTHORISED TO ANNOUNCE IN THIS COUNCIL AND PROPOSE TWO CONCRETE MEASURES. THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED, FIRST, TO COOPERATE IN AN IMMEDIATE IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF THESE CHARGES BY THE UNITED NATIONS, AND TO OFFER ALL FACILITIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS INVESTIGATION. AND SECOND, AS A PART OF, OR IN ADDITION TO SUCH AN INVESTIGATION, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO INVITE UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL ABOARD OUR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN TODAY, TOMORROW, OR AT THE CONVENIENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO SERVE AS IMPARTIAL OBSERVERS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF OUR PLANES IN THE AREA AND TO VERIFY THE PAST ACTIVITIES OF OUR PLANES FROM OUR OFFICIAL RECORDS AND FROM THE LOG THAT EACH SHIP CARRIES.

THESE OBSERVERS IN ADDITION WILL BE FREE TO INTERVIEW AIR CREWS ON THESE CARRIERS WITHOUT INHIBITION SO AS TO DETERMINE THEIR ACTIVITIES DURING THE DAYS IN QUESTION. THEIR PRESENCE AS OBSERVERS ON THESE CARRIERS WILL BE WELCOMED THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD OF THIS CRISIS AND SO LONG AS THESE SHIPS ARE IN THE EASTERN WATERS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN.

ENDS.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT Ø42Ø 7 JUNE 1967

RECD AT Ø421 7 JUNE 1967

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO. 1245
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
6 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1245 OF 6 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, COPENHAGEN, AND SAVING TO AMMAN, BAGHDAD, RIO DE JANEIRO, BEIRUT, ADDIS ABABA, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1222: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

THE EMERGENCY SESSION RESUMED AT 7.06 P.M. LOCAL TIME. ISRAEL, U.A.R., SYRIA, JORDAN, LEBANON, IRAQ, MOROCCO, SAUDI ARABIA, AND KUWAIT WERE SEATED AT THEIR OWN REQUEST WITHOUT VOTE. TUNISIA AND LIBYA WERE ALSO INVITED TO BE SEATED.

2. IN A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT TABOR (DENMARK) SAID THAT AFTER LENGTHY CONSULTATIONS UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE (TEXT IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 1239). AS PRESIDENT, HE PUT FORWARD THE DRAFT AND SUGGESTED THAT THE MEETING SHOULD PROCEED TO VOTE WITHOUT DEBATE. ON A SHOW OF HANDS THE RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY. THE PRESIDENT THEN ASKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO TRANSMIT THE TEXT TO THOSE CONCERNED AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL THEREAFTER. TABOR ALSO CALLED UPON THE PARTIES TO COMPLY IMMEDIATELY WITH THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION.

3. A NUMBER OF SPEAKERS THEN EXPLAINED THEIR VOTES. GOLDBERG (U.S.A.) SAID THAT THE RESOLUTION MARKED THE FIRST STEP ON THE ROAD BACK TO PEACE. IT WAS THE FRUIT OF EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS OVER 36 HOURS AND REFLECTED A HARMONIZING OF DIFFERING POSITIONS. HIS GOVERNMENT HAD THROUGHOUT SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS TO RE-ESTABLISH PEACE IN THE AREA: IT WAS MOST REGRETTABLE THAT THE COUNCIL'S EFFORTS AND THOSE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD FAILED TO PREVENT WAR. FOR THE LAST 36 HOURS HIS DELEGATION HAD BEEN PRESSING FOR A CEASE-FIRE. THE TIME LOST WAS MUCH REGRETTED. THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOW TURN ITS ATTENTION TO FURTHER STEPS TOWARDS A MORE LASTING PEACE WITHOUT DELAY. GOLDBERG THEN QUOTED FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICY STATEMENT ON THE NEAR EAST MADE ON 23 MAY, STRESSING THAT AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS POLICY WOULD BE CO-OPERATIVE PROGRAMMES TO ASSIST ALL NEAR EASTERN COUNTRIES.

/ 4. GOLDBERG

4. GOLDBERG STATED THAT FANTASTIC ALLEGATIONS ABOUT INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. AIRCRAFT IN MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES HAD BEEN MADE. THESE WERE TOTALLY BASELESS. HE DENIED THEM CATEGORICALLY WITH THE FULL AUTHORITY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, QUOTING FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICIAL RELEASE. THIS POINTED OUT THAT ALL SIXTH FLEET AIRCRAFT WERE STATIONED SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES FROM THE AREA OF CONFLICT. YET THESE FABRICATIONS HAD BEEN USED TO STIR UP VIOLENCE AGAINST U.S. PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN ARAB STATES. HE PROPOSED TWO MEASURES TO DEAL WITH THESE ALLEGATIONS:
(A) THE U.S. WOULD CO-OPERATE IN AN IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS INTO THE CHARGES:
(B) ADDITIONALLY, OR AS PART OF THIS INVESTIGATION, HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD INVITE U.N. PERSONNEL AS OBSERVERS ONTO U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, TO VERIFY THEIR PAST RECORD AND FUTURE ACTIONS. AIRCREWS WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW. THIS OFFER WOULD BE VALID THROUGHOUT THE PRESENT CRISIS, AND AS LONG AS U.S. CARRIERS WERE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.
5. MAKONNEN (ETHIOPIA) IN A BRIEF SPEECH WELCOMED THE RESOLUTION AS THE FIRST OF MANY URGENT STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE U.N. IN A TRAGIC SITUATION OF LARGE SCALE ARMED CONFLICT. TOTAL WAR INVOLVING ALL THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL WOULD BRING DESTITUTION TO THOUSANDS, AND DAMAGE TO THE HOLY SHRINES AT JERUSALEM. HE THEREFORE SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL THAT JERUSALEM BE DECLARED AN OPEN CITY WITHOUT DELAY. HE EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S SYMPATHY TO INDIA AND BRAZIL ON THE RECENT DEATHS OF THEIR NATIONALS IN THE SERVICE OF UNEF.
6. SEYDOUX (FRANCE) SAID THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD AT LAST SPOKEN UP IN FAVOUR OF A CEASE-FIRE. IF IT HAD SPOKEN EARLIER, MANY LIVES WOULD HAVE BEEN SPARED. SOME PLACES AT LEAST COULD STILL BE PRESERVED. HE STRESSED HIS COUNTRY'S ANXIETY THAT THE HOLY PLACES SHOULD COME TO NO HARM AND SAID THAT U THANT'S APPEAL IN THIS RESPECT MUST BE HEEDED. FOR THE FUTURE, ONCE FIGHTING

/ STOPPED,

STOPPED, THE COUNCIL MUST EMBARK ON THE LENGTHY PROCESS OF RE-ESTABLISHING STABILITY AND PEACE IN THE REGION WITHOUT DELAY.

7. I THEN SPOKE (TEXT IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 1240).

8. FEDORENKO (USSR) SAID THAT IN ADOPTING THE RESOLUTION THE COUNCIL HAD DECIDED TO PUT AN END TO THE LATEST ACT OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ARABS. A CLIMATE OF MILITARY PSYCHOSIS HAD DEVELOPED IN ISRAEL RECENTLY. ON 9 MAY THE ISRAELI PARLIAMENT AUTHORISED THE INITIATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON A WIDE SCALE. IN AN OFFICIAL SOVIET STATEMENT DATED 24 MAY, ISRAEL HAD BEEN WARNED TO CEASE ITS PROVOCATIONS. WITHOUT IMPERIALIST BACKING IT COULD SCARCELY HAVE FULFILLED ITS THREATS. BUT THE REASONABLE APPROACH HAD NOT YET PREVAILED IN TEL AVIV. FOR A DOZEN YEARS THE SOVIET UNION HAD AIDED ARAB COUNTRIES IN THEIR STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION, AND INTENDED TO CONTINUE THIS POLICY. THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION HAD BEEN EMBARKED UPON WHILE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS ACTUALLY DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. THIS WAS A DIRECT CHALLENGE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORITY.

9. FEDORENKO THEN REHEARSED EGYPTIAN VERSION OF THE OUTBREAK OF WAR ON 5 JUNE. HE QUOTED AT LENGTH FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT OF THE SAME DATE. ISRAEL WAS THE GUILTY PARTY BECAUSE IT KNEW, AFTER THE TIMELY WARNINGS OF THE SOVIET UNION, THAT WAR COULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED. AS A FIRST STEP THEREFORE THE SOVIET UNION NOW DEMANDED A CEASE-FIRE, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS BEHIND THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES. THE U.N. SHOULD CONDEMN ISRAEL AND TAKE ALL ACTION NECESSARY TO RESTORE PEACE IN THE AREA. THE USSR RESERVED ITS RIGHT TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS RESULTING FROM THE PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION. THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED WAS THE BARE MINIMUM. AS A RESULT OF THE OPPOSITION OF SOME COUNCIL MEMBERS, IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE SOVIET

/ PROPOSAL

PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWAL BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES. THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOW ADOPT A RESOLUTION SPELLING THIS OUT WITHOUT DELAY. 1Ø. FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE DEBATE SEE FURTHER TELEGRAM TO FOLLOW.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 121, PARIS 125, TEL AVIV 133, COPENHAGEN 56 AND SAVING AMMAN 39, BAGHDAD 2Ø, RIO DE JANEIRO 5, BEIRUT 5Ø, ADDIS ABABA 28, NEW DELHI 2Ø, JEDDA 27 AND CAIRO 52.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT Ø321 7 JUNE 1967
RECD AT Ø322 7 JUNE 1967

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV REFERRED TO DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

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CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO 1247
CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
6 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1247 OF 6 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN AND OTTAWA AND SAVING TO AMMAN BAGHDAD NEW DELHI AND CAIRO.

MYTEL 1237 (NOT TO ALL):

MIDDLE EAST.

THIS AFTERNOON AT A FINAL MEETING BETWEEN GOLDBERG AND FEDERENKO, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MYTEL 1239. THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL QUICKLY SECURED THE SUPPORT OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS TO THE TEXT AND THIS WAS SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED BY THE COUNCIL WITH UNANIMITY.

2...THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OBVIOUSLY CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT THE FULL DRAFT (MYTEL 1227) WHICH GOLDBERG HAD PUT TO FEDERENKO AND JUDGED THAT WESTERN DELEGATIONS WOULD NOT ABANDON THE PROVISIONS WHICH GOLDBERG HAD INSISTED ON.

3...AT THE END FEDERENKO AGREED THE TEXT SUDDENLY. THE DRAMATIC SUCCESS OF THE ISRAELIS ON THE GROUND AND A RETURN TO SOME REALISM BY THE U A R DELEGATION (WHO UP TO MIDDAY TODAY HAD BEEN CLAIMING MILITARY SUCCESSES AND REFUSING ANY COMPROMISE BUT WHO, ACCORDING TO THE DANISH PRESIDENT, THEREAFTER TOLD DR BUNCHE THAT THEY WOULD TAKE WHAT THE SOVIETS COULD GET) SEEM HOWEVER TO HAVE BEEN DECISIVE.

4...THE TEXT TO WHICH FEDERENKO CONSENTED AT THE END OF THE DAY DIFFERED LITTLE FROM THE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD EARLY YESTERDAY (MYTEL 1221) BY THE DANISH PRESIDENT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH US, THE U S AND THE CANADIANS. THE INDIANS WHO HAD LED FOR THE U A R IN DEMANDING SO MUCH MORE FROM THE COUNCIL DURING THE LAST TWO DAYS, CONSENTED MOST RELUCTANTLY TO THE AGREED U S/U S S R TEXT. BUT AFTER TWO MARATHON SESSIONS THE FINAL OUTCOME CAME WITH RELIEF TO MOST MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

5...WE HAVE MADE A START. THE COUNCIL HAS AT LAST BEEN MOVED TO CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE BUT MUST NOW TURN ITS ATTENTION TO THE

/ NEXT AND

NEXT AND MORE DIFFICULT TASK OF NEGOTIATING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THEN TO ALL THE OTHER EXTREMELY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS OF PREVENTING FUTURE CONFLICT. AN INDICATION OF THE DIFFICULTIES AHEAD WAS CLEAR FROM THE SPEECHES WHICH TODAY'S SESSION ENDED. FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN AS USUAL MADE A BRILLIANT SPEECH WHICH WAS CONCILIATORY, BUT THE ARABS (FOREIGN MINISTER PACHACHI (IRAQ), TOMEH (SYRIA) AND BENHIMA (MOROCCO)) WERE EXTREMELY BITTER.
6...RESIDENT CLERK PASS TO HAYMAN AT 8 A M.

F O PASS MOSCOW 123, PARIS 127, TEL AVIV 135 AND COPENHAGEN 58 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 41, BAGHDAD 22, NEW DELHI 22 AND CAIRO 54.
LORD CARADON

SENT AT Ø437 7 JUNE 1967
RECD AT Ø438 7 JUNE 1967

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS].

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1248 6 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1248 OF 6 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN AND SAVING TO AMMAN BAGHDAD RIO DE JANEIRO BEIRUT ADDIS ABABA NEW DELHI OTTAWA JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1245: MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL CONTINUED THEIR EXPLANATION OF VOTE AS FOLLOWS:

RUDA (ARGENTINA), SETE CAMARA (BRAZIL) AND MATSUI (JAPAN) ALL SPOKE ALONG SIMILAR LINES WELCOMING THE RESOLUTION, STATING THAT AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE WAS THE FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT STEP THE COUNCIL COULD TAKE AND MAKING THE POINT THAT THE CEASE-FIRE MUST BE FOLLOWED BY CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS TO FIND A JUST AND LASTING PEACE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. IGNATIEFF (CANADA), WELCOMING THE RESOLUTION WHICH HE SAID HELPED TO REDRESS THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE COUNCIL'S EARLIER IMPOTENCE IN DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM, CALLED UPON ALL STATES AND ESPECIALLY THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO EXERT THEIR EFFORTS TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END. HE HOPED THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD DEAL IN AN EQUITABLE MANNER WITH THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS AND WOULD NOT ALLOW THEM TO SIMMER FOR ANOTHER TEN YEARS AND THEN EXPLODE ONCE MORE.

3. TARABANOV (BULGARIA) ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION AS THE FIRST STEP TO HALT WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE BRUTAL AGGRESSION BY ISRAEL AGAINST EGYPT AND JORDAN. BUT, HE SAID, THE COUNCIL SHOULD ADOPT IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO CONDEMN THE AGGRESSION BY ISRAEL AND TO CALL FOR THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF THE AGGRESSOR BEHIND THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES. ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION, HE STATED, WAS ONE OF THE MOST SAVAGE EPISODES OF IMPERIALISTIC AGGRESSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

/4. KEITA

4. KEITA (MALI) STATED THAT HE ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION AS A FIRST STEP, BUT IT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A STUDY OF THE WHOLE BASIC PROBLEM.

5. LIU (CHINA) REGRETTED THAT THE COUNCIL HAD TO AWAIT THE OUT-BREAK OF HOSTILITIES BEFORE COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEM AND WELCOMED THE RESOLUTION.

6. PATHASARATHI (INDIA) WELCOMED THE DECISION OF THE COUNCIL BUT STATED THAT THE AGGRESSOR SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ENJOY THE FRUITS OF HIS AGGRESSION AND THE COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE UP IMMEDIATELY THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI FORCES. HE LISTED THE NUMBER OF INDIAN SOLDIERS IN UNEF WHO HAD BEEN KILLED AND WOUNDED IN THE LAST TWO DAYS AND REITERATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S STRONG PROTEST AGAINST THESE ACTS. HE ASKED FOR AN UNQUALIFIED GUARANTEE FOR THE SAFE REMOVAL OF THE REMAINDER OF UNEF.

7. TABOR (SPEAKING LAST IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF DENMARK) WELCOMED THE CEASE-FIRE AS THE FIRST IMPORTANT STEP.

8. PACHACHI (IRAQ) STATED THAT IT WAS HIS FRANK OPINION THAT THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION WAS A COMPLETE SURRENDER TO ISRAEL. THE COUNCIL BEFORE ORDERING THE CEASE-FIRE SHOULD HAVE DETERMINED WHO INITIATED THE AGGRESSION. HE HIMSELF HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A. AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE BREATHING SPELL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ASKED FOR, BUT NOW IT WAS CLEAR TO HIM THAT WHILST HE WAS CARRYING OUT THIS MISSION, MASSIVE ASSISTANCE AND ENCOURAGEMENT WAS BEING GIVEN BY THE U.S.A. TO ISRAEL TO COMMIT AGGRESSION. THIS WAS WHY HIS COUNTRY HAD BROKEN OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.A. HE THEN STATED THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THOSE WHO HAD EXPRESSED SYMPATHY WITH THE ARAB CAUSE DID NOT USE THEIR EFFORTS MORE EFFECTIVELY TO ENSURE THAT ISRAEL DID NOT ENJOY THE FRUITS OF HER AGGRESSION.

9. GOLDBERG (U.S.A.), EXERCISING HIS RIGHT OF REPLY, REBUTTED PACHACHI'S ALLEGATIONS OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT ON ISRAEL'S

/BEHALF

BEHALF, IN AN EXCEEDINGLY STRONG STATEMENT, QUOTING IN DETAIL FROM HIS SPEECHES OVER THE LAST THREE WEEKS.

10. EBAN (ISRAEL), IN A LONG STATEMENT, JUSTIFIED ISRAEL'S ACTIONS WHICH WERE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE MASSIVE DEPLOYMENT OF 80,000 MEN AND 900 TANKS WHICH, HE STATED, EGYPT HAD BROUGHT TO BEAR AGAINST ISRAEL, AND THEN FOLLOWED WITH A BLOCKADE OF AQABA. HE DESCRIBED STEP BY STEP THE INCIDENTS OF THE LAST FEW WEEKS AND THEN IN SOME DETAIL THE BOMBING AND SHELLING OF JERUSALEM WHICH HE HAD LEFT ONLY THAT MORNING. HE BLAMED THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION ON THE HURRIED WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF, WHICH, FOLLOWING MONTHS OF SABOTAGE ACROSS THE SYRIAN BORDER AND THE BLOCKADE OF AQABA, PROVIDED THE SPARK WHICH SET OFF THE EXPLOSION.

11. HE STATED THAT ISRAEL WELCOMED THE APPEAL FOR THE CEASE-FIRE BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IT WOULD DEPEND ON THE OTHER PARTIES AS WELL AS ISRAEL. ISRAEL WOULD REQUIRE BETTER ASSURANCES IN THE FUTURE THAT SHE WOULD BE ABLE TO CO-EXIST IN PEACE WITH HER NEIGHBOURS, AND HE LAID DOWN CERTAIN PRINCIPLES AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THERE MUST BE ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S STATEHOOD:

(B) THERE MUST BE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES:

(C) THERE MUST BE EQUALITY OF SUPPORT OF THE NATIONS OF THE AREA FOR ONE ANOTHER AND RIGOROUS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACE.

IN CONCLUSION, HE STATED THAT ISRAEL WAS WILLING TO DEMONSTRATE ITS DESIRE FOR PEACE AND WAS PREPARED TO BUILD NEW RELATIONSHIPS WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBOURS.

12. TOMEH (SYRIA) SAID THAT ALL THE TROUBLE SPRANG FROM ISRAEL'S PREMEDITATED ATTACK ON THE U A R. AN EARLIER LINK IN THE CHAIN

OF PROVOCATIONS WAS THE WANTON ISRAELI ATTACK ON SYRIAN VILLAGES ON 7 APRIL, ABOUT WHICH ISMAC HAD REPORTED. THERE WAS NOW ALSO IRREFUTABLE PROOF OF THE COLLUSION OF THE U S AND THE U K WITH ISRAEL IN THE 5 JUNE ATTACK. AMERICAN AND BRITISH AIRCRAFT HAD JOINED IN ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS, AND HAD PROVIDED AIR COVER FOR ISRAELI GROUND FORCES. THE PROOF OF THIS WAS THAT THE NUMBER OF PLANES WHICH ATTACKED AMMAN, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS SIMULTANEOUSLY WAS SO GREAT THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE UP BY THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE ALONE. THE BRITISH DELEGATE HAD SAID THAT THE OFFICIAL SYRIAN STATEMENT ABOUT THE ATTACK BY VULCAN AIRCRAFT ON ARAB FORCES WAS A LIE. THIS SURELY LENT COLOUR TO THE CHARGE OF COLLUSION. FURTHER EVIDENCE OF BRITISH INVOLVEMENT WAS THE STATEMENT OF THE ISRAELI PILOT, ABRAHAM VELAN, WHO HAD CONFIRMED UNDER INTERROGATION THAT BRITISH VULCAN AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN STATIONED AT AN ISRAELI AIRPORT FOR TEN DAYS BEFORE THE 5 JUNE ATTACK, AND TOOK PART IN IT. OTHER BRITISH AIRCRAFT STATIONED IN CYPRUS HAD ALSO PARTICIPATED. THE U S GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN SIMILARLY INVOLVED AND WAS WAGING A WAR OF ANNIHILATION ON THE ARABS BY MEANS OF ITS STOOGES IN TEL AVIV. FOR THIS REASON SYRIA, IRAQ, U A R AND ALGERIA HAD TODAY ALL SEVERED RELATIONS WITH THE U S GOVERNMENT. THE SYRIANS HAD NO QUARREL WITH THE U S NATION, BUT WITH THE ZIONISTS AND CROOKED POLITICIANS WHO RAN AMERICAN AFFAIRS. IT WAS NOW THE DUTY OF THE COUNCIL TO CONDEMN THE ISRAELI AGRESSORS AND APPLY THE SANCTIONS ENJOINED IN THE CHARTER.

13..GOLDBERG (U S A) EXCERCISING HIS RIGHT OF REPLY, REJECTED CATEGORICALLY TOMEH'S CHARGES OF U S MILITARY COLLUSION WITH ISRAEL, IN TERMS SIMILAR TO THOSE USED IN HIS MAIN STATEMENT. HE ALSO REJECTED TOMEH'S INSINUATION THAT A U S CITIZEN MIGHT HAVE DIVIDED LOYALTIES, BECAUSE OF AN ATTACHMENT TO HIS ANCESTRAL HOME. SUCH A CHARGE CONSTITUTED AN INTERVENTION BY AN OUTSIDER IN U S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, WHICH WAS IMPERMISSABLE.

14..I THEN SPOKE, IN EXCERCISING MY RIGHT OF REPLY, AND REFUTED THE ALLEGATIONS BY TOMEH CONCERNING UNITED KINGDOM AIR ASSISTANCE

/ TO ISRAEL

TO ISRAEL, QUOTING FROM THE OFFICIAL RELEASES ON THIS SUBJECT.

15..BEN HIMA (MOROCCO) STATED THAT THE COUNCIL HAD COME TO A DECISION BUT IT COULD WELL BE FRAUGHT WITH CONSEQUENCES. AFTER A DELAY OF 2 1/2 DAYS IT STILL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONDEMN THE AGRESSOR. MOREOVER, THE FOUR GREAT POWERS HAD JOINED IN PASSING OVER IN SILENCE THE WHOLE QUESTION OF AGRESSION. THIS WAS SIGNIFICANT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS WOULD BE CAREFULLY NOTED FOR THE FUTURE.

16..FEDERENKO (U S S R) MADE A FURTHER SHORT STATEMENT REITERATING THE NEED FOR THE CEASE-FIRE TO BE CARRIED OUT AT ONCE, AND CALLED UPON THE PRESIDENT TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE.

17..THE PRESIDENT ASSURED FEDERENKO THAT HE WOULD BEND EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WAS EFFECTIVE, AND THEN ADJOURNED THE MEETING STATING THAT HE WOULD CONSULT AMONGST MEMBERS ON THE TIME AND DATE OF THEIR NEXT MEETING. IN THE MEANTIME HE ASKED MEMBERS TO HOLD THEMSELVES IN READINESS IN CASE A MEETING SHOULD BE CALLED AT SHORT NOTICE.

F O PASS MOSCOW 124, PARIS 128, TEL AVIV 136 AND COPENHAGEN 59 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 42, NEW DELHI 23, BAGHDAD 23, RIO DE JANEIRO 7, BEIRUT 52, ADDIS ABABA 30, JEDDA 29 AND CAIRO 55.

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to postpone consideration of our application?

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend will know about the difficulties which arose yesterday because of the bursting of the Middle East crisis. There are hopes, I think, that the Foreign Ministers will be getting together in the very near future when our application will arise.

Mr. Hastings: In view of the Prime Minister's long reconnaissance around Europe, can he say whether he fully anticipated General de Gaulle's reaction to our application?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman must realise that it was not possible to get any clear answer out of General de Gaulle on this question until we made an application. That was his attitude. It was the attitude of the Six. If we had said that we were not going to make an application until he said that we would be accepted in, there would never have been an application. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] There would never have been an application, because he and the rest of the Six were unwilling to rule on it until there was an application. That was the advice we had from the Leader of the Opposition, and it was sound advice for a very long period of time. I certainly have not accepted that we have been turned down by the President of France, which is what seems to underly the hon. Gentleman's question.

Mr. Shinwell: Could I ask my right hon. Friend a serious question? Can he explain why, in these important negotiations which are about to take place and which fundamentally concern the interests of our Commonwealth, with which we are closely associated, no Minister from the Commonwealth Relations Office is to take part in the negotiations?

The Prime Minister: I think that my right hon. Friend is misinformed about this. When formal negotiations take place my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will be accompanied by whatever Ministers are necessary for the particular subject under discussion, whether it happens to be agriculture, including Scottish agriculture or other Scottish questions, or whether it happens to be Commonwealth matters. Whatever Ministers are relevant will be accompanying my right hon. Friend.

Several Hon. Members *rose*

Mr. Speaker: Order. We are past Question Time.

PRIME MINISTER (VISIT TO CANADA AND U.S.A.)

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): With permission, I will now answer Questions Nos. *1, *3, *Q4, *Q8 and *Q18.

During my visit I was able to have very full discussions over a wide range of topics with the Prime Minister of Canada, the President of the United States of America, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the President of the Security Council. Much of the content of these discussions must, of necessity, remain confidential, but I can tell the House that the situation in the Middle East figured prominently in all of them; and that, in addition, President Johnson and I discussed the situation in Vietnam in some depth.

My talks about the Middle East were aimed at securing conditions in which the countries concerned in the Middle East could be fairly asked to maintain continued restraint and not to resort to violent action. In particular, they related to the problem of the freedom of passage in the Straits of Tiran.

As my right hon. Friend said yesterday, the events of yesterday morning have overtaken these discussions, but the House will recognise their direct relevance to any long-term settlement capable of securing and maintaining peace in the Middle East on a basis which could be regarded as honourable by all concerned in the area. It will be our objective in securing the cease-fire for which we are pressing to ensure that such a long-term settlement is achieved. The issues I was able to discuss in such depth last week will of course, be highly relevant.

I now turn to the current situation. Since my right hon. Friend spoke to the House yesterday, there has been a flood of news, a great deal of it conflicting, about the fighting in the Middle East, though a pattern seems to be emerging. The most serious operations on the ground seem to have been on the United

[THE PRIME MINISTER.]

Arab Republic/Israel border, but information about them is unclear and disputed. Yesterday's air action by the Israel Air Force against United Arab Republic airfields was extended to airfields in Jordan and Syria. There are also reports of advances by Israel forces into Jordanian territory and the capture of the towns of Jenin and Latrun. The local truce in Jerusalem which was arranged yesterday did not, unfortunately, hold, and fighting continued into the night.

I would like to add the voice of Her Majesty's Government to that of His Holiness the Pope and others who have appealed for a cessation of fighting in the Jerusalem area before terrible damage is done to places which are sacred for three of the great religions of the world.

A most serious development has been the deliberate spreading by the United Arab Republic Government of entirely false accusations that British and American air forces have taken part in the fighting on the side of Israel. It has been reported that President Nasser has announced that he will, in retaliation, close the Suez Canal to navigation. President Aref of Iraq is also reported to have said that he has ordered a cessation of the pumping of oil to the Mediterranean for the same reason and there have also been reports that the Kuwait Government have forbidden oil exports to British and American destinations.

Her Majesty's Government have already categorically denied this monstrous story, and all our Ambassadors in the Arab countries have been instructed to make clear to the local governments that this is a malicious and mischievous invention. One story alleges that aircraft from British aircraft carriers have taken part in the fighting. During the past week the only British aircraft carriers in the area have been H.M.S. "Victorious", which has been at Malta, and H.M.S. "Hermes", which has been at Aden, each over 1,000 miles away. In view of these incontrovertible facts, we are calling upon the Arab Governments not to disrupt commercial arrangements which are as much in their interest as ours on the basis of such false statements.

In New York, the Security Council met promptly as foreshadowed, but then rose for private consultations, which continued for 14 hours. I can only tell the House of my regret that a resolution calling for a prompt and general ceasefire has not yet been passed. I think that it is vital that there should be no further delay.

As regards the shipment of arms, as my right hon. Friend informed the House yesterday we are consulting with other Governments who are suppliers for the area. The House will realise the desirability of ensuring, so far as we are able, that any embargo covers all arms supplies to the area, from whatever source. Pending the outcome of our consultations, we are suspending any further shipments to any of the countries involved.

Mr. Heath: The House was glad to hear the Prime Minister confirm that, in his discussions with President Johnson, he made clear that any measures to assert the rights of the maritime Powers in the Gulf of Aqaba are still relevant and they must take their part in any settlement for permanent peace. I believe this to be so. Second, we agree with the Prime Minister that it is absolutely right to use every means possible to show to the Arab countries that British forces are taking no part in the conflict.

May I now put three questions, recognising that the situation is still very fluid. First, in the Prime Minister's discussions with President Johnson, what contingency plans were made to deal with the situation which may now have been brought about, with the Suez Canal closed and certain Arab countries denying oil to Britain and to the United States?

Second, is the right hon. Gentleman now having any discussions with European colleagues about what action can be taken to deal with this situation? Perhaps he could state the Government's view on whether President Nasser is entitled in these circumstances to close the Canal. It would appear that, even on his own position in 1957, he is not entitled to do that, and that it should be possible to get an interim order from the International Court making this clear.

Third, in his discussions with President Johnson, did the Prime Minister propose changes in his policy for British forces in the Far East and in Aden as a result of the present situation?

The Prime Minister: I need not comment on the right hon. Gentleman's opening remarks. We are in agreement there.

The principal contingency plans which we started to discuss were those which would have been required in a different state of affairs in relation to the Aqaba situation. But, of course, we arranged to keep in the closest touch, which we have done, on any change in developments if fighting were to break out. We had some discussions on oil, and those discussions will continue, although, as regards both the United States and the European countries which might be involved if this plan were proceeded with, the right forum would be the O.E.C.D., which has its own special arrangements for dealing with all matters, emergency or otherwise, in relation to oil.

As regards the Suez Canal, the news is very conflicting and confused on whether there is a temporary or more than temporary closure. There seems to be some confirmation from the area that the Canal is at this moment closed. We do not know how long it will last. As to legality and entitlement to close it, the right hon. Gentleman is right: closure to peaceful nations—and Britain is in that position—whether for a reason of the kind which, I hope, I have satisfactorily dealt with this afternoon or for any other reason, is quite beyond the legal capacity of President Nasser.

Sir Knox Cunningham: Will the Prime Minister go a little further and say what understandings were reached in his discussions with President Johnson with regard to maintaining United Kingdom oil supplies from across the Atlantic?

The Prime Minister: There was no detailed discussion about that particular contingency, apart from the arrangement for urgent discussion if a situation like this were to arise. I am sure that, despite the feverish heat and passion in the Middle East at this time, the Middle Eastern countries concerned, and especially their Governments, will recognise that what they are talking of doing is not so much cutting off our oil but cutting off our markets from their oil, and that this might have very serious effects for their long-term sales position. This country would not be willing to be put twice in a decade in a position in which this kind of threat or blackmail could be held out. There might be a number of people in this country thinking in terms of long-term contracts with other oil supplying areas, which might have the most profound and devastating effects, which we should all regret, on the Middle East.

Mr. Marten: Did the Prime Minister discuss with President Johnson the question of forming a United Nations peace-keeping force? Does not he agree that, if there is to be a cease-fire, the first thing which the United Nations will probably want to do is to put in a substantial peace-keeping force as soon as possible to separate the contestants, and that it should get on with the formation of that force now?

The Prime Minister: In the discussions last week, it was widely agreed among those with whom I spoke—both the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States, and it was the basis of a lot of our discussions in the United Nations building—that as part of a long-term settlement we would need some kind of United Nations peace-keeping force restored to that area, but including the Israel side of the borders as well as the Arab side of the borders.

Mr. Blaker: I understood the Prime Minister to say just now that closure of the Suez Canal to peaceful nations would be quite unjustified. I am sure that he would not wish to give a false impression. Perhaps he would care to clear the point up. Does not Article 1 of the Convention of 1888 lay down that the Canal will always be open, in peace or in war, to ships of all nations?

The Prime Minister: I was not attempting to give a legal construction of the whole Suez Canal Convention. What I was trying to make clear is that we are not at war with Egypt, as the tendentious propaganda suggests. We are in their context a completely peaceful nation, not taking sides at all in this dispute and fighting. Clearly, in these circumstances, the Egyptians have no right to close the Canal to us and to others because of trumped-up statements of the kind which have been made.

Mr. Spriggs: The people of North and South Vietnam have been suffering death and destruction for many years. What

[MR. SPRIGGS.]
steps is my right hon. Friend prepared to take to bring about a peace conference on Vietnam?

The Prime Minister: As I said, I discussed this at considerable length with the President of the United States, because we both agreed that the crisis in the Middle East was no reason for neglecting a much more long-standing crisis in Asia. The position remains exactly as it was before; we are prepared to take any initiative, as is the United States, to get armistice talks, to get cease-fire talks, and to get a peace conference, whether at Geneva or anywhere else, if only Hanoi would come to the conference table with us.

Mr. Alfred Morris: In my right hon. Friend's discussions with the President of the United States, was consideration given to bilateral or multilateral action outside the United Nations if the United Nations finds it impossible to conciliate in the grievous conflict in the Middle East?

The Prime Minister: To a considerable extent, the context in which we were talking has been changed by the events of yesterday. We were concerned with what could be done to secure some understanding about freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran. In those circumstances, we decided to put full weight behind the Security Council and, at the same time, to try to secure a multilateral declaration of maritime Powers, and only if those efforts failed should we be prepared to consider other matters. In the event, while the Aqaba question which we discussed will be highly relevant to a peace settlement, as the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition agrees, it has been overtaken now by the actual outbreak of fighting.

Mr. Thorpe: I accept that the Government's first priority is to obtain a cease-fire through the United Nations, but does the Prime Minister recall that in 1950 the Labour Government made a firm declaration, in company with the Americans and the French, that they would intervene to prevent the violation of armistice or frontier lines in the Middle East? On the assumption that Israel were threatened with being driven into the sea, are we to take it that the Government prefer to wash their hands of this obligation, or do they believe that they have a continuing moral obligation for the future of this State?

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman's question is extremely hypothetical. Statements about the tripartite declaration have been made by successive Governments; a statement was made by one of my predecessors and I myself have made a statement about it. The tripartite declaration was made principally in the context of arms supplies at a time when the signatories to it were the only arms suppliers to the Middle East. The situation has been very much changed since that time. Mr. Macmillan, in 1963, and my right hon. Friend and I since, have made clear that we do not think it relevant to the present situation. What is relevant is our obligation as members of the United Nations.

Mr. Driberg: When my right hon. Friend discussed Vietnam with the President, was any reference made to the disclosure in Toronto that the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs had threatened total nuclear retaliation against China if China should enter the Vietnam war, even with conventional weapons?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. No reference was made to that. I have not seen that particular report and I cannot say anything about that. The only member of the United States Government who has authority either to threaten or invoke such a threat is the President of the United States, and I am satisfied that that is not his intention.

Mr. Sandys: Can the Prime Minister give us some indication of the kind of action he has in mind to secure the reopening of the Suez Canal?

The Prime Minister: I have made it clear that it is only in the past few hours that this report has come through. We have been checking on its accuracy, content and meaning. I think that the right hon. Gentleman would not wish us to jump to any conclusions about what our attitude should be. I am sure that he will be particularly concerned that we should not jump to wrong conclusions about how to set about it.

Mr. Hale: As a number of the combatant Arab nations are members of the

sterling area, is not this war on their side being partly financed at the expense of the £? May not it be necessary, in view of the embargoes they announced today, for Her Majesty's Government reluctantly to consider a moratorium upon those States which have declared a trade war upon Britain?

The Prime Minister: I am not sure if the opening part of my hon. Friend's question meant—I am sure that he did not mean this—that we were some way financing this war. We are not financing it in any way. It is true that a number of the countries on both sides hold balances in this country. This is a commercial matter, and I am quite sure that my hon. Friend's suggestion would not be appropriate in present circumstances. We have had no suggestion in any form of economic warfare against this country. I think that it would be quite wrong to consider that solution.

Mr. Tapsell: While we all recognise the importance of not allowing the conflict in the Middle East to drag the great Powers in to conflict with one another, will the Prime Minister recognise that many of the small Powers in the Middle East are deeply reluctant to have their affairs settled by the great Powers. Will he, therefore, direct his mind to calling a peace conference with one of the smaller neutralist Powers in the chair?

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Brown): Which one?

The Prime Minister: That raises the question, "Which one?". I think that this matter should be left to the Security Council. The Security Council is properly representative of great Powers, small Powers, Middle East Powers and neutral Powers. I think that it is a matter for the Security Council. We have given every support to the proposal of the President of France for close four-Power co-operation under the aegis of the Security Council to that end. As the House will know, my right hon. Friend and I are in very close touch at this moment with the heads of Governments of the other three permanent members of the Security Council.

Mr. Dickens: Did the Prime Minister make it clear to President Johnson that the British Government will dissociate themselves from any further American escalation of the war in Vietnam, and, in particular, will strongly oppose any American land invasion of North Vietnam.

The Prime Minister: The President of the United States fully understands our position so far as any further escalation is concerned, including any crossing of the border or invasion of North Vietnam.

Mr. Burden: While the Prime Minister has given the complete lie to the malicious invention of Colonel Nasser regarding British air cover over Egypt yesterday, does he agree that while that invention might indicate the massive blows that were struck against him it also indicates a very dangerous situation in which, whenever such blows are struck, Colonel Nasser might well try to blame us so as to involve us with Russia?

However successful the Israelis may be, they can never conquer the Arab States, so will the Prime Minister undertake to put into discussion immediately with the United Nations considerations to try to ensure the future of Israel when this war has ended?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman was quite right to stress the dangers which, as he indicated, are only part of the dangers. I have made clear that when my right hon. Friend meets the Arab Ambassadors later today he will give them chapter and verse for our denial of the malicious statement that has been made. This is also being made clear in the capitals of the countries concerned.

The second point was on?

Mr. Burden: The limited success of the Israelis.

The Prime Minister: I do not think that there has been any suggestion of a war of conquest here. The Prime Minister of Israel has said that Israel seeks no territorial changes, but wants to be in a position to resist aggression. I think that we can help best in these circumstances by not entering into declarations on these questions. Our job is to help, with those on the Security Council, to get a peace which satisfies the honourable requirements of all parties in the area.

Mr. Winnick: While we want to get a cease-fire as quickly as possible, may I

[MR. WINNICK.]
ask whether my right hon. Friend is aware that many people in Britain consider Israel now to be in the same position as we were in 1940, standing alone and fighting those who want to destroy her and put her people to death?

The Prime Minister: I think that historical parallels, particularly in the Middle East, can very often lead to the wrong conclusions and dangerous courses of action. We have stated our position; it was fully stated in the debate last week. The Israeli Government have made it clear that they are fighting in this conflict on their own and do not desire outside help. It would be very harmful for me to follow up the kind of question put by my hon. Friend.

Mr. Walters: What new steps does the Prime Minister propose to take to bring about a cease-fire irrespective of which way the war happens to be progressing?

The Prime Minister: This is being done through the Security Council, where my right hon. Friend is in hour by hour touch with Lord Caradon and giving him instructions as to the line he should take there. We are working for a cease-fire as quickly as possible so that we can then discuss the more long-term problems that need to be laid down if we are to have some kind of guarantee against this kind of tension and war arising again. In addition, as I have said, we are in very close touch with the other Governments principally concerned, not themselves being Governments involved in the fighting.

Mr. Molloy: In his discussions with the President of the United States, did my right hon. Friend raise the question of the United States now facing reality and making a move to recognise the People's Republic of China at every level of diplomacy?

The Prime Minister: Not on this occasion, Sir. There was a lot more to talk about, and the President of the United States fully understands our point of view on this, which has been explained both by my right hon. Friend and by myself in speeches to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I understood that the Prime Minister, in talking about an embargo on arms, rightly said that this needed close consideration because it must cover all suppliers. I understood him to go on to say that this country was suspending the shipment of arms to any country in the area, or am I mistaken? He will be aware that the Soviet Union is doing nothing of the kind. How long will the shipments from this country be suspended if the Russians do not take the same action?

The Prime Minister: We are trying to find out the position with regard to the other countries. A statement has been made by France which we are trying to verify and get elaborated, and the position of the Soviet Union needs to be known more clearly than it is at the present time.

But I agree with what I think is the right hon. Gentleman's point of view, that whatever is done should not be on a basis which creates unfairness as between one side and another in the Middle East. We have, of course, arms deliveries on order not only to Israel, but to other areas of the Middle East. We are, therefore, temporarily making this administrative suspension of shipments while we explore the situation with other countries, and we shall review the matter again tomorrow. It is a 24-hour suspension in the first instance.

Mr. Mendelson: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that if it is found that the Soviet Government are continuing arms supplies to Egypt and to Syria, whose Governments have publicly pledged the destruction of Israel, our country will not leave the people of Israel without the wherewithal to defend themselves.

Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Speaker: Order. We are discussing a very grave issue.

The Prime Minister: I have said that we believe that the proper settlement of the arms question should be on a basis of fairness and balance between the two sides who are fighting. Certainly, if we were to find that arms were going from anywhere else to one side that would be a very important issue to be taken up in our reconsideration of the matter tomorrow. At the moment, we are by administrative action stopping shipments, whether to Israel or to Arab countries,

until we have a clearer picture of the international arms supply to those areas.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: In view of the disappointing news which the Prime Minister has given of the state of affairs in the City of Jerusalem, and the fact that serious damage there would be a world tragedy, will he consider taking an initiative with all the Powers concerned to have Jerusalem declared an open city, in the same way and for the same purposes as Rome was so declared in the latter stages of the last war?

The Prime Minister: I should like to make it clear that not only do we fully support the appeal made yesterday by His Holiness the Pope to that very end, but that we have gone further and made plain our willingness, in addition to what is happening in the Security Council, to assist in a local sense to do anything to bring about a cease-fire to protect Jerusalem, not only to stop the damage and carnage there, but to protect the Holy City itself. We have actually been at work in trying to arrange a local cease-fire in Jerusalem.

Mr. Heffer: Further to the point concerning arms sales, will my right hon. Friend say what discussions are now taking place with the Soviet Government to stop Soviet arms going to the Middle East?

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend will know that we are in the closest touch with the Soviet Government. I have exchanged a number of messages with Mr. Kosygin on the broader issue, my right hon. Friend is in close touch with the Ambassador—I saw the Ambassador myself this afternoon—and we are in close enough touch, I hope, to be able to establish the position on this question. When we have established it, we will consider in the light of that what our own attitude should be.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: In view of all these threats to our interests and, indeed, to the interests of the Commonwealth as a whole, will the Prime Minister now make an unequivocal statement that Britain will maintain an effective presence east of Suez for the foreseeable future?

The Prime Minister: This raises a much wider question than the position in the Middle East, although it is, of course, a fair question, because it arose out of my talks with the President of the United States. We are considering that position. I can now take into account the views of the President. We shall be discussing the position with the Australian and New Zealand Governments during the next two or three weeks before an announcement can be made to the House.

Mr. Ginsburg: Notwithstanding what my right hon. Friend has said about arms supplies, would he be prepared to give the House an assurance that there will be no holding up over the next 24 hours of any request by the Israeli Government for essential medical supplies?

The Prime Minister: I will certainly consider the question of essential medical supplies. I agree that that might require other considerations. I was, of course, referring to arms for the actual fighting, and to arms for both sides.

Sir D. Renton: Further to the question by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter), will the Prime Minister bear in mind that the initiative which he has used and will use further should also relate to the Holy places at Bethlehem, Nazareth and Galilee?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. I think that I am right in saying, however, that those places have not been in any danger as yet, whereas there has been heavy fighting in Jerusalem. Our representatives in Jerusalem have shown great courage—they have been very much under fire themselves yesterday in a very dangerous situation—in what they have been doing to try to arrange a local accommodation in order to secure a cease-fire. If a cease-fire could be arranged, I agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman about extending it to other areas which were involved in the bilateral discussions between Israel and Jordan.

Mr. Kelley: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that it might assist clarification of the situation if Her Majesty's Government stated their attitude to the decisions which were imposed on the Middle East as a result of the tripartite action in 1956 and whether they agree that that situation should persist or otherwise?

The Prime Minister : If my hon. Friend is referring to the settlement made by Mr. Hammarskjoeld at the beginning of March, 1957, relating to the Gulf of Aqaba, the position of Her Majesty's Government and, I think, of the House as a whole, was made clear during the debate last week. As for other issues, we have now to try to get a settlement that will settle those issues, if we can, once and for all.

Mr. Hugh Fraser : Would not the Prime Minister agree that perhaps the most disturbing element in the whole situation is the total breakdown of the United Nations and the Security Council? In view of this, will he urgently call a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the four Great Powers, first, to see whether there cannot be an agreement about reinforcement of arms for the area and, secondly, if that should break down, to try to establish a *cordon sanitaire* to see that no arms come in?

The Prime Minister : No, I think that the right hon. Gentleman's approach is not the right one. I think that all of us feel, as was stated by right hon. Gentlemen opposite and by myself last week in the debate, that the United Nations has taken a serious blow by the decisions of three weeks ago. This was a point which I made strongly when I was in the United Nations building.

It must, however, be a matter for the Security Council now to secure a cease-fire. I believe that it is right for the four Powers concerned, instead of calling a conference at some time in the future, now to work, as we are trying to work, within the Security Council to get that. If it cannot be done by quadripartite co-operation in the Security Council, it cannot be got by quadripartite co-operation outside the Security Council.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker : Order. I need not assure the House that Mr. Speaker shares the awareness of every hon. Member of the House of the gravity of the issues which we are considering. We must, however, move on now to the next item of business.

NIGERIA

Mr. Tilney (*by Private Notice*) asked the Commonwealth Secretary whether he will make a statement on the safety of British subjects and the safeguarding of British interests following full mobilisation in Nigeria.

The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Herbert W. Bowden) : I am in continuous touch with our High Commissioner about the situation in Nigeria. There have been no incidents involving British lives or property. Up until today it has not been necessary to advise any United Kingdom citizens to leave the country, although some families are moving away from the border between the Northern and Eastern regions, which seems the most dangerous area if fighting should break out and it may well be necessary to arrange for further movement at short notice.

We still hope that this trouble can be settled peacefully, and I am sure that the House will support me in this earnest desire.

Mr. Tilney : In view of the large number of Britons in Nigeria and the substantial British capital investment there, can the Secretary of State say what effect the evacuation of United States personnel is having, what advice he is giving to British shipping companies faced with the Federal blockade and what action should be taken by British business companies which have commitments to the Government of the Eastern Region of Nigeria or with companies in what is now known as Biafra?

Mr. Bowden : As to the evacuation of British citizens from Nigeria, the only danger spot at the moment is the Northern area of Eastern Nigeria. While there has been some movement of British nationals across the bridge into other parts of Nigeria, there has not been a great deal of this.

On the other hand, our High Commissioner has been instructed to make facilities available to those women and children, and any men—the number is about 2,000 in the Northern area of Eastern Nigeria—who may wish to leave that area. Ships are available at Port Harcourt, an airlift is available and some of them can get out by road. Our

EN CLAIR

F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMISSION NEW YORK

TELNO. 2613 6 June 1967 (UN POL.)

UNCLASSIFIED

M.I.P.T.: MIDDLE EAST.

QUOTE HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ARE SHOCKED BY REPORTS EMANATING FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND CARRIED BY OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA THAT PLANES FROM A BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIER HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING. THIS IS A MALICIOUS FABRICATION. THERE IS NOT A GRAIN OF TRUTH IN IT. IT IS THE POLICY OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO AVOID TAKING SIDES IN THIS CONFLICT AND TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE FIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS STATED BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY YESTERDAY IN THE HOUSE, ALL BRITISH FORCES IN THE AREA HAVE THE STRICTEST INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY.

2. MEASURES TO INTERRUPT THE NORMAL FLOW OF OIL SUPPLIES OR TO CLOSE THE SUEZ CANAL TO SHIPPING ARE THEREFORE TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED.

3. URGENT STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN IN LONDON AND IN THE CAPITALS OF ARAB STATES TO CORRECT THESE MISREPRESENTATIONS. UNQUOTE

SOSFA SENT 1332Z/6 JUNE 1967

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En Clair

PRIORITY CANBERRA TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno. 905 6 June, 1967.

UNCLASSIFIED

Following is text of statement by Acting Prime Minister this afternoon.

Begins.

The outbreak of fighting in the Middle East is a tragic development. All Australians are dismayed at the suffering and destruction that is being brought to the people of the countries which are now in conflict. In addition any large scale fighting in that region which upsets the precarious balance there holds dangers of involving outside powers and endangering peace elsewhere.

The failure of the Security Council to act before hostilities began is to be deplored. The Australian Government still hopes that the United Nations can discharge its responsibilities and take decisions for which the Australian and other Governments can offer their full support. The Australian Permanent Representative to the United Nations has been instructed to give all support to this end.

On 25 May, the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Hasluck, said: "I hope that all the great powers, whatever their differences on some aspects of the present situation, will nevertheless work together to prevent hostilities." Now that hostilities have broken out, this appeal to the great powers is no less valid. In fact, the urgency is even greater.

Australia has a great concern that peace should be maintained in the Middle East. Where our own good offices can be of use, we are ready to be helpful. Australia looks to the Security Council to act to prevent a widening of hostilities and to bring about an end to the present fighting.

Ends.

Mr. Morgan Sent 0743Z 6 June.
Recd.0745Z 6 June.

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44444

En Clair

IMMEDIATE VALLETTA TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno. 571 6 June 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 571 of 6 June
Repeated for information to Commander British Forces Near East.

My immediately preceding telegram: Malta and Middle East Crisis.

Following is summary of statements made by Dr. Borg Olivier and opposition spokesmen in Malta House of Representatives on 5 June on outbreak of war in Middle East, according to report in Times of Malta of 6 June.

Begins.

"Regarding our relations with the United Kingdom, I have the British Government's assurance that nothing is being done on their side which can involve Malta in this conflict. The exercises and movements of warships and planes are solely connected with routine exercises which have been long planned and with possibilities of evacuation of citizens from countries involved in the war. I would like to add that the Government has already taken steps for Britain to take care of Maltese citizens in case of need of general evacuation from those countries where Britain represents Maltese interests."

2. In rest of his statement Dr. Borg Olivier said fighting created serious threat to world peace and Malta united with those nations who hoped United Nations would find a just and peaceful solution. Malta Government policy was to maintain good relations with the Arab countries and Israel. Malta Government "will not take, or allow anyone using her to take, any action against any one of those countries unless there are involved, in a situation which might develop, the principles and beliefs to which Malta adheres in her foreign policy."

3. Mintoff again demanded to know what principles of Malta's foreign policy were in this connection. He understood them to be those of the United Nations but if Malta Government intended to follow the NATO line, whose interests were different from those of Malta, Prime Minister's statement was incomplete and Malta was still in danger of becoming involved. It was generally known what interests of United Kingdom and United States were in the Middle East. They had shown their hand from the beginning and if Malta followed them "we would be unnecessarily subjected to reprisals from others."

4. In reply Dr. Borg Olivier said that Malta was a member of the United Nations and of the Council of Europe and was

/associated

associated with NATO. Friendly relations were maintained with all those countries with whom Malta had diplomatic ties. It was useless to refer to interests of United Kingdom and United States. Malta looked at her own interests. The interests of the United Kingdom and the United States were not necessarily those of Malta. But the House should not insist on the Government foreseeing what would be Malta's position in the case of a conflagration which might or might not develop. It was generally agreed to be in the nation's interest to keep war away from this island. He wished Malta had sufficient influence to keep war away not only from Malta but also from those poor countries where people were now facing death.

5. Mintoff intervened again to say opposition interpreted Borg Olivier's statement as meaning that Malta would not automatically follow NATO into the conflict but that a distinction would be made between Malta's interests and NATO's interests. If this were done, it would be found that neutrality was the best course for Malta.

6. Mr. Carachi of Malta Labour Party said he hoped Britain's assurance on not involving Malta was reliable. Present movement of ships and planes could hardly be called routine movements. Borg Olivier did not comment.

C.O. pass Commander British Forces Near East Routine and Unnumbered.

Sir G. Tory

Sent 1340/6 June 1967
Recd 1253Z/6 June 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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CYPHER/CAT.A.
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1949
CONFIDENTIAL
MIDDLE EAST.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 6TH JUNE 1967

I CALLED ON DEAN RUSK TODAY TO OBTAIN HIS LATEST ASSESSMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. I ARRIVED ON THE HEELS OF A NUMBER OF RELATION-BREAKING ARAB AMBASSADORS.

2. RUSK SAID HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD ADOPT A SIMPLE ONE-LINE RESOLUTION, AS THEY HAVE, CALLING FOR AN END TO THE FIGHTING SEMI COLON BUT THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD APPLY FOR A CEASE-FIRE FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER TWENTY-FOUR HOURS AND THEY WERE LIKELY TO BARGAIN VERY HARD WITH A VIEW TO GETTING RID OF ARAB ''RIGHTS OF BELLIGERENCE'' AND WITHDRAWING TO A ''STATE OF PEACE''. I ASKED WHETHER THIS WOULD IMPLY FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL. RUSK SAID THAT IT WAS UP TO THE ISRAELIS TO NEGOTIATE THIS FOR THEMSELVES WITH THE ARABS AND U. THANT.

3. RUSK DESCRIBED EGYPTIAN CHARGES OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE FIGHTING AS A ''GIGANTIC ALIBI'' FOR THEIR DEFEAT AT THE HANDS OF THE ISRAELIS. HE WAS ASKING ARAB AMBASSADORS WHOSE COUNTRIES WERE BREAKING RELATIONS WHETHER THE BREAK WAS PERMANENT OR ONLY APPLIED UP TO THE TIME WHEN THERE WAS A CEASE FIRE SEMI COLON HE HOPED IN THIS WAY TO LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN FOR THE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS LATER.

4. IN THE LONGER TERM RUSK HOPED THAT THE SWISS MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO TAKE THE LEAD ON THE REFUGEE QUESTION AND THAT THERE MIGHT ALSO BE A NEW REGIONAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT AND WATER PROBLEMS. THE U.S. WERE ANXIOUS NOT TO TAKE TOO MUCH OF A LEAD IN ALL THIS.

/I ASKED

I ASKED IF AMERICAN THINKING ALSO INCLUDED GETTING A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE BACK AND RUSK CONFIRMED THAT IT DID. HE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING FURTHER SOUNDINGS OF THE RUSSIANS ON THE LEVEL OF ARMS IN THE AREA. IT WOULD BE TOO BAD IF THE 300 EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT DESTROYED WERE JUST REPLACED.

5. THESE IDEAS CORRESPOND IN GENERAL WITH THOSE OUTLINED BY WALT ROSTOW YESTERDAY AND IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL TO ME IN FOLLOWING UP THIS DISCUSSION IF YOU COULD LET HAVE, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, YOUR FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE NEXT STEPS (YOUR TEL. 6059).

SIR. P. DEAN

SENT AT 0345 7 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 0346 7 JUNE 1967

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D.I.S. M.O.D.

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT.A.
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1950
SECRET
M.I.P.T. MIDDLE EAST.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 6TH JUNE 1967

RUSK TOLD ME PRIVATELY LATER THAT THE AMERICANS HAD HAD A FURTHER EXCHANGE EARLY THIS MORNING WITH KOSYGIN. THEY HAD PUT IT TO HIM VERY STRONGLY THAT BOTH SIDES REALLY MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO GET THE FIGHTING STOPPED AT ONCE. THEY HAD ALSO EXPLAINED TO KOSYGIN THAT THE US HAD A SPECIAL COMMITMENT ABOUT THE TIRAN STRAITS WHICH WENT BEYOND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. IN 1957 PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, AS THE PRICE OF GETTING THE ISRAELIS OUT OF THE SINAI PENINSULA, HAD UNDERTAKEN A DEFINITE COMMITMENT ABOUT FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE TIRAN STRAITS. THIS COMMITMENT HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE UAR. THE UAR HAD NOT AGREED TO THE COMMITMENT BUT THEY HAD ENJOYED THE BENEFIT. RUSK SAID THAT HE FELT SURE THAT THE DAY'S EXCHANGE WITH KOSYGIN HAD HELPED TO CLEAR THE WAY FOR AN AGREEMENT ON A CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. RUSK PARTICULARLY ASKED THAT THE ABOVE EXCHANGE SHOULD BE KEPT TO A VERY SMALL CIRCULATION AND THAT NO MENTION OF IT SHOULD BE MADE IN ANY MESSAGES FROM LONDON EITHER TO HIMSELF OR TO THE PRESIDENT.

3. AS WE WERE ALONE, I ASKED RUSK WHY HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD SO CLEARLY MISCALCULATED THE MILITARY PROFICIENCY OF THE U A R AND OTHER ARAB STATES AND HAD GONE SO FAR IN ENCOURAGING THEM TO ADOPT SUCH A MEAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISRAEL. RUSK SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IN FACT NASSER HAD BEEN HELPED BY THE UNEXPECTED WINDFALL OF U THANT'S CAPITULATION OVER THE UNEF AND HAD GONE MUCH FURTHER OUT THAN THE RUSSIANS INTENDED. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS PROBABLY HOPED, AND EXPECTED, THAT THE US WHO THEY BELIEVED COULD CONTROL THE ISRAELIS COMPLETELY WOULD IN FACT SUCCEED IN RESTRAINING THEM. THE RESULT MIGHT THEREFORE WELL BE THAT THE RUSSIANS NOW THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD BEEN DOUBLE-CROSSED BY THE AMERICANS JUST WHEN THEY THEMSELVES HOPED TO DOUBLE CROSS THE AMERICANS AND THAT THEY WOULD THEREFORE BE IN A DIFFICULT MOOD WHEN THE TIME CAME TO DEAL WITH A LONG-TERM SETTLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS. THE RUSSIANS WOULD PROBABLY NOT WANT A FURTHER CRISIS TO ARISE AGAIN BUT

/ THEY

THEY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY DO THEIR BEST TO UNDERMINE THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN POWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO HELP NASSER TO SAVE WHAT HE COULD FROM THE WRECK, ASSUMING THAT NASSER'S OWN PRESTIGE HAD NOT SUFFERED TOO BADLY BY HIS IGNOMINIOUS DEFEAT. RUSK SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE MODERATE REGIMES IN THE MIDDLE EAST WERE LIKELY TO BE IN SERIOUS TROUBLE FROM NOW ON.

SIR. P. DEAN.

SENT AT 07/0537Z RECD AT 07/0541Z

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CYPHER/CAT.A.

PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1952

SECRET

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

DATED 6TH JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1952 OF 6 JUNE 1967 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO U.K.DEL. N.A.T.O. MIDDLE EAST.

WHEN I SAW RUSK TODAY (MY TELEGRAM 1949) I SPOKE ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 6060. HE REITERATED THE AMERICAN INTEREST IN GETTING N.A.T.O. COUNTRIES TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF AREAS OUTSIDE N.A.T.O. LUNS WAS VERY GOOD, BUT THE REST JUST DID NOT SEEM INTERESTED. IF N.A.T.O. REFUSED TO DISCUSS THIS CRISIS ON THEIR DOOR STEP AND IN WHICH THEIR ESSENTIAL OIL SUPPLIES WERE INVOLVED, WHAT OTHER FORUM WAS MORE SUITABLE ? RUSK DID NOT HIMSELF REFER TO THE IDEA OF FORMING A SPECIAL GROUP IN N.A.T.O. ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT TAKE TOO AGGRESSIVE A LINE ON THIS AT N.A.T.O. MEETING, BUT THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT SOMEHOW TO GET THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO FACE THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THEIR INTERESTS, IN THE AREA.

FO PASS PRIORITY TO UKDEL NATO 191

SIR P. DEAN

GPS 120

SENT AT....070615Z FJF

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

FLASH KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 209 6 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 209 of 6 June
Repeated for information Saving to:- Damascus, Cairo, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Washington and U.K.Mis New York.

Prime Minister summoned American Ambassador and myself this afternoon to tell us that his Government were receiving reports that United States and British aircraft were providing air cover for Israeli forces and had made attacks on Arab countries. He said that if this news was confirmed he would have no alternative but to break all diplomatic relations with the British and United States Governments. He asked us to inform our Governments accordingly. While he was talking he received information over the telephone about a Damascus report alleging that captured Israeli pilot had confessed that United States aircraft were operating from a base in Saudi Arabia and that British aircraft were also taking part.

2. Prime Minister had already received a letter which I sent to him this morning quoting your statement in the House on 5 June expressing concern at these reports of participation by British aircraft which were being put out by Cairo and Amman radio, drawing his attention to your statement that the British concern is not to take sides and that instructions had been given to all our forces in the area to avoid any involvement in the conflict. I again emphasised the British Government's determination to avoid taking sides which had been affirmed on several occasions as he knew in recent days in the strongest terms and that I hoped he would attach no credence to what appeared to be mischievous propaganda.

3. The American Ambassador had just received a telegram from the State Department informing him that the U.A.R. Ambassador had been summoned to State Department and had been told that the United States Government took the most serious view of these false accusations being propagated by his Government and asked that they should cease forthwith. My United States colleague was also able to say that there were no American bases whatsoever in Saudi Arabia.

4. I promised to report the conversation at once and assured the Prime Minister that I should be able to let him have the most categorical statement from the British Government that these reports were entirely without foundation.

/5. After

5. After seeing the Prime Minister I received Guidance Telegram No. 128 giving text of Foreign Office Press release on this subject. I am sending the text of this round at once to the Foreign Ministry but feel sure that a specific reply to the Prime Minister's representations will be necessary if we are to achieve the desired effect.

6. May I suggest that the most effective way of giving the Prime Minister (in his capacity as Foreign Minister) the sort of re-assurances that he will need to use with some of his Cabinet colleagues would be in a personal message from yourself.

Foreign Office please pass unnumbered Saving to Damascus, Cairo, Amman, Tel Aviv, Washington, U.K.Mis New York and Beirut.

Sir R. Fowler

Sent 1355Z 6 June, 1967
Recd 1550Z 6 June, 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 210 6 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

My immediately preceding telegram: Shipping in Port Sudan.

When I saw the Prime Minister this morning I told him that I had received reports that no shipping facilities would henceforth be available for British ships in Port Sudan.

2. He assured me that this was a move organized by the Trade Unions and that it had no Government authority. He had in fact already issued instructions for the Union to be told that if a ban of this kind should become necessary the Government had full powers to issue the necessary orders.

3. The Prime Minister also confirmed that there were no Government restrictions on use by British civil aircraft of airports in the Sudan.

Sir R. Fowler

Sent 1400Z 6 June
Recd. 2053Z 6 June

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Nath T/153/67

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

June 6, 1967

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the attached message to you from President Johnson.

Sincerely yours,

Philip M. Kaiser
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

The Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson, O.B.E., M.P.,
The Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street, S. W. 1.

Subject

PRIME MINISTER'S

T155/67

SECRET

QUOTE -

Dear Harold:

I appreciate your comments on the unfortunate developments in the Near East. We had feared that someone might feel compelled to strike. We had no advance indication that a decision had been taken. We believed, in fact, we had at least a clean week for diplomacy.

Arthur Goldberg has had a difficult time in the Security Council. Like you, we had hoped for a quick cease-fire resolution. But we have had to deal with a determined effort to have the Council call for a withdrawal of forces in terms which would legitimize Nasser's action at the Strait of Tiran -- a subject on which we have both taken unequivocal positions.

We have done everything we could to get an even-handed Security Council pronouncement. We shall work with your people in New York to encourage helpful UN action. If the Soviets, and the French, are more forthcoming than they have been, both of us will want to build on that development to work toward a satisfactory settlement.

Meanwhile, I hope we can keep in closest touch as the military situation develops and put the best minds available to both of us to work on the contingencies that may arise and the constructive possibilities that may unfold.

I think you know the deep satisfaction I derived from our discussions.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

-UNQUOTE

S E C R E T

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR. GEORGE BROWN IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON 6 JUNE, 1967

With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on the situation in the Middle East.

The House will have heard with satisfaction that the Security Council of the United Nations has now adopted unanimously a resolution calling for a cease-fire. The Council's most urgent task will now be to get this resolution implemented. I was glad to see that the Israel Foreign Minister in his speech to the Council yesterday evening welcomed the appeal for the cease-fire, while pointing out that this implementation demands an absolute and sincere acceptance and cooperation of the other parties. It is now for those other parties to make equally clear their welcome for the appeal for the cease-fire so that this can come into force without any delay. I have seen a report that the United Arab Republic may have rejected the appeal. I hope they will think better of this very quickly. It seems to be much in their own interest to do so.

/Once

2. Once the cease-fire has been implemented the Security Council will need to turn its most urgent attention to the further steps that are needed to secure a lasting peace in the area. It is too early to speculate in detail about the form that this might take, but I am myself convinced that there will have to be a thorough re-examination of all aspects of the root causes of the conflict.

3. Prior to the implementation of the cease-fire, it is now very clear that the military struggle has been going in favour of Israel. It is evident that in the first twenty-four hours of the fighting the Israel Air Force established complete air superiority over the Air force of the United Arab Republic and its allies. On the ground, Israel forces defeated United Arab Republic forces in the Gaza strip, and are engaging Egyptian units deep in the Sinai Desert. There has been fierce fighting on the Israel/Jordan front and Israel forces captured large areas of Jordan territory on the West bank of the River Jordan. I am sorry to report that fighting has been particularly bitter in Jerusalem and still continues in that area. I have no reports of any serious damage to the Holy Places.

4. The United Arab Republic, through Cairo Radio, have continued to broadcast the straight lie that British and American air forces have taken part in the fighting on the side of Israel. I repeat that this is a lie. It not only did not happen but, it could not have happened, as they well know. In the light of the military situation I have described the reason for this lie is quite clear. The United Arab Republic is trying to give itself an alibi for its own military failures and the extent to which its failures have let down its allies. The Government have taken every step open to them to deny this action. We have made statements in this House and issued statements to the Press. We have made both oral and written communications in Arab capitals and to Arab Heads of Mission in London. My right honourable and Noble Friend Lord Caradon has spoken in the Security Co ncil and had circulated a written denial to all members of the Security Council. The United States Delegate to the United Nations yesterday offered facilities for United Nations observers in the vessels of the American Sixth Fleet to check the falsity of the story. I am equally ready to make a similar offer for United Nations observers to visit any of our ships in the area and any of our Royal Air Force stations, including those at Cyprus and Malta. We wish to nail this lie once and for all.

5./

5. I am sorry to report to the House that the broadcasting of this lie has misled certain Arab countries into taking a series of measures against Britain. My right honourable Friend informed the House of some of these yesterday. The list is now as follows. British Embassies and Consulates and British Council premises have been attacked and damaged in many Arab cities. The United Arab Republic Government have closed the Suez Canal to all traffic. The Governments of Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Syria and Lebanon have taken steps to interfere with oil supplies, either to the United Kingdom and United State of America only or in some cases on a wider basis. The Governments of Iraq, Syria and Sudan have notified us that they are breaking off diplomatic relations: relations were of course already broken with the United Arab Republic and Algeria. It is my sincere hope these Governments will reverse their attitude now that it is clear not only that the allegation was a lie, but what the motives of the Egyptians have been in propagating it.

6. Nevertheless, the Government are having to make suitable arrangements for the protection of British interests if the countries concerned persist in breaches of diplomatic relations. We are in touch with appropriate governments to act as protecting powers.

7. Arrangements are also going ahead to evacuate further numbers of British subjects from countries involved in the fighting and from countries which have broken diplomatic relations. However, in some of these cases a breach of diplomatic relations will presumably not extend to commercial relations and I would expect that, where there is no immediate danger to life and property, many British Subjects will still wish to remain.

8. Urgent steps are being taken to readjust the pattern of oil supplies to this country. While there may well be temporary inconveniences for us, there should be no insuperable problem. The action taken against us has come at a time of oil surplus in the world and the countries which have taken it may find that they have done their own economic interests much greater harm than they have done to ours.

9. On the question of arms shipments, we are continuing our efforts to achieve a suspension of the export of all arms supplies to this area, and the call for a cease-fire reinforces the position we have taken up on this.

10. However, I am bound to warn the House the situation at the moment is that we have had no reponse from the Russians and we understand the Americans are not placing an embargo. In this situation it makes it very difficult for Britain to maintain the suspension of supplies which we have already unilaterally imposed.

11. In any long term agreement which is negotiated, limitation and control over arms exports into the area will clearly be a very important factor.

Copied Kcd c Nanuil

T 158/67

CONFIDENTIAL

June 6, 1967

The Soviet Ambassador called on the Prime Minister at his own request at 1.30 p.m. today to deliver a further message from Mr. Kosygin, a copy of which is enclosed.

The Prime Minister said that we were facing a very serious situation. Mr. Kosygin's letter would be carefully considered. The British Government's purpose was to achieve a resolution at the Security Council calling for a cease-fire. He was sure that the Soviet Permanent Representative at New York was in touch with his British and other colleagues but he thought that it would be useful if Mr. Federenko and Lord Caradon could meet privately to discuss the situation, and he knew that Lord Caradon was under instructions to do this at any appropriate moment. He would reply to Mr. Kosygin in due course and hoped that the British and Soviet Governments could continue to keep in close touch.

The Ambassador enquired about the Prime Minister's reply sent last night to Kosygin's message of yesterday. The Prime Minister gave him an account of the reply (and, as the Ambassador was leaving, I gave him a copy of it for which

he asked).

The Ambassador asked if Her Majesty's Government would support the line in Kosygin's message. The Prime Minister said that the difficulty about calling for a "withdrawal of forces beyond the truce line" was that this meant in effect a return to 1948; and he doubted whether this was a realistic demand if we hoped for a cease-fire. It would mean that President Nasser's assertion of his claim to control thetStraits of Tiran would be given apparent validity. In the British view, whatever was done now should not prejudice the prospects of a long-term settlement that would be honourable to all the countries in the area. Recognition of the Egyptian position on the Straits would represent a one-sided arrangement that in his view Israel could not be expected to accept. Our purpose should be to achieve a cease-fire. The Security Council should then take vigorous action to bring about a settlement that could result in the countries of the area living together in peace and confidence. There had been considerable talk on all sides about "victory" as was evident from situations in other parts of the world, a search for total victory was incompatible with a search for peace. At present both sides were putting forward claims which, if accepted in full, would rule out any honourable settlement. Britain and the Soviet Union could usefully work together for such a settlement and if the Four Powers could reach agreement in consultation with the countries of the area, lasting peace could be secured.

The Prime Minister said that in the statement he would be making this afternoon in the House he would categorically deny the allegations by certain Arab Governments that British and American aircraft had been involved in the military operations. He asked the Ambassador to inform the Soviet Government of this. Not only was it untrue; it was also impossible. The aircraft carrier "Victorious" was in Malta; and "Hermes" in Aden, both a thousand miles from the scene of conflict. In any case, such action by British forces would be totally contrary to the British Government's policy of non-intervention and the avoidance of taking sides in the conflict. The Prime Minister repeated that he wished Mr. Smirnovsky to bring this to the attention of Mr. Kosygin and the Ambassador agreed to do so.

I am copying this letter to Nairne (Ministry of Defence) and Reid (Cabinet Office).

A M. Palliser

C.M. MacLehose, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

Subject

T 158/67

Translation from Russian

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No. T 158/67

Mr.H.Wilson,
Prime Minister,
10, Downing Street,
London.

Mr.Prime Minister,

Military action in the Middle East continue. Moreover its scale is increasing.

The Soviet Government is convinced that a resolute demand for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces beyond the truce line would correspond to the interests of restoring peace. We express the hope that this demand will be supported by the Government of Great Britain. We support it.

Everything possible should be done to ensure the adoption by the Security Council to day of a positive decision on this matter.

With respect,

A.KOSYGIN
Chairman of the USSR Council
of Ministers

The Kremlin,
Moscow,
6th June, 1967

Лондон,
Даунинг стрит, IO,
Премьер-министру Г. Вильсону

Господин Премьер-министр,

Военные действия на Ближнем Востоке продолжаются. Более того, масштаб их расширяется.

Советское правительство убеждено, что интересам восстановления мира отвечало бы решительное требование о немедленном прекращении огня и отводе войск за линию перемирия. Мы выражаем надежду, что правительство Великобритании поддержит в Совете Безопасности указанное требование. Мы его поддерживаем.

Надо было бы сделать все возможное, чтобы сегодня Советом Безопасности было принято по этому вопросу положительное решение.

С уважением

А. КОСЫГИН
Председатель Совета
Министров СССР

Москва, Кремль

6 июня 1967 года

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office
S.W.1

6 June, 1967.

Dear Michael,

You asked for a draft reply to the message from Mr. Kosygin delivered by the Soviet Ambassador today (your letter of 6 June).

... I enclose a draft prepared in the Department.

The Foreign Secretary has not seen it, but I am sure he would approve its general line.

Yours,

A. M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.,
10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft Letter from the Prime Minister to Mr. Kosygin

Many thanks for your message. I entirely agree that we should concentrate on obtaining a cease-fire. I think the best place to work for this at the moment is the Security Council. You can rely on our cooperation in achieving this as soon as possible - preferably to-day.

I learn that Lord ~~Arthur Goldberg and Hugh~~ Caradon ~~are~~ is now trying as the U.S. colleague, Mr Goldberg, to reach an agreement with Mr. Federenko on the basis of an expanded draft resolution which calls for a cease fire and in addition a withdrawal of forces, but

~~Hurt & Ingrid~~ . . ..

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Since we have got a Security Council Resolution, we still face many difficult & dangerous problems. In the House of Commons today, I said that we must get a solution which meets the honourable requirements of all concerned. This means we must work together to this end.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft Letter from the Prime Minister to Mr. Kosygin

Many thanks for your message. I entirely agree that we should concentrate on obtaining a cease-fire. I think the best place to work for this at the moment is the Security Council. You can rely on our cooperation in achieving this as soon as possible - preferably to-day.

I learn that Lord ~~Arthur Goldberg and Hugh~~ Caradon ~~are~~ is now trying as the U.S. colleague, Mr. Goldberg, to reach an agreement with Mr. Federenko on the basis of an expanded draft resolution which calls for a cease fire and in addition a withdrawal of forces, but "without prejudice to the respective rights claims or position of anyone." It also calls on both parties to work for the disengagement of their forces and to reduce tension.

In our view this expanded draft resolution would not be as good as a simple cease fire resolution but we would certainly accept it. In any case we hope that the present intensive negotiations now going on in New York will result in a unanimous resolution by the Security Council. // Please get in touch with me again if you have further thoughts on this dangerous problem.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TRANSCRIPTION OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. LESTER PEARSON AT 9.13 P.M. ON TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 1967.

LP Hallo.

PM Is that you Mike?

LP Yes Harold.

PM I have been into all this. As you said it is very difficult because there is a danger that on the sort of resolution that is going to go through there will be pressure on certain people to take action which in the circumstances of their (you know) victory they will not be willing to do, and then trouble will follow tomorrow, but ..

LP You think that resolution is going to go through do you?

PM Well there is no doubt about it I think because first of all we have got the fact of Mr. G. supporting it.

LP Well, if you three are supporting it then so far as we are concerned it is over.

PM Well we are more worried about it than Mr. G. is you know.

LP He may well find himself faced with some difficult decisions.

PM Well .. we .. this is exactly what I agree. I gather your man has endorsed it readily.

LP Yes we will have to go along with anything.

PM No, more than that Mike, I think that your man

has welcomed it.

LP Well he has of course, but we are worried about the possible consequences as regards Washington.

PM So am I. What I am afraid of here is that certain people - I mean people who we are asking to restrain themselves - will tell us to go and stuff ourselves.

LP That is what I am afraid because they have really got the bit in their teeth now.

PM Of course they have, and very naturally. The next thing then is that there will be a move tomorrow to brand them as enemies of peace.

LP Exactly.

PM But I am advised that we can probably deal with that all right.

LP I am glad to hear that.

PM But I am very worried about it because I think they will tell us to stuff ourselves.

LP That is what I am worried about.

PM The other thing is of course we have in it - and this is what Mr. F. is not very fond of - the phrasing (have you got the thing in front of you) about refraining from acts of force regardless of their nature.

LP Yes that is quite helpful in terms of the water business.

PM That means the water business you and I talked about last week outside.

LP That is quite helpful.

PM That is helpful. Now I guess that the people who have got the bit between their teeth will say "we are prepared to consider doing what we are asked to do," provided that this reference is interpreted in the water terms. Now it seems to me Mike, there are two points here. One is there is another part of the draft which is not yet agreed and on which it would be very helpful if your people would throw their full weight in, either tonight - I mean either when it is still in drafting stage or when it comes before the full group and that is, we are still fighting for the phrase - you know the phrase 'behind the lines' - we don't like that because it does create difficulties about certain marginal areas, one of them starting with 'L' (you know the one I mean). We are trying to fight for a phrase saying 'withdrawal to where they were before the start of hostilities'. But if you can support us on that one. We are not getting a lot of support from south of the Parallel that you have got.

LP I will look into that at once.

PM It is very important.

LP ... to make a statement emphasising the interpretation of these words as applying to the water.

PM Well, I think two points, Mike. One, if your people will support us, with no support from the place below your Parallel (you know what I mean), if they will support us on the phrase - instead of the

'behind the lines', the phrase 'before hostilities', meaning, as they were last Sunday, that makes a big difference psychologically to those who have got the bit between their teeth. And secondly, to say that we absolutely insist that the reference to refraining from acts of force does refer to water not land.

LP Especially to the latter.

PM Yes, that is important.

LP I will check on the former right away.

PM Now the other thing, Mike. I very much welcomed your statement last night which has rather fallen on the desert air but which deserves a better fate. I do not believe we are going to get out of this without a straight four power job.

LP No I don't think so and I keep hammering away at that because you may have to vote, the four of you, far beyond what the Security Council could vote.

PM Well we can do it. You see there are two problems here in my mind. One is, I am very glad that since we spoke to you I found out that Mr. F. is sitting down with Mr. G. and Lord C. Now that is an improvement, and the fourth member of the party I think will be prepared to go along with it. I would hope that the resolution when agreed will be signed by all four of them and not put forward just by Mr. G. That's one point.

LP That's a big subject.

PM Well this is what I think we ought to work for.

LP Well, thank you very much Harold. I hate bothering you at this hour.

PM But Mike one more point. If we run into further difficulties and I think we may because those who have the bit between their teeth may say to hell with this. Then I think we ought to go, as your suggestion, for four powers at top level. I am very anxious not second level because two of the four - I mean I am happy about our chap and I am happy about the chap south of you.

LP ~~We can~~ It would just ~~add~~ be ad referendum.

PM Well Couve and Gromyko would be no good to us.

LP That is right.

PM So any backing you can give on that and if necessary a fresh initiative would be useful.

PM All right Harold.

LP O.K. Mike, thanks very much for phoning. It has been very helpful.

Seen. D
6/6.

SECRET

RECORD OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. LESTER PEARSON AT 9.10 P.M. ON TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 1967.

Mr. Pearson had telephoned the Prime Minister at 6 p.m. to express his concern that the Israelis might in the event not be prepared to comply with the terms of the Resolution that was under discussion in the Security Council. This could create a very difficult situation. The Prime Minister said that he was not completely in touch with the latest developments. He would look into the position himself and telephone Mr. Pearson later in the evening.

When he telephoned back, the Prime Minister said that he agreed that there was a danger that, if the Resolution now under discussion (telegram No 1227 from New York of June 5) were passed, the Israelis would be unwilling to comply with it in circumstances where they had won a victory. This would mean that there would be serious difficulties and there would no doubt be a movement to brand them as "enemies of peace". The Prime Minister said, however, that he understood that the Canadian representative at the Security Council had gone along with the Resolution, and indeed welcomed it.

Mr. Pearson said that the Canadian representative had gone along with the Resolution but he was genuinely

worried about its consequences. But if the British, Americans and Russians were in agreement on it, there seemed little that could be done. But he was worried that the Israelis, with the bit between their teeth, would refuse to comply with it.

The Prime Minister said that he was advised that we could probably deal with the problem in the Security Council. But he said there was one point in the Resolution - which the Russians did not like - and this was the reference to "refrain from acts of force regardless of their nature". This was intended to refer to the Suez Canal and was, in his view, quite helpful from this point of view provided it was clearly understood in this sense.

Mr. Pearson agreed.

The Prime Minister said that the Israelis might well be ready to consider complying with the Resolution provided this reference were interpreted to refer to the Suez Canal.

The Prime Minister went on to say that the Resolution also referred to "withdrawal ..... behind the armistice lines". He explained that we disliked this reference because of the difficulty it would create in relation to which line was referred to. We would therefore prefer to see substituted for this a reference to withdrawal to where the parties were before the start of hostilities. It would be helpful

if the Canadians could press for this amendment either at the drafting stage or when the Resolution was before the full Security Council. He explained that this was a point in which we could not expect support from the United States. He believed, however, that an amendment in this sense would be of great help psychologically to the Israelis.

The Prime Minister said that he hoped the Canadians would use their influence in support of us on both of these points i.e. the amendment to the provision on withdrawal and the interpretation of the reference to refraining from acts of force.

Mr. Pearson said that he attached importance especially to the second, but he would check on the first point immediately.

The Prime Minister then said that he very much welcomed the statement that Mr. Pearson had made the previous evening. It had rather fallen on desert air but it deserved a much better fate. He said that he believed that it would not be possible to resolve the present Middle East situation without a four-power meeting.

Mr. Pearson agreed and said he kept emphasizing this because it seemed unlikely that the Security Council would be able to reach an agreement which went far enough to resolve the present difficulties.

The Prime Minister said that he understood that the Russian representative was now sitting down and

discussing the problem with the United States and British representatives. This was a great improvement and he believed that the French would be prepared to go along. He hoped that the Resolution, when agreed, would be signed by all four and not put forward by the United States alone. This was certainly what he thought we should work for in the Security Council. But if further difficulties did arise then he thought it would be right to press, as Mr. Pearson suggested, for a four-power meeting at top level. He thought it would not be sufficient to have a meeting at Foreign Minister level because both the French and the Russian would not have sufficient power to reach a settlement.

He said that any help which Mr. Pearson could give in this direction and, if necessary, in taking a new initiative, would be most useful.

Mr. Pearson said he agreed that any such meeting would have to be at Head of Government level and he would certainly do what he could to help in the way that the Prime Minister had asked.

June 7, 1967.

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister.

This could be
also your speaking
note for Pearson.

Hayman will be
here at 7.40.

HW.

6/6.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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THREE 4 PAPERS EXTRACTED AND TEMPORARILY RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) PENDING COMPLETION OF REVIEW

(date) 17-3-97

(Signed) T. R. Green

Cypher/Cat.A

SECRET

COPY NO. !!...

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

No. 1570
6 June, 1967

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No T160/67

SECRET.
PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MR KOSYGIN.
BEGINS.
MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE. I ENTIRELY AGREE THAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON OBTAINING A CEASE-FIRE. I THINK THE BEST PLACE TO WORK FOR THIS AT THE MOMENT IS THE SECURITY COUNCIL. YOU CAN RELY ON OUR COOPERATION IN ACHIEVING THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE - PREFERABLY TODAY.

I LEARN THAT LORD CARADON IS NOW TRYING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH MR FEDERENKO AND THEIR UNITED STATES COLLEAGUE, MR GOLDBERG, ON THE BASIS OF AN EXPANDED DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH CALLS FOR A CEASE FIRE AND IN ADDITION A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, BUT QUOTE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RESPECTIVE RIGHTS CLAIMS OR POSITION OF ANYONE UNQUOTE. IT ALSO CALLS ON BOTH PARTIES TO WORK FOR THE DISENGAGEMENT OF THEIR FORCES AND TO REDUCE TENSION.

IN OUR VIEW THIS EXPANDED DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD NOT BE AS GOOD AS A SIMPLE CEASE FIRE RESOLUTION BUT WE WOULD CERTAINLY ACCEPT IT. IN ANY CASE WE HOPE THAT THE PRESENT INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS NOW GOING ON IN NEW YORK WILL RESULT IN A UNANIMOUS RESOLUTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ONCE WE HAVE GOT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WE STILL FACE MANY DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS PROBLEMS. IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY, I SAID THAT WE MUST GET A SOLUTION WHICH MEETS THE HONOURABLE REQUIREMENTS OF ALL CONCERNED. THIS MEANS WE MUST WORK TOGETHER TO THIS END.

PLEASE GET IN TOUCH WITH ME AGAIN IF YOU HAVE FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THIS DANGEROUS PROBLEM.

WARM REGARDS.
ENDS.

SOSFA

PRISEC (F.O.)

Sent 2139Z 6 June, 1967.
/Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street/

SECRET

11A

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

TELNO 974 6 JUNE, 1967 (EASTERN)

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO. 974 OF 6 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 549: POSSIBLE CEASEFIRE.
THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR CALLED ON MR. THOMSON THIS EVENING TO EXPRESS THE GRAVE CONCERN OF THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE SITUATION ON THE JORDAN FRONT. THEY HAD RECEIVED THE MESSAGE THAT KING HUSSEIN WANTED A CEASEFIRE BUT THIS PUT THEM IN A DILEMMA. THE FACT WAS THAT THE JORDAN FRONT HAD, DURING THE DAY, SEEN THE MOST VICIOUS AND DAMAGING SHELLFIRE FROM THE ARAB SIDE. THIS HAD BEEN QUITE RECKLESS AND NOT IN ANY WAY DIRECTED AT MILITARY TARGETS. THERE HAD BEEN OVER 600 CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN THE NEW CITY OF JERUSALEM, AND THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT COULD NOT LET THIS CONTINUE. THEY HAD BEEN QUITE WILLING TO KEEP THE JORDAN FRONT QUIET BUT THE JORDANIANS HAD REACTED IN THIS WAY WHICH COULD NOT BE TOLERATED FOR LONG.
2. MR. REMEZ SAID THAT IF KING HUSSEIN WAS REALLY IN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION AND COULD MAKE A CEASEFIRE STICK ON HIS SIDE, THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO AGREE TO THIS. HOWEVER, THEY SUSPECTED THAT HE WAS NO LONGER IN CONTROL AND THAT EGYPTIAN OFFICERS WERE IN COMMAND AT THE FRONT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT PUT THEMSELVES AT A MILITARY DISADVANTAGE BY AGREEING TO A CEASEFIRE AND THEY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO OCCUPY PARTS OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY, WHICH THEY DID NOT WANT TO DO, IN ORDER TO SILENCE THESE VERY DAMAGING BATTERIES.
3. MR. REMEZ'S REQUEST TO US WAS, THEREFORE, FOR INFORMATION ABOUT / THE

THE PRESENT POSITION OF KING HUSSEIN AND, IN PARTICULAR, FOR A SPEEDY APPRECIATION OF HIS ABILITY TO IMPOSE A CEASEFIRE ON HIS SIDE. PLEASE SEND YOUR ASSESSMENT ON THIS BY FLASH TELEGRAM AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TOMORROW MORNING. IF YOU THINK IT WOULD BE HELP-FUL , YOU MAY TELL THE KING THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE READY TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE PROVIDED THAT THE PRESENT HEAVY SHELL-ING OF CIVILIAN TARGETS IN ISRAEL FROM JORDAN STOPS.

SOSFA SENT 2230Z/6 JUNE

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N.E.A.D.
U.N.D.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N.D.

En Clair

FLASH AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 562 7 June, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 562 of 7 June. Repeated for information to: U.K.Mission New York, Washington, Tel Aviv.

My telegram No. 560: Cease-fire.

Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs has just summoned me with Ambassadors of United States, France and Soviet Union to inform us that despite the fact that Jordan has given immediate effect to Cease-fire Resolution this was not being observed by the Israelis. A number of positions from Tubas in the north to points near Bethlehem in the south were at the moment under artillery fire and air bombardment.

2. So far Jordanians have abstained from making organized counter-attacks. But unless Israelis stop attacking forthwith they will counter-attack with everything remaining to them. This would include the use of aircraft.

3. Jordan intends to make urgent representations to Security Council. But in view of critical state of Jordanian armed forces the Council's intervention may be too late to prevent their collapse. Minister appealed to our Governments to do everything to impress on the Israelis that they are pushing Jordan to the limit of her patience.

4. Minister added that he was sending a similar message to General Bull through the local United Nations representative.

Foreign Office pass Flash to U.K.Mission New York as my telegram No.41.

Mr. Adams

Sent 0806Z 7 June
Recd. 0850Z 7 June

[Repeated as requested]

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Eastern Dept.

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=====

File

CONFIDENTIAL

June 7, 1967

Top copy in France, June, 1967.

The Prime Minister asked the French Ambassador to call on him this afternoon to give him a general idea of the way in which he hoped his talks with General de Gaulle on June 19 might be arranged.

He explained that he had not had a tour d'horizon with the President since their meeting in April 1965. As he had said to the General when they last saw each other in Bonn, he would like their forthcoming meeting to be wider in scope than their talks in January, which had by definition concentrated exclusively on the British approach to Europe. He considered that this time they should have a wide ranging discussion of world problems as a whole, without any fixed agenda. Clearly, the problems of Europe would have to be discussed and, equally obviously in the present situation, those of the Middle East. They would also no doubt wish to take a look at Africa and it might be that the Prime Minister would want to say something about Rhodesia. On the whole, the Prime Minister did not expect that they would need to go into any great detail on economic problems and certainly not into such matters as international liquidity. Nor did he imagine that the General would wish him to repeat the

Copy in Israel (Despatch file) Part 4.

75 minute lecture on the sterling area with which he feared that he might somewhat have wearied Messieurs Pompidou and Couve in January.

Courcel thanked the Prime Minister. He said that he believed the General would also prefer that there should be no set agenda. He thought that in fact, in the context of Britain and Europe there would probably have to be some discussion of the sterling area and its problems, and indeed of the interaction of political and economic matters generally. But he certainly agreed with the Prime Minister that General de Gaulle would not wish to get into any technical detail on such matters as liquidity. The Prime Minister said that, of course, economic matters were bound to arise and he would gladly take part in any discussion on the sterling area that the General wished to have. But his concept was that this, as the other subjects they would be discussing, should be looked at essentially in a broad political context and not in a narrowly financial or economic one.

The exchange then became rather more general and the Prime Minister referred to recent developments in the Middle Eastern situation. Courcel asked how we viewed these. The Prime Minister said he had just come from listening to a statement by the Foreign Secretary in which the latest position and our attitude to it had been very clearly explained. As he saw it, we now had a possibility of achieving a long-term settlement in the area that would be honourable for both parties. If we failed to seize

this opportunity the area would certainly sink back again into conflict and instability. We had initially been concerned to ensure that the freedom of passage through the Tiran Straits on which we knew that Israel felt very deeply; and which in any case we supported in principle. It might be that the problem now would be both to save the face of the Arab countries and also to ensure that their own legitimate interests were not forgotten. He drew the Ambassador's attention to what the Foreign Secretary had just said on this point and said that he had rarely heard it expressed with such clarity and authority. He believed that Israel would be in a mood to show understanding of this need and particularly, he hoped, towards the problem of the refugees. But it was clear to him that any long term settlement would require 4-power agreement and indeed would probably have to be largely hammered out by the 4 powers themselves. This was why we had so welcomed General de Gaulle's appeal for 4 power discussions and why we continued to believe that the matter should be approached on a 4-power basis, in the first instance no doubt at the level of the 4 permanent representatives in New York.

Courcel said that this view would, he knew, be welcome to the French Government. Their present attitude of slight caution derived largely from two considerations. First, that the 4 powers should not seem to be dictating a settlement to the countries of the area; secondly, that the Russians might in the present circumstances be reluctant to

sit down in a 4 power forum because of their hostility to American policy in Vietnam. The Prime Minister said that he took both points. As regards the first, it was obvious that the countries of the area would have to be associated with any discussions amongst the 4 powers; the latter should regard themselves in the light of friends of the local countries and not as dictators laying down the law. On the second point, he thought it was perhaps arguable that the Russians might not mind a meeting with the Americans in the Middle Eastern context. Although this would not be specifically convened to deal with Vietnam, it might in fact give an opportunity for some quiet diplomacy on that problem as well. And all the 4 powers shared a common interest in seeing an honourable settlement in Vietnam as much as in the Middle East.

The Prime Minister thought it appropriate that he should see Courcel personally before he goes to Paris. But he has, of course, no objection to Sir Patrick Reilly, if he wishes, speaking to the Elysee on similar lines about the subject matter of the talks; and I should naturally be grateful to know of any comments that may be made to Patrick if he does so.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Reid (Cabinet Office).

A.M.P.

C.M. MacLehose, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

5 June, 1967

The Middle East

It is not exactly an unmixed pleasure to make something other than Vietnam the "lead story" for this month. It is not of course my intention to get into the substance of the Middle East crisis which is still with us as I write. I should, however, just like to bring out a few impressions which may otherwise get lost in the welter of day-to-day exchanges. First, of course, the crisis is just about the last thing the President would have wished to find on his plate alongside Vietnam. But having been landed with it, he has tackled it with characteristic energy and determination. Indeed it is clear that in making his early public statements and in reviewing and reaffirming the commitments of the U.S. he was markedly out ahead of his own more junior officials. Thus, it has proved extremely difficult for the State Department to formulate quickly for his approval detailed plans, whether diplomatic or other, for translating his evident firmness into practical action. He has been subjected to conflicting pressures both inside and outside the Administration. Public opinion, the press and

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Sir Paul Gore-Booth, G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

the Congress, while broadly conscious of the seriousness of the situation and at bottom aware that the U.S. cannot just wash its hands of it, have chiefly been concerned that this country should somehow avoid becoming involved directly in a second open-ended situation in the world. Least of all would they wish to see the U.S. alone in carrying the burden. A strange feature of the situation is that many who are "doves" on Vietnam are pro-Israel hawks on the Middle East, and vice versa. The pro-Israel lobby is no less active than usual, particularly with next year's elections in mind. One may be sure that the oil lobby has been no less active behind the scenes. The Pentagon are understandably reluctant to contemplate military action, especially when so much of America's military resources outside Vietnam have been deliberately run down to a state somewhat below full operational efficiency. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department remain no less concerned than ever to avoid ruining U.S. relations with the Arabs, whatever American commitments to Israel might be and believe that their policy of ensuring Israel a preponderance of military power should have been put to the test by allowing the Israelis to strike. But this policy which carries with it the inevitable corqllary that the U.S. has to intervene militarily to separate the contestants has been rejected.

2. Against this background, it seems to me that the President himself handled the visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister with skill and effectiveness. Only he could have succeeded in the last analysis in persuading the Israelis not to make any precipitate move which would lead to war. It remains to be seen, however, how far the Americans will be able to put to good use the time thus gained. Obviously they place little

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faith in the U.N., and their disappointment with the performance of the Secretary General and the Security Council in the earlier stages was no less than our own. Indeed, quite apart from the present crisis, the attitude of the Administration and of the press and public opinion towards the United Nations will have suffered a further serious and lasting blow. Finally, however things work out, it is apparent that in the eyes of the Administration, Britain and H.M.G. have emerged in a very favourable light. We have responded quickly and effectively (and, in the military field particularly, more effectively than the American military) to their appeals for someone to share the burden with them. William White, the columnist who is an old and close personal friend of the President, wrote on 27 May that "the peace of the world rests on the backs of two responsibles and two alone". Asking where the world would be today "but for the towering reality that Britain and the U.S. do indeed hold that special relationship..." he remarks "Again as so many times before the outcome rests at least upon the skill the determination and the strength of the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom". (We are also getting a good press on Hong Kong, and with Shanghai and Peking also featuring in the news, there is an unusually strong impression of the U.S. and Britain sharing the problems of the world). The natural pleasure which sitting in this chair I feel, at this must however be tempered by the realisation, of which you in London are no doubt more conscious, that this sort of thing does provide de Gaulle with ammunition for alleging that Britain is still too instinctively Anglo-Saxon.

Vietnam

3. For all the flurry over the Middle East, the great debate

/on

on Vietnam rages on. During the month, the figure of Americans killed in Vietnam rose above 10,000 (one-third as many as in the Korean war), and this provides an opportunity for reminding ourselves once again that this is in many ways for practical purposes a country at war. All the thinking here ranges between two poles. On the one hand, there are those who believe that if only the United States were to get out of Vietnam all the resources being swallowed up there could be diverted to the great internal problems of this country like the poverty campaign, the urban problem and so on. At the other extreme are those who would like to see the all-out use of American military power in order to win a speedy military victory. The President, standing in between, and with next year's elections in mind, goes on offering butter as well as guns. There are few who are willing and able to sit back and take a dispassionate look. One of the few is, not surprisingly, McGeorge Bundy who gave a lecture at the Cosmos Club in Washington during the month on the theme that the real colour of the complex truth is grey. His thesis, of which I exceptionally enclose a summary, is helpful reading for anybody who is trying to keep his bearings.

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4. The President is apparently being very successful in his attempt to be as many things to as many people as possible. One of the polls during the month shows that he has drawn level with Governor Romney in popular favour for the presidency for the first time since last October. Only a month ago Romney had a 54%-46% lead over him. The President's current lead over Nixon is convincing. The President's support at the moment comes from the moderate right-wing and the middle-of-the-roaders and this is the

/general

general mood of the country -moderate to right wing. He is out of favour among the extreme hawks, and with the doves who are opposed to the bombing. Three-quarters of the population are found to be in general agreement with his present policies. Yet it is clear at the same time that, in general as distinct from over Vietnam in particular, the President still fails to engender any broad feeling of affection or confidence and of those questioned on this particular point, only 34% answered favourably as compared with 66% unfavourably.

5. Nevertheless, the fact that he has consolidated his position somewhat has already had consequences. The Republican Party are still in total disarray over the attitude they should adopt in the election campaign about Vietnam. They have produced, and apparently published by mistake, a study paper on Vietnam which poses far more questions than it answers. It has excited considerable interest, and has been seized upon by the doves as support for their case since it appears to question the basis for American involvement. And although last month saw an increase in the number of Senators who came out against escalation, this month 16 Senators, all critical of United States policies in Vietnam, felt it necessary to issue a public warning addressed to Hanoi making clear that they were a small minority and saying that they themselves remained opposed to any unilateral withdrawal of American troops. Their statement was endorsed by a number of members of the House. This was unquestionably a significant victory for the President. Another straw in the wind has been that Joseph Kraft, the very pro-Kennedy columnist, has also acknowledged the extraordinary instinct of the

/President

President for finding and taking the political high ground. He regards the blunting of dissent, as instanced by the Senators' declaration, as being no bad thing.

6. Meanwhile the two extreme wings remain as vociferous as ever, with large-scale advertisements calling for "negotiation now" on the one hand and support for the serviceman in the field on the other. A "flag rally" in New York called out surprising numbers.

7. However, the President continues to be largely unsuccessful with the intellectuals. He is reported as having a lunch during the month with several of the intellectuals serving in the Administration. Nobody seemed able to advise him on how to put matters right, and most of them seem to have been agreed that there was a problem of communication, influenced perhaps by the President's personal style, but traceable basically to resentment of the war. As a comment on this exercise, Tom Wicker in the New York Times, quoted Louis Armstrong who, when asked what jazz was, replied "Man, if you gotta ask, you ain't never gonna know."!

8. It remains to be seen what effect the Near East crisis, and the President's handling of it, will have on this general situation. Meanwhile, the business community is usually a fairly sensitive barometer to the standing of a president and the top-level Business Council, which held a two-day session during the month, appeared by a large majority to be backing President Johnson for 1968 against any of the Republican possibilities. This despite their gloomy conviction that the war is growing bigger day by day and will necessitate a major tax boost by next year.

The Republican Party

9. It is not only because of Vietnam that the Republican

/Party

Party is in disarray. Indeed a good deal of current support for the President may result from the fact that there seems to so many people to be no viable alternative. Nixon has, perhaps wisely, spent a good deal of time abroad, and his standing with right-wing Republicans remains pretty high. There are many doubts about Romney who is strongest in the East and some parts of the West. Nixon's strength lies in the South and parts of the Mid-West and West. Reagan is by no means to be written off, however, as a rival to Nixon, and it seems to be the impression here that he showed up rather better than Robert Kennedy in a recent Town Meeting of the Air transatlantic television programme in which both he and Kennedy were confronted by questions from a number of angry young students in London. On the other wing, I am by no means disposed to take Nelson Rockefeller's chances lightly as a rival to Romney. On present form it seems extremely unlikely that any clear front-runner will emerge before the Republican Convention next year. However, the primaries, which I believe begin in New Hampshire next March, will be interesting to watch.

10. Meanwhile the real complicating factor is the intentions of Governor Wallace of Alabama. If the Republicans look likely to nominate, or do actually nominate, a liberal candidate for president, Wallace will run on his third party ticket and will cut deeply into Republican hopes in the South. It looks at present very much as though his candidature would be much more to the advantage of President Johnson than to the Republicans.

Race Relations

11. The main reason for this is the state of race relations in this country. The Negro leadership continues to take an extreme line, and the outlook for violence this summer is probably worse than at any time over the past five years. A negro

/professor

professor at Howard University has spoken of "a black blitzkrieg" - "a great number of Watts all over the country". This results, I suppose, from a feeling of frustration on the part of the leaders of the Civil Rights Movement, who can in fact point to little in the way of positive achievement. They have little money. Marches and demonstrations are all very well, but either they must lead to visible results, or escalate. On the other hand, everybody acknowledges that there is a good deal of "white backlash" to which Congressmen are becoming sensitive with next year's election in mind. Summer has still not arrived, but already the Spring has seen some ugly incidents in New York State, California, Nebraska, Ohio and Tennessee. The link with the war in Vietnam is increasingly mentioned, and Dr. Martin Luther King now regularly calls for its immediate ending so that the resources being used up there can be devoted to American internal problems.

The Kennedy Round

12. Just for the record I should mention that the successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round was greeted with a very considerable sigh of relief by the Administration here and broadly welcomed by the press. I have since had assurances from all sides that the rather intensive pressure to which we were subjected, by the Americans during the closing stages was absolutely genuine and contained no element of bluff. But since the initial reaction to the settlement, domestic interests have naturally made themselves felt on various individual fronts. Although the President already has the legal power to take most of the necessary consequential action, the ending of the American Selling Price system promises to involve a good deal of difficulty with the Congress.

Britain and the E.E.C.

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13. The lodging of our application to join E.E.C. was reported widely and with unanimous approval. One or two people like Walter Lippman tended to echo the line taken by de Gaulle at his press conference which was otherwise treated with considerable disapproval and disappointment. However this may be, most Americans now seem to take it for granted that we shall not succeed in entering E.E.C. in the early future. On the other hand, there is little discussion of possible alternatives and it seems to be assumed that we shall just have to soldier on patiently as at present.

Labour Relations

14. The Rt. Hon. Frank Cousins, accompanied by his wife visited the U.S. from 4 to 19 May. Cousins took part in a conference on public transportation sponsored by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen at the University of Chicago. He also fulfilled paid speaking engagements at Michigan State University, University of California at Berkeley and University of California at Los Angeles. According to reports the talks by Cousins were well received. He appears to have made no bones about explaining the reasons for his resignation from the Government while at the same time praising the Government for the solid gains it had made since it came to power. At Los Angeles, St. Louis and Washington, Cousins renewed contacts with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters from which the Transport and General Workers' Union had remained somewhat aloof since the Teamsters were expelled from the AFL-CIO some 11 years ago for unethical practices.

The Press

15. A sad event during the month - yet another newspaper

/death

death in New York with the loss this time of the Herald Tribune. In its way also sad, is that Walter Lippman has at last given up doing a daily column. He was getting old and the faults of his youthful and middle-aged judgements have tended to become more pronounced over the last three or four years, but he had great courage and integrity and with the exception of Scottie Reston who resembles him in many ways there is nobody of his personal distinction now on the Washington press scene.

Sgd. Patrick Dean

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office
S.W.1

7 June, 1967.

Dear Palliser,

As I think John Killick may have mentioned to you when you were recently in Washington, the Ambassador sends the Permanent Under-Secretary a monthly letter giving the general round-up of events as seen from Washington.

I am sorry that by an oversight I had not earlier thought of sending you regular copies of this letter, but I imagine you would like to see it on a regular basis. I am therefore sending you the letter for May and will, unless you ask otherwise, arrange for a copy to be sent to you every month from now on.

Yours ever,

(P.R.H. Wright)

A.M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.,
10 Downing Street,
S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

A.M. Palliser, Esq., CMG,
No. 10. Downing Street.

With the compliments of

SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

June 1967

File

CONFIDENTIAL

June 7, 1967

The Prime Minister tells me that he mentioned to the Foreign Secretary in the House that he has received a further message from Kosygin about the Middle East, a copy of which I enclose.

The Prime Minister spoke to Smirnovsky (who came round at 2.00 p.m. to his room in the House of Commons) on much the same lines as he did in the latter part of his conversation with Courcel, about which I have written to you separately. That is to say, he emphasized the need now to achieve a long term settlement in the area that would be honourable for both parties. If we failed to use the opportunity to eliminate the legacy of bitterness throughout the Middle East, including the bitterness arising out of the present conflict, we should be confronted within a few months or years with an identical situation. Moreover, Israel was at present in a mood of suffieient confidence, he belived, to be able to make some helpful moves towards the Arabs in any permanent settlement.

The Ambassador expressed scepticism at this, but the Prime Minister said he belived what he had said

to be true, provided all those concerned now played their cards sensibly. Israel demanded that her existence be recognised. The Arabs refused this at present. There was also the problem of freedom of navigation. No settlement that failed to meet these two requirements could last. Equally, however, the Arabs were entitled to security and it should be our purpose to build up their confidence as well. This was always difficult after a war. Israel was unlikely to put forward territorial claims. But an effective settlement of the refugee problem, which remained one of the festering sores in the whole situation, was very necessary and would help to remove the general Arab bitterness. He thought that Israel might be disposed to take a constructive view over the refugees.

The Prime Minister said that he was convinced that to get such a settlement would require a co-operative effort by the 4 powers. It could only be on this basis that something effective could be worked out under the aegis of the United Nations. He hoped that the Ambassador would make this clear to Mr. Kosygin.

I am sending copies of this letter to Nairne (Ministry of Defence) and Reid (Cabinet Office).

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C.M. MacLehose, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

Subject

T161/67

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No. T161/67

Translation from Russian

His Excellency Mr.H.Wilson,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
10, Downing Street,
London.

Mr.Prime Minister,

There is information that Israel is ignoring the Security Council resolution which calls upon the Governments concerned, as a first step, to take forthwith all measures for an immediate ceasefire and for cessation of all military activities in the area.

This situation demands that the Security Council should use its powers to ensure the implementation of the decision which it itself has adopted.

In view of this we have submitted a proposal that the Security Council should meet at once to take effective measures for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace.

With respect,

A.KOSYGIN,
Chairman of the USSR Council
of Ministers

7 June, 1967.

Лондон, Даунинг стрит, IO,
Его Превосходительству Г. Вильсону,
Премьер-министру Великобритании.

Господин Премьер-министр,

По имеющимся сведениям, Израиль игнорирует резолюцию Совета Безопасности, призывающую заинтересованные правительства в качестве первого шага предпринять все меры к немедленному прекращению огня и к прекращению всех военных действий в этом районе.

Такое положение требует, чтобы Совет Безопасности использовал свои полномочия для того, чтобы обеспечить выполнение им же принятого решения.

В связи с этим нами внесено предложение о немедленном созыве Совета Безопасности для принятия эффективных мер к немедленному прекращению военных действий и восстановлению мира.

С уважением

А. КОСЫГИН
Председатель Совета
Министров СССР

7 июня I967 года

SECRET

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S ROOM AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AT 2.00 P.M. ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 1967

Present:-

Prime Minister — Mr. Smirnovsky

Mr. A.M. Palliser

The Prime Minister gave the Ambassador a copy of his reply of the previous evening to the message from Mr. Kosygin delivered by the Ambassador on June 6. This had now been somewhat overtaken by events. At the time it was written Her Majesty's Government had been concerned at the possibility of the Security Council's resolution requiring a "withdrawal to the truce lines" because of the likelihood that this would have been unacceptable to Israel and would have led to subsequent fruitless controversy. Our purpose should now be to get a final settlement of the problems that lay at the root of the conflict. Israel would have interpreted such a resolution as a simple demand for their withdrawal with no undertaking about freedom of passage into the Gulf of Aqaba, to which they attached great importance. The result could only have been a resumption of the fighting in due course and a continuing difficult situation throughout the Middle East.

The Prime Minister said that the purpose of the present conversation was to enable him to discuss privately with the Ambassador some of his tentative thinking about

how the situation should now be handled, so that it couldbe conveyed on an equally personal and private basis to Mr. Kosygin. It was unfortunate that the teleprinter link on the establishment of which he and Mr. Kosygin had agreed in February was still not installed. But Mr. Kosygin had told him that the Ambassador enjoyed his (Kosygin's) complete confidence; and it was in this spirit that he wished to speak. He should emphasise that he had not yet discussed these tentative ideas with the other Governments concerned.

The Prime Minister said that if we failed to use the present opportunity to eliminate the legacy of bitterness throughout the Middle East including the bitterness arising out of the present conflict we should be confronted within a few months or years with an identical situation. He therefore considered that this exposition should be used in a constructive way to obtain a permanent solution honourable to both sides. This was of particular importance at a time when Israel was in a mood of sufficient confidence to be able to make some helpful moves towards the Arabs in any permanent settlement. His private soundings suggested that Israel was likely to be helpful in this sense. The Ambassador expressed scepticism.

The Prime Minister said that he believed what he had said to be true provided all those concerned now played their cards sensibly. Israel demanded that her existence be recognised. The Arabs refused this at present. There was also the problem of freedom of

navigation. No settlement that failed to meet these two requirements could last. Equally, however, the Arabs were entitled to security and it should be our purpose to build up their confidence as well. This was always difficult after a war. Israel was unlikely to put forward territorial claims. But an effective settlement of the refugee problem, which remained one of the festering sores in the whole situation, was very necessary and would help to remove the general Arab bitterness. He thought that Israel might be disposed to take a constructive view over the refugees. But none of these results could be achieved by bilateral negotiations and, despite their hopes, he doubted whether they could be in the Security Council. Speaking personally and in the hope that his view would be conveyed on a personal basis to Mr. Kosygin, he believed that to get such a settlement would require the Four Powers working together and at top level. This could well be under the aegis of the United Nations; indeed it might be best if it resulted from a Security Council recommendation. But only at that top level could we expect to find the necessary sense of imagination, constructiveness as well as toughness in argument. Indeed if such a meeting resulted in an acceptable Middle East settlement it might conceivably lead on to discussion of other problems as well.

The Ambassador said that there were indeed other problems that needed urgent settlement.

The Prime Minister said that he had been encouraged in his general approach by the constructive attitude of Mr. Kosygin in the past few days and by the helpful line he had taken with Mr. Brown in Moscow. Neither of us had wanted a flare-up in the Middle East: we must now seek to make any settlement really fire-proof. The Ambassador said that we might not have wanted a flare-up; but it had happened nonetheless. The Prime Minister agreed. But it had been less dangerous than many people had feared. However, the constructive help of the Four Powers was now needed if we were to avoid the danger of a military diktat from a position of strength and consequential attempts to prevent such a diktat. He hoped that Mr. Kosygin would give the matter his personal consideration. He would not propose to make this suggestion public in any way at present. Before deciding whether to pursue the idea further he would be glad to have from the Ambassador a private expression of Mr. Kosygin's view. He hoped that Mr. Kosygin would continue to convey his views through the Ambassador both on what Britain and the Soviet Union might be able to do separately and on what might be done in co-operation with others. He would gladly meet Mr. Kosygin, at some half-way place, if he thought this could be useful. But the Prime Minister himself thought that a Four Power meeting would be the right solution if it could be achieved. In

this purpose, he had been moderately encouraged by the fact that Mr. Federenko, Mr. Goldberg and Lord Caradon had worked together so helpfully the previous evening in New York. He hoped that this co-operation could continue: We all had a fresh chance now to achieve a settlement of this unhappy situation.

The Ambassador left at 2.30 p.m.

Distribution.

Sir B. Trend (Home and Economic)

June 7, 1967

DRAFT STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 7 JUNE

The House will have heard with satisfaction that the Security Council of the United Nations has now adopted unanimously a resolution calling for a cease-fire. The Council's most urgent task will now be to get this resolution implemented. I was glad to see that the Israel Foreign Minister in his speech to the Council yesterday evening welcomed the appeal for the cease-fire, while pointing out that this implementation demands an absolute and sincere acceptance and cooperation of the other parties. It is now for those other parties to make equally clear their welcome for the appeal for the cease-fire so that this can come into force without any delay. I have seen a report that the U.A.R. may have rejected the appeal. I hope they will think better of this very quickly. It seems to be much in their own interest to do so.

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2. Once the cease-fire has been implemented the Security Council will need to turn its most urgent attention to the further steps that are needed to secure a lasting peace in the area. It is too early to speculate in detail about the form that this might take, but I am myself convinced that there will have to be a thorough re-examination of all aspects of the root causes of the conflict.

3. Prior to the implementation of the cease-fire, it is now very clear that the military struggle has been going in favour of Israel. It is evident that in the first twenty-four

/hours

hours of the fighting the Israel Air Force established complete air superiority over the Air force of the United Arab Republic and its allies. On the ground, Israel forces defeated United Arab Republic forces in the Gaza strip, and are engaging Egyptian units deep in the Sinai Desert. There has been fierce fighting on the Israel/Jordan front and Israel forces captured large areas of Jordan territory on the West bank of the River Jordan. I am sorry to report that fighting has been particularly bitter in Jerusalem and still continues in that area. I have no reports of any serious damage to the Holy Places.

4. The U.A.R., through Cairo Radio, have continued to broadcast as the straight lie that British and American air forces have taken part in the fighting on the side of Israel. I repeat that this is a lie. It not only did not happen but, it could not have happened, as they well know. In the light of the military situation I have described the reason for this lie is quite clear. The United Arab Republic is trying to give itself an alibi for its own military failures and the extent to which its failures have let down its allies.

/The

The Government have taken every step open to them to deny this action. We have made statements in this House and issued statements to the Press. We have made both oral and written communications in Arab capitals and to Arab Heads of Missions in London. My Right Honourable friend Lord Caradon has spoken in the Security Council and had circulated a written denial to all members of the Security Council. The United States Delegate to the UN yesterday offered facilities for United Nations observers in the vessels of the American Sixth Fleet to check the falsity of the story. I am equally ready to make a similar offer for United Nations observers to visit any of our ships in the area and any of our RAF stations, including those at Cyprus and Malta. We wish to nail this lie once and for all.

5. I am sorry to report to the House that the broadcasting of this lie has misled certain Arab countries into taking a series of measures against Britain. My Right Honourable Friend informed the House of some of these yesterday. The list is now as follows. British Embassies and Consulates and British Council premises have been attacked and damaged in many Arab cities. The U.A.R. Government have closed the Suez Canal to all traffic. The Governments of Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Syria and Lebanon have taken steps to interfere with oil supplies, either to the United Kingdom and U.S.A. only or in some cases on a wider basis. The Governments of Iraq, Syria and Sudan have notified us that they are breaking off diplomatic relations: relations were of course already broken with the U.A.R. and Algeria. It is my sincere hope that these Governments will reverse their attitude now that it is clear not only that the allegation was a lie, but what the motives of the Egyptians have been in propagating it.

/6.

6. Nevertheless, the Government are having to make suitable arrangements for the protection of British interests if the countries concerned persist in breaches of diplomatic relations. We are in touch with appropriate governments to act as protecting powers.

7. I think that to break off diplomatic relations with us, and for this reason, is the silliest possible action that these governments could take. This has been put to them as forcibly as possible. If they insist, they will of course have to face the consequences.

8. Arrangements are also going ahead to evacuate further numbers of British subjects from countries involved in the fighting and from countries which have broken diplomatic relations. However, in some of these cases a breach of diplomatic relations will presumably not extend to commercial

/relations

relations and I would expect that, where there is no immediate danger to life and property, many British Subjects will still wish to remain.

8. Urgent steps are being taken to readjust the pattern of oil supplies to this country. While there may well be temporary inconveniences for us, there should be no insuperable problem. The action taken against us has come at a time of oil surplus in the world and the countries which have taken it may find that they have done their own economic interests much greater harm than they have done to ours.

9. On the question of arms shipments, we are continuing our efforts to achieve a suspension of the export of all arms supplies to this area, and the call for a cease-fire reinforces the position we have taken up on this.

/10. However

10. However, I am bound to warn the House the situation at the moment is that we have had no response from the Russians and we understand the Americans are not placing an embargo. In this situation it makes it very difficult for Britain to maintain the suspension of supplies which we have already unilaterally imposed.

11. In any long term agreement which is negotiated, limitation and control over arms exports into the area will clearly be a very important factor.

[MRS. CASTLE.]
road [illegible]ty, not least by improving the work[illegible] conditions of lorry drivers.

Mr. Peter Walker: Is the Minister aware that we welcome any proposals which look after drivers' safety? In her statement she refers to nine hours' driving. Does she mean nine hours' actual driving at the wheel, or does it include loading and unloading periods? Has the right hon. Lady considered the possibility of dispensing with the need to keep drivers' records in respect of, for example, bakers' and milk delivery vans, where there tends to be a good deal of unnecessary bureaucracy?

Mrs. Castle: The number of hours at the wheel will be reduced from a maximum of 11 to a maximum of nine. Where any special interests are concerned, we are now going into detailed consultation on the basis of these proposals, and we shall be glad to examine any particular point.

Mr. Bessell: Does the right hon. Lady agree that it will be difficult to enforce these new regulations, welcome as they may be? What proposals does she have for enforcement and, if necessary, for increasing the size of any particular force which could be used to enable her to do this?

Mrs. Castle: I have very far-reaching proposals to make on enforcement. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that one of the difficulties under the present law is that the existing hours, excessive as they are, are not properly enforced. If the hours are to be reduced, we must have adequate enforcement. I therefore propose to make the introduction of tacheographs in lorries and coaches compulsory, to simplify and improve drivers' own personal hours records over a week and not just a day, and, finally, to improve the powers of my own enforcement officers.

MIDDLE EAST

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Brown): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on the situation in the Middle East.

The House will have heard with satisfaction that the Security Council of the United Nations has now adopted unanimously a resolution calling for a cease-fire. In this, the House can rightly take pride in the outstanding contribution which has been made by my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Caradon in bringing this result about.

The Council's most urgent task will now be to get this resolution implemented. I was glad to see that the Israel Foreign Minister, in his speech to the Council yesterday evening, welcomed the appeal for the cease-fire, while pointing out that its implementation requires an absolute and sincere acceptance and co-operation of all other parties. It is now for those other parties to make equally clear their acceptance of the call for the cease-fire so that this can come into force without any delay.

I have seen reports that the United Arab Republic and Iraq have rejected the appeal. I hope that they will think better of this very quickly. It seems to be much in their own interest to do so.

Once the cease-fire has been implemented the Security Council will need to turn its most urgent attention to the further steps that are needed to secure a lasting peace in the area. It is too early to speculate in detail about the form that this might take, but I am convinced that there will have to be now a thorough re-examination of all aspects of the root causes of the conflict.

Prior to the implementation of the cease-fire, it is now very clear that the military struggle has been going in favour of Israel. It is evident that in the first 24 hours of the fighting the Israel Air Force established complete air superiority over the Air Force of the United Arab Republic and of its allies.

On the ground, Israel forces defeated United Arab Republic forces in the Gaza strip, and are engaging Egyptian units deep in the Sinai Desert. There has been fierce fighting on the Israel/Jordan front and Israel forces captured a substantial area of Jordan territory on the west bank of the River Jordan.

I am sorry to report that fighting has been particularly bitter in Jerusalem and still continues there. I have no reports of any serious damage to the Holy Places.

The United Arab Republic, through Cairo Radio, has continued to broadcast the downright lie that British and American air forces have taken part in the

fighting on the side of Israel. I repeat that this is a lie. It not only did not happen, but it could not have happened, as it well knows. In the light of the military situation which I have described the reason for this lie is quite clear. The United Arab Republic is trying to give itself an alibi for its own military failures and the extent to which its failures have let down its allies.

The Government have taken every step open to them to deny this action. We have made statements in this House and have issued statements to the Press. We have made both oral and written commucinations in Arab capitals and to Arab Heads of Mission in London. My right hon. and noble Friend Lord Caradon has spoken in the Security Council and has circulated a written denial to all members of the Council. The United States delegate to the United Nations yesterday offered facilities for United Nations observers to visit ships of the American Sixth Fleet to check the falsity of the story.

I am equally ready to make a similar offer for United Nations observers to visit any of our ships in the area, any of our Royal Air Force stations, including those at Cyprus and our installations at the airfields of Malta. We wish to nail this lie once and for all.

I am sorry to report that the broadcasting of this lie has misled certain Arab countries into taking a series of measures against Britain. My right hon. Friend informed the House of some of these yesterday. The list is now as follows. British embassies, consulates and British Council premises have been attacked and damaged in many Arab cities. The United Arab Republic Government have closed the Suez Canal to all traffic. The Governments of Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Syria and the Lebanon have taken steps to interfere with oil supplies, either to the United Kingdom and the United States of America only, or, in some cases, on a wider basis than that.

The Governments of Iraq, Syria and the Sudan have notified us that they are breaking off diplomatic relations: relations, of course, were already broken with the United Arab Republic and Algeria. It is my sincere hope these Governments will reverse their attitude now that it is clear not only that the allegation was a lie, but it is also clear what the motives of the Egyptians have been in propagating it.

Nevertheless, the Government are having to make suitable arrangements for the protection of British interests if the countries concerned persist in breaches of diplomatic relations. We are in touch with appropriate Governments to act as protecting Powers.

I think that to break off diplomatic relations with us, and for this reason, is the most foolish possible action that these Governments could take. This has been put to them as forcefully as possible. If they insist, they will, of course, have to face the consequences.

Arrangements are also going ahead to evacuate further numbers of British subjects from countries involved in the fighting and from countries which have broken off diplomatic relations. However, in some of these cases a breach of diplomatic relations will presumably not extend to commercial relations and I would expect that, where there is no immediate danger to life and property, many British subjects will still wish to remain.

Urgent steps are being taken to readjust the pattern of oil supplies to this country. While there may well be temporary inconveniences for us, there should be no insuperable problem. The action taken against us has come at a time of oil surplus in the world and the countries which have taken it may find that they have done their own economic interests much greater harm than they have done to ours.

On the question of arms shipments, we are continuing our efforts to achieve a suspension of the export of all arms supplies to this area, and the call for a ceasefire, in my view, reinforces the position we have taken up on this.

However, I am bound to warn the House that the situation at the moment is that we have had no positive response from the Russians and we understand that the Americans are not placing an embargo. In this situation, it makes it very difficult for Britain to maintain the suspension of supplies which we have already unilaterally imposed.

[MR. BROWN.]

In any long-term agreement which is negotiated, limitation and control over arms exports into this area will clearly be a very important factor.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The House will be grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for keeping us informed each day and for the tone in which he has made his statement. We welcome the fact that the Security Council has achieved unanimity on a cease-fire—a very modest beginning, but, nevertheless, a beginning on which we can perhaps build.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether Jordan has accepted the cease-fire? There are rumours that she has. If so, it is a very welcome fact.

We shall give the right hon. Gentleman all the help we can to obtain a comprehensive settlement of all the problems in the Middle East. This seems to be the most important thing ahead of us.

The most serious part of the right hon. Gentleman's statement was that which dealt with the reaction of the Arab countries to this country. Is every device of broadcasting being used—particularly the B.B.C.'s Arabic Service, which has a very wide and effective coverage in that area?

We have noted what the right hon. Gentleman has said about an arms embargo. I will not press him further today. It would not be reasonable. He has to have conversations with the United States and the Soviet Union and may hope to get some arrangements. But does he realise the seriousness of the United Kingdom's withholding arms if everybody else is sending them?

Mr. Brown: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the way in which he has said what he had to say. On the question of Jordan and the cease-fire, the situation is exceedingly confused as to what was originally the Jordanian response and what was the Israeli response to that. I would rather not go into that at the moment, if the right hon. Gentleman would not mind.

I agree that we will have to have discussions, and we are now giving careful thought to the kind of items that ought to figure in a comprehensive settlement. There will, no doubt, be an opportunity for the House to discuss th[illegible]out the immediate thing is to get the cease-fire in order to move from there to the discussions.

About the B.B.C. and all other forms of communication being used, I think that they are, although I have heard suggestions that the B.B.C. services were not being as fully used as perhaps they should have been. I do not know this at first hand, but I am having inquiries made to see whether we can improve what has been done.

On arms, I take complete note of what the right hon. Gentleman has said. I worded that passage in my speech very carefully.

Mr. Thorpe: Is the Foreign Secretary aware that the success of obtaining a cease fire will not only be welcome for its own sake, but will help to restore the authority of the United Nations?

May I ask him, first, whether he is satisfied that this can be transmitted to the combatants in the field, as opposed to those in control of the Governments? Secondly, is Colonel Nasser still in effective control of the Government of Egypt, and, thirdly, can he say a word about the sterling balances held in London by the Arab States—particularly Kuwait, who, it has been suggested, is trying to transfer them to Switzerland?

Mr. Brown: As far as the United Nations authority is concerned, I deplore the tendency to giggle when it is mentioned. When this Middle Eastern situation has become just one more event in history the creating and building of United Nations authority will still be an outstanding aim of any intelligent, rational Government anywhere in the world. I agree entirely with what the Leader of the Liberal Party has said. Getting the resolution passed is important for its own sake, but it is also important as being a step back from the miserable period—so far as the United Nations is concerned—which has marked the last few weeks.

The right hon. Gentleman asks whether it is being transmitted. Certainly, it is being transmitted to all those in authority and who can make the decisions, and I have no reason to think that they do not know about it.

As to whether President Nasser is in comma[illegible] all that I can say is that I have no evidence to the contrary. I have seen a statement by a journalist in a mid-day newspaper, but that journalist's past record of accuracy is not such as leads me to give it all that much credence.

On sterling balances, I have nothing to say.

Mr. Shinwell: Can the Government now depart, at least to some extent, from their attitude of neutrality by congratulating the State of Israel and the Israeli forces—[AN HON. MEMBER: "Really."] —on having successfully——

Mr. Faulds: Conducted a pre-emptive strike.

Mr. Shinwell: —on having successfully resisted the threat of annihilation? Can the Government not go that far?

If my right hon. Friend is relying on the United Nations in the future to ensure a satisfactory and permanent settlement, can we have an assurance that, so far as our own Government's representations are concerned, there will be guarantees to protect the economy of the State of Israel against economic boycott, and free passage through international waters, including the Suez Canal? Can we have assurances of that kind?

Will my right hon. Friend take it from me that the noises behind me have no effect on my mind whatever? I am not afraid of this crowd. I am not afraid of the Arabs and Nasserites. I am not afraid of anyone. I take sides, and I am on the side of the State of Israel—[*Interruption.*]

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Brown: Unlike me, my right hon. Friend does not carry responsibility and is in the happy position of being able to take sides. Were I to make any of the statements which he invites me to make, it is clear that I should make the situation worse in hampering the working out of a settlement and do the cause which he has at heart as much harm as I should do any other cause. Therefore, I do not answer my right hon. Friend on the merits, but that does not mean that I agree with him on the merits, either.

As to the aspects of a long-term settlement, all the points which he mentioned must be taken into account. However, there are other matters to be taken into account, as well. I repeat that this is not a situation in which one can say that all the rights and merits are on one side and in one people's hands only. Before we make partisan statements in this House on behalf of one side—in this case, Israel—let us recognise that the Arabs also have cases and issues to deploy which they are entitled to expect to be heard and treated with respect.

All of these will be taken into account, and that is why I said in my statement that, in the settlement, I believe that we must take a good look at the fundamental and root causes of the conflict. We have had this twice in a decade. I believe that it will be the business of those of us who carry responsibility and, I hope, those who support us, to try to work out this time a settlement which will ensure that we do not have it a third time.

Mr. Sandys: Will the Foreign Secretary begin now to initiate action to secure the setting up of some kind of international force which could police the cease-fire when it takes effect? Secondly, is he now in a position to tell us what is being done to secure the reopening of the Suez Canal?

Mr. Brown: The establishment of anything in the nature of a permanent U.N. force must be one of the aspects of a long-term settlement. However, I believe that getting a cease-fire is the important matter. I do not think that complicating that with arguments about a United Nations force and where it should go at this stage in the battle will help us very much. But it may well be that if we can assure the cease-fire the Secretary General, or a very prominent representative of his, might help the situation by proceeding immediately to the area to ensure that what is said to be going on is, in fact, going on. Thereafter, we can discuss what kind of continuing force there should be.

The right hon. Gentleman has a passionate desire about opening the Suez Canal. I am never very clear how he envisages doing it. I can only say that I envisage doing it by getting a cease-fire and proceeding to negotiate a settlement for the whole area.

Mr. Lawson: Will my right hon. Friend recognise that perhaps the worst thing

[MR. LAWSON.]
which can happen to any people is the feeling of national humiliation? Will he be most generous and sympathetic in this case and do his utmost to show that we are genuinely neutral and wish to be friendly with the Arab people as well as others?

Mr. Shinwell *rose*——

Mr. Lawson: Will he also recognise that the Arab people have a genuine grievance against the Israeli nation——

Mr. Shinwell *rose*——

Mr. Lawson: —and, on the basis which all of us recognise, try his utmost to heal the sores in this part of the world?

Mr. Brown: This is exactly what I am afraid of. One over-stated, emotional, partisan statement invites the contrary—[*Interruption.*]

Mr. Rankin: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I ask for your guidance? Are you aware that war has broken out in my immediate neighbourhood? I am not taking sides, either, but may I ask my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to tell us what he proposes to do to stop the war in this House before he goes on to deal with the Middle East?

Mr. Speaker: Order. We are discussing a very serious issue. There are widely differing points of view inside what is probably a fundamental unity. Noise and heat do not help the day at all.

Mr. Brown: I was about to say this when I was interrupted by that point of order. May I remind everyone in the House, if anyone needs reminding, that not only are there vast issues at stake, but that people's lives are at stake. If statements which may satisfy our emotions in the House tend to prolong the conflict outside, they are much to be deplored and denounced.

My hon. Friend the Member for Motherwell (Mr. Lawson) spoke of the feeling of national humiliation. I understand this very well. As a matter of fact, the sense of humiliation since 1956 no doubt has been a factor in what has now happened. I put it no higher than that. I have it very much in mind.

My hon. Friend asks the Government to be friendly to the Arab people and to Arab statesmen. On that, I have as good a record as anyone, and they well know it. I ask them to respond to it.

Mr. St. John Stevas: Will the Foreign Secretary assure the House that the Government will do nothing to deprive Israel of the legitimate fruits of her victory, and that much less will they do anything to prevent the fate overtaking President Nasser which seems likely to reach him in the near future?

Mr. Brown: I am sorry, but I shall not say anything of the kind, and I think that, on reflection, even the hon. Gentleman will think it would have been better if he had not said it.

Mr. Raphael Tuck: When my right hon. Friend looks at the root causes, as he calls them, will he look at the sale early last year of £107 million worth of arms to Saudi Arabia, and consider whether this was not a cause of the intensification of the arms race in the Middle East?

Secondly, will my right hon. Friend look at the whole matter not in the context of one side having a case against the other, but of the determination expressed by one country completely to annihilate the other?

Mr. Brown: My hon. Friend made the latter point the other day, and there is no more that I can say about it. It is my hon. Friend's point of view.

On the question of arms, as I said the other day, we have a better record than most in ensuring that by any supplies which we have sold we have kept the balance of power very much in mind. I think that the balance of power, and maybe this conflict, owes a good deal more to the lack of concern which some other nations have shown in their supplies to the area.

Mr. Dodds-Parker: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman how many ships are held up in transit through the Canal, and what practical steps are being taken by the U.A.R. authorities to stop other ships transiting?

Mr. Brown: I cannot say without notice. The last information I had this morning was that some ships were still

held up, but I do not recall the number, and the efforts were being made to try to ensure that they were allowed to proceed. As I told the House the other day, we have in the meantime advised our shipping to stay away from the entrances to the Canal.

Mr. Mayhew: Would my right hon. Friend agree that one result of the war may well be——

Mr. Shinwell: Go back to Nasser.

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Mayhew: —to remove the political objections on both sides to a solution of the bitter problem of the Arab refugees? Is my right hon. Friend aware that this country has had a good record in this matter in the past, and will he now make a special study of this problem with a view to taking advantage of the new situation which could soon exist?

Mr. Brown: For a long time I have been concerned—before I ever came to office—with the position of the Palestine refugees. I have visited them many times, and I have often made proposals, both to Israeli, and Arab statesmen now in office, about the ways in which I thought this problem might either be completely dealt with, or certainly removed as a festering irritating sore. I agree with my hon. Friend that we have a good record about this, and that one of the root causes of the coflict which will have to be dealt with in a settlement must be the future of these wretched people.

Mr. Woodnutt: May I follow the point touched on by the Leader of the Liberal Party and raised by the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) yesterday? While agreeing with the Government's policy of restraint and not wishing to take sides, there is no doubt that hostile acts have been taken against this country in the stopping of the oil flow and the breaking off of diplomatic relations. As there is a risk of a run on sterling, will the right hon. Gentleman assure us that if this takes place he will have no hesitation in freezing the balances of these countries in this country because of the danger to sterling?

Mr. Brown: I am sure that that was well meant, but it could hardly be more damaging. May I make it plain that the £ today is running very strongly indeed. There is, therefore, no need for anybody to get into that kind of panic situation or to make suggestions of that kind. We do not need that kind of support.

On the question of acts against us which are hostile, such as breaking off diplomatic relations, and suspending oil shipments, I take a very strong view of them, and I have explained this very strongly both personally and in writing to the Governments and their representatives. On the other hand, I ask the House to recognise that in a situation as deeply charged as this has been in the last week it is possible to understand the pressures on some of these countries, and that probably the less we attack in public the more likely we are very soon to rehabilitate the situation.

Mr. Francis Noel-Baker: While expressing warm support for my right hon. Friend's general approach, may I ask one specific and one more general question? Among the major root causes of the conflict in the Middle East are not the war in Vietnam and bad relations between the Soviet Union and the United States very important factors?

My specific question is this. Is it not unrealistic to expect the victorious Israeli forces to withdraw to the 1949 armistice lines unless there are very substantial guarantees, and that there will have to be substantial frontier rectifications if the security of Israel and stability in the Middle East are to be preserved in the future in addition to firm treaties with Israel's Arab neighbours recognising her existence and guaranteeing her frontier?

Mr. Brown: On the first point, what my hon. Friend called the general one, as I said when I returned from Moscow I did not have the impression that any differences about Vietnam were being allowed to cloud the Russians' minds about the undesirability of having a conflagration in the Middle East in addition to one in South-East Asia. I see no reason to believe that Vietnam has had anything to do with this conflagration arising, though I am bound to say it may have had something to do with the passing of the cease-fire resolution in the United Nations.

[MR. BROWN.]

On the point about Israel's forces and positions reached by Israel, I repeat that I take note of what my hon. Friend has said. All these things will have to be considered when it comes to trying to work out an equitable and lasting settlement.

Sir J. Eden: Although the position is still somewhat uncertain, would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that a more lasting settlement in future is likely to be achieved only if there are direct negotiations between the principal combatants? Therefore, as soon as he thinks the time is ripe, will the right hon. Gentleman initiate four-Power proposals to try to bring this about?

Mr. Brown: With respect to the hon. Gentleman, I think that we are running ahead of ourselves here. If the House would accept a piece of advice, I think that canvassing these ideas at this stage may well be counter-productive. I will take these things into account. I agree that the four Powers have a rôle to play, but whether we handle it that way, or whether we handle it at the United Nations, is a matter which we have to work out very carefully, and I would rather not be pressed on it.

Sir B. Janner: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the battle which is being fought is the battle of Israel, similar to the lone battle that was fought in the Battle of Britain? Is not my right hon. Friend aware that some assurance must be given, in whatever terms are arranged, that the diabolical kind of propaganda which went on before will not emanate against the little State of Israel?

Secondly, will my right hon. Friend look into the question of the facilities for broadcasting which we gave to the Arabs who were attacking us as well as Israel, and the very little help that was given to Israel in the form of broadcasting facilities?

Mr. Brown: I am sure that this country's capacity to help bring about a lasting and equitable settlement, and thereby help the cause which my hon. Friend has at heart, will not be enhanced by any statement by me at this moment which could suggest to the Arabs that I was endorsing claims made by those who speak for Israel.

Equally, may I remind my hon. Friend that one of the difficulties in these days is that other people do not distinguish as easily as we do between Government statements and responsibility in this House, and statements made by others in this House. We want to get at a settlement. We have to get at it if my hon. Friend's ambitions are to be satisfied. We have to get at it if our own interests are to be satisfied. We have to get at it if the Arabs are to be satisfied. I urge on the House that restraint in what we have to say at this moment may be of the utmost possible value.

Sir B. Janner: On a point of order. My right hon. Friend did not answer the second part of my question.

Mr. Speaker: Order. It is for the Minister to answer questions in the way he wishes to answer. The hon. Gentleman knows that.

Mr. G. Campbell: Would the right hon. Gentleman say through what agencies on the ground this cease-fire, when accepted, is to be supervised and policed? Is this not a task which U.N.T.S.O. could carry out?

Mr. Brown: As I said when I made my statement on Monday, that is obviously a possibility. U.N.T.S.O. still exists, although it had a fairly rough time in Jerusalem. That is obviously a possibility, but I suggest that we remember the phrase, "First catch your hare." The first thing is to get the cease-fire, and then decide how to supervise and enforce it.

Mr. Michael Foot: Will my right hon. Friend accept that, whatever may be the inevitable differences of opinion which are bound to arise on this subject, many of us believe that his single-minded aim is to stop the bloodshed and get an honourable and lasting settlement? Is he aware that we wish him the very best of success in this endeavour?

Mr. Brown: I thank my hon. Friend very much indeed.

Sir J. Langford-Holt: Will the right hon. Gentleman be assured that, while agreeing with his hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot), the whole House will, I think, agree with him when he said that we cannot accept

a situation which returns to the conditions which gave birth to the struggle which is going on?

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Richard Pollock—

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Nancy Rachelose

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

7-6-1967.

Keep for Mr Lord's record: Overtaken today: Sent, slightly by Foreign Sec. 7/6

10 Downing Street
Whitehall

June 7, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Thomas,

The Prime Minister had a brief word with the Minister of State (Mr. Thomson) after O.P.D. this morning about the Government's public position on the export of arms to the Middle East.

Mr. Thomson explained that we could no longer maintain the current administrative hold-up. If we wished to prevent further exports, export licences would have to be held. But we were under very strong pressure from the Israelis, particularly over ammunition, and in present circumstances it would seem undesirable to get into an argument with them about this.

After a short discussion the Prime Minister agreed that, if we had received no indication from Moscow by the beginning of House of Commons Business this afternoon that the Soviet Government were suspending arms deliveries, we should be prepared to say that the temporary suspension by H.M.G., to which he had referred yesterday, was now ended and we had reverted to the normal state of affairs.

I am sending copies of this letter to O'Neill (Foreign Office), Meynell (Board of Trade),

copied in
Middle East (Policy)
Dec 1964

Nairne (Ministry of Defence), Baldwin (H.M. Treasury), Burgh (Department of Economic Affairs) and Reid (Cabinet Office).

C.M. MacLehose, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

S E C R E T

Cypher/Cat.A.

FLASH AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 560 7 June, 1967.

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 560 of 7 June. Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Washington, UKMis New York and UKDel NATO.

Your telegram No. 974.

Jordan.

This telegram arrived after Security Council decision on a general cease fire. However, I communicated its contents to Director General, Jordan General Intelligence, who passed it to King Hussein after obtaining from General Khammash confirmation that order to cease fire had been passed to all Arab forces on Jordanian soil.

2. The King said he was very thankful for all the efforts which had been made on Jordan's behalf and re-affirmed the cease fire and that it was subject only to Israelis honouring it. If they did not Jordan would refer the incident to the United Nations.

3. King Hussein added that p lans for a Jordanian air operation against Israel were cancelled following earlier intimation that we were active on Jordan's behalf with the Israelis.

Foreign Office pass Flash to Tel Aviv 84, Washington 87, UKMis New York 40 and UKDel NATO M46.

Mr. Adams Sent 0333 7 June.
Recd.0441 7 June.

[Repeated as requested]

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GR 205

TELNO 562 OF 7 JUNE TO FO RPTD FOR INFO TO UKMIS NEW YORK WTON AND TEL AVIV MY TEL NO 560.

CEASE FIRE. JORDANIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS JUST SUMMONED ME WITH AMBASSADORS OF UNITED STATES, FRANCE AND SOVIET UNION TO INFORM US THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT JORDAN HAS GIVEN IMMEDIATE EFFECT TO CEASE FIRE RESOLUTION THIS WAS NOT BEING OBSERVED BY THE ISRAELIS. A NUMBER OF POSITIONS FROM TUBAS IN THE NORTH TO POINTS NEAR BETHLEHEM IN THE SOUTH WERE AT THE MOMENT UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE AND AIR BOMBARDMENT.

2. SO FAR JORDANIANS HAVE ABSTAINED FROM MAKING ORGANISED COUNTER ATTACKS. BUT UNLESS ISRAELIS STOP ATTACKING FORTHWITH THEY WILL COUNTER ATTACK WITH EVERYTHING REMAINING TO THEM.

WILL COUNTER ATTACK WITH EVERYTHING REMAINING TO THEM.
THIS WOULD INCLUDE THE USE OF AIRCRAFT.

3. JORDAN INTENDS TO MAKE URGENT REPRESENTATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT IN VIEW OF CRITICAL STATE OF JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES THE COUNCIL'S INTERVENTION MAY BE TOO LATE TO PREVENT THEIR COLLAPSE. MINISTER APPEALED TO OUR GOVTS TO DO EVERYTHING TO IMPRESS ON THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY ARE PUSHING JORDAN TO THE LIMIT OF HER PATIENCE.

4. MINISTER ADDED THAT HE WAS SENDING A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO GENERAL BULL THROUGH THE LOCAL UN REPRESENTATIVE

FO PASS UKMIS NEW YORK AS MY TEL NO 41.

FLASH.

ADAMS.

BT

GRS 205

NNN

File - Jerusalem

Israel

En Clair

FLASH PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 654 7 June 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 654 of 7 June
Repeated for information to Washington

After a day of mass demonstrations outside my house and office in connexion with the Middle East war, at 4.40 p.m. a motley crowd of so-called foreign experts entered the office courtyard and proceeded to break many of the windows on the ground floor as well as the flower pots outside. Some broke into the front hall and destroyed The Queen's portrait. They also hauled down and tore up the flag. Mr. Whitney went outside to receive a protest and they then went away. No one was injured though Mr. Whitney, and Mr. Blishen who accompanied him were struck.

2. The group included Arabs, Africans, Americans, and even British (I spotted Mrs. Epstein nee Fairfax-Cholmondeley). There were also some Chinese Press men with cameras. The police made no, (repeat no) attempt to interfere.

3. We telephoned Protocol Department to report what had occurred and request effective police measures to prevent a repetition. Their reply was that "the action of the revolutionary masses was completely justified".

Mr. Hopson

Sent 0945Z 7 June 1967

Recd 1017Z 7 June 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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7 file

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CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO BAGHDAD

TELNO. 1119 7 JUNE 1967 (EASTERN)

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ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 1119 OF 7 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO KUWAIT JEDDA BEIRUT WASHINGTON BAHRAIN AND SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS UKDEL NATO BONN.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 712.

BREACH OF RELATIONS.

IF YOU SEE NO INSUPERABLE PRACTICAL OR POLITICAL OBJECTION, YOU SHOULD ATTEMPT THROUGH WHATEVER CHANNELS ARE AVAILABLE TO YOU TO GET THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS TO PRESIDENT AREF OR OTHER IRAQI LEADERS WHO MIGHT BE A MODERATING INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION.

2. IN BREAKING RELATIONS AND INTERFERING WITH OIL SUPPLIES, THEY ARE ACTING ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION WHICH IS KNOWN TO THE WORLD TO BE FALSE, AND WHICH EVEN THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT THOUGHT IT EXPEDIENT TO ENDORSE, ABOUT BRITISH AND AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE FIGHTING. THEY SHOULD NOW BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND BETTER THAT THE DESPERATE EFFORTS THAT WERE BEING MADE LAST WEEK BY BRITAIN AND AMERICA WOULD HAVE SAVED THEM FROM THE CATASTROPHE TO WHICH NASSER'S MEGALOMANIA AND RUSSIAN OPPORTUNISM HAS LED THEM.

3. INSTEAD OF ALLOWING THEMSELVES TO BE LED FURTHER ALONG THIS SELF-DESTRUCTIVE COURSE THEY SHOULD NOW BE CONSIDERING WHAT THEY CAN DO TO GET SANITY RESTORED AND SALVAGE WHAT CAN BE RECOVERED FROM THE WRECKAGE.

4. AS REGARDS OIL, IRAQ HAS ALREADY SUFFERED ENOUGH IN RECENT

/ YEARS

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FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1119 TO BAGHDAD

YEARS FROM THE REFUSAL TO FACE ECONOMIC REALITIES. OTHER PRODUCERS ARE BOUND TO WANT TO RESUME NORMAL SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS AS SOON AS THEY DECENTLY CAN, AND ONCE AGAIN IT SEEMS ALL TOO LIKELY THAT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WILL CAUSE THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT TO SACRIFICE IRAQ'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS. VERY RECENT EXPERIENCE HAS ILLUSTRATED FOR IRAQ THE FACT THAT ONCE THE PATTERN OF OIL SUPPLY IS ALTERED IT IS NOT EASY TO GET IT RESTORED.

SOSFA SENT 1329/7 JUNE

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO. 1802 7 JUNE, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO PARIS TELEGRAM NO. 1802 OF 7 JUNE REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW.

MIDDLE EAST.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1720.

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME AT HIS REQUEST TODAY TO GIVE ME M. COUVE DE MURVILLE'S REPLY TO MY MESSAGE. M. COUVE THANKED ME FOR THE MESSAGE AND AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD STAY TOGETHER. HE HAD HOPED THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN KEEPING ME FULLY IN THE PICTURE ABOUT FRENCH THINKING ON DEVELOPMENTS AT THE U.N.

2. WE DISCUSSED WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN IN THE NEXT PHASE. I SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND I WERE AGREED THAT IT WAS VITAL TO MAINTAIN VERY CLOSE CONTACT BETWEEN THE FOUR POWERS. I HAD SAID SO IN THE HOUSE EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON. M DE COURCEL SAID THAT, HAVING ACHIEVED A CEASE-FIRE, THE FRENCH VIEW WAS THAT NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH MIGHT BE PROTRACTED, SHOULD NOW BEGIN ON A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. THEY HAD, AS WE KNEW, ORIGINALLY FAVOURED A U.N. RESOLUTION WHICH WENT FURTHER THAN A SIMPLE CEASE-FIRE, BUT HAD BEEN WILLING TO ACCEPT THE LATTER WHEN A CONSENSUS IN ITS FAVOUR BEGAN TO EMERGE. THEY HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE RUSSIANS THROUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE AMBASSADORS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS BUT HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY RENEWED THE MAY 25 PROPOSAL FOR A FOUR POWER MEETING WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD AT THAT TIME REJECTED.

3. I ASKED M. DE COURCEL TO ASK M. COUVE IF HE WOULD LET ME HAVE URGENTLY SOME IDEA OF HIS THINKING ON WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN NEXT. I WOULD OF COURSE DO THE SAME. I WAS NOT LOOKING FOR DECISIONS WITH PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY - ON MY SIDE I WAS THINKING OF AN EXCHANGE WHICH WOULD BE PART OF THE PREPARATION FOR FURTHER FORMAL CONSULTATION WITH MY MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES. THE ISRAELIS WERE NOW MOVING TO A POINT WHERE THEY COULD POSSIBLY STOP: THE ARABS WERE IN A STATE, AT BEST, OF SOME HUMILIATION. THERE WERE MANY POSSIBILITIES WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER, AND IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD

/EXCHANGE .....

EXCHANGE VIEWS EVEN IF, AT THE END, OUR OPINIONS DIVERGED. THERE WAS A TEMPTATION TO SIT BACK AND LET THE TWO SUPERPOWERS IMPOSE A DECISION. IN MY VIEW THIS WAS A MOMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN POWERS NAMELY OURSELVES, TO ASSERT THEMSELVES. IF WE COULD CONCERT OUR VIEWS AND ACTIONS, WE COULD TOGETHER BECOME AN EFFECTIVE PARTY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I WAS FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT THE FOUR POWER PROPOSAL NOW HAD ITS BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS SO FAR. WE SHOULD CONSIDER TOGETHER HOW THE SITUATION MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IN THAT CONTEXT BEFORE IT WAS PUT INTO THE FULL U.N. CONTEXT.

4. M. DE COURCEL UNDERTOOK TO PASS ON MY REQUEST TO M. COUVE.

SOSFA SENT 0739Z 8 JUNE

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But I fear trouble since too long keeping the world waiting for us!

EN CLAIR
F L A S H PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TEL NO. 566 7 JUNE 67
UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FO TEL NO. 566 OF 7 JUNE REPTD FOR INFMN TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND MOSCOW.

MIDDLE EAST.

THE FRENCH PRIME MINISTER IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD GAULLIST DEPUTIES ON 6 JUNE THAT FRENCH POLICY WAS TO WORK FOR AN OVERALL AND LASTING SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. EVEN IF ISRAEL HAD OBTAINED A STRIKING MILITARY VICTORY ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, THIS WOULD ONLY ASSURE A TEMPORARY AND PRECARIOUS RESPITE. FRANCE HAD ALWAYS ENJOYED FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, AND HAD NOW ALSO SUCCEEDED IN RE-ESTABLISHING SIMILAR RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. FRANCE WAS THEREFORE WELL PLACED TO HELP BRING ABOUT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. BUT THIS WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF SHE DID NOT COMMIT HERSELF TO EITHER SIDE.

2. THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER IS TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT THIS AFTERNOON.

FO PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON 166 UKMIS NEW YORK 42 AND MOSCOW 45.

SIR P REILLY SENT AT...1247/07
RECD AT...1244/07

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Mr Bryant BOT
Mr Sampson Min of Transport
& Civil Av Hqrs

EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NO.568
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
7 JUNE 1967.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.568 OF 7 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND MOSCOW.

MIDDLE EAST.

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE MINISTER FOR INFORMATION, M. GORSE, AFTER THIS MORNING'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: BEGINS

THE CEASE-FIRE DECISION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS WELCOMED IN FRANCE. IT CORRESPONDS WITH FRENCH VIEWS EXPOUNDED IN PREVIOUS COUNCIL MEETINGS. WE CONSIDER THAT THE GREAT POWERS WHO HAVE SUCCEEDED IN REACHING AGREEMENT IN PROPOSING A CEASE-FIRE SHOULD, PROVIDED THE PARTIES CONCERNED THEMSELVES ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL, NEXT PROCEED TO AN AGREEMENT TO EXAMINE TOGETHER ALL THE BASIC PROBLEMS WHICH AFFECT RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES.

ENDS.

3. M. GORSE ALSO SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN TWO EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES BETWEEN PRESIDENT DE GAULLE AND MR. KOSYGIN BY THE SPECIAL TELEPRINTER LINK ON 5 AND 6 JUNE.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS PRIORITY WASHINGTON 167 UKMIS NEW YORK 43 AND MOSCOW 46.

SIR P. REILLY. GROUPS 160A SENT

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CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY PARIS
TELEGRAM NO.569
CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
7 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.569 OF 7 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV MOSCOW AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO.538: FRANCE AND ISRAEL.

LISTENING TO M. COUVE DE MURVILLE THIS AFTERNOON DELIVERING A STATEMENT OF FRENCH GOVERNMENT POLICY (SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM) AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, I WAS STRUCK BY THE EVIDENT PAINS HE WAS TAKING TO KEEP THE TEMPERATURE DOWN, PRESENTING FRENCH POLICY AS BEING IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED INCLUDING THE ISRAELIS. (SEE ALSO M. POMPIDOU'S REMARKS OF YESTERDAY REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM NO.566). THE GOVERNMENT HAVE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PUBLIC SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL WHICH HAS STEADILY INCREASED SINCE THE FIRST MANIFESTATIONS DESCRIBED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

2. THE GOVERNMENT FELT OBLIGED TO REFUSE A DEMAND FROM THE OPPOSITION THAT M. COUVE'S STATEMENT TODAY SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY AN OPEN DEBATE. (THE VOTE REJECTING THIS PROPOSAL WAS ONLY CARRIED BY A MAJORITY OF 4). MANY MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL MAJORITY GROUP HAVE BEEN SHOWING SIGNS OF RESTLESSNESS AND THE GOVERNMENT COULD WELL LOSE ON A STRAIGHT VOTE IF ONE WERE NOW TAKEN ON SOME OPPOSITION MOTION CRITICISING THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY.

3. A STATEMENT OF THE QUOTE FRENCH COMMITTEE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH ISRAEL UNQUOTE PUBLISHED YESTERDAY AND CALLING FOR GUARANTEES FOR ISRAEL, CARRIES SIGNATURES OF A WIDE RANGE OF POLITICAL FIGURES IN BOTH THE OPPOSITION AND THE GOVERNMENT PARTIES - INCLUDING MITTERRAND, DEFFERRE, LECANUET, DUHAMEL, GISCARD D'ESTAING, BAUMEL, SANGUINETTI AND TERRENOIRE. I AM ALSO INFORMED THAT OVER HALF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC DEPUTIES HAVE GIVEN THEIR SIGNATURES TO A PRO-ISRAELI DECLARATION. ALL FRENCH DEPUTIES, GAULLISTS INCLUDED, ARE UNDER PRESSURE FROM ELECTORAL SENTIMENT TO EXPRESS SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL.

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4. THE COHESION OF THE GOVERNMENTAL MAJORITY PARTY IS NOT, HOWEVER, IMMEDIATELY, THREATENED. MANY OF THE LEADING GAULLIST POLITICIANS ARE NO DOUBT ACTING TO PREVENT PRO-ISRAELI FEELING BECOMING A MONOPOLY OF THE OPPOSITION. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT FOUND IT EASY TO KEEP THIS MOVEMENT UNDER CONTROL. M. COUVE HAD TO INTERVENE PERSONALLY EARLIER THIS WEEK WITH THE EDITOR OF THE MASS CIRCULATION EVENING PAPER AFTER THE FIRST EDITION CAME OUT WITH THE GIANT HEADLINES QUOTE THE EGYPTIANS ATTACK ISRAEL UNQUOTE. AS A CONSEQUENCE THE HEADLINES FOR THE SECOND EDITION WERE CORRECTED TO QUOTE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNQUOTE. THIS STORY HAS HOWEVER BEEN GIVEN WIDE CURRENCY AND IS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S GENERAL UNEASE.

5. THERE IS NO SIGN THAT THE GENERAL HIMSELF HAS BEEN MOVED BY THIS PARIAMENTARY CRITICISM AND POPULAR PRO-ISRAELI SENTIMENT TO MODIFY HIS POLICY OF NEUTRALITY. THIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT, EVEN AMONG HIS OWN MINISTERS, I AM TOLD, ONLY M. COUVE HIMSELF AND POSSIBLY M. PEYREFITTE (MINISTER OF EDUCATION) ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE ARABS. ALL OTHER MINISTERS WITHOUT EXCEPTION ARE SAID TO SHARE PRO-ISRAELI FEELINGS, WITH MM. JOXE AND FREY AS THE MOST OUTSPOKENLY CRITICAL.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON 168 AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV 1 MOSCOW 34 AND UKMIS NEW YORK 40.

SIR P. REILLY.

DESP. 1929Z Ø7 JUNE '67.
RECD. 1939Z Ø7 JUNE '67.

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 570
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
7 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO F O TELEGRAM NUMBER 570 OF 7 JUNE REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND MOSCOW.
MY TELEGRAM NO. 569 FRANCE AND ISRAEL.

THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER, M. COUVE DE MURVILLE, MADE A STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON 7 JUNE.

2. M. COUVE SAID IN ESSENCE THAT ALL EFFORTS SHOULD NOW BE CONCENTRATED ON OBTAINING AN IMMEDIATE HALT TO THE FIGHTING. APPLICATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE BY ALL CONCERNED WOULD, HOWEVER, ONLY BE THE BEGINNING OF A LENGTHY ENDEVOUR IF LASTING PEACE WAS TO BE OBTAINED. IT WAS FOR THE FOUR GREAT POWERS TOGETHER, AND PERHAPS IN PARTICULAR FOR FRANCE, TO WORK FOR AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT.

3. IN THE COURSE OF A DETAILED HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS, M. COUVE SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN REPROACHED FOR FAILING TO MAKE A SOLEMN REAFFIRMATION OF THE POSITION ADOPTED BY FRANCE IN 1957 CONCERNING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA. BUT SUCH A DECLARATION COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN QUOTE PLATONIC AND WITHOUT A FUTURE UNQUOTE AND MIGHT INDEED HAVE ENCOURAGED THE ISRAELIS TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK AND EVEN HAVE IMPLIED THAT FRANCE WOULD GIVE MILITARY SUPPORT TO ISRAEL. IN FACT, NONE OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES COULD BE LASTINGLY SETTLED BY FORCE. NOR WAS IT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION (OR INDEED OF THE GREAT POWERS THEMSELVES) TO BE DRAWN INTO GREAT POWER RIVALRIES.

4. THIS WAS WHY FRANCE HAD PROPOSED ON 24 MAY THAT THE FOUR GREAT POWERS SHOULD CONCERT TOGETHER IN ORDER TO REDUCE TENSION. THE GREAT POWERS HAD, IN FACT, THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS, ACTED MODERATELY, RECOGNISING THE THREAT TO WORLD PEACE WHICH WOULD ARISE FROM THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES IN THE REGION.

/ 5. .....

5. IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING THAT EVERY STATE, INCLUDING ISRAEL, HAD THE RIGHT TO EXIST. THIS APPLIED TO EVERY PEOPLE AND EVERY RACE. ARABS AND ISRAELIS WERE DESTINED TO CO-EXIST TOGETHER. BUT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO IMPOSE SOLUTIONS UNACCEPTABLE TO EITHER SIDE. M. COUVE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SO NAIVE AS TO THINK THAT TOMORROW OR THE NEXT DAY A REAL DIALOGUE COULD BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO, WHERE THERE HAD BEEN NONE FOR THE PAST TWENTY YEARS. IT WAS THEREFORE PRECISELY AT THIS POINT THAT THE POWERS WHO HAD THE PRIME RESPONSIBILITY COULD AND SHOULD PLAY THEIR PART AND COOPERATE TOGETHER. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO ARRIVE AT AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION CONCERNING AQABA WHICH WOULD FIX AND GUARANTEE THE CONDITIONS OF NAVIGATION AND WHICH WOULD BE SIGNED BY ALL THE INTERESTED POWERS, THEREBY ENSURING A LASTING SETTLEMENT.

6. SPEAKING OF THE PART PLAYED BY FRANCE IN RECENT EVENTS, M. COUVE SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT WHICH HAD FINALLY BEEN REACHED BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN DECISIVE. BUT PRESIDENT DE GAULLE HIMSELF AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD FOLLOWED THE DISCUSSIONS CAREFULLY, AND IN PARTICULAR HAD KEPT IN PERMANENT TOUCH WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS ALSO DESERVED THE ASSEMBLY'S GRATITUDE FOR THE CONTRIBUTION HE HAD MADE TO THE FINAL RESULT THROUGH THE CLOSE CONTACTS HE HAD MAINTAINED WITH HIS AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN COLLEAGUES.

7. IN CONCLUSION, M. COUVE SAID THAT, IN THE GREAT UNDERTAKING ON WHICH IT WOULD NOW BE NECESSARY TO EMBARK, FRANCE WOULD PLAY A ROLE CONSISTENT WITH HER TRADITIONAL PRESENCE IN THE EAST AND WITH HER MISSION IN THE WORLD. IT WOULD GO DOWN TO THE HONOUR OF FRANCE IF SHE COULD IN SOME MEASURE LEAD THE MIDDLE EAST TO PEACE AND TO A FUTURE IN WHICH BOTH ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES WOULD BE ABLE TO DEVOTE THEMSELVES TO THE REAL TASK OF THEIR OWN DEVELOPMENT.

F.O. PASS PRIORITY WASHINGTON 169 UKMIS NEW YORK 44 AND ROUTINE MOSCOW 47.

SIR P. REILLY

SENT 2036/07
RECD 2037/07

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(35)

...ER/CAT A

L A S H KUWAIT

...240

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

7 JUNE 1967

Good, robust
stuff. Hope FO.
stay 'yes'.

...FIDENTIAL

...SD FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 240 OF 7 JUNE REPTD FOR INFMN ...

...MAIN AND WASHINGTON.

...TEL 235: PALESTINE.

...WOULD LIKE INSTRUCTIONS TO SPEAK TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND TO THE AMIR ON THE FOLLG GENERAL LINES.

2. I SHOULD SAY THAT YOU WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE EXPLANATIONS YOU HAD RECEIVED THROUGH THE KUWAIT AMBASSADOR AND ME AND THAT YOU HAD NOTED THE ASSURANCE ON THE SECURITY OF BRITISH LIVES AND PROPERTY. YOU UNDERSTOOD VERY WELL THE DIFFICULTY OF KUWAIT'S POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD AND IN PARTICULAR HER NEED FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE U A R AND THE BENEVOLENCE OF IRAQ. YOU THEREFORE UNDERSTOOD WHY SHE HAD FELT IT NECESSARY TO STOP THE OIL AND PROVIDED THE STOPPAGE WAS TEMPORARY YOU WOULD TAKE IT ON THE CHIN.

3. [illegible] EVER YOU DID NOT CREPEAT NOT) UNDERSTAND WHY KUWAIT CONTINUED TO RELAY THE SLANDERS OF CAIRO MORE PROMINENTLY [illegible] ESTERN DENIALS OF INVOLVEMENT. NOR DID YOU ACCEPT THE [illegible] MINISTER'S EXPLANATION OF THE LACK OF CONSULATION: [illegible] WOULD HAVE BEEN EASY TO INFORM H M G BEFORE ANNOUNCING THE [illegible] DECISION. WE HAD BEEN VERY PATIENT WITH KUWAIT AND WE TOO WERE ANXIOUS NOT TO DISTURB OUR ANCIENT FRIENDSHIP. BUT FRIENDSHIP HAD ITS OBLIGATIONS ON BOTH SIDES AND YOU WANTED TO KNOW WHERE ALL THIS WAS GOING TO END. EGYPT WAS HOSTILE TO THE WEST AND WAS DOING HER BEST TO DESTROY ALL FRIENDLY [illegible] BETWEEN THE U K AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES INCLUDING KUWAIT(H), IF [illegible] WAS DEFEATED NASSER WOULD BLAME THE WEST AND LIKE SAMSON TRY TO [illegible] THE MIDDLE EAST ABOUT HIS EARS. IF THE KUWAITIS FOLLOWED HIM, [illegible] THEY HAD SO FAR, THEY WOULD BECOME SATELLITES OF EGYPT (IN FACT THEY ARE ALREADY) AND DESTROY THE BRITISH CONNEXION [illegible] SAID THEY VALUED, FOR THERE WAS SUCH A THING AS PUBLIC [illegible]ON IN THE U K ALSO?. KUWAIT'S INDEPENDENCE WOULD THEN BE [illegible] RISK. WAS THIS THE WAY THEY WANTED TO GO?

4. IF THE KUWAITIS WANTED TO RETAIN OUR FRIENDSHIP (AND I GATHERED FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHERS THAT THEY DID), I WOULD SUGGEST AMONG ~~AMOG~~ OTHER THINGS ~~05234528,01~~

(A) THAT THEY TOOK H M G INTO THEIR CONFIDENCE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, BEFORE THEY ACTED AGAINST BRITISH INTERESTS

(B) THAT THEY SHOULD DO THEIR BEST TO MODERATE RATHER THAN INFLAME PUBLIC OPINION HERE

(C) THAT THEY SHOULD NOT IMPOSE UNNECESSARY(UNDERLINED) ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRICTIONS, SUCH AS THE BAN ON THE USE OF [illegible]E RADIO AT AHMADI

(D) THAT THEY SHOULD DECREE A LIMIT ON WITHDRAWALS WHEN THE BANKS REOPEN ON 10 JUNE (THERE WILL BE A RIOT AT THE B B M E IF THEY DON'T).

5. AN APPROACH OF THIS KIND WOULD ALARM THE AMIR AND ANNOY THE FOREIGN MINISTER. BUT I THINK THE TIME HAS COME TO REMIND THE KUWAITIS, WHO TAKE US TOO MUCH FOR GRANTED, THAT IT TAKES

5. AN APPROACH OF THIS KIND WOULD ALARM THE AMIR AND ANNOY THE FOREIGN MINISTER. BUT I THINK THE TIME HAS COME TO REMIND THE AFGHANS, WHO TAKE US TOO MUCH FOR GRANTED, THAT IT TAKES TWO SIDES TO MAKE A FRIENDSHIP AND THAT THEY ARE NOT THE ONLY PEOPLE IN THE WORLD WHO HAVE DIFFICULTIES

F O PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON 15

ARTHUR

SENT 0930Z 07 JUNE 1967

RCVD 1100Z 07 JUNE

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/ CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO. 1958

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
7 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1958 OF 7 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

MIDDLE EAST.

. CHET COOPER, WHO HAS BEEN MADE RESPONSIBLE FOR U.S. PLANNING TO COUNTER ARAB CHARGES OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE ARAB/ISRAELI WAR, ASKED MINISTER TO CALL THIS MORNING AND DISCUSS IDEAS ON HOW THE QUOTE BIG LIE UNQUOTE MIGHT BE NAILED.
2. COOPER STRESSED HIS CONVICTION THAT WE MUST MOVE SWIFTLY TO FOLLOW UP OUR INITIAL SUCCESS AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEN ON A PERSONAL BASIS GAVE STEWART THE FOLLOWING OUTLINE PROPOSALS WHICH, SUBJECT TO ANY COMMENTS BY GOLDBERG, HE EXPECTED WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY RUSK:

(I) PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD ISSUE PUBLIC STATEMENTS REQUESTING INVESTIGATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF ARAB CHARGES:

(II) MR. GOLDBERG AND LORD CARADON SHOULD FOLLOW THROUGH AT ONCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS, ALSO PRESSING FOR INVESTIGATION BY THE COUNCIL:

(III) A THIRD COUNTRY, POSSIBLY CANADA, SHOULD PROPOSE IN THE UNITED NATIONS THAT THE INVESTIGATION BE HANDLED PRIMARILY BY MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL REPRESENTED IN U.N.E.F. (CANADA, BRAZIL, AND INDIA):

(IV) THE U.S. AND U.K. TO WELCOME SUCH A PROPOSAL AND TO INDICATE THAT ALL FACILITIES AND RECORDS BE OPEN TO AN INVESTIGATING PARTY.

3. COOPER HOPED THAT THESE PROPOSALS WOULD :

(I) MAINTAIN OUR OFFENSIVE THRUST IN THE UNITED NATIONS:

(II) DEMONSTRATE DRAMATICALLY THAT WE HAD NOTHING TO FEAR, SINCE THE REQUEST FOR SUCH AN INVESTIGATION HAD BEEN MADE AT THE

/ HIGHEST

HIGHEST LEVEL:

(III) PUT INDIA AND OTHER QUOTE RELUCTANT DRAGONS UNQUOTE ON THE COUNCIL ON THE DEFENSIVE.

4. COOPER SAID HE HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THE ABOVE IDEAS WITH ELMORE JACKSON OF THE U.S. MISSION IN NEW YORK WHO HAD TOLD HIM THAT SPEAKING PERSONALLY HE THOUGHT THEY REPRESENTED A USEFUL APPROACH.

5. THINKING ALOUD ABOUT OTHER POSSIBILITIES COOPER WONDERED IF, ONCE THE CEASE-FIRE WAS OBSERVED THE ARABS BEGAN TO FALL OUT AMONG THEMSELVES, WE COULD NOT FIND A PROMINENT ARAB WILLING TO EXPOSE EGYPTIAN MENDACITY FOR WHAT IT WAS. HE CLEARLY DID NOT HAVE ANY PARTICULAR CANDIDATE IN MIND FOR THE JOB AND READILY AGREED THAT IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO FIND ONE WHO WOULD COMMAND THE NECESSARY RESPECT IN ARAB EYES.

6. HE SAID THAT THE VOICE OF AMERICA WAS BROADCASTING TWELVE HOURS A DAY IN ARABIC FROM RHODES AND HIS INCLINATION WAS TO ASK IF THEY COULD NOT STEP IT UP TO EIGHTEEN HOURS. HE ENQUIRED ABOUT B.B.C. ARABIC BROADCASTS AND WONDERED IF THEY TOO MIGHT BE ABLE TO STEP UP HOURS OF TRANSMISSION.

7. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT GREATLY INCREASED PUBLICITY FOR THE EGYPTIAN USE OF POISON GAS IN THE YEMEN MIGHT HELP TO DISCREDIT NASSER IN ARAB EYES. THE RED CROSS REPORT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL FOR THIS PURPOSE.

8. WHILE WE CANNOT YET BE CERTAIN HOW MANY OF COOPER'S IDEAS WILL BE ACCEPTED, IT WOULD BE USEFUL IN FOLLOWING UP THIS DISCUSSION TO HAVE YOUR EARLY COMMENTS.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT 2035/07
RECD AT 2036/07

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CYPHER/ CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 1959

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
7, JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1959 OF 7 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

M.I.P.T. : MIDDLE EAST.

COOPER ALSO SHOWED MINISTER A TRANSLATION OF A MOSCOW RADIO ARABIC SERVICE BROADCAST MADE AT 1230Z ON 6 JUNE (AN UNATTRIB-UTED COMMENTARY ENTITLED QUOTE THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ARAB COUNTRIES MUST BE HALTED UNQUOTE) WHICH QUOTED CAIRO RADIO ON ALLEGED BRITISH AND AMERICAN INTERVENTION AND SAID THAT QUOTE ALL THIS EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT THE U.S. AND BRITAIN HAVE HAD A HAND IN THE AGGRESSION. UNQUOTE TOON, COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR THE SOVIET UNION, WAS PRESENT FOR THIS PART OF THE CONVERSATION.

2. COOPER AND TOON INDICATED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF A VERY HIGH LEVEL APPROACH IN MOSCOW AS WELL AS CALLING IN THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN WASHINGTON TO PROTEST IN THE STRONGEST TERMS AGAINST THE REPETITION OF THESE CHARGES ON SOVIET INFORMATION MEDIA.

3. IF YOU OR THE PRIME MINISTER ARE CONTEMPLATING TAKING SIMILAR ACTION, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD LET ME KNOW.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT 2044 7/6
RECD AT 2045 7/6

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SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

TELNO 990 7 JUNE 1967 (E)

SECRET

ADDRESSED AMMAN TELNO 990 OF 7 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TEL AVIV WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 563 : CEASE FIRE.

ACCORDING TO ISRAEL EMBASSY HERE U S AMBASSADOR TEL AVIV PASSED PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM MR RUSK YESTERDAY TO MR ESHKOL, URGING THE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT JORDANIAN OFFER OF CEASE-FIRE. MR ESHKOL HAS REPLIED TO IT, SAYING THAT EITHER KING HUSSEIN IS NOT TELLING THE TRUTH OR IS UNAWARE OF THE SITUATION, SINCE JORDANIANS ARE STILL FIGHTING AND IN PARTICULAR USING ARTILLERY FIRE INTO THE NEW CITY AND CAUSING HEAVY CASUALTIES.

2. ISRAEL EMBASSY HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US THAT THIS MORNING THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT SENT A MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN ASKING:

(A) FOR CONFIRMATION THAT HE WAS ABLE TO EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE ARAB FORCES ON THE JORDAN/ISRAEL FRONT AND THAT HE COULD ENSURE OBSERVANCE BY THEM OF A CEASE-FIRE,

(B) FOR HIM TO NAME A TIME WHEN JORDANIAN SHELLING OF ISRAEL WOULD CEASE,

(C) FOR THE TIME AND PLACE WHERE A JORDANIAN REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ATTEND TALKS AIMING AT A CEASE-FIRE AND AT A MORE

/PERMANENT

SECRET

PERMANENT PEACE,

(D) FOR THE NAME OF THE JORDANIAN REPRESENTATIVE WHO WOULD ATTEND SUCH TALKS.

THE ISRAEL EMBASSY SAY THAT SO FAR THEY HAVE NOT HEARD OF ANY JORDANIAN RESPONSE.

SOSFA SENT 1606Z 7 JUNE 1967

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:::::

7 file

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CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY UKDEL NATO
TELEGRAM NO.234
CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
7 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.234 OF 7 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO PARIS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.6060 TO WASHINGTON: NATO AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THIS AT THE COUNCIL MEETING THIS MORNING AND AT A SUBSEQUENT INFORMAL MEETING OF SOME OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DID NOT PUT FORWARD ANY PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING OF A SPECIAL GROUP BEFORE LUXEMBOURG BUT MENTIONED IN VERY GENERAL TERMS THE THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE ONE OF THE OBJECTS OF THE DISCUSSION WHICH FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD HAVE AT LUXEMBOURG TO SET UP SUCH A GROUP TO MEET AFTERWARDS TO DISCUSS LONGER TERM MIDDLE EAST QUESTIONS. THE DUTCH REPRESENTATIVE, SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS, SAID THAT THERE SHOULD BE STUDIES BOTH IN THE CIVIL AND MILITARY SIDES OF NATO TO CONSIDER WHETHER NATO WAS SUFFICIENTLY PREPARED FOR CONTINGENCIES OF THE KIND WHICH HAD JUST OCCURRED, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION. IN SUBSEQUENT INFORMAL DISCUSSION MOST OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED, IN WHICH I JOINED, WERE TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY AND PERHAPS UNDESIRABLE TO TRY TO CREATE A NEW NATO INSTITUTION FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAS NOT GOING TO BE DECIDED BY NATO ITSELF AND THERE WAS POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGE IN NATO ADOPTING TOO PROMINENT AND PUBLIC A POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE MIDDLE EAST. ON THE OTHER HAND THOSE OF US WHO WERE GOING TO BE DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, WHETHER IN THE U.N. OR IN A SMALLER GROUP OF POWERS, COULD AND SHOULD MAKE FULL USE OF THE NORMAL CONSULTATION METHODS OF NATO TO OBTAIN THE VIEWS OF OUR ALLIES, PREFERABLY BEFORE ENTERING INTO DISCUSSIONS ELSEWHERE. FLEXIBLE AND INFORMAL PROCEDURES COULD BE USED BY WHICH E.G. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AND EXPERTS FROM CAPITALS,

/IF .....

IF DELEGATIONS WISHED TO BRING THEM, COULD TAKE PART IN DISCUSSIONS TOGETHER. IT WAS ALSO FELT THAT THE FRENCH, WHO HAD EXPRESSED RESERVES AT THE FORMAL COUNCIL MEETING, WERE MORE LIKELY TO BE WILLING TO TAKE PART IN THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE EXISTING BASIS OF COUNCIL MEETINGS OR INFORMAL MEETINGS OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES RATHER THAN IF A NEW BODY WAS SET UP WITH SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. IF THE FRENCH WERE NOT WILLING TO TAKE PART IN DISCUSSIONS THEN THESE COULD BECOME ''OPEN-ENDED'', I.E. COULD BE HELD BETWEEN THOSE MEMBERS WHO WISHED TO TAKE PART.

2. IT WAS GENERALLY RECOGNISED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO TRY TO PRE-ARRANGE OR LIMIT THE DISCUSSION WHICH MINISTERS WILL WISH TO HAVE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THOUGHT THAT, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE, THE CONCLUSIONS MIGHT BE TO HAVE SOME GENERAL REFERENCES TO THE DESIRABILITY OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ETC. IN THE COMMUNIQUE AND TO AGREE THAT THE COUNCIL AT PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE LEVEL SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE THE SUBJECT ON ITS AGENDA, BEARING IN MIND BOTH THE NECESSARY INTEREST OF NATO IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION ON ITS FLANK AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AS AN ELEMENT IN THE GENERAL PICTURE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS, WHICH WAS ONE OF NATO'S MAIN OBJECTS OF STUDY.

3. IN THE COURSE OF THE FORMAL MEETING I AND THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REPEAT OFFICIALLY DENIALS OF THE PARTICIPATION OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IN THE FIGHTING.

4. IN THE INFORMAL MEETING THERE WAS SOME CRITICISM OF THE FACT THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS HAD NOT APPROACHED NATO IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ABOUT THE MARITIME DECLARATION RATHER THAN MAKE INDIVIDUAL BILATERAL APPROACHES.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON 142.

SIR B. BURROWS

SENT 1921/07
RECD 1922/07

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

F.O./C.O./WH DISTRIBUTION
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CIPHER/CAT. A

F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMISSION NEW YORK

TELNO. 2669 7 JUNE 1967 (UN(POL))

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 2669 OF 7 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO VALLETTA (PASS TO AOC MALTA)
NICOSIA (PASS TO AOC NEAF)
YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. 1243 AND 1244.
MIDDLE EAST: ACCUSATIONS OF U.K. INVOLVEMENT.
YOU SHOULD INFORM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT ONCE THAT WE WOULD WELCOME
AN IMMEDIATE IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF THESE CHARGES BY THE
UNITED NATIONS. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO OFFER THE UNITED NATIONS
INVESTIGATING OFFICIALS ALL FACILITIES. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT,
IN ADDITION TO SUCH AN INVESTIGATION, H.M.G. IS PREPARED TO
INVITE UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALS TO VISIT H.M. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
AS WELL AS THE AIRFIELDS IN THE SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS
IN CYPRUS, AND OUR INSTALLATIONS ON THE AIRFIELDS IN MALTA.
2. YOU SHOULD, OF COURSE, COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH MR. GOLDBERG
IN WORKING OUT DETAILS OF HOW THIS INVESTIGATION SHOULD BE
CARRIED OUT. YOU SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE INVESTIGATION IS
UNDERTAKEN BY A SMALL GROUP FROM THE SECRETARIAT. WE SHOULD
NATURALLY EXPECT THE GROUP ALSO TO INVESTIGATE THE SOURCE OF
THESE FABRICATED STORIES IN THE U.A.R. AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES.

SOSFA SENT 1329Z/7 JUNE 1967

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SSSSS

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 13

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER:CAT 'A'
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1250
CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
7 JUNE

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1250 OF 7 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FROM LORD CARADON.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2668.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE, GREATLY APPRECIATED BY THIS MISSION

2. YOU WILL HAVE HEARD THAT WE HAVE BEEN CALLED BACK INTO THE COUNCIL TODAY BY THE RUSSIANS.

3. LATER TODAY I SHALL PUT TO YOU MY IDEAS ON THE NEXT STEPS HERE. LET ME MEANWHILE PUT DOWN THIS THOUGHT.

4. ALTHOUGH WE CAN HOPE THAT SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HERE IN NEW YORK WILL CONTINUE AND WILL FROM TIME TO TIME PRODUCE A GOOD RESULT, AS THEY DID YESTERDAY, I VERY MUCH DOUBT IF ANYTHING LIKE FORMAL JOINT FOUR-POWER DISCUSSIONS WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE AND I DONT THINK IT HELPS TO TALK PUBLICLY ABOUT FOUR POWER ACTION. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH THE U.N. WILL WE TRUST HAVE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE FROM TIME TO TIME AND WILL HAVE TO ENDORSE WHATEVER SETTLEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED WE CANNOT EXPECT THAT THE RUSSIANS (OR THE FRENCH EITHER) WILL BE PREPARED TO GIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE A MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PROCESSES OF CEASE-FIRE, DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL. IT MAY BE THAT FEDORENKO IS GOING TO RETURN TODAY TO HIS PROPOSAL MADE JUST BEFORE THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED LAST NIGHT THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE GIVEN A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY. BUT LOOKING EVERYWHERE TO SEE WHO IS IN THE BEST POSITIOON TO TAKE A LEAD IT SEEMS TO ME THAT FRANCE IS THE BEST HORSE TO BACK (A SORT OF FRENCH TASHKENT MIGHT BE CONCEIVABLE) SINCE FRANCE

/MAINTAINS

CONFIDENTIAL

MAINTAINS RELATIONS WITH BOTH ARABS AND JEWS AND MIGHT ALSO CARRY OTHER MAJOR POWERS AS WELL AS THE GENERAL MEMBERSHIP HERE IN A NEW INITIATIVE. EVEN IF FRANCE IS NOT PREPARED TO GO OUT AHEAD IT DOES SEEM CLEAR THAT SHE IS IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO TAKE A VALUABLE PART AND IT THEREFORE SEEMS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE FRENCH TO TAKE A LEAD.

LORD CARADON

DESP. 1709Z 07 JUNE '67.
RECD. 1716Z 07 JUNE '67.

PRISEC (F.O.)

EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1253 7 JUNE 1967
UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1253 OF 7 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV AND COPENHAGEN AND SAVING TO AMMAN BAGHDAD RIO DE JANEIRO BEIRUT ADDID ABABA NEW DELHI OTTAWA JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO 1248:

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

THE SESSION RESUMED ON THE URGENT REQUEST OF THE SOVIET DELEGATE, AT 1.10 P M NEW YORK TIME. ISRAEL,U A R, SYRIA, JORDAN, LEBANON, IRAQ, MOROCCO, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, TUNISIA AND LIBYA WERE SEATED AT THEIR REQUEST WITHOUT VOTE.

2...FEDORENKO (SOVIET UNION) SAID THAT SINCE THE PASSING OF THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION LAST NIGHT, CONTINUING ACTS OF AGGRESSION BY ISRAEL HAD CREATED A GRAVER SITUATION FOR THE ARAB STATES. THE COUNCIL MUST NOW DEMAND THAT BOTH PARTIES OBSERVE A CEASE-FIRE FROM 2000 HOURS G M T TODAY. HE THEN PRESENTED A DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN M I F T). HE SAID THAT HIS COUNTRY INSISTED ON AN IMMEDIATE VOTE ON THIS DRAFT BY THE COUNCIL, SO THAT THE ACTION NECESSARY TO AVERT FURTHER BLOODSHED COULD BE TAKEN WITHOUT DELAY.

3...AT THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION, THE SECRETARY GENERAL THEN MADE A STATEMENT ON INFORMATION WHICH HAD BECOME AVAILABLE TO HIM OVER NIGHT. A MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT JORDAN HAD ACCEPTED THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE COUNCIL ON 6 JUNE: SINCE THEN ORDERS HAD GONE OUT TO ALL JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES TO CEASE FIRE, EXCEPT IN SELF DEFENCE. U THANT ADDED THAT HE HAD INFORMED THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OF THE JORDANIAN MESSAGE.

4...THE CHIEF OF STAFF UNTSO HAD REPORTED THAT THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION HEADQUARTERS HAD BEEN OCCUPIED BY ISRAELI TROOPS YESTERDAY. AN UNTSO OBSERVER OF THE IRISH ARMY WAS KILLED EARLY ON 7JUNE IN SOUTHERN SYRIA. U THANT HAD TOLD THE CHIEF OF STAFF UNTSO TO MAKE HIS GOOD OFFICES AVAILABLE TO BOTH SIDES

/ IN IMPLEMENTATION

IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION. COMMANDER UNEF REPORTED THAT NO UNEF UNITS WERE NOW IN DANGER. HE CONFIRMED THE DEATH OF ONE BRAZILIAN SOLDIER ON 5 JUNE. INDIAN CASUALTIES WERE NOW 9 KILLED, 20 WOUNDED, 12 MISSING. U THANT ENDED BY SAYING THAT ALL REPORTS CONFIRMED THAT FIGHTING CONTINUED AT NUMEROUS POINTS.

5...ON A POINT OF ORDER, SETE CAMARA (BRAZIL) ASKED FOR A SHORT TIME TO REFLECT AND CONSULT ON THE TEXT OF THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION. GOLDBERG (U S A) WHILE NOT OBJECTING TO THE BRAZILIAN PLEA, REITERATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEW OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION. IF CERTAIN POWERS HAD NOT HUNG BACK, THE TEXT OF AN INFORMAL RESOLUTION CIRCULATED BY THE PRESIDENT ON 5 JUNE CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE COULD HAVE BEEN PASSED THEN AND THERE. TWO FULL DAYS HAD BEEN WASTED. SEYDOUX (FRANCE) SUPPORTED THE BRAZILIAN SUGGESTION FOR A BRIEF RECESS. FEDORENKO (U S S R) AGREED TO A RECESS OF 10 OR 15 MINUTES WHILE COMPLAINING OF GOLDBERG'S ATTEMPT TO BLAME OTHERS FOR DELAY.

6...AFTER THE RECESS IGNATIEFF (CANADA) PROPOSED A SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY SECOND I F T), EXPLAINING THAT HE DID THIS TO TRY AND ENSURE EARLY AND EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE WITH LAST NIGHT'S RESOLUTION AS WELL AS TODAY'S.

7...AT SOVIET INSISTENCE AN IMMEDIATE VOTE WAS THEN TAKEN ON THE SOVIET DRAFT, WHICH WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY. COMMENTING ON THE CANADIAN DRAFT, FEDORENKO (U S S R) ASKED FOR THE USUAL PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED, WHEREBY MEMBERS WOULD RECEIVE A WRITTEN TEXT FOR STUDY AND CONSULTATION. TARABANOV (BULGARIA), ON A POINT OF ORDER, REQUESTED THE IMMEDIATE DESPATCH OF CABLES TO BOTH PARTIES TO CONVEY TO THEM THE TEXT OF THE SOVIET RESOLUTION. THE PRESIDENT ASSURED HIM THAT THESE WERE ALREADY ON THE WAY.

8...EL KONY (U A R) SAID THAT EVIDENCE OF COLLUSION BETWEEN THE U K AND ISRAEL IN 1956 WAS NOW IRREFUTABLE. IN THE PRESENT WAR IT HAD BEEN PROVED BEYOND DOUBT THAT BRITAIN AND THE U S HAD PARTICIPATED IN AIR STRIKES AGAINST ARAB LANDS, AND PROVIDED AN AIR UMBRELLA OVER ISRAEL SINCE 5 JUNE. HIS GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION OF 6 JUNE TO MEAN THAT ISRAEL SHOULD

/ WITHDRAW

WITHDRAW BEHIND THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES. JORDAN HAD SHOWN HER WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE FROM ISRAEL. HE ASKED THE COUNCIL TO CONDEMN ISRAEL: TO ORDER HER TO CEASE FIRE IMMEDIATELY: AND TO WITHDRAW BEHIND THE VARIOUS ARMISTICE LINES.

9...EBAN (ISRAEL) DECLARED THAT NOTHING MORE ABSURD HAD BEEN SAID IN AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM THAN THE ALLEGATION THAT THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN HAD TAKEN PART IN THIS WAR. ISRAEL HAD NOT RECEIVED ONE OUNCE OF ASSISTANCE FROM EITHER COUNTRY. COMMENTING ON THE RESOLUTION OF 6 JUNE CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE, HE SAID ISRAEL HAD WELCOMED IT: SYRIA, IRAQ AND THE U A R HAD ALL ADDRESSED THE COUNCIL SINCE THE RESOLUTION WAS PASSED WITHOUT GREETING OR ACCEPTING IT IN ANY WAY. INDEED, CAIRO RADIO HAD BROADCAST A CLEAR-CUT REJECTION OF IT AND SO HAD SYRIA. JORDAN HAD ACCEPTED THE CEASE -FIRE, BUT THE FACT THAT AN EGYPTIAN COMMANDED THE JORDANIAN FORCES HAD COMPLICATED THE ISSUE, AS JORDANIAN ACCEPTANCE HAD NOT SO FAR BEEN PARALLELED BY THE EGYPTIAN COMMANDER'S ACTIONS. MEANWHILE, FIRING CONTINUED IN JERUSALEM, AND THE HOLY PLACES WERE THREATENED BECAUSE EGYPTIAN GUN EMPLACEMENTS HAD DUG IN CLOSE TO THEM IN ATTEMPTS TO BE IMMUNE FROM ISRAELI FIRE. HE RECOMMENDED THAT THE RESOLUTIONS OF 6 AND 7 JUNE SHOULD BE WIDENED TO INCLUDE ALL ARAB GOVERNMENTS WHO CLAIMED TO BE FIGHTING ISRAEL.

10..GOLDBERG (U S A), EXERCISING HIS RIGHT OF REPLY TO EL KONY'S ACCUSATION OF U S A PARTICIPATION ON THE SIDE OF ISRAEL IN THE CONFLICT, REAFFIRMED HIS GOVERNMENTS INVITATION TO ALLOW FULL AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION BY THE U N TO THESE CHARGES. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WHILST IN ARAB CAPITALS U S EMBASSIES WERE BEING SACKED AND BURNED, THE U S GOVERNMENT IN NEW YORK HAD TAKEN ALL STEPS TO ENSURE INVIOLABILITY OF MISSION AND EMBASSY BUILDINGS BELONGING TO ARAB COUNTRIES..

11..TARABANOV (BULGARIA) REFERRED TO THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED AND STATED THAT IN SPITE OF THIS ISRAELI AGGRESSION STILL CONTINUES AND THE COUNCIL COULD NOT ALLOW A SITUATION TO BE SET UP WHEREBY

THA AGGRESSOR COULD WIN THE REWARDS OF HIS AGGRESSION. HE SUPPORTED THE U A R REPRESENTATIVE'S STATEMENT THAT AGGRESSION MUST FIRST CEASE AND THEN RESISTANCE TO AGGRESSION WOULD THEN CEASE. REFERRING TO THE CANADIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION (SEE MY SECOND I F T) HE STATED THAT HE WOULD REQUIRE TIME TO STUDY THIS BEFORE IT COULD BE BROUGHT TO THE VOTE.

12..I THEN SPOKE IN EXERCISE OF MY RIGHT OF REPLY, REBUTTING EL KONY'S ACCUSATIONS (SEE PARAGRAPH 8 ABOVE) (TEXT TELEXED SEPARATELY TO C O I).

13..FEDORENKO (U S S R) RIDICULED THE HIGH-MINDED STATEMENTS OF THE U S A AND U K. HE QUOTED FROM A SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT TO THE AFFECT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U S S R HAD CLEARLY WARNED THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AGAINST PROMOTING AGGRESSION, BUT THIS HAD NOT BEEN HEEDED. IF THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT DID NOT FULFIL THE DEMAND FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REVISE ITS ATTITUDE IN RESPECT OF ISRAEL AND ADOPT A DECISION CONCERNING FURTHER MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL WHICH BY ITS ACTION IS OPPOSING THE WISHES OF PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER NECESSARY MEASURES STEMMING FROM ISRAEL'S AGGRESSIVE POLICIES.

14..THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THEN READ OUT A SITUATION REPORT FROM GENERAL ODD BULL, THE MOST IMPORTANT ITEMS OF WHICH WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) DURING THE NIGHT 6/7 JUNE, ISRAEL BOMBARDED MOUNT SCOPUS, AND LATER OCCUPIED IT.

(B) THE VICTORIA HOSPITAL HAD BEEN BURNT OUT.

(C) THERE HAD BEEN A HEAVY WEAPON ATTACK ON THE WEST PART OF JERUSALEM AND SPORADIC FIRE IN THE CITY.

(D) GOVERNMENT HOUSE HAD BEEN BOMBARDED HEAVILY AND THERE WERE A NUMBER OF ISRAELI CASUALTIES.

15..IN ADDITION HE STATED THAT THE OBSERVER POSTS AT JENIN AND LATRUN HAD BEEN ESCORTED SAFELY OUT OF DANGER BY ISRAELI FORCES AND THE TULKARM OBSERVERS WERE SAFE AND WERE BEING EVACUATED. THE

/ HEBRON

HEBRON OBSERVERS WERE SAFE. THERE HAD BEEN HEAVY ISRAELI MORTARING IN THE VICINITY OF BETHLEHEM AT 10.30 HOURS G M TNON 7 JUNE. ATTEMPTS TO PRODUCE A CEASE-FIRE HAD NOT PROVED EFFECTIVE BY 10.99 HOURS G M T 7 JUNE.

16..HE THEN REFERRED TO A LETTER WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL QUOTING EBAN'S STATEMENT THAT ISRAEL WELCOMED THE CEASE-FIRE APPEAL BUT THAT IMPLEMENTATION WOULD DEPEND ON ACCEPTANCE BY THE ARAB PARTIES, WHO HAD NOT YET STATED THEIR INTENTIONS. THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL HAD ASKED FOR THIS LETTER TO BE CIRCULATED AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT.

17..IGNATIEFF (CANADA) PROPOSED A SUSPENSION OF THE COUNCIL TO CONSIDER THE TEXT OF HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION (MY SECOND I F T) BUT AFTER SOME ARGUMENT WITH TARABANOV HE ACCEDED TO AN ETHIOPIAN APPEAL TO CHANGE HIS REQUEST TO ONE OF AN ADJOURNMENT UNTIL DELEGATES WERE READY TO VOTE ON HIS DRAFT.

F O PASS MOSCOW 125, PARIS 129, TEL AVIV 137 AND COPENHAGEN 60 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 44, BAGHDAD 24, RIO DE JANEIRO 8, BEIRUT 54, ADDIS ABABA 31, NEW DELHI 25, JEDDA 30 AND CAIRO 57.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0106/08
RECD AT 0107/08

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister.

I read these after writing your own remarks, in this box, about the Gaulle and the Middle East.

But it strengthens my conviction.

9/6

Au Palais

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 13

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1260 7 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE.

MIDDLE EAST: RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS.

IT MAY BE WORTH MAKING THE POINT THAT WE HERE ARE IN A GOOD POSITION TO MAINTAIN WORKING RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS. THEY ARE OF COURSE FURIOUS AND HUMILIATED (AND PACHACHI (IRAQ) LEFT NEW YORK TODAY IN A VERY BAD TEMPER). ALL THE MORE NEED TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THEM AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO SEE THAT WE ARE NOT ANTI-ARAB.

2...I HAVE VERY FRIENDLY PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH THEM ALL INCLUDING EL KONY (U A R). WHEN I TOLD HIM TODAY THAT WE MUST KEEP OUR LINES OPEN HERE HE WARMLY THANKED ME. AND EL FARRA (JORDAN) WHOSE HOME IN KHAN YUNIS HAS BEEN OVERRUN IN THE ISRAELI ADVANCE IS AN OLD FRIEND.

3...WE MUST START REBUILDING BRIDGES WITH THEM.

LORD CARADON SENT AT 0152/08
RECD AT 0153/08

PRISEC (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1263 7 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1263 OF 7 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN AND OTTAWA AND SAVING TO AMMAN BAGHDAD NEW DELHI AND CAIRO.

MYTEL NO 1253:
MIDDLE EAST.

THE URGENT SOVIET REQUEST THIS MORNING FOR ANOTHER MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TO CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE AT 2000 HOURS G M T TODAY CAME AS SOMETHING OF A SURPRISE AND SOVIET MOTIVES WERE NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY HAD IN MIND SOME REQUIREMENT OF THEIR OWN IN RELATION TO THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE U A R. ALTERNATIVELY THEY HAD THE MORE SINISTER PURPOSE OF TRYING TO FORCE US AND THE UNITED STATES TO OBJECT TO THE UNREASONABLENESS OF THEIR PROPOSAL AND THUS PUT US IN THE POSITION OF APPEARING TO RESIST THE URGENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE FOR WHICH WE VOTED LAST NIGHT. NEITHER WE NOR THE OTHER WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WERE PREPARED TO FALL INTO THIS TRAP AND THE RESOLUTION WAS THUS PASSED UNANIMOUSLY.

2...IF THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL CALLING FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ASSIST IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE CALL HAD BEEN PRESSED AT THE SAME MEETING IT COULD HAVE FORCED THE RUSSIANS (AND BULGARIANS, WHO WERE THE ONES IN THE COUNCIL CALLING FOR DELAY) EITHER INTO ACCEPTING SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT HAVE GIVEN SOME STIMULUS TO THE EFFORTS TO GET THOSE INVOLVED TO ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE OR INTO APPARENTLY OPPOSING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR OWN RESOLUTION. IN THE EVENT, HOWEVER, THE AFRO-ASIANS WERE NOT PREPARED TO TAKE THIS HURDLE AND SOON AFTER THE ADJOURNMENT IT QUICKLY BECAME APPARENT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT SUPPORT TO PUT THE RESOLUTION THROUGH. THE U A R HAVE BEEN SEEKING TO DISCREDIT IT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE AIM IS TO GET A WESTERN EUROPEAN (TABOR) INTO A POSITION OF RESPONSIBILITY WHERE HIS ACTIONS COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO U A R INTERESTS.

/ 3...THE PRESIDENT

CONFIDENTIAL

3...THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS INTENTION TO CONSULT THE FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS INDIVIDUALLY AGAIN THIS EVENING AND THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS ARE EXPECTED TO MEET AT 10 A M TOMORROW. THERE MAY BE A COUNCIL MEETING AFTER THAT, BUT DEVELOPMENTS HERE ARE VERY DEPENDENT ON THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE AREA AND IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT FROM DAY TO DAY WHAT IS LIKELY TO OCCUR.

4...I MADE CLEAR TO THE PRESIDENT MY BELIEF THAT WE SHOULD HAVE MET AGAIN THIS EVENING TO CONSIDER SOMETHING LIKE THE CANADIAN DRAFT AND THIS ACTION WILL BE USEFUL IN REBUTTING ANY CHARGES BY FEDORENKO THAT WE ARE DRAGGING OUR FEET OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

5...THE CANADIAN DRAFT MAY BE USEFUL TO US IN DEALING WITH WHAT WILL PROBABLY BE THE NEXT SOVIET MOVE - A CALL FOR A CONDEMNATION OF THE ISRAELIS FOR NOT IMPLEMENTING THE CEASE-FIRE AND A CALL FOR IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE TRUCE LINES. WE WILL BE ABLE TO ARGUE THAT WHAT IS NECESSARY IS NOT ONE-SIDED CONDEMNATIONS BUT MEANS TO SECURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CEASE-FIRE. ON WITHDRAWAL WE WILL BE ABLE TO DECLARE OURSELVES AS FULLY IN FAVOUR OF IT BUT POINT OUT THAT THE FIRST STEP IS OBVIOUSLY TO OBTAIN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE CEASE-FIRE.

6...RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE PASS TO MR HAYMAN AT 7.45 A M.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 129, PARIS 133, TEL AVIV 140 AND COPENHAGEN 63 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 47, BAGHDAD 27, NEW DELHI 28 AND CAIRO 61.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0210/08
RECD AT 0211/08

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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PPPPP

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office
S.W.1

7 June, 1967

Dear Michael,

... As requested I enclose a revised draft message to the Israel Prime Minister. This supersedes the draft sent to you with my letter of 6 June.

Yours sincerely,
Derek Tidy

A. M. Palliser, Esq., CMG,
10 Downing Street.

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DRAFT

Type 1 +

To:

From

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

DRAFT REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE MESSAGE OF 5 JUNE FROM THE ISRAEL PRIME MINISTER, MR. ESHKOL

Thank you for your message of 5 June.

The outbreak of ~~fighting~~ came to ~~us~~ as a great shock ~~and~~ we deplore the loss of life which has followed on ~~both sides~~. Now, ~~however,~~ that the Security Council has unanimously called for a cease-fire, ~~this is no time for recriminations or post-mortems into what has passed. We must all bend our utmost~~ we claim for every efforts must be made to put ~~ting the cease-fire~~ it speedily into effect. So far ~~we have avoided~~ the dangers of outside intervention and escalation have been avoided. But any prolongation of the fighting will immeasurably increase these risks. I was ~~very~~ glad, therefore, to note Mr. Eban's welcome for the Security Council's cease-fire appeal in his speech at the Council.

~~We accept that~~ Once the cease-fire has been implemented, the Security Council must clearly ~~will need to~~ turn its most urgent attention to the further steps that are needed to secure a lasting peace. Without seeking at this stage to assess in any ~~in the area. It is too early to speculate in~~ detail ~~about~~ the form which this might take, I can assure you that H.M. Government will ~~certainly~~ work for a

/thoroughly

Ed. (3746)

Dd.033009 Gp.863

A - 7/9

thorough examination of all aspects of the root causes of the conflict.

In the meantime, I ~~hope~~ am sure we can count on the cooperation of your Government in ~~doing~~ working towards, such as ~~nothing which will make more difficult the achievement of a just and~~ lasting settlement, and one that will be just and honorable for all the countries of the area.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

SECRET

14

RECORD OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. LESTER PEARSON ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 1967 AT

H.W. Hello Mike

L.P. Hello Harold

H.W. I thought I'd give you a ring. Well everything went all right yesterday in the end.

L.P. Yes, very well.

H.W. It was a very big change by the Russians - I suppose they had news from Cairo.

L.P. Well I think it was related entirely to the military situation.

H.W. I think it was.

L.P. Of course they could have abstained you see,

H.W. Of course.

L.P. and let it go through that way, but they didn't and I was a little surprised at that.

H.W. Well there are rumours of a coup d'etat in Cairo. I don't know if it is true.

L.P. Really.

H.W. It is only in the newspapers so far.

L.P. The next step -

H.W. What I wanted to talk to you about was the next step Mike, because this gives us now a wonderful opportunity to build a complete permanent settlement out there.

L.P. Well it certainly does and we won't have very long.

H.W. We won't have long. The Israelis as far as I gather are in a mood to be fairly generous and you know . . . . . (There was then a temporary interruption in the call)

L.P. You were just mentioning before we were cut off a possible next step.

H.W. Yes. What I feel is that there is a good chance now the Israelis are pretty generous and magnanimous. They want to be settled there with everybody recognising their existence and the right to live, and obviously they want Aqaba. But I understand they are prepared now to settle the refugee problem once and for all.

L.P. Well that would be a step forward.

H.W. And this would help the Arabs not to lose too much face and the Israelis are very conscious of this. But my very strong feeling now in accordance with what you said three nights ago is that we should all now press for the Four-Power Meeting.

L.P. That's right.

H.W. I don't think you'll get ~~in~~ anywhere at Fedorenko level and you certainly won't get ~~in~~ anywhere I think at Gromyko-Couve level.

L.P. Yeah.

H.W. And I think we should really get an absolute break-through here, if that could be done. So if you were able to press this in any way I think it would be very valuable.

L.P. Well, I might be able to do that. I might even get a Question today about it.

H.W. Any contact you have with the Russians would help me awfully because they are moving on the question I think.

L.P. You bet.

H.W. I think they are beginning to move.

L.P. You've got that Harold. Because it's in line with what I have been saying.

H.W. Well you said it first - well after De Gaulle anyway.

L.P. If I can help I'll certainly be glad to do so and I'll keep in touch with you.

H.W. Very many thanks Mike.

L.P. Thanks Harold.

H.W. O.K. then. Thanks again, we'll keep in touch.

Copy to :-
Sir B. Trend.

Israel

PRIME MINISTER Has seen.

Peace in the Middle East

I wonder whether you would not wish the Ministry of Overseas Development and especially its economic planning staff, together with some of the Economic Advisers, who like myself have had great experience of the Middle East, and especially of Arab settlement and development, to form a working party. This could put forward constructive suggestions for an Arab settlement scheme to be financed by the great powers and Israel. Without such an initiative the whole peace negotiation may deteriorate into wrangling in which the fate of the real victims of the war will be forgotten. I think your intervention at this point will be immeasurably important but we must have detailed work in preparation and in the government structure the O.D.M. and the Economic Advisers are uniquely fitted for this particular task.

T. Balogh

8th June,1967.

Reply to Sir A. Douglas-Home's P.N.Q.

DRAFT ~~STATEMENT~~ TO BE MADE BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 8 JUNE

I have endeavoured to keep the House very fully informed about developments in the Middle East, but there is little I can add today. The situation is very fluid and it is simply not possible at this moment to amplify the general picture I gave yesterday.

2. The immediate necessity is to obtain an effective cease-fire. The position on this is that the Israel Foreign Minister said in the Security Council yesterday that his Government was ready to accept the Security Council Resolution calling for a cease-fire at 8 p.m. yesterday provided that the Arab Governments did the same. So far the Arab Governments have refused to do the same, with the exception of Jordan, who have announced their Government's acceptance. But I must tell the House frankly that there are very conflicting and disturbing stories about what is actually happening on the Israeli/Jordan front.

3. Even though the U.A.R. Government have

/not yet

not yet accepted the cease-fire, the Israel Government have announced that they are halting the advance

/of their

of their forces in the Sinai Desert short of the Suez Canal. But I also have reports of resumed fighting on this front.

We still have no positive response from the Soviet Government about arms supplies and it is clear that for the time being there is no immediate prospect of a general embargo. We are therefore reverting to our normal practice of scrutinising applications for arms in each particular case, and we are naturally doing so particularly carefully in present circumstances.

The only material change in the oil situation since yesterday is that the Libyan Government have suspended all oil exports. It is not entirely clear whether this is a temporary suspension due to strikes by oil workers. And here let me say that I understand the pressures that are operating on these governments in this highly charged atmosphere.

The Arab Foreign Ministers are meeting today in Kuwait to discuss the implementation of the

/Resolution

Resolution on oil supplies recently passed at the Baghdad Conference. Now that it has become so patently clear to everybody that we were not involved in the conflict, I trust that they will decide to withdraw the actions which they were misled into taking against us.

/We have

We have examined the dangers in each of the territories where the safety of British Subjects arises. We have made plans, some of which are already being operated, to ensure the safe evacuation of British Subjects from these areas. In a situation where airfields have been closed and others have been damaged this is clearly not an easy operation, but it is proceeding.

My greatest concern is with the British Subjects in Jordan. Evacuation by road would be too dangerous; and the difficulty about evacuation by air is that the airfield at Amman has been damaged in the fighting. However these difficulties will be overcome.

/I will

I will of course continue to report developments to the House when anything of significance occurs. Meanwhile we are in close contact with all parties concerned.

Our immediate objective must be of course to make the cease-fire effective. The House should be under no illusions that this may still take some time. Once this has been achieved we must move on to consider how a more permanent settlement in the Middle East, on an equitable basis, can be reached.

Extract from Hansard 8th June 1967.

which are relevant from 1956 to the present situation, or to enlarge on the difficulties which 1956 caused in the Middle East and for Britain in the handling of this crisis at this time. There will be a time to say all that later.

Dame Irene Ward: Has the right hon. Gentleman ascertained whether the United States and Russia entered into an agreement on recent events in the Middle East without informing the Foreign Office?

The Prime Minister: There is certainly no question of that. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary explained to the House yesterday about the agreement reached at the Security Council in which our representative, Lord Caradon, played a very full and significant part.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. We are past Question Time.

Following is the answer:

The House will recall my announcement of 10th August last that a standing inter-party group of Privy Counsellors was to be established to consider proposals for a new range of official histories covering selected periods or episodes of peacetime history. I am happy to be able to tell the House, following consulations between the parties, that this standing group has now been constituted. Its members are, for the Government, and to act as Chairman, the Right Hon. Patrick Gordon Walker, Minister without Portfolio, for the Official Opposition, the Rt. Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and for the Liberal Party, the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore.

The particular suggestion contained in my hon. Friend's question would be one for consultation with this group, but the House might well feel that it would be unwise for the Government to commission a work of this kind at the present time, when all our efforts should be directed towards reducing the tensions in the Middle East.

MIDDLE EAST

Sir Alec Douglas-Home (*by Private Notice*) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement about the situation in the Middle East.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Brown): I have endeavoured to keep the House very fully informed about developments in the Middle East, but there is, frankly, little I can add today. The situation is very fluid and it is simply not possible at this moment to amplify the general picture I gave yesterday.

The immediate necessity is to obtain an effective cease-fire. The position on this is that the Israel Foreign Minister said in the Security Council yesterday that his Government were ready to accept the Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire at 8 p.m. G.M.T. provided that the Arab Governments did the same.

So far, the Arab Governments have refused to do the same, with the exception of Jordan, who have announced their Government's acceptance. But I must tell the House frankly that there are very conflicting and disturbing stories about what is actually happening on the Israeli/Jordan front.

Even though the United Arab Republic Government have not yet accepted the cease-fire, the Israel Government have announced that they are halting the advance of their forces in the Sinai Desert short of the Suez Canal. But I also have reports of resumed fighting on this front.

We still have no positive response from the Soviet Government about arms supplies and it is clear that for the time being there is no immediate prospect of a general embargo. We are, therefore, reverting to our normal practice of scrutinising applications for arms in each particular case, and we are, naturally, doing so particularly carefully in the present situation.

The only material change in the oil situation since yesterday is that the Libyan Government have suspended all oil exports. It is not entirely clear whether this is a temporary suspension due to strikes by oil workers. And here let me say that I understand the pressures that are operating on these Governments in this highly charged atmosphere.

The Arab Foreign Ministers were due to meet today in Kuwait to discuss the implementation of the resolution on oil supplies recently passed at the Baghdad conference. But I have heard in the last hour that the meeting has been postponed. Now that it has become so patently clear to everybody that we were not involved in the conflict, I trust that these Governments will decide to withdraw the actions which they were misled into taking against us.

We have examined the dangers in each of the territories where the safety of

Extract from Hansard 8th June 1967.

British subjects arises. We have made plans, some of which are already being operated, to ensure the safe evacuation of British subjects from these areas. In a situation where airfields have been closed and others have been damaged this is clearly not an easy operation, but it is proceeding.

My greatest concern is with the British subjects in Jordan. Evacuation by road would be too dangerous; and evacuation by air involves the danger I have first mentioned. However, by various means, these problems will be overcome.

I will, of course, continue to report developments to the House when anything of significance occurs. Meanwhile, we are in close contact with all the parties concerned.

Our immediate objective must be, of course, to make the cease-fire effective. The House should I suggest, be under no illusions that this may still take some little time. But once this has been achieved we must move on to consider how a more permanent settlement in the Middle East, on an equitable basis, can be reached.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: We on this side fully share the Foreign Secretary's hopes that the Arab Governments, at their meeting, will lift the oil embargo in face of the very convincing evidence that neither the United States nor Britain intervened in any way. We would support, too, the right hon. Gentleman's decision on arms as long as the Russians do not co-operate. There are rumours that arms are going into Alexandria. The Government's decision is right.

Would the right hon. Gentleman say a word about the Suez Canal? By what resolution of the United Nations is this now governed, and is the United Nations taking notice of the situation?

Mr. Brown: It has taken notice of it. But for the moment there is not a lot that anybody can do until we get the cease-fire and can start discussing all the complementary things which will form part of the settlement. Clearly, this will be one of them. But the right hon. Gentleman may have it firmly in his mind that I am addressing myself, and ensuring that our friends address themselves, to this as much as to anything else.

Mr. Judd: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in Israel, even during the most critical recent days of the brilliant campaign, there has been a marked degree of moderation on the part of the Israeli leaders about the objectives in the political reality of the situation and that this is in marked contrast to some unfortunately exaggerated statements elsewhere? Would he agree that our major efforts, and the efforts of all true friends of Israel at this juncture, must be to encourage her in the long-term future to reach meaningful political and economic relations with the area of which she is essentially a part?

Mr. Brown: I agree very much with the latter part of that question. Israel must live as a Middle Eastern Power in a Middle Eastern context, and the more she can be encouraged to think that way, the better it will be.

As to the first part of the question, I dislike, as I said yesterday, these partisan comparisons with what is supposed to be moderation on one side and exaggeration on the other side. I do not think that that kind of presentation does us any good at all.

Mr. Maudling: I do not think that there has been any information about the Trucial States, particularly the oil-producing areas like Abu Dhabi. Has the Foreign Secretary any information about developments in that area, either political or economic?

Mr. Brown: No, Sir. As I am informed, none of those States is at the moment, joining in the boycott or is heavily involved. Qatar, I am told, has recently made a decision to stop supplies, but I am hoping, and obviously trying very hard, to get these things lifted fairly soon. I made the point in my original statement that I understand the pressures which are upon those Governments. We have political pressures on us in this House. It is much more easy to understand the pressures which are on Governments in those States.

Mr. Donnelly: In view of my right hon. Friend's rightly expressed desire to secure pacification in the area, what instructions have been given to the British delegation at the United Nations to facilitate the withdrawal of Egyptian

[MR. DONNELLY.]

troops from the Yemen and abiding by the rules of international law regarding poison gas?

Mr. Brown: I have been so busy with the immediate problem that I do not think that I have given any instructions recently to my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Caradon on that subject. Our position is, however, clear. The Egyptians ought not to be in the Yemen. Many problems would be easier of solution if they were not. No civilised Government could possibly support the use of poison gas in any conflict anywhere in the world.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: The Foreign Secretary will be aware that only today a Bill has been published which enables Her Majesty's Government to relinquish their sovereignty in Aden. Would not the right hon. Gentleman accept that this is an extremely ill-timed Measure and that it might be wise to take back that Bill and think again?

Mr. Brown: Not for the first time, I totally disagree with the hon. Member. But there will be an occasion for us to debate the matter.

Mr. Paget: Would my right hon. Friend agree that it is not a question of persuading Israel to settle down as a Middle Eastern Power: it is a question of persuading the Arab nations to accept her as a Middle East Power? Is it not true that for 20 years Israel has wanted nothing but peace, and is she not now entitled to demand peace before she retires from the territory?

Mr. Brown: My hon. and learned Friend and I had this one out yesterday and we had it out on Monday. The position remains the same. I believe that both parties—all parties is a better way of saying it—have to accept the same thing. Israel and the Arabs have to accept that Israel exists and that Israel exists as a Middle Eastern Power.

Mr. Paget: Hear, hear.

Mr. Brown: So long as we say "both", we may help the situation. It is when we say only one of the two things that we do not help the situation very much. My hon. and learned Friend continues to start history from a point of his own choosing. This has been the mistake of many would-be historians over the years.

Mr. Heath: We recognise the preoccupations of the Foreign Secretary during the past few days, but ought not the Government to take an initiative in the Security Council to bring about the condemnation of the use of poison gas in the Yemen by the U.A.R? Should not everything possible be done to prevent the extension of use of this foul weapon by a desperate Power in the present circumstances elsewhere?

Mr. Brown: It is a matter for consideration. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Seriously, this is a matter for consideration. I did not take the view that in this situation it was for us to take the initiative on that. The Arab countries, on whose territory it has been used and who made a great show of coming to the support of Egypt in the last few days, might themselves have taken the initiative. I thought that it was better for us to concentrate on the main issue.

Mr. Heffer: As the Security Council has unanimously called upon both sides to stop fighting, but also in view of the fact that there appears to be a continuation of the sale of arms, I understand both from the Soviet Union and from the United States of America, could we not follow up this initiative in the Security Council with a call for the complete embargo on all arms to the Middle East, so that no side will think that it can continue the fighting because it has a supply of arms ready to hand?

Mr. Brown: I am much obliged to my hon. Friend. As I said yesterday, I am absolutely certain that one of the elements in the solution must be a limitation and control of the supply of armaments to this area of the world. The competitive exercise that has been going on while we have been exercising a very great deal of restraint is of no use to anybody and must be put right in the solution.

Mr. Hastings: Can the Foreign Secretary tell us anything about the whereabouts or position at this moment of King Hussein of Jordan?

Mr. Brown: King Hussein is in Jordan He held a Press conference this morning and made his own position clear. I am not asked to comment on that, but that is where he is. He is, clearly, still operating as the Head of State of Jordan.

Extract from Hansard 8th June 1967.

Mr. W. Baxter: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the most disturbing part of his original statement this afternoon is that he has made it abundantly clear that we will raise our arms embargo, which has been in operation for the last day or two? I think that most people of this country will be very disturbed about that. I would like my right hon. Friend to reconsider that aspect of his statement.

Mr. Brown: I have a very great deal of doubt about my hon. Friend's judgment about what most of the people will feel. My own guess is that most of the people of the country will feel that if others are putting in replacements it would be very difficult for us to defend a situation in which we were not ready to honour contracts already entered into.

May I make it absolutely plain, however, that every request for arms or ammunition, whatever it is, will be very carefully considered by us in relation to the situation. I would like to think that the same careful consideration will be given in Moscow and other capitals of the world.

Mr. Sandys: The right hon. Gentleman has very rightly stressed the importance of making the cease-fire effective when it takes place. Does he realise that the cease-fire will not last for very long unless it is very quickly policed by some kind of international force along the cease-fire line pending the conclusion of a settlement? Will the right hon. Gentleman begin to take steps now to bring about the creation of such a force, so that it could be ready to go in very quickly when the fighting ends?

Mr. Brown: One of the reasons why I did not volunteer a statement today was that I thought that we were almost certain to go back over the discussion yesterday and the day before and the day before that. I dealt with this matter yesterday. The position remains the same. Of course, I am taking every step open to me to ensure that arrangements are made for supervising the cease-fire and for considering what United Nations presence thereafter can be helpful in the situation. I cannot say any more about it. There is literally nothing more that I can tell the House than I told hon. Members yesterday. But, like the right hon. Gentleman, I know only too well that both these are critically important factors.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: Would my right hon. Friend think it appropriate at this stage to express a word of regret at the death of two officers of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, and think it true to say of these men that they gave their lives in the cause of peace?

Mr. Brown: Yes, Sir. I said this yesterday, and I feel it strongly. If I may go from there, those who have been striving in their United Nations capacity to hold this area are very deserving of a special word of sympathy from us in a situation where their own faith and belief must have been shattered by the events which have occurred.

While on this point, I might say that, to the best of my knowledge, no British citizens have been killed or severely wounded during the recent troubles.

Mr. Birch: Would the right hon. Gentleman agree that, at the moment, the fewer comments made in this House on the situation the better?

Mr. Brown: I wholly agree with that, and did my best to avoid any being made today.

Mr. Thorpe: Since Jordan and Israel have now both accepted the call for a cease-fire, could the Foreign Secretary use his initiative to get U.N.T.S.O. working on this frontier, in view of the fact that its headquarters is in Jerusalem? Secondly, since the call for a cease-fire is the united voice of the Security Council, are those who refuse to accept it technically to be considered aggressors?

Mr. Brown: Those who refuse to accept it are in conflict with the other members of the United Nations, although whether it does us much good to draw attention to that I do not know. That is one of the reasons why I did not want to be drawn too far on these matters today, because I do not want things on the record today which will make it that much more difficult tomorrow or the day after to bring about what I want to do.

As for U.N.T.S.O. and the cease-fire, I said in my original statement—and I was not referring to the newspapers only, or particularly—that I was getting conflicting and disturbing reports about what is happening on the Jordanian and Israeli frontier. I chose my words carefully.

[MR. BROWN.]
and in that statement I was not identifying one country more than another.

The situation is confused. I am not sure what is happening. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, U.N.T.S.O. was removed by force from Jerusalem to Israel. At the moment, it is not really in a position to operate, although it exists. I still think that the best use of any initiatives of mine is to try to bring about a genuine cease-fire. Then we can discuss how the area can be policed and by whom.

Mr. Heath: Quite rightly, the Foreign Secretary has addressed himself to the immediate problems and particularly to the implementation of the cease-fire. He has also spoken of his desire not to have just another truce, but a permanent settlement. However, it is difficult to see how a permanent settlement can be brought about by a United Nations resolution and discussions behind the scenes. Obviously, it will require, I suggest, a major conference of the Powers involved, with the United Nations Secretariat present and such other assistance from other Powers as is required. Can he assure the House that urgent thought is being given to how it can be brought about at the earliest opportunity?

Mr. Brown: Very much thought is being given to that, and I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for raising the matter. As he knows, I feel that, in the end, it must be done formally, at any rate, within a United Nations context. A lot of thought is being given to how we can do it, whether we should start from there, whether we should start elsewhere, whether the four Powers would be the best way of starting, or whether we could do it by direct contact with the parties in the area. We are thinking very hard, and we rule out none of the possibilities. However, in the end, I am sure that any settlement ought to be enshrined in treaties which are registered and endorsed by the United Nations.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. Mr. Heath. Business question.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Heath: May I ask the Leader of the House to state the business of the House for next week?

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Richard Crossman): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:

MONDAY, 12TH JUNE—In the morning—

Remaining stages of the Road Transport Lighting Bill.

Resumed debate on the Second Reading of the Anchors and Chain Cables Bill.

Motion on the Industrial Organisation and Development Order.

In the afternoon—

Progress on the Committee stage of the Finance (No. 2) Bill.

TUESDAY, 13TH JUNE—Second Reading of the Prices and Incomes (No. 2) Bill.

Remaining stages of the Wireless Telegraphy Bill.

WEDNESDAY, 14TH JUNE—In the morning—

Second Reading of the Bermuda Constitution Bill.

Motions on the Calf Subsidies (United Kingdom) (Amendment) Scheme, the Agriculture (Tractor Cabs) Regulations and on the Agricultural Investment (Variation of Grant) Order.

In the afternoon—

Further progress on the Committee stage of the Finance (No. 2) Bill, which will be continued on Thursday, 15th June.

FRIDAY, 16TH JUNE—Private Members' Bills.

MONDAY, 19TH JUNE—Proposed business will be; In the morning—

Second Reading of the Public Works Loans (No. 2) Bill.

Remaining stages of the Bermuda Constitution Bill.

In the afternoon—

Second Reading of the Aden, Perim and Kuria Muria Islands Bill.

Adjourned debate on the Gas (Borrowing Powers) Order.

Israel (Pt 4)

PRESS NOTICE

PRIME MINISTER OPENS WORKINGTON PULP AND BOARD
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Speaks of Middle Eastern situation

In the course of his speech after the formal opening of this new Mill, the Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, said:

"In the situation we are facing, I feel it would be wrong if I were not to say something about the very grave situation confronting the world in the Middle East at this time.

The British Government realised at once the gravity of the situation that was bound to follow the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force. We worked unsparingly for a peaceful outcome. But despite our efforts, and those of other countries, we were unable to avert the hostilities. We all deplore the suffering and loss of life which has resulted.

The first need was to achieve a cease-fire. Lord Caradon, the member of the British Government who is our Permanent Representative at the United Nations, has distinguished himself in this past week by the outstanding effort he has made, in co-operation with his French, Soviet and United States colleagues to bring about the Security Council's unanimous cease-fire resolution and to work for its implementation. And the Foreign Secretary and I have also been in the closest touch with the Heads of other Governments concerned to bring this about.

Israel very quickly made it clear that she was ready to accept a cease-fire if the Arab States did so too. First Jordan, then the U.A.R. and now, it appears, Syria too have declared that they are also ready to accept the cease-fire. This is welcome news. If, as we all hope, the cease-fire can now be made fully effective, the Security Council will then be able to look to the future, for the cease-fire will be only the first step.

From the present confusion and bitterness we must now all work to bring about a lasting and honourable settlement for the future. If any such settlement is to carry hope of acceptance it must take account of the legitimate interests and aspirations of both sides in this conflict.

I would not at this stage try to suggest in any detail the form of such a settlement. Clearly, whatever the controversies which surrounded the establishment of the State of Israel, any settlement must unequivocably now recognise Israel's sovereign right to existence, and this must be accepted by all her neighbours. For nearly 20 years Israel has been a member of the United Nations, entitled to the respect and protection which this implies.

Any settlement will also have to take account of the right of free and innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran for ships of all nations. Israel has made it clear that she regards this as a vital interest. Britain, as a maritime power, also has made clear that we too have a close concern in it. As you know, the Foreign Secretary and I have on a number of occasions during recent weeks reaffirmed the British Government's view that the Straits of Tiran are an international waterway through which ships of all nations have this right of free passage. Our efforts to secure this were distorted and misrepresented and, in the Arab States we were accused of taking the side of Israel. But had those efforts been successful it is possible that the Middle East as a whole might have been spared the present tragic hostilities.

Equally, however, any lasting settlement in the area must recognise the legitimate interests of the Arab States. They too, as the Foreign Secretary has pointed

out with great clarity in the House of Commons, are entitled to sympathy and understanding for their point of view, not least at this difficult time for them. We recognise in particular their deep feelings about the problem of the Arab refugees who have been displaced from their homes in what is now the State of Israel. All of us know the difficulties of achieving any solution of this refugee problem. But some progress here is essential if the future peace of the area is to be secured for a generation to come. For out of the tragedy and suffering of these past days, it is for the next generation that all of us must be legislating.

This country, the British people, and the British Government are in no sense hostile to Arab Nationalism or to perfectly legitimate Arab aspirations to a greater degree of unity. We deplore the current misunderstandings between us and the Arab States. But we hope and believe that the present phase of bitterness and misrepresentation will pass and that we shall gradually be able to rebuild our relations on a firmer basis.

We are confronted today with a major challenge to constructive Statesmanship. The Four Powers, who are the effective members of the Security Council, now have an opportunity - and if we miss this opportunity we may face the gravest dangers - to work together for an honourable and constructive settlement in the Middle East. Indeed, without such four-power co-operation, there is little hope of such a settlement being achieved.

There is one particular field in which this four-power co-operation is particularly necessary - the organisation of some general understanding to control the level of armaments flowing into the area. This is not only essential if future conflict is to be averted, but no less important, it could release economic resources for the infinitely more productive purposes of development - development for which much of the area has cried out for far too long.

Our purpose now - the purpose of the Four-Powers working in consultation with the United Nations and with all the countries of the area - must be to bring about the kind of lasting settlement in which Israel and the Arab States can come not only to live together in peace; but to co-operate as good neighbours. Our purpose too will be to maintain and to cultivate anew relations of friendship with all countries in the area and to do what we can to join them in promoting their economic development in peace. I have said that this is a great challenge. The British Government intend to respond to it with every resource of effort and good will at our command."

10 Downing Street,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

June 9, 1967

Subject

Translation from Russian

T162/67

Prime Minister H.Wilson,
IO, Downing Street,
London

Mr. Prime Minister,

Two days have passed since the resolution of the Security Council regarding the cessation of military actions in the Middle East.

Facts show that after the call of the Security Council Israel has seized considerable territory of the Arab states - the United Arab Republic and Jordan, ignoring the Security Council decision. The situation has developed which demands in view of Israel's actions not just a cease-fire but also the withdrawal of the Israeli forces behind the truce line. The Arab states have been placed by these actions of Israel in a position when they cannot but wage a legitimate defensive war against the aggressor who challenged the Security Council and all the peace-loving states. In this situation the restoration of peace in the Middle East could not be secured until there is a complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the territory of the Arab states.

We have instructed the Soviet representative at the United Nation to raise this matter in the Security Council for the Council to take an appropriate decision. We would like, Mr. Prime Minister, to express the hope that you personally and your Government will take the stand which will be in the interests of ending the war in the Middle East, in the interests of peace.

A. KOSYGIN
Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers

The Kremlin, Moscow

8 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office
S.W.1

8 June, 1967

Dear Michael,

...

I enclose a draft reply to Mr. Kosygin's latest message to the Prime Minister. This has been seen and agreed by Mr. Thomson. We have not had a chance to show it to the Foreign Secretary.

Yours ever,

D

A. M. Palliser, Esq., CMG,
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

T164/67 16

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~~Draft~~ Message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Kosygin

Thank you for your further message ~~dated~~ of 7 June.

As I ~~said~~ told you in my previous message, Her Majesty's Government ~~will do~~ are doing everything in their power to bring an end to the military conflict. To this end, as you know, we fully supported the Resolution which your Permanent Representative to the United Nations put forward in the Security Council last night, calling for an immediate cessation of all military activities. We welcome the fact that this was passed unanimously.

I understand that the Jordan and Israel Governments have already informed the U.N. of their acceptance of a cease-fire. There remains the problem of persuading the other combatants to do likewise. It is clearly essential that all efforts should be made to achieve this without further delay and to avoid further bloodshed. I ~~very much hope~~ know that you, as we are doing, will do all in your power to work to this end which is in our common interest.

Jun 8 1967

Approved by P.M.

FLAP A

Mr Hayman

clears with Mr. Mans Eastern Dept

Ed. (3746)

Subject

17

C[redacted]R/CAT.A.

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

PERSONAL TELEX

SERIAL No. T164/67.

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

TELNO. 1605 8 JUNE, 1967 (E)

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO MOSCOW TELEGRAM NUMBER 1605 OF 8 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1593.

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR KOSYGIN.

BEGINS.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR FURTHER MESSAGE OF 7 JUNE.

AS I TOLD YOU IN MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE, HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ARE DOING EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO BRING AN END TO THE MILITARY CONFLICT. TO THIS END, AS YOU KNOW, WE FULLY SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION WHICH YOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS PUT FORWARD IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL LAST NIGHT, CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

WE WELCOME THE FACT THAT THIS WAS PASSED UNANIMOUSLY. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE JORDAN AND ISRAEL GOVERNMENTS HAVE ALREADY INFORMED THE U.N. OF THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF A CEASE-FIRE. THERE REMAINS THE PROBLEM OF PERSUADING THE OTHER COMBATANTS TO DO LIKEWISE. IT IS CLEARLY ESSENTIAL THAT ALL EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO ACHIEVE THIS WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY AND TO AVOID FURTHER BLOODSHED. I KNOW THAT YOU WILL DO ALL IN YOUR POWER AS WE ARE DOING TO WORK TO THIS END WHICH IS IN OUR COMMON INTEREST.

SOSFA SENT 2037Z 8 JUNE

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17/6.

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SECRET

June 8, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Many thanks for your letter of June 7 enclosing a revised draft message to the Israel Prime Minister. The Prime Minister has made a number of changes to this draft. I enclose the text in the form in which he has approved it.

...

If the Foreign Secretary sees no objection, perhaps you would be kind enough to have it sent at once to Tel Aviv for Michael Hadow to deliver.

Michael Pattisi

D.M. Day, Esq.,
Foreign Office

Israel. (IV 4)

SUBJECT FILED ON CHINA, OCTOBER, 1964.

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 165/67

10 Downing Street
Whitehall

June 8, 1967.

Dear Prime Minister,

I am so sorry that I have not written before this in reply to your letter of April 1, which Mr. L.K. Jha gave me when he was in London towards the end of the month.

First, may I say how much I value your standing invitation to me to visit India. You were very understanding when I had so unfortunately to cancel the plan for October last year, and I know you realise how difficult it has been for me in these last few months to make any plans for leaving the country. In these circumstances it has been indeed kind and thoughtful of you to keep the invitation open. Since getting your letter, I have been hoping from week to week that I would

be able to propose dates for my visit. I have not yet been able to do so, largely because it has been, and still is, very difficult to see ahead what involvements the Common Market negotiations will impose, and what the timetable is likely to be during the next twelve months. And now we are faced with the very serious situation in the Middle East.

As I have made plain throughout, our sole object in the Middle East has been not to take sides but to try first to prevent and then to stop the armed conflict. This tragic conflict is now, I hope, drawing to a close. But we must look forward to what will follow a ceasefire. Much work has to be done in the United Nations, and outside, if the convulsions of war in the area are not to be followed by even greater convulsions. It is clear

that a real and lasting peace can only come from compromise, and in securing a compromise it will be essential that those countries which have special influence in the area should work together to do everything they can to help. I am sure that your counsels and your influence will have a special part to play. The fact that in the last few weeks you may have taken a rather different view from ours does not stand in the way of our working together now to restore the peace which the Middle East so desperately needs. I believe that this peace will only come if all the parties in the dispute can be brought to accept that they must first find some way of living together and working together for the future prosperity and development of the area as a whole.

I was extremely interested to have Mr. Freeman's first hand account of some of the problems with

which you are confronted and which you are tackling so vigorously and constructively. I hope you know how much you have our goodwill and sympathy in all you are trying to do. I think we are having some success here as a result of the drastic economic measures which we have taken since last year, and we now seem - if the present international crisis can be surmounted - to have a reasonable prospect of getting our balance of payments right in the near future. But we are still faced with the problem of reconciling public opinion to the hard measures which we have had to take in the national interest and the others which will no doubt face us in the future.

May I just say a word about Mr. L.K. Jha's visit. Thank you for writing so frankly in the letter he brought to me. I was very pleased to see Mr. Jha

and much welcomed the opportunity to discuss the questions of security guarantees and nuclear non-proliferation with him. Mr. Jha has no doubt reported the details of our conversation to you. I appreciate your taking us so fully into your thinking on this subject. We now have a much clearer picture of India's needs and of possible ways in which these needs may be met.

We are working on the information and the various papers Mr. Jha gave us, and we are in touch with the Americans and also the Russians. I hope we can help towards finding a satisfactory solution.

We are also working on the problem of how best to handle the control of immigration into this country, on which I know you feel strongly. We expect the report of the Wilson Committee next month, and

as soon as we have studied its recommendations, hope to get in touch with you through our High Commissioner.

I have asked Mr. Freeman to bring this letter back to Delhi with him. I was very glad to hear from him at first hand of his frank and useful conversation with you before he came to London. I hope that, although we cannot for the moment meet personally, you will have the fullest confidence, as I do, in confiding to Mr. Freeman any matters of common concern to our two Governments. For my part, I have asked Mr. Freeman to continue to keep in close touch with you and your Government so that we may fully understand each other's point of view even on those issues where our policies diverge.

I close by renewing to you my regret that I cannot at this moment propose a date for my

visit with confidence that it can be firm. I want to come. I hope I can take it that the invitation remains open; I will get in touch with you again about it as soon as the road ahead is a little clearer. It is impossibly congested at this moment, and the clearance of the traffic jam does not lie entirely in my own hands.

Yours very sincerely,
Harold Wilson.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi

Subject

No 10 DS

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL TELEGRAM

COPY NO....

SERIAL No T166/67

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELNO 907 8 JUNE 1967 (P.S.)

CONFIDENTIAL.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 477.

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR ESHKOL

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 5 JUNE.

NOW THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS UNANIMOUSLY CALLED FOR A CEASE-FIRE, WE THINK THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO PUT IT SPEEDILY INTO EFFECT. SO FAR THE DANGERS OF OUTSIDE INTERVENTION AND ESCALATION HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. BUT ANY PROLONGATION OF THE FIGHTER WILL IMMEASURABLY INCREASE THESE RISKS. I WAS GLAD, THEREFORE, TO NOTE MR EBAN'S WELCOME FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CEASE-FIRE APPEAL IN HIS SPEECH AT THE COUNCIL.

ONCE THE CEASE-FIRE HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST CLEARLY TURN ITS MOST URGENT ATTENTION TO THE FURTHER STEPS THAT ARE NEEDED TO SECURE A LASTING PEACE. WITHOUT SEEKING AT THIS STAGE TO ASSESS IN ANY DETAIL THE FORM WHICH THIS MIGHT TAKE, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT H M GOVERNMENT WILL WORK FOR A THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF EVERYTHING NECESSARY FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE ARRANGEMENT THAT WILL TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AND ASPIRATIONS OF ALL THE PARTIES AND WILL SEEK TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF PAST BITTERNESS AND CONFLICT.

IN THE MEANTIME, I AM SURE WE CAN EQUALLY COUNT ON THE COOPERATION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT IN WORKING TOWARDS SUCH A LASTING SETTLEMENT, AND ONE THAT WILL BE JUST AND HONOURABLE FOR ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA.

SOSFA SENT 1930Z/8 JUNE 1967

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P R I S E C (F. O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

FFFFF

A.M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.,
10, Downing Street.

P.C.

11/6

With the compliments of

PLANNING STAFF

Mr. J.A. Thomson

Black Market copy!

FOREIGN OFFICE
LONDON, S.W.1
8 June, 1967.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Ross

Securing British Interests in the Middle East

It may be useful to put down on paper the views I expressed orally this morning.

2. I submit that in company with the Americans and if possible the French we should insist that the price of our further cooperation in the Security Council and our future influence with the Israelis is the immediate opening of the Suez Canal and the resumption of our oil supplies from Arab countries. These are the main tangible British interests in the Middle East and I think it behoves us to secure them as quickly and as firmly as possible.

3. I believe that if we do not secure them at the outset of what promises to be a long period of bargaining for a Middle Eastern settlement we shall find that the Russians and Egyptians, probably with the reluctant support of the oil producing countries, try to insist on a bargain whereby the quid pro quo for the resumption of oil supplies and the opening of the Canal is a total Israeli withdrawal. This is something we might not be able to deliver and moreover might not want to deliver. This Russian/Egyptian tactic might in the end breakdown because of the wish of the oil producing states to earn revenue. But in the meantime it might cause us serious material damage while at the same time it would greatly complicate, if not destroy, the prospects of securing a sensible long term Arab-Israel settlement.

4. Accordingly, I hope we will not agree to Security Council resolutions condemning Israel or calling for withdrawal or indeed for anything else that the Russians/Egyptians want until we have secured our own substantive interests as suggested.

5. It is for consideration whether at the same time we should make two further demands:-

(a) the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from the Yemen;

(b) the resumption of diplomatic relations with those Arab states who have broken them off.

As to (a), I am inclined to think that we should first talk to the Saudis to see whether they could not by other means achieve our object. On (b) I think it is possible that if we got a resumption of oil and the opening of the Canal this might be enough to make it possible for the Iraqis and the Sudanese to resume diplomatic relations. Ideally, however, we should also use the occasion to get the Egyptians to resume relations

/ since

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

since this would go a long way towards destroying the myth that Cairo Radio has propagated of Anglo-American intervention on the side of the Israelis.

(J.A. Thomson)
8 June, 1967.

Copies to: Sir D. Allen
Mr J. Rennie
Mr. Greenhill
Mr. Hayman
Mr. Brenchley
Mr. Norris
Mr. Speares
Mr. Weir
Mr. Moore

S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 6234 8 JUNE 1967 (ZP)

SECRET

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1949.

WE TOO HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE LONGER TERM. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SOME TENTATIVE OFFICIAL THINKING. FOR ITS STATUS SEE PARAGRAPH 10 BELOW. WE FULLY REALISE THAT AT THE BEGINNING WE SHALL BE DEALING WITH PEOPLE WHO THROUGH BITTERNESS OR ELATION WILL BE EXCEPTIONALLY INTRACTABLE.

2. BROADLY THERE ARE TWO PROBLEMS. THE FIRST IS THE PROTECTION OF SUBSTANTIAL BRITISH INTERESTS. WE MUST PROTECT OUR OIL SUPPLIES, OUR INVESTMENTS AND OUR COMMUNICATIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD. WE SHALL OF COURSE WANT TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS AND OTHERS CONCERNED BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE SHALL NEED TO ACT BILATERALLY WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND SPEAK AND ACT INDEPENDENTLY AS AND WHEN REQUIRED.

3. THE SECOND PROBLEM IS HOW TO DEAL WITH THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE IN WHICH BRITISH INTERESTS AS DESCRIBED ABOVE ARE LESS DIRECTLY INVOLVED. FOR THE TIME BEING THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS TILTED BACK SOMEWHAT IN FAVOUR OF THE WEST AND WE MUST USE THE OCCASION TO TRY TO DEAL WITH THE ROOT OF THE TROUBLE AND NOT ONLY ITS SYMPTOMS. THE ESSENCE OF A DEAL MUST BE FIXED UP BETWEEN THOSE POWERS WHICH HAVE THE MOST INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL ON THE ONE HAND AND WITH EGYPT ON THE OTHER, NAMELY THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. OUR BEST COURSE WILL BE TO WORK FOR THE SORT OF SETTLEMENT WE WANT BY TRYING TO GUIDE EACH OF THEM,

/PARTICULARLY

PARTICULARLY THE U.S., IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. WE MUST NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE PUSHED INTO THE LEAD. A SETTLEMENT WILL INEVITABLY BE UNPOPULAR WITH MANY ARABS AND IF WE ARE SEEN TO BE THE CHIEF PROTAGONIST IT COULD DAMAGE OUR SUBSTANTIVE INTERESTS. IT WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS AND TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT IF, AS SEEMS PROBABLE, THE ARABS FALL INTO DISUNITY. IF NASSER SURVIVES RELATIONS WITH HIM WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT BUT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON EFFORTS ON IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES WHERE OUR MAIN INTERESTS LIE, ESPECIALLY IN THE GULF AREA. IN SHORT, IF A LONG TERM MODUS VIVENDI IS TO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS, THE U.S.WILL HAVE TO TAKE A LEAD. THE BARGAINING POWER OF THE WEST IS PROBABLY NOW AT ITS MAXIMUM. WHEN THINGS CALM DOWN AND BECOME ENMESHED IN U.N. PROCEDURES THE RUSSIANS WILL GROW BOLDER AND WILL BE LESS READY TO PRESS THE EGYPTIANS AND THE ARABS GENERALLY TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. THUS WE THINK THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO ACT QUICKLY WITH THE RUSSIANS. WE SHALL BE GLAD TO HAVE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DO SO.

4. ALL THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE ARE NOT READY TO PLAY AN ACTIVE PART OR THAT WE DO NOT THINK THERE IS A MAJOR ROLE FOR THE U.N. AND FOR FOUR POWER NEGOTIATIONS. BUT NONE OF THIS WILL SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGE THE SITUATION IF THE AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS ARE UNABLE TO DO A DEAL.

5. WE ARE CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS AS POTENTIAL PARTS OF AN IDEAL PACKAGE. THE ARABS MIGHT:

(A) FOREGO THEIR CLAIMS TO A STATE OF BELLIGERENCE INCLUDING THE END OF THE BOYCOTT:

(B) ACQUIESCE IN LIMITED TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS:

(C) ACCEPT THAT MOST OF JERUSALEM SHOULD BE AN OPEN CITY

/UNDER

UNDER U.N. CONTROL:
(D) ACCEPT THAT THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE SUEZ CANAL SHOULD BE OPEN TO THE SHIPPING OF ALL NATIONS INCLUDING ISRAEL:
(E) COOPERATE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE U.N. PRESENCE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ISRAELI BORDERS, WITH PERHAPS THE PRESENCE IN THE AREA OF A HIGH RANKING REPRESENTATIVE OF U THANT:
(F) AGREE TO A DEAL ON REFUGEES:
(G) ACQUIESCE IN AN ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT:
(H) WITHDRAW EGYPTIAN TROOPS FROM THE YEMEN.

6. ON THEIR SIDE THE ISRAELIS MIGHT IDEALLY:
(A) HALT AND STOP FIGHTING:
(B) ACQUIESCE IN LIMITED TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS:
(C) ACCEPT THAT PART OF NEW JERUSALEM SHOULD BE JOINED WITH THE OLD IN AN OPEN CITY UNDER U.N. CONTROL:
(D) EVACUATE THEIR OTHER TERRITORIAL GAINS:
(E) COOPERATE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.N. MILITARY PRESENCE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ISRAELI BORDERS, WITH PERHAPS THE PRESENCE IN THE AREA OF A HIGH RANKING REPRESENTATIVE OF U THANT:
(F) AGREE TO A DEAL ON REFUGEES:
(G) ACQUIESCE IN AN ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT.

7. AS TO THE REFUGEES, WE HAVE IN MIND THE POSSIBILITY THAT IF ISRAEL OFFERED THEM THE CHOICE OF EITHER WAITING TO BE GRADUALLY ABSORBED INTO ISRAEL OR OF GENEROUS AND IMMEDIATE COMPENSATION FOR THOSE WHO CHOSE TO SETTLE IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY WOULD CHOOSE THE LATTER. THE COMPENSATION WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBSTANTIAL AND MUCH OF IT WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO COME FROM THE U.S. THERE WOULD PROBABLY ALSO HAVE TO BE SPECIAL ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS FOR THE U.A.R. AND PROBABLY OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AS WELL. IN PARTICULAR THE I.M.F. MIGHT RESCUE EGYPT FROM IMMINENT BANKRUPTCY AND AMERICAN PL 480 AID MIGHT BE NEEDED

/TO

TO PROVIDE FOOD.

8. IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO THINK THAT ANY PACKAGE DEAL COULD INCLUDE ALL THE ELEMENTS LISTED ABOVE BUT UNTIL NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN IT WILL BE HARD TO SAY WHAT IS FEASIBLE. PUBLIC SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL IN THIS COUNTRY WILL EFFECT THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE CAN GO.

9. RUSK'S IDEA THAT THE SWISS MIGHT TAKE A LEAD IN THE LONG TERM REFUGEE QUESTION SEEMS UNREALISTIC. A NEW REGIONAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT AND WATER PROBLEMS MIGHT FORM PART OF GENERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE BUT BY ITSELF SEEMS UNLIKELY TO CUT MUCH ICE.

10. NONE OF THE FOREGOING HAS ANY MINISTERIAL AUTHORITY. YOU SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT THEREFORE DISCLOSE THESE THOUGHTS TO THE AMERICANS BUT YOU MAY BE GUIDED BY THEM IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH RUSK AND ROSTOW. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW HOW FAR YOU THINK THEY MIGHT BE SALEABLE TO THE AMERICANS.

SOSFA SENT 1315Z 8 JUNE 1967

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO. 6273 8 JUNE, 1967 (E)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDSD WASHINGTON TELNO. 6273 OF 8/6 AND TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO. 1958 AND NEW YORK TELNO. 1262 PARA. 3. [MIDDLE EAST]

AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN WE ARE CONTINUING TO DO ALL WE CAN WITH A VIEW TO , AS CHET COOPER SAYS, QUOTE NAILING THE BIG LIE UNQUOTE. BUT I AM INCLINED TO THINK THAT COOPER'S PROPOSAL OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE TO OVER-EGG THE CAKE.

2. I ALSO AGREE WITH LORD CARADON'S VIEW IN NEW YORK TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE THAT SOME OF THE OTHER ACTIVITIES SUGGESTED BY COOPER WOULD NOT DO MUCH TO HELP. LORD CARADON AND MR.GOLDBERG HAVE MADE SPECIFIC OFFERS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN MY TELEGRAM NO.2669 TO NEW YORK I SUGGESTED HOW WE CONSIDER THE EXERCISE MIGHT BE CARRIED OUT. I THINK WE SHOULD STICK TO THIS AND WORK CLOSELY WITH THE U.S. DELEGATION IN NEW YORK.

3. WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR PARA. 6 THE B.B.C. ARE NOW BROADCASTING 16 HOURS A DAY.

4. WE ARE LOOKING INTO THE QUESTION RAISED IN PARA.7.

SOSFA SENT 1958Z 8 JUNE

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EASTERN DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1264.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

8 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1264 OF 8 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, COPENHAGEN AND AMMAN.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1253 : PARAGRAPH 3.

MIDDLE EAST.

TEXT OF THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S TELEGRAM DATED JUNE 7 TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ACCEPTING THE CEASE-FIRE CALLED FOR IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 233 OF 6 JUNE IS AS FOLLOWS :

QUOTE.

FORMALLY RECEIVED THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TRANSMITTED TO MY GOVERNMENT BY HIS EXCELLENCY, THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, AT 6 A.M., 7 JUNE 1967 LOCAL TIME, WHICH ''CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED AS A FIRST STEP TO TAKE FORTHWITH ALL MEASURES FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND FOR A CESSATION OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA''.

ON HEARING THROUGH TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH JORDAN'S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, DR. MOHAMMED EL FARRA, INSTANTLY AFTER SECURITY COUNCIL CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY, ORDERS WERE IMMEDIATELY ISSUED TO OUR TROOPS TO OBSERVE CEASE-FIRE EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENCE. THESE ORDERS WERE ACTUALLY ISSUED TO OUR TROOPS FOUR HOURS BEFORE U THANT'S - SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS - CABLE ARRIVED IN AMMAN. HOWEVER, THE ISRAELI SIDE HAS NOT, REPEAT NOT, COMPLIED WITH THIS RESOLUTION, CONTINUING UNTIL 13 HOURS LOCAL TIME, 7 JUNE, THEIR INTENSIVE AND RUTHLESS MILITARY ACTIVITIES AGAINST JORDAN TROOPS AND CIVILIANS INSIDE

/JORDAN

JORDAN TERR'TORY.

WE HAVE THEREFORE REQUESTED FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JORDAN TO THE JNITED NATIONS AN IMMEDIATE LODGING OF OUR COMPLAINT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR ISRAEL'S NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE ABOVE RESOLUTION.

UNQUOTE.

FO PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW NO. 130, PARIS NO. 134, TEL AVIV NO. 141, COPENHAGEN NO. 64 AND AMMAN NO. 85.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 08/1528Z
RCVD AT 08/1528Z

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK. TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1265. 8 JUNE 1967.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1265 OF 8 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, COPENHAGEN AND AMMAN.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: MIDDLE EAST.

LATE LAST NIGHT THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER DATED 7 JUNE FROM THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER: BEGINS

AT 4.45 O'CLOCK P.M., NEW YORK TIME, I INFORMED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH JERUSALEM, INFORMING ME THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE, PROVIDED THAT THE OTHER PARTIES ACCEPT.

I HAVE SINCE RECEIVED A CABLED CONFIRMATION OF THIS DECISION, WHICH I NOW COMMUNICATE TO YOU OFFICIALLY.

WE HAVE BEEN APPRISED OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN'S ACCEPTANCE AND THE CEASE-FIRE WITH THAT COUNTRY HAS BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE 20.00 HOURS G.M.T.

WE WOULD WELCOME THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED IN THE HOSTILITIES.

ENDS

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 131 PARIS 135 TEL AVIV 142 COPENHAGEN 65 AND AMMAN 86.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 081530Z

RCVD AT 081536Z

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1272 8 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1272 OF 8 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, COPENHAGEN, OTTAWA AND SAVING TO AMMAN, NEW DELHI AND CAIRO.
MY TELNO. 1263: MIDDLE EAST.
THIS MORNING WE FIRST HEARD THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD BE CALLED FOR THIS AFTERNOON AT THE REQUEST OF THE AMERICANS. THEN GOLDBERG SPOKE TO ME AND SAID THAT HE WAS WAITING INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON BUT HAD ALREADY ASKED FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AT STATE DEPARTMENT SUGGESTION. HE SAID THAT HE HIMSELF DID NOT YET KNOW WHAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD IN MIND BUT HE GATHERED THAT THEY HAD NEW PROPOSALS WHICH THEY WISHED TO BE PUT TO THE COUNCIL AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO PRE-EMPT ANY MOVE FROM THE RUSSIANS.
2. TOGETHER WITH THE CANADIANS, DANES AND JAPANESE AND LATIN AMERICANS, WE MET GOLDBERG AT THE END OF THE MORNING AND HE GAVE US THE ROUGH OUTLINE OF WHAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDED TO PROPOSE. HIS MISSION WAS STILL SETTLING THE DETAIL OF THIS RESOLUTION IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH WASHINGTON. SO IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO GIVE EVEN OUR PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT NOT YET SETTLED.
3. WE THEN HEARD THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEATEN THE UNITED STATES TO THE JUMP AND HAD THEIR OWN RESOLUTION TABLED. THE TEXT OF THE RUSSIAN RESOLUTION IS IN MY TELNO. 1276 AND THE FINAL TEXT PUT FORWARD BY THE UNITED STATES IS IN MY TELNO. 1275.
4.WHEN THE COUNCIL MET GOLDBERG SPOKE FIRST AND READ THE TEXT OF HIS RESOLUTION. IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

/ ANNOUNCED

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNOUNCED THE UAR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASE FIRE. THIS ALTERED THE SITUATION AND WHEN THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED UNTIL TOMORROW (FRIDAY) AFTERNOON LITTLE FURTHER HAD HAPPENED ON THE TWO RESOLUTIONS EXCEPT THAT EBAN HAD ATTACKED THE RUSSIAN TEXT AND TARABANOV (BULGARIA) HAD ATTACKED THE U.S. DRAFT.

5. YOU WILL SEE FROM MY REPORTING TELEGRAM THAT EBAN EMPHASISED THAT NEITHER SYRIA NOR IRAQ HAD YET ACCEPTED THE CEASE FIRE.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 133, PARIS 137, TEL AVIV 144, COPENHAGEN 67, AND SAVING TO AMMAN 48, NEW DELHI 29 AND CAIRO 61.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0053 9 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 0054 9 JUNE 1967

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1273 8 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1273 OF 8 JUNE

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, COPENHAGEN, OTTAWA AND SAVING TO AMMAN, NEW DELHI AND CAIRO.

M.I.P.T. MIDDLE EAST.

DO NOT EXPECT THAT ANY RESOLUTION WILL COME TO A VOTE TOMORROW AND THERE MAY BE SEVERAL DAYS OF CONFUSED CONSULTATION AHEAD OF US.

2. AS TO THE RUSSIAN TEXT, I DO NOT EXPECT THAT AS THINGS ARE NOW ANY RESOLUTION WHICH INCLUDES A PLAIN CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL CAN HOPE TO ATTRACT NINE VOTES.

3. NOR WOULD I EXPECT THAT THE UNITED STATES TEXT COULD ATTRACT NINE VOTES EITHER.

4. THE DANGER, IT SEEMS TO ME, IS THAT THE RUSSIANS OR ONE OF THEIR FRIENDS WILL PUT FORWARD A NEW RESOLUTION CALLING (WITHOUT CONDEMNATION) ON FULL WITHDRAWAL TO THE ARMISTICE LINES AS THE NEXT STEP AND BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE HAPPENS. SUPPORT FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION MIGHT WELL GAIN GROUND. IT IS OF COURSE KNOWN THAT IN NEGOTIATIONS A DAY OR TWO AGO THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL TO THE ARMISTICE LINES TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THEIR TEXT IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 1227.

5. I SHOULD WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS ON THE UNITED STATES DRAFT RESOLUTION (MY TEL NO. 1275) AS IT NOW STANDS. ITS MAIN INTENT IS TO WORK FOR A PERMANENT PEACE RATHER THAN A PRECARIOUS ARMISTICE AND THAT IS ALL VERY WELL, BUT THE ARGUMENT WHICH MAY WELL GAIN GROUND IS THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO KEEP ALL THEIR GAINS PENDING A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. I MYSELF AM NOT ALTOGETHER HAPPY ABOUT THE U.S. DRAFT EITHER IN ITS CONTENT OR IN THE WAY IT WAS PUT TO US. THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR

/TOLD ME

CONFIDENTIAL

TOLD ME THIS EVENING THAT HE TOO WAS UNEASY AND WISHED TO DISCUSS IT WITH ME TOMORROW. AS I SAY, I DO NOT THINK THERE IS ANY DANGER OF EITHER OF THE TEXTS BEING VOTED ON TOMORROW AND I SHOULD LIKE TO SEND YOU MY FURTHER COMMENTS WHEN I HAVE DISCUSSED IT FURTHER WITH THE AMERICANS AND OTHERS.

6. WHATEVER HAPPENS IN THE COUNCIL IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE FOR THE TIME BEING ON MEASURES TO MAKE EFFECTIVE THE CEASE FIRE AND AT THE SAME TIME AN ATTEMPT TO PUT A HIGH LEVEL MEDIATOR TO WORK. THE AMERICANS SUGGESTED TO US TODAY THAT BULL AND RIKHYE, GIVEN SOME ADDITIONAL SUPPORT, MIGHT BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH THE FIRST TASK AND THEY ALSO TOLD US THAT THAY HAD THOUGHT OF AITKEN (FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRELAND) AS WELL AS ERLANDER AS A POSSIBLE MEDIATOR. WE SHALL DISCUSS THESE IDEAS FURTHER AND HOW THEY CAN BE PROMOTED AND REPORT AGAIN TOMORROW.

7. AS TO THE CANADIAN RESOLUTION, (MY TEL NO. 1255) THE ASSUMPTION HAS BEEN THAT IT WILL BE ABSORBED INTO THE U.S. DRAFT (BUT IN ANY EVENT THE LATIN AMERICANS ARE VERY MUCH OPPOSED TO GIVING ANY SPECIAL AUTHORITY TO THE PRESIDENT).

8. I SHALL ALSO PUT TO YOU TOMORROW MY IDEAS ON WHAT OUR AIMS AND TACTICS SHOULD NOW BE.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 134, PARIS 138, TEL AVIV 145, COPENHAGEN 68 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 49, NEW DELHI 30 AND CAIRO 62.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0121 9 JUNE 1967

RECD AT 0122 9 JUNE 1967

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 1274 8 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1274 OF 8 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WAHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN AND SAVING TO AMMAN BAGHDAD RIO DE JANEIRO BEIRUT ADDIS ABABA NEW DELHI OTTAWA JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MY TELNO. 1253: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE COUNCIL MET THIS AFTERNON UPON SEPARATE REQUESTS BY THE U.S. AND USSR. RESOLUTIONS WERE TABLED BY BOTH (TEXTS AS FINALLY REVISED ARE IN MY TWO IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS). THE COUNCIL ALSO HAD BEFORE IT A CABLE OF 8 JUNE FROM KUWAIT SAYING THAT THEY WOULD NOT OBSERVE THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS FOR A CEASE FIRE ''WHICH DO NOT CONDEMN THE ISRAELI AGRESSORS....ALSO IGNORED THE JUST RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS'', AND A CABLE, ALSO OF 8 JUNE, FROM JORDAN COMPLAINING THAT DESPITE JORDAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASE FIRE, THE ISRAELI FORCES HAD NOT COMPLIED AND WERE STILL CONCENTRATING FORCES WITH A VIEW TO CARRYING OUT FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS.

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL MADE A FURTHER REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS OF 8 JUNE REFERRING TO CONTINUED ACTIVITY ON THE ISRAEL/JORDAN FRONT AT MAFRAQ AND NEAR DAMIAH, AND TO HEAVY AIR AND GROUND FIRE IN THE AREA OF THE ISRAEL/SYRIA DEMILITARIZED ZONE. HE ALSO SAID THAT STEPS CONTINUED TO CONCENTRATE THE UNEF CONTINGENTS AND IT WAS HOPED TO COMMENCE THEIR EVACUATION IN 48 HOURS.

3. GOLDBERG (U.S.) THEN SPOKE TO INTRODUCE THE U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS OF 6 AND 7 JUNE HAD NOT YET BEEN ACHIEVED AND FURTHER STEPS HAD TO BE TAKEN WITHOUT DELAY. THE U.S. RESOLUTION WAS DESIGNED TO COMPLETE THE ESSENTIAL OF A CEASE FIRE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS NECESSARY TO LOOK FORWARD TO PRACTICAL FUTURE STEPS TO DEAL WITH THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS. THE PURPOSE OF THE U.S. RESOLUTION WAS TO PROVIDE

/FOR

FOR MOVEMENT TOWARDS A FINAL SETTLEMENT. GOLDBERG REAFFIRMED THE U.S. WISH FOR ALL NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, NAMELY TRUE PEACE WITH JUSTICE, MUTUAL TOLERANCE AND CREATIVE GROWTH. THE U.S. WAS READY TO DO ALL THEY COULD TO HELP TO THIS END.

4. THE SECRETARY GENERAL THEN READ A MESSAGE OF 8 JUNE FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.A.R. ACCEPTING A CEASE FIRE AS PRESCRIBED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS ON CONDITION THAT THE OTHER PARTY CEASED TO FIRE (TEXT IN MYTELNO. 1275).

5. FEDERENKO (USSR) INTRODUCED THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION. HE REPEATED THE SOVIET ACCUSATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL AND CALLED UPON THE COUNCIL TO CONDEMN ISRAEL AS THE AGRESSOR. HE ACCUSED THE U.S. OF CONTINUING TO PROTECT ISRAEL AND REFERRED TO ALLEGED WASHINGTON OFFICIAL STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT ISRAEL'S SUCCESSFUL AGGRESSION WAS A VICTORY FOR THE WEST. THE COUNCIL MUST GO BEYOND CONDEMNING ISRAEL AND CALL FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. HAVING READ OUT THE SOVIET RESOLUTION, FEDERENKO SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWAL IN PARAGRAPH 2 MEANT ALSO WITHDRAWAL FROM THE DEMILITARIZED ZONES AS INCLUDED IN THE MIXED ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS (THIS WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INSERTED IN THE TEXT OF THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION).

6. I THEN SPOKE (TEXT SENT SEPARATELY).

7. EBAN (ISRAEL) SAID THAT HE HAD TODAY CONVEYED HIS GOVERNMENT'S SINCERE REGRETS TO SECRETARY RUSK FOR THE DAMAGE AND LOSS OF LIFE CAUSED IN THE TORPEDOING INCIDENT OFF HAIFA TO WHICH GOLDBERG HAD REFERRED. HE WELCOMED THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE UAR OF THE COUNCIL'S TWO CEASE -FIRE RESOLUTIONS. BUT SYRIA HAD NOT INDICATED ITS ATTITUDE TO THE COUNCIL'S CALL, AND FIGHTING HAD INTENSIFIED THERE IN RECENT HOURS. THERE WAS NO NEWS FROM IRAQ, AND KUWAIT HAD NOTIFIED THE COUNCIL OF ITS REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE. ON THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION, EBAN SAID THAT ITS PREMISES WERE INACCURATE, PARTICULARLY PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2= AND ITS DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OUTBREAK OF WAR A TRAVESTY OF THE FACTS. HE THEN GAVE A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE BUILD-UP OF

/EGYPTIAN

EGYPTIAN FORCES IN SINAI PENINSULA CULMINATING IN THE DECLARATION OF A BLOCKADE OF THE GULF OF AQABA. HE RESERVED COMMENT ON THE AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH CONTAINED MUCH OF SUBSTANCE AND WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY STUDIED.

8. FINALLY, EBAN REPEATED TWO MAIN THEMES OF HIS 6 JUNE SPEECH: THE MINIMAL CRITERIA OF RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES WOULD HAVE IN FUTURE TO BE ACCEPTED BY ALL IN THE REGION= THIS MEANT A NEW STRUCTURE OF INTERSTATE RELATIONSHIPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. A COROLLARY WAS THAT THE EMPHASIS IN ISRAEL'S THINKING IS NOT SO MUCH ON THE AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES, BUT ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATES.

9. GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES) THEN MADE A CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENT TO HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF EGYPT'S ACCEPTANCE OF A CEASE-FIRE.

10. TARABANOV (BULGARIA) SPOKE ATTACKING ISRAEL AND SUPPORTING THE USSR DRAFT RESOLUTION. HE CALLED UPON THE COUNCIL TO REJECT THE UNITED STATES DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS DESIGNED TO ENABLE THE ISRAELIS TO DEMAND THE SATISFACTION OF THEIR CLAIMS AS A CONDITION FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL.

11. FEDERENKO (USSR) SPOKE AGAIN TO ATTACK EBAN'S STATEMENT QUOTING FROM AN NBC REPORT OF A STATEMENT BY THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR IN LONDON THAT ISRAEL WAS THE FIRST TO COMMENCE HOSTILITIES.

12. EL FARRA (JORDAN) ACCUSED ISRAEL OF CONTINUING TO VIOLATE THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT. IN AN EMOTIONAL STATEMENT HE WENT ON TO STRESS THAT WHATEVER THE POSITION NOW THE ARABS WOULD CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY. HE ATTACKED THE UNITED STATES FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL THROUGH DONATIONS, ARMS AND ''AERIAL COVER''.

/13.

13. TARABANOV (BULGARIA) RAFAEL (ISRAEL) FEDERENKO (USSR) THEN EXERCISED RIGHTS OF REPLY. THE ONLY POINT OF INTEREST WAS RAFAEL'S CATEGORIC REJECTION OF THE SOVIET AND JORDANIAN INTERPRETATION (SEE ABOVE) OF AN ALLEGED STATEMENT BY THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. FEDERENKO POINTED OUT THAT THE STATEMENT BY REMEZN WHICH HE CLAIMED ADMITTED THAT ISRAEL HAD STARTED THE WAR ON 5 JUNE, HAD BEEN PUBLISHED BY AMERICAN MEDIA.

14. THE MEETING WAS ADJOURNED FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE THREE DRAFTS BEFORE THE COUNCIL UNTIL 3 P M TOMORROW.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS MOSCOW 135, PARIS 139 TEL AVIV 146 COPENHAGEN 69 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 50 BAGHDAD 28 RIO DE JANEIRO 11 BEIRUT 57 ADDIS ABABA 34 NEW DELHI 31 JEDDA 33 AND CAIRO 63.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0227 9 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 0228 9 JUNE 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO 1275 8 JUNE, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.1275 OF 8 JUNE,
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV,
COPENHAGEN AND SAVING TO AMMAN, BAGHDAD, RIO DE JANEIRO, BEIRUT
ADDIS ABABA, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO.1274: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF UNITED STATES DRAFT RESOLUTION (THE REFERENCES TO THE U.A.R. WERE INSERTED AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.A.R. ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE).

'THE SECURITY COUNCIL'.

'RECALLING' ITS RESOLUTIONS 233 and 234,

'RECALLING' THAT IN THE LATTER RESOLUTION THE COUNCIL DEMANDED THAT THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED SHOULD AS A FIRST STEP CEASE-FIRE AND DISCONTINUE MILITARY OPERATIONS AT 2000 HOURS G.M.T. ON 7 JUNE 1967,

'NOTING' THAT ISRAEL, JORDAN AND THE U.A.R. HAVE INDICATED THEIR MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE COUNCIL'S DEMAND FOR A CEASE-FIRE, AND THAT ISRAEL HAS EXPRESSED WITH RESPECT TO ALL PARTIES ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE PROVIDED THE OTHER PARTIES ACCEPT.

'NOTING FURTHER' WITH DEEP CONCERN THAT OTHER PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT HAVE NOT YET AGREED TO A CEASE-FIRE.

1. 'CALLS FOR' SCRUPULOUS COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL, JORDAN AND THE U.A.R. WITH THEIR AGREEMENTS TO A CEASE-FIRE,

2. 'INSISTS' THAT ALL THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED IMMEDIATELY COMPLY WITH THE COUNCIL'S REPEATED DEMANDS FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND CESSATION OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY AS A FIRST URGENT STEP TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

3. 'CALLS FOR' DISCUSSIONS PROMPTLY THEREAFTER AMONG THE PARTIES CONCERNED, USING SUCH THIRD PARTY OR UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE AS THEY MAY WISH, LOOKING TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF VIABLE ARRANGEMENTS ENCOMPASSING THE WITHDRAWAL AND DISENGAGEMENT OF ARMED PERSONNEL, THE RENUNCIATION OF FORCE REGARDLESS OF ITS NATURE, THE MAINTENANCE OF VITAL INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STABLE AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

/4. 'REQUESTS'

4. 'REQUESTS' THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO SEEK TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CEASE-FIRE AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL THEREON WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS=

5. 'ALSO REQUESTS' THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE AS MAY BE REQUIRED IN FACILITATING THE DISCUSSIONS CALLED FOR IN PARAGRAPH 3.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOSOCOW NO 136, PARIS NO 140, TEL AVIV NO 147 COPENHAGEN NO 70 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO 51, BAGHDAD NO 29, RIO DE JANEIRO NO 12, BEIRUT NO 58, ADDIS ABABA NO 35 NEW DELHI NO 32, JEDDA NO 34 AND CAIRO NO 64.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0143 9 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 0144 9 JUNE 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE FROM UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1276 8 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1276 OF 8 JUNE,
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV
COPENHAGEN AND SAVING TO AMMAN BAGHDAD RIO DE JANEIRO BEIRUT
ADDIS ABABA NEW DELHI OTTAWA JEDDA CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO 1274: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF USSR DRAFT RESOLUTION.

'THE SECURITY COUNCIL,'

'NOTING'THAT ISRAEL HAS DISREGARDED THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS CALLING FOR THE CESSATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES (S/RES/233 OF 6 JUNE 1967 AND S/RES/234 OF 7 JUNE 1967),

'CONSIDERING' THAT ISRAEL NOT ONLY HAS NOT HALTED MILITARY ACTIVITIES BUT HAS MADE USE OF THE TIME ELAPSED SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE AFOREMENTIONED COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IN ORDER TO SEIZE ADDITIONAL TERRITORY OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND JORDAN,

'NOTING' THAT EVEN NOW ISRAEL IS CONTINUING MILITARY ACTIVITIES INSTEAD OF HALTING ITS AGGRESSION, THUS DEFYING THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALL PEACE-LOVING STATES,

1. 'VIGOROUSLY CONDEMNS' ISRAEL'S AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITIES AND ITS VIOLATIONS OF THE AFOREMENTIONED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND OF UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLES=

2. 'DEMANDS' THAT ISRAEL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY HALT ITS MILITARY ACTIVITIES AGAINST NEIGHBOURING ARAB STATES AND SHOULD REMOVE ALL ITS TROOPS FROM THE TERRITORY OF THOSE STATES AND WITHDRAW THEM BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES AND RESPECT THE STATUS OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONES, AS PRESCRIBED IN THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS.

FO PASS TO MOSCOW 137 PARIS 141 TEL AVIV 148 COPENHAGEN 71 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 52 BAGHDAD 30, RIO DE JANEIRO 13 BEIRUT 59 ADDIS ABABA 36 NEW DELHI 33 JEDDA 35 AND CAIRO 65.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0155 9 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 0156 9 JUNE 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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S E C R E T

Cypher/Cat.A. and By Bag

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO ALGIERS

Telno. 131 8 June, 1967. (V)

SECRET

Addressed to Algiers telegram No. 131 of 8 June.
Repeated for information to Rabat, Tel Aviv and
Saving to Tunis, Tripoli.

Middle East Crisis

We should be grateful for any assessment you feel able to make of the Algerian Government's likely course of action in the immediate future and in the longer term. If fighting continues, to what extent are they likely to commit their armed forces? What will be their aims if the U.A.R. is defeated and President Nasser is discredited?

SOSFA Sent 0116Z 9 June.

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N.E.A.D.

44444

S E C R E T

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

8 June, 1967.

Dear Derek,

The text of the Egyptian Representative's letter to U Thant accepting the cease-fire is attached.

...

Yours

W Murray.

D. H. Andrews, Esq.,
10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

Text of Egyptian Representative's Letter to U Thant

I have the honour to inform you, on the instructions of my Government, that it has decided to accept the cease-fire call as it has been prescribed in the Resolutions of the Council on the 5th and 6th June, on the condition that the other party ceases fire.

CONFIDENTIAL

Commonwealth Office
S.W.1

8 June, 1967

Dear Michael,

The Commonwealth Secretary left with you this morning a Note about the attitudes of Commonwealth governments to the Middle East crisis; this Note had been prepared at the Prime Minister's request and I believe that the Commonwealth Secretary spoke from it at Cabinet this morning.

2. There are two additions required to bring the Note up-to-date:-

(i) India (paragraph 2(e))

The Indians have been slightly more helpful over the last few days, e.g. the Acting High Commissioner in London called at this Office on 5 June to suggest that our two governments should keep in close touch over the crisis;

(ii) Cyprus

You will have seen from Nicosia telegram No. 475 this morning that the Archbishop has assured us that he completely accepts that the allegations of British involvement are absolutely unfounded.

3. I am copying this letter together with the Note which the Commonwealth Secretary left with you to Derek Day in the Foreign Office and Richard Hastie-Smith in the Ministry of Defence.

Yours,

(O.G. FORSTER)
Private Secretary

A.M. Palliser Esq., C.M.G.,

MIDDLE EAST: ATTITUDE OF COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS

NOTE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

General alignment in the dispute

The great majority of Commonwealth countries have been anxious not to become involved in the Arab-Israel dispute, not to appear to take sides, and for the fighting to be limited and stopped as soon as possible. They have not expressed specific views on British policies. All of this majority have been in favour of action in the United Nations to these ends but very dubious about any action by us or anyone else outside the U.N. This includes most of the Commonwealth countries in Africa; Kenya and Malawi however have expressed to us understanding of and sympathy with our policies.

2. The following is the attitude of those Commonwealth Governments more closely involved.

(a) In the Security Council Nigeria, because of her internal problems, has not sought to play an active role but has shown general sympathy to the Arabs. Canada has been helpful and constructive throughout, though dubious about the effectiveness of action outside the U.N. (e.g. in support of the proposed maritime declaration). India has come out as the spokesman of the U.A.R. and has been extremely active in opposing U.K./U.S. initiatives.

/(b)

(b) Australia and New Zealand have been thoroughly sound in support of the U.K. and the U.S. and agreed to join in the maritime declaration.

(c) Pakistan's sympathies with the Arabs are extremely strong, and based not only on Islamic feeling but on general disillusionment with the West since Tashkent. On 7th June, President Ayub sent a message to Arab Heads of States immediately involved in which he expressed pro-Arab sentiments and the wish to extend all possible assistance. However, the Pakistan Government have not taken up a hostile attitude to us.

(d) Malaysia's Islamic sympathies are in general with the Arab countries but they have kept very quiet and have not criticised us. Mr. Lee has explained to us that he finds it necessary to send a friendly message on behalf of Singapore to Colonel Nasser because of all the latter's help to Singapore in 1965.

(e) This leaves India, whose activities, particularly in the U.N. (where she is a member of the Security Council) have been thoroughly contrary to our interests. For example, she has been active in tabling U.A.R.-sponsored resolutions in the Security Council and in resisting the British and American desire for an unconditional ceasefire. India's action in supporting the Arabs may well prove

/short-sighted

short-sighted in view of her dependence on the shipment of wheat through the Suez Canal.

Pro-Israel

Although no Commonwealth country has actively supported Israel against the Arabs, the sympathy of the three "old" Commonwealth countries have been broadly with the West and to a lesser extent with Israel. Even so, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were all extremely doubtful about our proposal for a maritime declaration although Australia and New Zealand in the end reluctantly agreed to support it. None of them would agree to participate in contingency planning for opening the Gulf of Aqaba. Canada's position in this is however fully understandable, since as a member of the Security Council she has by maintaining the appearance of strict neutrality been able to play a very helpful part in New York in securing a ceasefire resolution. It is also worth mentioning that Kenya and Malawi, within the limits imposed by their geographical position and Afro-Asian pressures, have been as helpful to us as they could.

Cyprus and Malta

Cyprus and Malta are both in the special position, among Commonwealth countries, of having, either on their territory or adjacent to it, British bases which could be used for operations in the Middle East. Early in the crisis President Makarios issued a statement setting out his opposition to the use of the British Sovereign Base Areas "against" the Arabs. On the 5th June he sent President Nasser a message of support "in the struggle of the Arab world to

/repel

repel the aggression and defend their rights". He is under considerable internal and external pressure to show sympathy to the Arab cause. He has not followed up these public utterances with any action designed to interfere with our freedom of operation in the bases, and he may well regard his public messages as necessary to head off pressures being generated among his own people by the U.A.R. or the Communists to take action against the bases. In Malta, domestic politics make it essential for Dr. Borg Olivier not to appear to favour Israel or to do anything which might embroil Malta in the conflict. Malta also has a considerable trade with Libya. In his public statements Dr. Borg Olivier has not criticised Britain and has been careful not to commit himself to any course of action in hypothetical future circumstances. Our offer to admit United Nations observers to the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and to our aircraft carrier and Air Force installations in Malta should help to reduce any local tendency to believe Arab allegations about the participation of British aircraft in operations against them.

H.L.F. Boudon

RESTRICTED

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1971 8 JUNE 1967
RESTRICTED

MIDDLE EAST.

AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN, THE PRESIDENT HAS RECALLED MACGEORGE BUNDY TO BE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, INCLUDING RUSK, MACNAMARA, FOWLER AND OTHERS, TO DEAL WITH U.S. EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACE SETTLEMENT. BUNDY IS ALREADY WORKING AND I HOPE TO SEE HIM SOON. MACNAMARA HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE GROUPS TASKS ARE AS STATED.

SIR P DEAN

SENT AT 0515/08
RECD AT 0516/08

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EASTERN DEPT.

RESTRICTED

File

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

Guidance No. 137 9 June, 1967 (IPG)

UNCLASSIFIED

Middle East.

At military briefing for foreign Press in Tel Aviv on 8 June, translation in English of alleged Israel Radio intercept of conversation between Nasser and Hussein was released and tape recording in Arabic of alleged conversation was played back to them.

2. Text which has already been published widely in British Press, is as follows:

"Conversation between Nasser and Hussein on 6 June 1967 at 4.50 a.m. by Cairo-Amman radio telephone link. Conversation between Cairo and Amman - hello - His Majesty is ready? The President is coming. - Hello Amman is His Majesty ready? - Hello, His Honour the President is ready - how are you? I hear His Majesty, the brother wants to know if the fighting is going on along all the Front? - Yes. Shall we include also the United States do you know of this, shall we announce that the United States is cooperating with Israel? - Hello, I do not hear, the connexion is the worst - the line between you and the Palace of The King from which The King is speaking is bad. Nasser - Hello, will we say the United States and England or just the United States? Hussein - the United States and England. Nasser - does Britain have aircraft carriers? Hussein - answer unintelligible. Nasser - good. King Hussein will make an announcement and I will make an announcement.- Thank you. - Do not give up. - Yes. - Hello, good morning brother. Never mind, be strong. - Yes. I hear - Mr. President if you have something, or any idea at all ... at any time. Nasser - we are fighting with all our strength and we have battles going on on every front all night and if we had any troubles at the beginning - it does not matter, we will overcome despite this. God is with us. Nasser - will His Majesty make an announcement on the participation of Americans and the British? (answer not clear). Nasser - by God, I say that I will make an announcement and you will make an announcement and we will see to it that Syrians will make an announcement that American and British airplanes are taking part against us from aircraft carriers. We will issue an announcement, we will stress the matter and we will drive the point home. Hussein - Good. All right. Nasser - Your Majesty, do you agree? - (not clear). Nasser - A thousand thanks, don't give up, we are with you with all our heart and we are flying out planes over Israel today, our planes are striking at Israel's air fields since morning. Hussein - a thousand thanks, be well".

[Copies sent to D.T.D. for Overseas Distribution].

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CONFIDENTIAL

8 June, 1967

I had a talk about the Middle East yesterday afternoon with Bob McNamara. As you will have seen from my telegram No. 1971 he is a member of the Committee which the President has set up to co-ordinate US efforts to achieve a peace settlement.

McNamara said that he was puzzled and a little worried by the Soviet attitude. British and American predictions of Israeli superiority had in general proved very accurate. It was hard to understand how the Russians with their superior knowledge of the Egyptian Armed Forces had failed to make a similar prediction. No doubt Nasser had dashed far ahead, but that hardly accounted for such an apparent gross miscalculation. Any longer term settlement would be greatly affected by the Soviet need to find ways of lessening the costs of their defeat.

McNamara said he shared the view of those who thought there would have to be a broader settlement. He did not yet have any clear idea what shape a settlement could or should have. It was clear that Israel's aims were far wider than the achievement of free passage through the Straits of Tiran.

McNamara accepted the idea in Foreign Office Guidance telegram No. 130 that any settlement would contain elements disagreeable to the Arabs and to the Soviet Union and also to the Israelis. On the various elements of a settlement which have been mentioned - recognition of Israel, refugees,

/development...

Sir Paul Gore-Booth G.C.M.G. K.C.V.O.

X If Nasser has gone, this is much less true.

development and a UN presence, McNamara commented that one difficulty was that there was no Arab leader strong enough to accept the existence of Israel, although this acceptance was the essential prerequisite of a settlement. We agreed that whatever else the Israelis gave up they were unlikely to give up Old Jerusalem. McNamara recognised that the UN would have to play some sort of role in a settlement but said that he thought that progress would only be made in complicated bilateral negotiations. He mentioned the possibility of arranging Great Power guarantees for the countries of the area.

It was clear that McNamara had not yet applied himself fully to the problem. As always, he was ready to talk and asked a number of very pertinent questions. In general his preliminary thoughts are close to Dean Rusk's sombre realism.

I have sent a copy of this letter to Palliser.

Sgd. Patrick Dean

fil

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat. A

IMMEDIATE NEW ELHI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno. 1195 9 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

see T 165/67 8.6.67

My telegram No. 1141 Prime Minister's Message.

If it is not already too late, I suggest that the Prime Minister's letter to Mrs. Gandhi might contain an expression of sympathy at the casualties sustained by the Indian element in the U.N.E.F. during the recent conflict in the Middle East. American Embassy tell us that they decided against sending a message, but I consider that we have nothing to lose and possibly something to gain by expressing our sympathy and in fact this would be particularly appropriate since the President of India and the Indian Minister of Aviation sent messages to The Queen and Minister of Aviation respectively on the recent British air disasters at Stockport and in the Pyrenees. I and the staff have expressed our personal sympathy already to officials and I shall do so when I see the President for my farewell call on 10 June.

2. Text might be on the following lines:

"I would like to express to you, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, our deep sorrow at the casualties which have been sustained by the Indian element of the United Nations Emergency Force. India has made a valuable contribution to the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. It is distressing that the Indian soldiers who have served so well in the United Nations Emergency Force should have suffered loss of life and injury and that their families should have suffered bereavement. Please accept our most sincere sympathy".

3. If it is too late to embody this in the Prime Minister's letter the High Commissioner might perhaps be authorised, on his return, to pass on orally a message on similar lines to the Government of India from the Prime Minister.

Mr. Scott

Sent 0712Z/9 June 1967

Recd 0752Z/9 June 1967

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street]

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South Asia Dept.

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A.M. Palliser, Esq.. C.M.G.

With the compliments of

Sir Patrick Dean

British Embassy, Washington, D.C.

7.6.67.

Pt. 4 Israel

File

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO NEW DELHI

Telno 1266 9 June 1967 (SAD)

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 1195: Prime Minister's Message.

Letter already signed and in bag today, 9th. Please inform H.C. on return that he has authority to speak as proposed in your paragraph 3.

CROSEC Sent 0802Z 10 June

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing Street]

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South Asia Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

EN CLAIR
FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1280

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 9 JUNE

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1280 OF 9 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN AMMAN AND SAVING TO OTTAWA AND NEW DELHI.

MIDDLE EAST : SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT AND PASSED UNANIMOUSLY THIS AFTERNOON.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 233 AND 234,

NOTING THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA HAVE ANNOUNCED THEIR MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE COUNCIL'S DEMAND FOR A CEASE-FIRE,

NOTING THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF SYRIA AND ISRAEL,

1. CONFIRMS ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS ABOUT IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND CESSATION OF MILITARY ACTION:

2. DEMANDS THAT HOSTILITIES SHOULD CEASE FORTHWITH:

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE IMMEDIATE CONTACTS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA TO ARRANGE IMMEDIATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABOVE-MENTIONED RESOLUTIONS, AND TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL NOT LATER THAN TWO HOURS FROM NOW.

FO PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 138 PARIS 142 TEL AVIV 149 COPENHAGEN 72 AMMAN 88 SAVING DELHI 34

LORD CARADON

SENT Ø92Ø26Z
RECD Ø92Ø33Z

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June 9, 1967

TOP SECRET

I apologise for not sending you before the enclosed copy of a letter to President Johnson from the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, transmitting a message and a memorandum about the Middle East from Mr. Pearson. These papers were given to the Prime Minister personally by the President after dinner in Washington on June 2.

I think that they are now simply of interest for the record. But the Department may be interested to have them.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Forster (Commonwealth Office).

Michael Palliser.

C.M. MacLehose, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office.

Subject

COPY NO. .....

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No. T 167/67

Cypher/Cat A

FLASH TUNIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 128 9 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of personal message from President Bourguiba to Prime Minister.

Begins.

While military operations and in particular bombing of certain Arab countries by Israeli forces are still continuing in the Middle East, I have the honour to draw your attention to the extreme gravity of the situation.

[? paragraph 2 omitted]

The only object of such operations is to destroy the economic potential of these countries and to bring about anarchy.

3. In short term the consequence may be an explosion of popular wrath in the Arab-Moslem world, in the long term the risk is that peace may be endangered since these operations may prevent any attempt at finding a lasting solution to the Middle East crisis.

4. I entreat you to exert your influence in order to bring to an end these operations which are continuing in violation of the Security Council's recommendations. Such an action would go down in history to the credit of the British people.

(Signed) Habib Bourguiba

President of the Tunisian Republic

Ends.

Mr. Hooper

Sent 2353Z/9 June
Recd. 0348Z/10 June

[Copies passed to No. 10, Downing Street]

PRISEC (F.O.)

xxxxx

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

PM/67/60

We have all seen tonight the announcement that Nasser had tendered his resignation. I have had a meeting here, the purpose of which was to try to fathom whether this was serious or just a way of getting himself re-elected by acclamation. The news just coming in at 12.15 suggests it was the latter.

2. I have told the Office that we should use every opening available to us to support the view that he had let down all his friends and had failed on every ground.

3. I was told the BBC would not do this. I have said that if this is true then that I will reconsider the provision of funds that we make for their overseas, in this case Arabic, service. I am being opposed on this general

/approach

approach by pretty well the entire Office. I would like to know whether you agree with my broad approach.

Ed

Speaker.

1976. R 9 June, 1967

Mr Palliser (Personal)

The F.S. came over (very relaxed & clear). I said I supported his general view as he explained it (better than in this minute) that we should orchestrate the view in Arab countries that N. had let them down but that we should not overtly or consciously be seen to be trying to "topple Nasser" who, if he remains, George agrees — his words — will be a dead duck.

I made, however, two points

① No vote will be B.B.C. — if they don't voluntarily agree no vote — or (a) it will look + (b) it will be the wrong issue (Following Sivetlana we should argue re general case about pipes & tunes).

② He asked me if I thought he was crazy. I said no, but he'd driven the office crazy. They had had a tough time for 3 weeks, & had driven — he agreed — a first class job. He was driving them two hard & I gracefully & gratefully accepted which I should like to mention to you.

ITW.

EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UKMISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1282 9 JUNE, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1282 OF 9 JUNE

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN AND SAVING TO AMMAN CAIRO NEW DELHI AND OTTAWA

MY TELEGRAM NO 1274:
MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

THE COUNCIL MET ON AN URGENT SYRIAN REQUEST AT 12.30 P M NEW YORK TIME. THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED THAT AT 1 A M HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY THE SECRETARIAT OF SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTIONS CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE. AT 5.30 A M THE ISRAELI DELEGATE HAD TOLD HIM ABOUT RAIDS ON SIXTEEN ISRAELI VILLAGES ON THE NORTHERN BORDER, AFTER SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF A CEASE-FIRE. AT 6 A M THE SYRIAN DELEGATE HAD ASKED FOR AN URGENT MEETING AS THE ISRAEL ATTACK ON SYRIA WAS CONTINUING.

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THEN MADE A STATEMENT ON REPORTS RECEIVED OVERNIGHT. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNTSO HAD BEEN WARNED EARLY THIS MORNING BY THE ISRAELIS NOT TO MAN POSTS ON THE SYRIAN SIDE OF THE ARMISTICE LINE. GENERAL BULL HAD BEEN UNABLE TO CONTACT UNTSO TIBERIAS, BUT HAD REMINDED BOTH PARTIES OF THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF A CEASE-FIRE. AT 9 A M NEW YORK TIME, GENERAL BULL HAD REPORTED ISRAELI BOMBARDMENTS NEAR TIBERIAS. THE ISRAELIS IN TURN HAD REPORTED SHELLING OF SAFAT AND SIXTEEN VILLAGES IN NORTHERN ISRAEL. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, CHAIRMAN ISMAC HAD REPORTED BOMBING, NAPALMING AND STRAFING OF SQOUFIC VILLAGE. HE HAD ALSO CONFIRMED A BOMBING INCIDENT NEAR DAMASCUS, EXPLOSIONS AND SHELLING AT TIBERIAS, THE PRESENCE OF ISRAELI JET MILITARY AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA, AND THE ENGAGEMENT OF TROOPS AS FAR EAST AS QUNEITRA.

3. TOMEH (SYRIA) THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR CONVENING THE MEETING. THE SITUATION WAS VERY GRAVE. ONE HOUR AFTER THE SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS HAD BEEN BROADCAST OVER DAMASCUS RADIO, THE ISRAELIS HAD ATTACKED

/ON A WIDE

ON A WIDE FRONT, USING ALL ARMS. IN ADDITION TO THE FACTS SET OUT IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT, TWO ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS HAD BEEN MADE ON DAMASCUS TODAY, ONE OF WHICH STARTED AT THE TIME WHEN THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO MEET. SUCH PREMEDITATED AGGRESSION WAS A VIOLATION OF THE CHARTER. IF THE UNITED NATIONS FAILED TO ACT NOW, ITS EXISTENCE WOULD BE JEOPARDISED.

4. RAFAEL (ISRAEL) THEN SPOKE TO PLACE THE BLAME FOR THE CONTINUATION OF HOSTILITIES ON SYRIA. THE SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN A CAMOUFLAGE FOR FURTHER ATTACKS BY SYRIAN BATTERIES ON ISRAELI VILLAGES.

5. AFTER THE PRESIDENT HAD INFORMED THE COUNCIL THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT FOR THE COUNCIL, BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH ITS BUSINESS, TO ADOPT URGENTLY A RESOLUTION DEMANDING THAT HOSTILITIES CEASE FORTHWITH, THE COUNCIL UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED THE RESOLUTION IN MY TELEGRAM NO 1280.

6. IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES) SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION HAD BEEN READY IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY, TO SUPPORT SUCH A RESOLUTION FROM THE MOMENT THAT THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN CALLED THE DELAY HAD BEEN DUE TO THE INSISTENCE OF OTHER MEMBERS ON INJECTING OTHER ISSUES INTO THE DISCUSSION WHICH, THOUGH IMPORTANT SHOULD BE TAKEN AT THE NEXT STAGE. HE PARTICULARLY WELCOMED THE PROPOSAL IN THE RESOLUTION REQUESTING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE IMMEDIATE CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES. SOME MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAD EARLIER NOT BEEN WILLING TO ALLOW THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CARRY OUT HIS FUNCTIONS. GOLDBERG REGRETTED THE COUNCIL'S FAILURE TO ACT PROMPTLY ON THE CANADIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION (MY TELEGRAM NO 1255). ONCE THERE WAS A CEASE-FIRE, THE UNITED STATES WERE READY TO ACT TO DEAL WITH ALL OTHER PROBLEMS.

7. FEDERENKO (USSR) SUPPORTED THE SYRIAN ACCUSATIONS OF CONTINUED ISRAELI AGGRESSIONS IN DEFIANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND DESPITE SYRIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF IT. CLAIMS WERE NOW BEING ADVANCED IN TEL AVIV FOR ISRAEL TO KEEP PARTS OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES NOW SEIZED. THEY WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON. THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE SPOKE ONLY OF A

/CEASE-FIRE

CEASE-FIRE. BUT THE COUNCIL SHOULD ALSO DEAL WITH ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION AND SHOULD SEE THAT ISRAEL WAS PUNISHED. THE ISRAELI TROOPS MUST WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY. FEDERENKO AGAIN URGED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD ADOPT THE SOVIET RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY TELEGRAM NO 1276).

8. COX (CANADA) WELCOMED THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL. THE CANADIAN DELEGATION ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 SINCE IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE CLEAR ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

9. PARTHASARATHI (INDIA) REFERRED TO FURTHER CASUALTIES CAUSED BY ISRAEL FORCES TO THE INDIAN UNEF CONTINGENT BRINGING THE TOTAL OF KILLED, WOUNDED AND MISSING TO 41. HE CALLED UPON THE COUNCIL TO CENSURE ISRAEL. THE COUNCIL'S EFFORTS FOR PEACE HAD BEEN SMASHED BY THE MASSIVE ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND NOW THERE WAS A FURTHER ATTACK AGAINST SYRIA. INDIA HAD WORKED FOR A RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR A BREATHING SPACE. BUT SOME DELEGATIONS HAD TRIED TO INTRODUCE CLAIMS WHICH CONFLICTED WITH THE UAR'S SOVEREIGNTY. ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DEMAND THE SATISFACTION OF ITS CLAIMS ON THE BASIS OF THE ARAB TERRITORIES WHICH IT HAD NOW OCCUPIED IN BREACH OF THE CHARTER. AFTER THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION, INDIA HAD SOUGHT A RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR WITHDRAWAL AS WELL AS A CEASE-FIRE. BUT OTHERS HAD SEEN IN A CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE ONLY, MEANS OF ACHIEVING A SOLUTION SATISFACTORY TO THEM OVER AQABA AND HAD OBSTINATELY REFUSED TO DEAL WITH WITHDRAWAL. PARTHASARATHI URGED ON THE COUNCIL THE FOLLOWING STEPS:-

(I) IT SHOULD REINFORCE ITS CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND SHOULD CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL=

(II) ON THE BASIS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 26 MAY, IT SHOULD REACTIVATE AND STRENGTHEN THE UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY IN THE AREA IN ORDER TO SECURE WITHDRAWAL=

(III) THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO SEND A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA=

/(IV) WHEN

(IV) WHEN WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN COMPLETED, THE COUNCIL SHOULD CONSIDER STEPS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF STATES IN THE AREA AND THE IMMEMORIAL RIGHTS OF THE ARABS.

10. RUDA (ARGENTINA) AND SILOS (BRAZIL) BOTH SPOKE WELCOMING THE RESOLUTION WHICH THE COUNCIL HAD ADOPTED.

11. TARABANOV (BULGARIA) SAID THAT HE HAD VOTED FOR THE RESOLUTION BUT WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO HAVE CONDEMNED THE AGGRESSOR. IT COULD BE SEEN FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT ITSELF, NOT JUST FROM THE PRESS, THAT ISRAEL HAD ATTACKED SYRIAN POSITIONS THIS MORNING. ISRAEL HAD BRAZENLY DECLARED THAT THE NEW STRUCTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD HAVE TO SERVE AS THE STARTING-POINT FOR A SETTLEMENT, NOT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. THIS WAS BARE-FACED 'REALPOLITIK'. HE FINISHED WITH A TURGID ATTACK ON GOLDBERG'S SPEECH.

12. TOMEH (SYRIA) THEN ASKED TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT STATEMENT. HE TOLD THE COUNCIL THAT HE HAD JUST CONVEYED TO HIS FOREIGN MINISTER THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION S/7960 JUST AGREED UNANIMOUSLY. SYRIA ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION AND LAID FRESH INFORMATION ABOUT ISRAELI ATTACKS BEFORE THE MEETING.

ISRAELI PARATROOPS HAD BEEN DROPPED OVER QUNEITRA WHICH WAS THIRTY KILOMETERS INSIDE SYRIA AND ONLY SIXTY-FIVE KILOMETRES FROM DAMASCUS. ISRAELI COLUMNS WERE ADVANCING ON QUNEITRA, AND AIR-RAIDS ON DAMASCUS CONTINUED. IT WAS ALREADY AN HOUR AND A HALF SINCE THE RESOLUTION CAME INTO FORCE= THERE WAS THUS ONLY HALF AN HOUR TO GO BEFORE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTED AGAIN TO THE COUNCIL.

13. GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES), EXERCISING HIS RIGHT OF REPLY, DENIED THE SOVIET INNUENDO THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD FAILED TO ADVISE THE ISRAELIS NOT TO RESORT TO FORCE. RAFAEL (ISRAEL) TOOK UP FEDERENKO'S COMPARISON OF ISRAELS STRUGGLE TO SURVIVE WITH HITLER'S AGGRESSION IN 1939. WHICH OF THE GREAT POWERS HAD STARTED THE WAR PSYCHOSIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST? WHO WAS THE MAJOR SUPPLIER OF ARMS TO THE ARAB REPUBLICS? THE SOVIET UNION HAD CONSISTENTLY KEPT THE TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

/AT FEVER

AT FEVER PITCH. THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WOULD SIGNIFY ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THIS MORNING'S RESOLUTION IN DUE TIME= MEANWHILE THEY AWAITED SYRIA'S APPLICATION ON THE GROUND, OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

14. FEDERENKO (USSR) SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT YET ANSWERED THE VITAL QUESTION. WHY WAS SHE NOT WITHDRAWING HER FORCES FROM EGYPT AND JORDAN? ONLY IN WASHINGTON COULD ONE LEARN THE ANSWER. HE CALLED ON THE COUNCIL TO TAKE IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO MAKE THE ISRAELIS COMPLY WITH ITS RESOLUTIONS.

15. THE NEXT TWO HOURS WERE TAKEN UP WITH A LONG DRAWN-OUT DEBATE FOSTERED BY THE USSR AND BULGARIA IN WHICH THEY TRIED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ISRAELI REPLY TO RESOLUTION S/796Ø WAS EQUIVOCAL. THE COUNCIL FINALLY ADJOURNED AT 163Ø ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WOULD RECONVENE IN TWO HOURS TIME TO RECEIVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WAS IN EFFECT.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW 139, PARIS 143, TEL AVIV 15Ø COPENHAGEN 73 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 53, CAIRO 66, NEW DELHI 35.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT ØØ53Z 1Ø JUNE 1967
RECD AT ØØ54Z 1Ø JUNE 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1283 9 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1283 OF 9 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, COPENHAGEN, OTTAWA AND SAVING TO AMMAN, NEW DELHI AND CAIRO.
YOUR TEL. NO. 2741 AND 2742 : MIDDLE EAST.

I WAS VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE GUIDANCE IN YOUR TEL. NO. 2741 WHICH IS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH OUR OWN THINKING HERE.

2. AS REGARDS YOUR TEL. NO. 2742, I AGREED WITH GEORGE THOMSON ON THE TELEPHONE THIS MORNING THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR US TO TAKE SUCH AN INITIATIVE IN THE COUNCIL AT THIS STAGE. TO DO SO COULD HAVE DEFEATED OUR PURPOSE.

3. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO COME TO ANY CONCLUSIONS ABOUT HOW WE SHOULD HANDLE THE VARIOUS ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE WHICH ARE RAISED IN THESE TELEGRAMS UNTIL THE COUNCIL HAS COMPLETED ITS FIRST AIM OF ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE. THE LONG ACRIMONIOUS AND CONFUSED DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL TODAY AND THE CONTINUED ISRAEL/SYRIA FIGHTING SHOWED THAT WE ARE NOT YET OUT OF THIS WOOD. UNTIL THERE IS SOME RESPITE FROM CONTINUOUS SESSIONS IN THE COUNCIL RELATING TO THE CEASE FIRE IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR REPRESENTATIVES HERE TO TURN THEIR MINDS TO THE LONGER TERM ISSUES. I HESITATE TO MAKE NEW SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE UNTIL WE CAN SEE THE OUTCOME OF PRESENT FAST-MOVING EVENTS BUT WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR SO I HOPE TO PUT DOWN SOME IDEAS ON THE NEXT STEPS.

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U.K.MIS. NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1283 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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4. THE MOST DEPRESSING ASPECT OF TO-DAYS DEBATE HAS BEEN THE NEGATIVE PARTISANSHIP OF FEDERENKO (ECHOED BY THE BULGARIAN REPRESENTATIVE). THE FRENCH ARE THOUGHTFUL AND VERY ANXIOUS TO COOPERATE BUT THE RUSSIANS AT PRESENT SHOW NO SIGN AT ALL OF BEING ANYTHING OTHER THAN ABUSIVE AND OBSTRUCTIVE.

K.O.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 140, PARIS 144, TEL AVIV 151, COP COPENHAGEN 74, AND SAVING TO AMMAN TRN NEW DELHI 36 AND CAIRO 67.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0006Z 10 JUNE 1967

RECD AT 0007Z 10 JUNE 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO UK MIS. NEW YORK

TELNO 2741 9 JUNE, 1967 (M/STATE)
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 2741 OF 9 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN OTTAWA AND SAVING AMMAN DELHI CAIRO.

YOUR TELNO 1273 : MIDDLE EAST.

NOW THAT THE U.A.R. AND SYRIA HAVE ACCEPTED THE CEASE FIRE I RECOGNISE THAT WE ARE IN FOR A PERIOD OF HARD BARGAINING IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND I SHOULD WELCOME YOUR PROMISED COMMENTS AFTER DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS AND OTHER FRIENDLY DELEGATIONS.

2. MEANWHILE, NOW THAT THERE IS A GENERAL CEASE-FIRE, I RECOGNISE THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY WELL PUT FORWARD A SIMPLE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE ARMISTICE LINES. THIS WOULD NO DOUBT BE IN SHARPER TERMS THAN THE RESOLUTION WHICH THEY HAVE ALREADY TABLED (NEW YORK TEL. NO. 1276). AS SEEN FROM HERE OUR TACTICS SHOULD BE TO COUNTER ANY SUCH MOVE BY CONCENTRATING ON THE PRACTICAL WORK WHICH HAS NOW TO BE DONE FOLLOWING THE CEASE-FIRE, DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES AND OTHER PRACTICAL CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS (IN WHICH PERHAPS RIKHYE AND BULL COULD PLAY A PART) AND LONGER TERM ARRANGEMENTS DIRECTED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DURABLE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. THE AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION (NEW YORK TEL. NO. 1275) PROVIDES A GOOD BASIS FOR THIS AND YOU SHOULD SUPPORT THE AMERICANS IN WORKING FOR A RESOLUTION WHICH CONTAINS THE PRACTICAL PROPOSALS OUTLINED IN OPERATIVE PARA. 3 OF THEIR RESOLUTION.

4. MEANWHILE WE RECOGNISE THAT THERE IS BOUND TO BE A CALL FOR AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE QUITE UNREALISTIC TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL WITHDRAW EXCEPT AT A SUBSTANTIAL PRICE. FOR THE SAKE OF OUR OWN INTERESTS WE MUST AS FAR AS WE CAN AVOID BEING SEEN AS PUBLICLY QUOTE DEFENDING UNQUOTE THE ISRAELIS, THIS IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO RECOVER FROM THE ECONOMIC DAMAGE

/ALREADY

ALREADY INFLICTED ON US BY THE ARAB STATES AND ARE TO WORK TOWARDS A GENERAL RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THEM. FOR THESE REASONS WE SHOULD BE PREPARED, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS, TO PROCEED IN FAVOUR OF A MEASURE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL EVEN IF WE PRIVATELY RECOGNISE THAT A MEASURE OF WITHDRAWAL SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE SECURITY COUNCIL GENERALLY IS UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN.

5. TO SUM UP WE THINK THAT OUR IMMEDIATE TACTICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD BE

(A) TO CONTINUE TO WORK IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS AND WITHOUT GOING OUT IN FRONT OF THEM, SEEK TO INFLUENCE THEM TO OUR POINT OF VIEW.

(B) TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT THE DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS CONCERNED WITH PRACTICAL MATTERS, DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES, TRUCE ARRANGEMENTS AND THE LIKE, RATHER THAN DOCTRINAL ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE BASIS OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. AMONG THE PRACTICAL MATTERS THE MOST URGENT IS OBVIOUSLY THE REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL, AND ON THIS SEE M.I.F.T.

(C) TO TRY AS FAR AS POSSIBLE NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW BUT WORK FOR A SETTLEMENT IN WHICH THERE ARE CONCESSIONS BY BOTH SIDES, INCLUDING SOME MEASURE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

6. IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THESE MATTERS BOTH AT THE U.N. AND IN CAPITALS WE MUST HAVE IN THE FOREFRONT OF OUR MINDS THE NEED TO SECURE OUR OWN INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY THE FLOW OF OIL AND THE RESUMPTION OF TRAFFIC THROUGH THE CANAL AND ALSO OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

SOSFA SENT 1555Z 9 JUNE

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F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

TELNO 2742 9 JUNE 1967 (M/STATE)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO U K MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 2742 OF 9 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV
COPENHAGEN OTTAWA AND SAVING TO AMMAN NEW DELHI CAIRO.
MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

DURING THE COURSE OF TODAY'S DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL I SHOULD LIKE YOU TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CALLING FOR THE IMMEDIATE REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL. NOW THAT CAIRO HAS ACCEPTED THE CEASE-FIRE THERE IS NO FURTHER PRETEXT FOR ITS CLOSURE BECAUSE OF DAMAGE WHICH MIGHT BE CAUSED TO IT THROUGH ISRAELI ACTION. YOUR INTERVENTION SHOULD OF COURSE BE QUITE SEPERATE FROM THE GENERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE RESOLUTIONS.

2. NO DOUBT YOU WILL WARN GOLDBERG BEFOREHAND THAT YOU ARE PRESSING TO TAKE THIS ACTION BUT I HOPE THAT YOU CAN SO ARRANGE THINGS THAT THE INITIATIVE WILL COME FROM YOU. YOU SHOULD PHRASE YOUR INTERVENTION IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PUT OUR REQUEST ON A BROAD ECONOMIC AND PRACTICAL BASIS UNRELATED TO ANY PRESENT CONTROVORSIES (IN PARTICULAR IT SHOULD BE KEPT WHOLLY SEPERATE FROM ANY QUESTION OF ISRAELI RIGHTS IN THE CANAL OR ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE GULF OF AQABA.) THIS IS SIMPLY A MATTER OF REOPENING A GREAT INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY WHICH IS OF THE UTMOST CONCERN TO ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD.

3. PLEASE LET US KNOW WHEN YOUR INTERVENTION WILL TAKE PLACE SO THAT NEWS DEPARTMENT CAN COOPERATE WITH SQUIRE ABOUT PUBLICITY.

SOSFA SENT 1535Z 9 JUNE

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IMMEDIATE TUNIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. Unnumbered 9 June 1967
(Received via U.S. Embassy)
CONFIDENTIAL

My immediately preceding telegram.

On 8 June my United States colleague and I were granted audiences by President Bourguiba who also saw French and Soviet Ambassadors. Following account covers main points from both conversations which followed broadly similar lines. Both conversations took place before announcement of Egyptian acceptance of cease-fire. President told my United States colleague that, for the second time, Nasser had recklessly and without previous consultation, led the Arab States into a hopeless war with Israel. Bourguiba said he had made his announcement of despatch of troops purely to gain time. No Tunisian soldiers had left Tunisian soil, and unless hostilities were resumed, none would. Tunisia had no intention of wasting manpower and resources on a hopeless venture.

2. To both, President emphasised that Tunisia's Western sympathies remained and would remain unchanged, though to me he improved the occasion with a mild complaint about inadequacy of British aid. However, Tunisia's support for the West stemmed from conviction and not the pocket. He made it clear that he had no intention of breaking off diplomatic relations with either country.

3. President said that he wished to urge all four great Powers through their representations here to use their influence with Israel to accept a "reasonable settlement" which would not leave the Arabs with a sense of resentment and humiliation. Such resentment could only sow seeds of a third Arab-Israel conflict, and be exploited by Soviets or Chinese to the detriment of the West. This would in turn create difficulties for Tunisia with the other Arab States, in view of her well-known pro-Western orientation, particularly with Algeria and Egypt, who at another point he described as his two "mad neighbours". President said to me that he had spoken on similar lines to our French colleague, though he expressed misgivings and some distrust regarding the line that "de Gaulle not the French people" were taking. He was silent on what had passed with the Soviet Ambassador. I tried to elicit his ideas of a "reasonable settlement". At first he said withdrawal to positions occupied before outbreak of hostilities. Later, he appeared to agree that Israel, in view of recent experience with United Nations force, could hardly be expected to accept any arrangements which did not leave her as at present in physical control of Straits of Tiran. Though unwilling to be drawn, he implied that he still held to his view that "for the present anyway", Israel was a fact of life.

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TUNIS TELEGRAM NO. Unnumbered to Foreign Office

President was not at present contemplating any major overt diplomatic action, but would work behind the scenes to reduce the temperature. For this he needed great Power support in inducing Israel to accept reasonable terms. I assured him of Her Majesty's Government's sympathy and asked him to keep me informed.

Please see my immediately following telegram.

Mr. Hooper

Sent 1100Z/9 June
Received 1215Z/9 June

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Eastern Dept.

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 576

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 9 JUNE

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 576 OF 9 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW SAVING UKDEL OECD UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 1802 : MIDDLE EAST.

I SAW M. COUVE DE MURVILLE TODAY AT MY REQUEST. I SAID THAT I HAD NOT WISHED TO BOTHER HIM EARLIER THIS WEEK, PARTICULARLY AS YOU HAD TWICE SEEN THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR. I HAD, HOWEVER, THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO YOU TO HEAR HIS LATEST IMPRESSIONS OF THE SITUATION. HE WOULD HAVE SEEN THAT YOU HAD TOLD THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THAT YOU THOUGHT THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS COULD EXERT A MORE EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE ON EVENTS IF THEY CONCERTED THEIR ACTION THAN SEPARATELY. M. COUVE DID NOT RESPOND ON THIS POINT BUT HE SAID THAT HE AGREED THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT.

2. M. COUVE SAID THAT WE WERE OF COURSE STILL IN A STATE OF CRISIS. THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD WERE GOING TO BE EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT. THE ISRAELI'S VICTORY HAD BEEN SO SWIFT AND COMPLETE THAT THEY WOULD CERTAINLY BE INTRANSIGENT. WHILE OF COURSE EVERYONE HAD EXPECTED THEM TO WIN EARLY VICTORIES THEIR ACHIEVEMENT HAD GONE FAR BEYOND ANYTHING THAT COULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED. NO-ONE COULD HAVE SUPPOSED THAT THE ARAB PERFORMANCE WOULD HAVE BEEN SO PITIABLE. NOW THE ISRAELIS HELD ALL THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN AND ALL SINAI. THEY WOULD CERTAINLY EXPECT TO OBTAIN A MORE FAVOURABLE SETTLEMENT THAN LAST TIME. THEY MIGHT HOWEVER BE INFLUENCED TOWARDS MODERATION BY ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES RESULTING FROM MOBILISATION AND THE VAST NUMBER OF ARAB REFUGEES WHOM THEY WOULD NOW HAVE TO SUPPORT ON THE WEST BANK AND IN THE GAZA STRIP. THE LENGTH OF THEIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION MIGHT ALSO BE A PROBLEM FOR THEM.

3. I ASKED M. COUVE WHETHER HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO GIVE ANY THOUGHT TO WHAT MIGHT BE THE ELEMENTS OF A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT. FOR INSTANCE THE ISRAELIS WERE DEMANDING THE WHOLE OF JERUSALEM. COULD THIS BE POSSIBLE? M. COUVE INDICATED THAT

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IT WAS TOO SOON TO HAVE ANY PRECISE IDEAS ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. I SAID THAT HIS SUGGESTION OF A CONVENTION GOVERNING NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA HAD BEEN NOTED WITH INTEREST IN LONDON. YOU HAD MADE A SIMILAR SUGGESTION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 31 MAY. M. COUVE INDICATED THAT THE FRENCH HAVE NOT YET WORKED OUT HIS IDEA IN ANY DETAIL BUT SAID THAT IT SHOULD CERTAINLY BE AN ELEMENT IN A SETTLEMENT. IT WOULD NO DOUBT PROVIDE FOR THE FREE PASSAGE OF QUOTE INNOCENT UNQUOTE CARGOES. HE THOUGHT THAT THE QUESTION OF WARSHIPS NEED HARDLY ARISE SINCE NO-ONE WAS LIKELY TO WANT TO HAVE WARSHIPS IN THE GULF OF AQABA.

4. I ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON THE QUOTE GREEN LINE UNQUOTE HAD GIVEN ANY SIGNIFICANT INDICATIONS OF THE LATTER'S POSITION OR INTENTIONS. THEY SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY SURPRISE BY THE U.A.R. ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE. DID M. COUVE THINK THAT THEIR RESOLUTION OF YESTERDAY SUGGESTED THAT THEY WOULD NOW TRY TO INSIST ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BEFORE THERE COULD BE ANY DISCUSSION OF A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT? M. COUVE WAS NOT FORTHCOMING ABOUT THE FRENCH EXCHANGES WITH MOSCOW. HE SAID THAT THE EARLIER EXCHANGES WHICH HAD BEEN REFERRED TO IN PUBLIC RELATED TO THE CEASE-FIRE. THERE HAD BEEN ANOTHER MESSAGE FROM THE RUSSIANS YESTERDAY ON THE QUOTE GREEN LINE UNQUOTE ABOUT THEIR NEW RESOLUTION. THE FRENCH HAD SIMPLY REPLIED THAT IT HAD NOW BEEN OVERTAKEN BY THE U.A.R.'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

5. AS REGARDS THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, M. COUVE SAID THAT M. SEYDOUX HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TAKE THE LINE THAT ANOTHER MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY WOULD SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE. M.COUVE THOUGHT IT PREFERABLE THAT THERE SHOULD IN FACT BE NO MEETING FOR SEVERAL DAYS. IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IT WOULD BE A WASTE OF TIME TO DISCUSS RESOLUTIONS WHICH HAD NO PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE, E.G., ABOUT THE ARMISTICE COMMISSION. (HE REFERRED HERE RATHER DISPARAGINGLY TO THE QUOTE U.N. MACHINE UNQUOTE AND TO CANADIAN ACTIVITIES). THE ISRAELI VICTORY WAS SO COMPLETE THAT THERE WAS IN FACT NOTHING TO CONTROL. HE THOUGHT THAT TIME WAS NOW NEEDED TO TAKE STOCK AND TO REFLECT. FOR ONE THING IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SEE WHAT WAS

/GOING TO

GOING TO HAPPEN IN THE ARAB STATES AND IN PARTICULAR WHAT WOULD BE THE INTERNAL POSITION OF KING HUSSEIN AND NASSER. THE NEXT FEW DAYS COULD BEST BE USED FOR EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS CHIEFLY CONCERNED AND THIS COULD PERHAPS BE MOST EASILY DONE AT NEW YORK WHERE THE NECESSARY MECHANISM FOR RAPID AND INFORMAL EXCHANGES EXISTED.

6. I ASKED M. COUVE WHAT WAS NOW THE FRENCH POSITION ON AN ARMS EMBARGO. HE SAID THAT IT WAS VERY MUCH THE SAME AS THAT OF H.M.G. BUT THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE MAKING ANY STATEMENT. THEY HAD IN FACT ALREADY RESUMED THE DELIVERY OF SPARE PARTS. IN THEORY THEY WERE PREPARED TO SUPPLY THEM TO BOTH SIDES BUT IN PRACTICE THE ARABS WERE HARDLY IN A STATE TO RECEIVE ANY. (I HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY BEFORE FIGHTING STARTED WERE SO LARGE THAT THE FRENCH ARMY IS VIRTUALLY WITHOUT SPARE PARTS FOR MANY ITEMS.) M. COUVE ADDED THAT NO NEW CONTRACTS FOR SUPPLIES FOR EITHER SIDE WOULD BE ACCEPTED.

7. ON THE PROBLEM OF PETROL AND THE CANAL, M. COUVE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE RIGHT COURSE WAS TO PLAY THINGS QUIETLY AT PRESENT AVOIDING PUBLICITY OR ANY MAJOR ACTIVITY. (QUOTE GRANDES ACTIONS UNQUOTE). IF WE TRIED TO GO TOO FAST POSITIONS OF PRESTIGE MIGHT BE BUILT UP FROM WHICH THE ARABS WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BACK DOWN. HE COULD NOT HELP THINKING THAT THE OIL PROBLEM WOULD SETTLE ITSELF BEFORE LONG SINCE HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PERSIAN GULF STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA OR EVEN IRAQ COULD HOLD OUT VERY LONG. THE MAIN DIFFICULTY MIGHT BE SYRIA. I SAID THAT IT WAS EASIER TO BEGIN AN ACTION LIKE THIS EMBARGO THAN TO CALL IT OFF. AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, ALTHOUGH THE EMBARGO WAS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST FRANCE, IN FACT THE CLOSURE OF THE CANAL AND THE PIPE-LINE WOULD BEFORE LONG BE SERIOUS FOR FRANCE TOO. M. COUVE AGREED THAT THIS WAS SO. FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE WISE TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY ON THIS SUBJECT.

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PARIS TELEGRAM NO. 576 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

8. IN CONCLUSION, M. COUVE SAID THAT THERE WOULD NO DOUBT BE MUCH DISCUSSION OF THE MIDDLE EAST AT LUXEMBOURG AND THAT HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING YOU.

FO PASS WASHINGTON 171 UKMIS NEW YORK 45 MOSCOW 48

SIR P REILLY

SENT Ø91614Z JUNE
RECD Ø91618Z

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Mr Parsons

COPY NO. 12

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT 'A'
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1986 9 JUNE 1967
SECRET.

YOUR TEL. 6234. MIDDLE EAST.

IN ADDITION TO MY TALKS WITH RUSK (MY TEL. 1950) AND MACNAMARA (MY LETTER OF 8 JUNE TO SIR PAUL GORE BOOTH) WE HAVE HAD A LONG TALK WITH A MEMBER OF THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF (SAUNDERS) WHO IS WORKING FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, AND THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT IS BASED ON THIS CONVERSATION AND CONTACTS WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

2. THE AMERICANS ARE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBLE CONTEXT OF A BROAD SETTLEMENT UNDER FIVE MAIN HEADINGS:

(I) REFUGEES
(II) INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS, BOYCOTT, ETC.
(III) GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS
(IV) SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION
(V) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

3. THESE HEADINGS ARE OF COURSE QUITE FLEXIBLE AND UNDOUBTEDLY COVER MUCH THE SAME FIELD AS THE IDEAS IN PARAS. 5 AND 6 OF YOUR TEL. UNDER REFERENCE. SAUNDERS CONSIDERED THAT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE THE FOCAL POINT SINCE AN AGREEMENT ON THIS COULD RESULT IN TACIT RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. SAUNDERS CLEARLY THOUGHT THAT FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL FOR ISRAELI SHIPS WAS THE MAIN ISSUE UNDER (II) ABOVE.

4. SAUNDERS CLAIMED THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT YET WORKED OUT DETAILED VIEWS UNDER ANY OF THE HEADINGS ABOVE, BUT SAID THAT THEY DEFINITELY WOULD BE DOING SO. IN GENERAL HE THOUGHT THAT U.S. POLICY WOULD BE TO QUOTE SIT ON THEIR HANDS UNQUOTE AND FORCE THE NATIONS IN THE AREA TO NEGOTIATE DIRECT. SAUNDERS SAID THIS WOULD BE IN LINE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD OF EXPECTING COUNTRIES AND REGIONS TO HELP THEMSELVES. SAUNDERS ACCEPTED THAT THE U.S. HAD THE ROLE OF KEEPING THE SOVIET UNION

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WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 1986 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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IN CHECK AND IMPLIED THAT IF ISRAEL AND THE ARAB NATIONS COULD REACH A SETTLEMENT, THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO UNDERWRITE IT WHERE APPROPRIATE. ISRAEL WOULD HAVE LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN RAISING MONEY FOR REDEVELOPMENT FROM AMERICAN JEWRY BUT THE ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD NEED A GREAT DEAL OF ASSISTANCE.

5. SAUNDERS AGREED THAT THE U.N. SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO PLAY AS LARGE A ROLE AS POSSIBLE AND THAT SPECIALIST AGENCIES, F.A.O., THE WORLD BANK, ETC. COULD HAVE A PART TO PLAY. UNLIKE MR. MACNAMARA, SAUNDERS DID NOT THINK MUCH OF THE IDEA OF GREAT POWER GUARANTEES.

6. THERE ARE STILL SEVERAL SCHOOLS OF OPINION IN WASHINGTON ABOUT HOW A SETTLEMENT CAN BE BROUGHT ABOUT. SOME BELIEVE A CONFERENCE WOULD BE THE BEST WAY OF ACHIEVING A FINAL SETTLEMENT, OR AT ANY RATE PUTTING A FINAL SEAL ON ONE: OTHERS ARE LESS OPTIMISTIC AND BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR IS A NUMBER OF SEPARATE AGREEMENTS OR ARRRANGEMENTS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS WHICH ADD UP TO SOMETHING CLOSE TO A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT. ARRANGEMENTS OF THIS SORT WOULD BE ARRIVED AT BY A SERIES OF COMPLEX BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE REGIONAL POWERS AND PRODDED ON BY THE GREAT POWERS. SAUNDERS HINTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOW LAUNCHING DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH THE ARABS.

7. AS THE ABOVE ACCOUNT SHOWS, AMERICAN THINKING ON THE POSSIBLE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT IS UNLIKELY TO BE FAR FROM OUR OWN BUT, EXCEPT WHERE THE SOVIET UNION IS CONCERNED, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO TAKE A LEAD. OUR JUDGEMENT HERE IS THAT THEY WILL BE EXTREMELY ACTIVE DIPLOMATICALLY BEHIND THE SCENES.

8. MUCH OF THIS ASSESSMENT REPRESENTS SAUNDERS' PERSONAL VIEWS, BUT WE ARE REPORTING IT BECAUSE IN THE PAST HE HAS ALWAYS PROVED A RELIABLE EXPONENT OF U.S. POLICY. I SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE GRATEFUL IF HE WERE NOT QUOTED. I AM SEEING MACGEORGE BUNDY VERY SOON AND SHOULD BE GRATEFUL I COULD BE AUTHORISED TO OUTLINE TO HIM THE BASIS OF YOUR THINKING.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT 2332Z 9 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 2333Z 9 JUNE 1967

P R I S E C (F.O.)

SECRET

EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO 1290

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
9 JUNE, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1290 OF 9 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, COPENHAGEN AND SAVING TO AMMAN, CAIRO, NEW DELHI AND OTTAWA.

MY TELEGRAM NO 1282:
MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

THE MEETING RESUMED AT 7.20 P M, AFTER PROCEDURAL BICKERING BETWEEN THE SOVIET DELEGATE AND THE PRESIDENT. TABOR THEN CALLED ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE THE REPORT CALLED FOR IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY THIS AFTERNOON (MY TELEGRAM NO 1280).

2. U THANT SAID THAT HE HAD SENT CABLES TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA AT 4.25 P M SEEKING CONFIRMATION THAT FIGHTING HAD ACTUALLY STOPPED. AT 5.30 P M THE SYRIAN DELEGATION INFORMED U THANT THAT THE ISRAELI FORCES WERE STILL FIRING AT CIVILIANS AT BANIAS= ISRAELI AIRCRAFT WERE MAKING INCURSIONS BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES= AND THAT ISRAELI TANKS AND ARMOURED CARS REMAINED UPON SYRIAN TERRITORY. THE MESSAGE CONFIRMED THAT ORDERS HAD GONE OUT TO SYRIAN TROOPS TO CEASE FIRE FORTHWITH. AT 6.05 P M THE ISRAELI DELEGATE INFORMED U THANT THAT ALL CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS OF THE COUNCIL HAD NOW BEEN COMPLIED WITH BY HIS GOVERNMENT. ISRAELI FORCES HAD CEASED FIGHTING, EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENCE. AT 6.50 P M THE SYRIAN DELEGATE INFORMED U THANT THAT TWO VILLAGES CONTINUED UNDER AIR ATTACK WHILE ISRAELI TANKS AND ARMOURED CARS WERE STILL MASSED AND ADVANCING WITHIN SYRIA.

3. EL KONY (UAR) SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD SPECIFICALLY TRIED TO PREVARICATE OVER ACCEPTING THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION. MEANWHILE, MANY PARTS OF THE ARAB WORLD HAD BEEN BOMBED, IN PARTICULAR CAIRO, ANJASS, ISMAILIA AND THE SUEZ CANAL AREA, WHICH HAD SUFFERED TEN AIR RAIDS. TWO BUSES HAD BEEN STRAFED, WITH NUMEROUS CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, BETWEEN ISMAILIA AND THE DELTA.

/4. RAFAEL

4. RAFAEL (ISRAEL) THEN SAID THAT SINCE THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED, HE HAD TELEPHONED HIS GOVERNMENT. HE CONFIRMED THAT ISRAEL ACCEPTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ADOPTED TODAY. THREE ISRAELI VILLAGES WERE STILL UNDER HEAVY SYRIAN SHELLFIRE. HE DENIED CATEGORICALY THAT DAMASCUS, CAIRO OR ISMAILIA HAD BEEN BOMBED BY ISRAELI AIRCRAFT TODAY.

5. BEN HIMA (MOROCCO) SAID THAT THE UAR ACCEPTED THE CEASE FIRE FORMALLY YESTERDAY, AND THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HAD FOLLOWED SUIT TODAY. THE KING OF MOROCCO HAD INSTRUCTED HIM THAT MORNING TO PROTEST TO THE COUNCIL ABOUT THE CONTINUING BOMBING OF SYRIA BY ISRAELI FORCES. EBAN HAD CONVENIENTLY SLIPPED AWAY TO LONDON AND TEL AVIV, TO AVOID HAVING TO ANSWER FOR THIS CONTINUING AGGRESSION. IN EGYPT, A GREAT STATESMAN HAD DECIDED TO WITHDRAW, TO ALLOW OTHERS TO SHARE THE WEIGHT OF DECISION MAKING. THE EGYPTIAN ASSEMBLY HAD NOW DECIDED TO CALL BACK ITS PRESIDENT. COULD IT BE THIS MOVE WHICH HAD CAUSED THE ISRAELIS TO BOMB CAIRO AND DAMASCUS SO WANTONLY?

6. FEDERENKO (USSR) DILATED AGAIN AT LENGTH ON THE ADVENTURISM OF ISRAEL. THE COUNCIL MUST TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT ITS RESOLUTION. IT MUST DEMAND THAT ISRAEL SHOULD STOP HOSTILITIES: IT MUST WARN HER THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WOULD BRING THE GRAVEST PENALTIES. IN MOSCOW TODAY PARTY LEADERS OF TEN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT SUPPORTING THE ARAB POSITION. THIS SAID THAT THE WAR HAD RESULTED FROM COLLUSION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ''CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES'', PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES. TODAY FOUND ISRAELI TROOPS BEGINNING NEW HOSTILE OPERATIONS, IN SPITE OF THREE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS. THE SOCIAL COUNTRIES STOOD FOUR-SQUARE BEHIND THE ARABS AND WOULD RENDER THEM ASSISTANCE TO REPEL ANY AGGRESSION. THEY WOULD DO ALL THAT WAS NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE ARABS TO REBUFF ISRAEL, AND PROTECT THEIR LAWFUL RIGHTS.

7. TOMEH (SYRIA) ALLEGED THAT ISRAEL'S DELAY IN ACCEPTING THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION WAS DELIBERATE, SO THAT THEIR FORCES IN SYRIA COULD ACHIEVE THEIR MILITARY OBJECTIVES WITHOUT HINDRANCE. THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT ACCEPT THE ISRAELI QUALIFICATION THAT THEY WOULD OBSERVE A CEASE-FIRE ''EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENCE''. HE QUOTED A PRESS REPORT FROM JERUSALEM ALLEGING THAT THE PURPOSE

/ OF THE

OF THE DRIVE ON DAMASCUS WAS TO OVERTHROW SYRIA'S BAATHIST LEADERS. HE READ OUT A TELEPHONE MESSAGE JUST RECEIVED FROM DAMASCUS WHICH ALLEGED THAT COLUMNS OF TANKS HAD JUST ENTERED SYRIAN TERRITORY NEAR MASADA.

8. RAFAEL (ISRAEL), REFERRING TO THE BOMBING ATTACKS ON CAIRO, SUGGESTED THAT THESE WERE CAUSED BY OTHER MEANS. HE QUOTED FROM PRESS REPORTS WHICH STATED THAT EGYPTIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY HAD BEEN FIRING INTO THE AIR ALTHOUGH NO 'PLANES WERE FLYING OVERHEAD, AND POLICE AND SOLDIERS HAD BEEN FIRING GRENADES INTO THE AIR TO DRIVE BACK MARCHING MOBS IN THE CENTRE OF CAIRO. THESE EXPLODING SHELLS MAY HAVE GIVEN RISE TO THE REPORTS OF BOMBING. HE REPEATED THAT NO ISRAEL AIRCRAFT WERE BOMBING DAMASCUS, AND NO ISRAEL FORCES WERE ADVANCING TOWARDS DAMASCUS. THE ONLY OPERATIONS WHICH HAD GONE ON TODAY WERE ATTACKS WHICH HAD THE AIM OF SILENCING THE SYRIAN ARTILLERY WHICH HAD BEEN SHELLING ISRAEL VILLAGES. ORDERS HAD BEEN ISSUED TO CEASE ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND TO ACT ONLY IN SELF-DEFENCE. REFERRING TO THE USSR STATEMENTS, HE SAID THAT HE HOPED THESE MONSTROUS ALLEGATIONS WOULD EVENTUALLY BE WITHDRAWN BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, AS THEY HAD ONCE BEFORE WITHDRAWN ALLEGATIONS ABOUT JEWS TRYING TO POISON RUSSIAN LEADERS.

9. GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES) STATED THAT ON THE AUTHORITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT HE WAS TO SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES POSITION WAS THAT THIS WAR MUST COME TO AN END AND ALL PARTIES MUST COMPLY WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. HIS GOVERNMENT REGRETTED THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS HAD FAILED TO PREVENT VIOLENCE, THEY WERE DISMAYED AT THE TIME AT THE HURRIED WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF, AND THEY HAD DEPLORED THE RECENT BUILD-UP OF MILITARY FORCES IN THE AREA WHICH THEY HAD STATED AGAIN AT THE TIME SHOULD BE STOPPED. IT HAD BEEN THEIR POLICY FOR 20 YEARS AND UNDER THREE PRESIDENTS TO MAINTAIN THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ALL NATIONS IN THE NEAR EAST, BUT THEIR WORDS WERE NOT HEEDED AT THE TIME AND IN RECENT DAYS THE UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PEACE HAD BEEN FRUSTRATED BY CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. HE SAID HE HAD INTRODUCED HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION BECAUSE IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO SETTLE ALL OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS AND TO HAVE THE

/ WARRING

WARRING NATIONS LIVE IN PEACE IN THE FUTURE. BUT THE MAIN DIFFICULTY NOW IN TRYING TO BRING ABOUT PEACE WAS THAT THERE WAS NO UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY IN THE AREA WHICH COULD ARBITRATE OVER THE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS. IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT -

(A) THERE SHOULD BE IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF VIOLATIONS OF CEASE-FIRE ORDERS.

(B) THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD HAVE ADEQUATE MACHINERY TO IMPLEMENT THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS.

10. HE ENDED BY SAYING THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO ASCERTAIN THE FACTS AND THEN TO TAKE ACTION ON THE GROUND.

11. THERE WERE THEN A SERIES OF STATEMENTS BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF SYRIA AND ISRAEL REITERATING POINTS WHICH THEY HAD MADE EARLIER THAT ORDERS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO ENFORCE THE CEASE-FIRE, BUT THAT THE OTHER PARTY WAS NOT COMPLYING.

12. FEDERENKO (USSR), ON A POINT OF ORDER, ASKED IF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD THROW ANY LIGHT ON THE SITUATION AND IN PARTICULAR DETERMINE IF ONE OF THE PARTIES HAD BROKEN THE CEASE-FIRE, BUT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT HE HAD NO FURTHER CONFIRMED INFORMATION TO OFFER AND THAT GENERAL ODD BULL WAS HAVING GREAT DIFFICULTY IN TRYING TO CONTACT HIS OBSERVERS IN THE AREA.

13. EL FARRA (JORDAN) AND KEITA (MALI) MADE SHORT STATEMENTS, THE FIRST ASKING THE COUNCIL TO ESTABLISH THE FACTS OF THE AGGRESSION, AND THE SECOND REPEATING HIS EARLIER APPEAL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS TO THEIR ORIGINAL POSITIONS. HE WAS [REF OMITTED], HE SAID, BECAUSE HIS EARLIER APPEAL WAS NOT HEEDED THAT THE CEASE-FIRE HAD PROVED TO BE INEFFECTIVE. IF ISRAEL WAS ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN POSSESSION OF THE FRUITS OF CONQUEST THIS WOULD BODE ILL FOR THE FUTURE PEACE IN THE AREA.

14. AFTER A LONG SERIES OF INTERVENTIONS BY THE SOVIET,

BULGARIAN AND SYRIAN REPRESENTATIVES, THE COUNCIL DECIDED TO ASK THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO OBTAIN FROM UNTSO A FULL REPORT ON THE SITUATION ASKING THE PARTIES AT THE SAME TIME TO GIVE ALL FACILITIES, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND COMMUNICATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO PREPARE THEIR REPORT. THE COUNCIL THEN ADJOURNED AT 10.50 P M. THE TIME OF THE NEXT MEETING WILL BE FIXED AS SOON AS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT IS AVAILABLE AND IN ANY CASE NOT LATER THAN 10.30 A M ON SATURDAY.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW 141, PARIS 145, TEL AVIV 152, COPENHAGEN 75 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 55, CAIRO 68, NEW DELHI 37.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0520Z 10 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 0521Z 10 JUNE 1967

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IMMEDIATE MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 1002 10 June, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1002 of 10 June Repeated for information to:- Washington, Paris, Cairo, Tel Aviv and U.K.Mis New York.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of statement:

Begins:

The participants examined the position which has arisen in the Middle East following Israel's aggression, which was the result of a deal among certain imperialist forces, in the first place the United States against the Arab States. The participants in the meeting exchanged opinions concerning measures necessary to cut short the aggression and to avert its dangerous consequences for the cause of universal peace.

2. The participants of the meeting consider it necessary to draw appropriate conclusions from the fact that Israel did not submit to the decision of the Security Council and did not cease military action against the Arab States. The occupation by Israeli forces of territory of Arab States would be used to reimpose a foreign colonial régime.

3. On the 9th of June Israeli forces, in spite of the fact that the Syrian Government announced that it had ceased fire, are carrying out a new attack on the Syrian border subjecting towns of Syria to barbarous bombardment.

4. The peoples of the Arab countries are defending a just cause in struggling against imperialism for their freedom, independence, for the integrity of their territories, for the inalienable sovereign right independently to decide all questions of their internal life and foreign policy. The peoples of the Socialist countries are entirely on their side.

5. The peoples of the U.A.R. and a number of Arab countries have made in recent years great historic gains in the sphere of achieving national independence and freedom. Important social reforms in the interest of the toiling masses have been implemented.

6. We express confidence that these gains will be preserved, that progressive régimes will be consolidated notwithstanding the difficulties which are being met with by the Arab peoples.

7. In a difficult hour for the States of the Arab East, the Socialist countries announce their full and complete solidarity with their just struggle and will render them aid in the cause of repelling aggression and defending their national independence and territorial integrity. /8. The

8. The participants States in the meeting demand that Israel immediately cease military action against neighbouring Arab countries, withdraw [sic] of all its troops from their territories behind the armistice line.

9. It is the duty of the United Nations Organisation to condemn the aggressor. If the appropriate measures are not taken in the Security Council, then a heavy responsibility will fall on those States who will not have done their duty as members of the Security Council.

10. Today the determined joint actions of all peace-loving and progressive forces, all who hold dear the freedom and independence of peoples are necessary as never before.

11. If the Government of Israel does not cease aggression and does not withdraw its forces behind the armistice line, then the Socialist States who have signed this statement will do all that is necessary to help the peoples of the Arab countries to give a determined rebuff to the aggressor, to guard their lawful rights, to extinguish the flames of war in the Middle East, to restore peace in this region.

12. The just struggle of the Arab peoples will triumph.

Ends.

Sir G. Harrison

Sent 1105Z 10 June, 1967

Recd 1220Z 10 June, 1967

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FLASH MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 1005 10 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1005 of 10 June. Repeated for information to: Washington, U.K.Mission New York, U.K.Del. NATO, Paris

Middle East: Soviet Intentions.

With the issue today of the joint statement by the Eastern bloc leaders (my telegram No. 1002) it may be useful to analyse Soviet handling of the Middle East crisis, as seen from here, in order to attempt a prediction of the line they will now take.

2. For the Soviet leaders the crisis has fallen into three phases, the phase of preparation up to the military flare-up of 5 June, the phase of holocaust up till the acceptance of ceasefire by the major participants, and the phase starting yesterday of picking up the pieces.

3. Whether or not the Russians were passively privy to Nasser's fait accompli in calling for UNEF's withdrawal and then closing the Gulf of Aqaba, I am sure they did not want, for local as well as global reasons, to see actual hostilities break out in the Middle East. They were counting on a political and diplomatic Arab victory. Even if they had not foreseen U Thant's capitulation and its inevitable consequences for the Straits of Tiran, I suspect that their own and Western estimates of the Arab build-up led them to believe that Israel would not risk hostilities. Soviet diplomatic activity was consequently concentrated on underpinning this by urging United States/United Kingdom pressure on Tel Aviv, possibly balanced by Soviet counsels of restraint on the Arab Governments to wait for the apples to fall in their laps. They were content to see us destroy our position with the Arabs by activity which could be portrayed as pro-Israeli.

4. With the outbreak of fighting and the Arab military disasters, the whole situation changed for them and got completely out of control. Arab allegations of United Kingdom/United States involvement confronted them with a growing risk that their chosen clients would ask to see the colour of their money. They avoided any endorsement of these allegations and, in accepting the unconditional ceasefire resolution, together with their increased diplomatic pressure on us to restrain Israel, demonstrated their vital concern with avoiding Great Power involvement. Their total under-estimation of Israel's capacities and over-estimation of the Arabs had left them in a position where their proteges had been disastrously defeated without their lifting a finger.

5. Their position is the more dangerous in that, to salvage the Arabs morale, they have had, and will have, to represent Israel's success as the result of encouragement and at least moral support from the "imperialist Powers". They must ascribe the Israeli walk-over to the unfair aggressor's advantage of surprise attack and imply that, since we did not restrain her, we and the Americans must have been supporting Israel.

/6.

6. In the current third phase, the Russians must seek, by diplomatic effort, to retrieve what they can from the politico-military debacle. Their object must be to identify the Soviet Union and the whole "progressive world" with the Arabs in order

(a) to bolster their own prestige, and

(b) consolidate Arab resentment against the Western world.

They have held their shot in the arm for the Arabs of associating "all progressive forces" in their support, (against Israel and ourselves) until it is apparent that the fighting is virtually over and the risk of military involvement receded. This, in itself will need some explaining: but the line emerging seems to be that "history itself", with "Socialist" backing, is bound to ensure that, if the Arabs have lost the war, they must win the peace. As I have reported separately, this line is even being taken in advice to Israel through the Press to the effect that 3 million Israelis must, sooner or later, reach accommodation with 100 million Arabs.

7. I estimate that they will develop this line to press on with a long-term solution based on the premises that "aggression cannot be allowed to pay", that, insofar as it does, this is because the United States and United Kingdom, against the "Socialist camp", are opposing Arab just requirements and that to thwart any Arab demand is to sow new instability in the Middle East. If, in the first phase, their interest was in dilatoriness, they must now press for activity, hoping that we will damn ourselves in Arab eyes, whether so called dilatoriness or obstruction on our part leaves Israel with her gains or our searches for a long-term solution involve us in resisting Arab attempts to win the peace totally.

8. Please repeat as necessary.

Foreign Office pass Immediate Washington 170, U.K.Mission New York 46, U.K.Del. NATO 27, Paris 45.

Sir G. Harrison

Sent 1150Z 10 June
Recd. 1228Z 10 June

[Repeated as requested]

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

TEL NO. 1085 10 JUNE 1967

(UP)

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ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 1085 OF 10 JUNE AND TO KUWAIT JEDDA BAHRAIN BEIRUT TUNIS TRIPOLI ALGIERS RABAT REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO PARIS AND TEL AVIV.

MOSCOW TELEGRAM NO 1005 NOW REPEATED TO ALL: SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS GOING TO BE VERY ACTIVE IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SHE REMAINS A FIRM AND RELIABLE FRIEND OF THE ARAB STATES DESPITE THE DEBACLE IN THE WAR. HAVING FAILED TO HELP THE ARABS WIN THE WAR SHE MUST NOW TRY TO HELP THEM WIN THE PEACE.

2. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR CONSIDERED VIEWS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE FOLLOWING:

(A) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN DAMAGED BY THE ARABS BLAMING THEIR FAILURE IN THE WAR UPON RUSSIAN INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO HELP THEM, AND ALSO UPON THE SHORTCOMINGS OF RUSSIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

(B) THE EXTENT TO WHICH NASSER'S PERSONAL POSITION IS LINKED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IS IT LIKELY THAT HE HIMSELF FEELS THAT HE HAS

../BEEN

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1085 TO AMMAN

BEEN LET DOWN BY THE SOVIET UNION?

(C) IS THE SOVIET UNION LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO RESTORE HER POSITION BY TAKING A STRONG ANTI-ISRAEL LINE IN THE DISCUSSIONS OVER A PEACE SETTLEMENT?

3. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR MOSCOW'S VIEWS ON HOW HARD THE SOVIET UNION IS LIKELY TO WORK TO RESTORE HIS STRENGTH IN EGYPT AND IMAGE IN THE ARAB WORLD. MIGHT THEY PREFER INSTEAD TO SUPPORT LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTIES?

SOSFA SENT 2315Z 10 JUNE

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IMMEDIATE BONN TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 896 1Ø JUNE 1967
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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 896 OF 1Ø JUNE 1967
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NO. 1628 AND 1629 TO MOSCOW : MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ALTHOUGH CLOSELY INTERESTED SINCE THEIR RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND CONSEQUENT TROUBLES WITH THE ARABS, ARE NOT DEEPLY INFORMED ON MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS AND ARE NOT LIKELY TO HAVE, STILL LESS TO WANT TO PROFFER, DETAILED VIEWS ON WHAT FORM A SETTLEMENT SHOULD TAKE. THEY ARE ANXIOUS TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN CONTROVERSY IN THE AREA: FACED AS THEY ARE WITH OVERWHELMING PUBLIC SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL AND WITH THE DANGER THAT ARAB STATES MIGHT RECOGNIZE THE EAST GERMAN REGIME THEY WILL NOT WISH TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH ANY PROPOSALS NOT COMMANDING GENERAL ASSENT AND THEY CAN AVOID THIS THE MORE EASILY SINCE THEY ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. IN GENERAL THE ATTITUDE SO FAR ADOPTED BY GENERAL DE GAULLE PROBABLY SUITS THE GERMANS BEST.

2. MY ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR FIRST TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE ARE NOT BASED ON ANY SOUNDINGS TAKEN SINCE THESE TELEGRAMS WERE RECEIVED. I WILL REPORT FURTHER EARLY NEXT WEEK WHATEVER MAY EMERGE FROM CONVERSATIONS HERE.
MY PRELIMINARY VIEWS ARE:
(A) ALL THE IDEAS IN PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 OF YOUR SECOND TELEGRAM WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE GERMANS PROVIDED THAT THEY WERE NOT VOCIFEROUSLY OPPOSED BY THE BELLIGERENTS AND THAT THEY SEEMED LIKELY TO LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT WITH SOME PROSPECT OF PERMANENCE. AS A TRADING NATION THEY WOULD WELCOME AN END TO THE BOYCOTT AND FREEDOM FOR SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN

/ AND THE

AND THE SUEZ CANAL. IF THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE OLD CITY WERE, AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT, WELCOME TO CHURCH LEADERS IT WOULD BE WELCOME HERE. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE ALREADY OFFERED INCREASED ASSISTANCE TO THE ARAB REFUGEES AND RECENT GERMAN HISTORY REINFORCES THEIR CONCERN THAT THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE SETTLED. THEY ARE IN FAVOUR OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING ACTIVITIES AND WOULD PROBABLY ON THE CYPRUS MODEL CONTRIBUTE FINANCIALLY WITH OTHERS, THOUGH THEY WOULD BE UNWILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO ANY U.N. PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. ARMS LIMITATION WOULD COINCIDE WITH THEIR OWN POLICY OF SUPPLYING NONE TO THE AREA.

(B) GERMAN MINISTERS HAVE EXPRESSED NO VIEWS IN PUBLIC OR IN PRIVATE TO US ABOUT THE ELEMENTS OF A LONG TERM SETTLEMENT OR METHODS OF ACHIEVING IT. SENIOR OFFICIALS HAVE REFERRED PRIVATELY TO THE NEED TO RE-OPEN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND HAVE SUGGESTED THE POSSIBLE OCCUPATION OF SHARM AL SHEIKH BY UNITED NATIONS FORCES AS INTERNATIONAL TERRITORY (TO AVOID ANY U.A.R. VETO IN THE FUTURE). THEY HAVE ALSO SPOKEN OF THE NEED NOW TO SOLVE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM AND THE PROBLEM OF JORDAN WATERS.

(C) I WOULD EXPECT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO BE READY TO MAKE SOME FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE RE-SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEES AND TO REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, BUT IN THEIR PRESENT BUDGETARY SITUATION THIS WOULD NOT BE SO HIGH AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN EARLIER YEARS. THEY WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO BE READY TO PLAY ANY OTHER PART IN A SETTLEMENT.

(D) ON TIMING I CONCUR WITH THE ARGUMENTS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR SECOND TELEGRAM.

3. ON PARA 4 OF YOUR FIRST TELEGRAM, I STRONGLY CONCUR IN THE VIEW THAT H.M.G. SHOULD NOT TAKE THE LEAD IN SEEKING A SETTLEMENT, PARTICULARLY IN WHAT MIGHT SEEM TOO EXCLUSIVELY AN ANGLO-AMERICAN / OPERATION.

OPERATION. THIS WOULD REINFORCE FRENCH ARGUMENTS, WHICH FIND SOME SUPPORT IN CERTAIN CIRCLES HERE, THAT THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP STILL TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER OUR ATTACHMENT TO EUROPE AND THAT OUR MAIN CONCERNS LIE OUTSIDE EUROPE. THE GERMANS ARE REALISTS ENOUGH, HOWEVER, TO EXPECT US TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE, AND IN APPEALING TO THE GREAT POWERS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE AREA (MY TELEGRAM NO. 885) I BELIEVE DR. KIESINGER WAS REFERRING TO FRANCE AND OURSELVES AS WELL AS TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THEY WOULD VALUE OUR CONFIDENCE IF WE WERE ABLE TO KEEP THEM FULLY INFORMED OF WHAT WE WERE DOING AND TO SEEK THEIR VIEWS, BOTH BILATERALLY AND IN NATO MEETINGS, FROM TIME TO TIME. IT MAY WELL BE UNREALISTIC TO SUPPOSE THAT EUROPE AS SUCH CAN PLAY A DECISIVE ROLE BUT IT WOULD BE GREATLY TO OUR ADVANTAGE IF WE TAKE THE LEAD IN TRYING TO FORM A EUROPEAN POINT OF VIEW. YOU WILL NO DOUBT HAVE THIS IN MIND WHEN YOU SEE HERR BRANDT ON 13 JUNE.

4. HITHERTO GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION HAS TAKEN THE NEAR EAST CRISIS SURPRISINGLY CALMLY, IN STRONG CONTRAST TO THE REACTIONS HERE TO EARLIER CRISES E.G. KOREA, SUEZ AND CUBA. BUT THERE IS AN UNDERTONE OF CONCERN LEST ULBRICHT MIGHT INVOLVE THE RUSSIANS IN SOME SPOILING ACTIVITIES, E.G., AGAINST BERLIN. THIS WILL MAKE THE GERMANS EVEN MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT ANYTHING WHICH COULD INVOLVE THEM MORE DIRECTLY IN THE ISRAEL-ARAB DISPUTE.

F O PASS PRIORITY WASHINGTON 207

SIR F.K.ROBERTS

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IMMEDIATE ALGIERS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 156 10 June 1967

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We have one card in our hand here: the Gas Contract.

While this must be of rapidly diminishing value to us it is very important to the Algerians. There is plenty of evidence that responsible Algerians are deeply worried by the Revolutionary Council's decision to stop all exports and thus gas, which will have immediate repercussions on the important gas negotiations with France and is likely to jeopardise the future exploitation of the country's gas resources.

2. I recommend therefore that immediately and for as long as the present period of danger to British lives and property lasts, the Gas Council's methane tankers should be instructed not to load at Arzew. It is in any case unwise for these tankers to put in at Arzew in present conditions as I advised in my telegram No. 131 and I was surprised to learn indirectly that a tanker called yesterday.

3. If the Council do not wish to act for legal or other reasons a radio leakage to the effect that loading is continuing would be acutely embarrassing to the Authorities here and probably force them to stop operations.

4. It would be helpful if we could be informed of the Council's intentions. We cannot hope to provide protection if they keep us in the dark.

Mr. Dawbarn Sent 1005Z 10 June

Recd 1302Z 10 June

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SECSTATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1994 10 JUNE 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1994 OF 10 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK BRUSSELS.

U.S. ARMS SUPPLIES.

1. EUGENE ROSTOW ASKED THE MINISTER TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON SO THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO GIVE URGENT CONSIDERATION TO THE QUESTION OF FURTHER ARMS SUPPLIES FROM ANY QUARTER TO THE COUNTRIES RECENTLY OPENLY ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE HAVE BEEN SUGGESTIONS BOTH IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND FROM OTHERS (HE CITED THE BELGIANS) THAT AN APPROACH SHOULD BE MADE TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT WITH THE OBJECT OF REACHING AN AGREED POLICY ON ARMS LIMITATION IN THE AREA. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME A VERY EARLY EXPRESSION (IF POSSIBLE BY MONDAY) OF H.M.G'S VIEWS.

2. APART FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREED APPROACH TO THE RUSS-

. APART FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREED APPROACH TO THE RUSS-

ROSTOW THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO WORK FOR

NTS WITH THE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED IN THE MIDDLE

ON THE QUANTITIES AND TYPES OF ARMS TO BE SUPPLIED AND THAT

E AGREEMENTS COULD THEN BE REGISTERED WITH THE UNITED

TIONS.

4. CONTINUING ROSTOW SAID THAT THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF

WOULD BE AWARE, OF RECENT SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO SYRIA

LGERIA. IT WAS TRUE THAT THESE SEEM TO HAVE BLACKED

IN THE LAST TWO DAYS, BUT CLEARLY IF THEY WERE TO BE ESTAB-

THE ISRAELIS WOULD TURN AGAIN TO THE WESTERN POWERS FOR

SUPPLIES AND THE WHOLE BUILD-UP COULD BEGIN AGAIN.

. FOR THE TIME BEING ROSTOW SAID, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS

LIMITING THEIR SOUNDINGS TO H.M.G. AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

(WHO HAD JUST SPOKEN TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR). IT MIGHT HOWEVER

-2-

BE DESIRABLE TO TRY AND ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS

EARLY SOON.

5. FOR A STATEMENT OF THE PRESENT U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION

ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES, PLEASE SEE F.O. .F.T.

6. ROSTOW ALSO TOLD THE MINISTER THAT HE HAD ASKED MY

FRENCH COLLEAGUE TO FIND OUT WHETHER THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

WOULD BE PREPARED TO URGE UPON THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT

NEED TO RE-OPEN THE SUEZ CANAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ALL

TRAFFIC. HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE FRENCH WERE PARTICULARLY

PLACED TO MAKE THIS APPROACH. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION HE TOLD

THAT WHILE AGREEING TO REPORT, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAD MADE

NO COMMENT ON EITHER THE QUESTION OF THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND

AN APPROACH TO THE RUSSIANS OR ON THE CANAL QUESTION.

FO PASS MOSCOW 137, PARIS 157 AND BRUSSELS 28.

P. DEAN.

GPS 405 SENT AT 2310Z/

28

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F.O.

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HD. OF GENERAL DEPT.
RESIDENT CLERK
~~SIR R. JACKLING~~
MR. GARVEY
MR. COOK

C.O.

P.S.
P.U.S.
HD. OF M.E.W. & U.N.D.
NO. 10 DOWNING STREET
SIR B. TREND CABINET OFFICE
D.I.O. CABINET OFFICE
D.I.S. M.O.D.
D.O.C. M.O.D.
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE
MR. MOORE
HD. OF COMMUNICATIONS
~~MR. BRYANT B.O.T.~~
~~MR. SAMPSON MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT.~~

Lord Hood

CYPHER/OTP A

INWASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TEL NO 1995 10 JUNE, 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDED TO FOREIGN OFFICE, TEL NO 1995 OF 10 JUNE, REPTD FOR INFOR
TO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, PARIS, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAV-
ING TO BEIRUT, BRUSSELS, BEIRUT, KUWAIT, JEDDA, TEHRAN AND TRIPOLI.
R. 9 JUNE. CHOT TO ALL: U.S. ARMS POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE DIRECTOR OF NEAR EAST REGIONAL AFFAIRS ASKED A MEMBER OF M STAFF TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON. HE SAID THAT:

AS WE/THEY WERE FURTHER REVIEWING AND SUBJECT TO PARA 2 BELOW, NO (NO) FURTHER SHIPMENTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST OF WAR MATERIAL UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT, EITHER BY GRANT, ON CREDIT OR FOR CASH, WOULD BE APPROVED. NO (NO) NEW MUNITIONS EXPORT LICENCES (COVERING COMMERCIAL DEALS) WERE BEING GRANTED SEMI COLON B) SINCE 5 JUNE NO (NO) NEW AUTHORISATIONS OF ANY TYPE TO PERMIT SHIPMENTS OF WAR MATERIAL EITHER TO ISRAEL OR TO ARAB STATES HAD BEEN ISSUED.

2. HE/THEY SAID THAT IF ANY GOOD LICENCES ALREADY

2. [illegible] NO CHANGE IN OUR AUTHORIZATIONS OF ANY TYPE TO LIMIT EXPORT [illegible] AT THIS TIME. WITHIN TO MODIFY OR REVOKE ANY [illegible]

IN ORDER TO AVOID [illegible] MEDIA SAID THAT, IF ANY CASES WERE ALREADY UNDER WAY THEY WOULD NOT BE STOPPED, BUT THAT WOULD NOT COUNT AGAINST TO [illegible] TURN A TRICKLE. SIMILARLY ANY MUNITIONS EXPORT LICENSES [illegible] EXPORT OF JUNE WOULD REMAIN VALID, AGAIN SUBJECT TO [illegible].

3. ALL SHIPMENTS OF MILITARY GOODS TO STATES WHICH HAD BROKEN RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.A. HAD BEEN SUSPENDED. THIS APPLIED EVEN TO CASES WHERE EXPORT CONTROL AND TIGHE COVERED BY COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS UNDER MUNITIONS EXPORT LICENSES.

3. WITH REFERENCE TO [illegible] SEPARATE ENQUIRY ABOUT THE AMERICAN REQUEST TO ISRAELI AUTHORITY FOR HARDWARE, REFER SAID THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC U.S. POLICY SET OUT ABOVE, NO CASH PAYMENTS HAD BEEN MADE SINCE HOSTILITIES BEGAN AND NONE APPROVED.

4. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE NOT (NOT) GIVING PUBLICITY TO THE POLICY OUTLINED ABOVE AND NOT (NOT) DECIDED WHAT THEY WOULD SAY IF QUESTIONED AND HOPED THAT H.M.G. WOULD NOT (NOT) REVEAL THIS INFORMATION WHICH IS NOW GIVEN ALSO TO THE FRENCH EMBASSY.

TO: PASS TEL AVIV 45, CAIRO 44, PARIS 169, MOSCOW 130 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 7, BRUSSELS 33, BEIRUT 30, KUWAIT 44, JEDDA 10, TRIPOLI 45 AND TRIPOLI 17.

[illegible] DEAN CYPR 369 SENT AT 23462/10 [illegible]

fil

EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK
TELNO. 1291
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
1Ø JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1291 OF 1Ø JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, PARIS, WASHINGTON, PARIS, AMMAN, ANKARA AND SAVING TO CAIRO.

MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.
THE SOVIET DELEGATE SPEAKING AT 9.3Ø AM NEW YORK TIME THIS MORNING DECLARED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD ''TAKEN THE DECISION'' TO BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TEL AVIV. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD WARNED ISRAEL THAT UNLESS ISRAEL ENDED THEIR AGGRESSION THE SOVIET UNION, WITH OTHER PEACE LOVING STATES, WOULD HAVE ''TO APPLY SANCTIONS'' AGAINST ISRAEL ''WITH ALL THE CONSEQUENCES THEREFROM''.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 142, TEL AVIV 153, PRIORITY TO PARIS 146, AMMAN 89, ANKARA 49 AND SAVING TO CAIRO 69.
LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 1445Z/1Ø
RECD AT 1446Z/1Ø

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TEL NUMBER 1293 DATE 10 JUNE

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1293 OF 10 JUNE, RFI TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, COPENHAGEN, OTTAWA AND SAVING TO AMMAN, NEW DELHI AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO.1290: MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.

THE COUNCIL MET IN EMERGENCY SESSION SOON AFTER 4.00 A.M. THIS MORNING AT THE REQUEST OF SYRIA WHO ALLEGED THAT ISRAELI FORCES HAD TAKEN KUNEITRA AND WERE ON THE WAY TO DAMASCUS. THERE FOLLOWED A LONG AND CONFUSED DEBATE IN THE COURSE OF WHICH FRAGMENTARY REPORTS WERE MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE BASIS OF TELEGRAMS FROM GENERAL BULL IN JERUSALEM AND THE CHAIRMAN OF ISMAC IN DAMASCUS. THE LATTER REPORTED AT ONE STAGE THAT ''AN AIR ATTACK ON DAMASCUS WAS GOING ON''.

2. THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE DENIED THE SYRIAN ALLEGATIONS THAT THEY HAD TAKEN KUNEITRA AND THAT THEY WERE ADVANCING ON DAMASCUS. HE ALSO DENIED CATEGORICALLY THAT THEY HAD MOUNTED AN AIR ATTACK ON DAMASCUS AND PROTESTED AGAINST THE ISMAC REPORT, THOUGH A LATER ISRAELI DENIAL FROM TEL AVIV DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REJECT ALLEGATIONS OF AN ATTACK ON DAMASCUS AIRFIELD. HE CLAIMED THAT SYRIAN BATTERIES WERE STILL SHELLING ISRAELI VILLAGES AND THAT ISRAELI ACTION WAS DIRECTED TOWARDS SILENCING THE BATTERIES.

3. THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE REPORTS FROM GENERAL BULL AND THE CHAIRMAN OF ISMAC AS THEY EMERGED IN THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE WERE AS FOLLOWS:-

1) EXTRACT FROM A REPORT FROM GENERAL BULL AT 10.09 GMT.

''THE PRESENT SITUATION IS VERY CONFUSED.

''THIS IS MY ASSESSMENT IN LIGHT OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION:

''1. UNTSO OBSERVERS HAVE REPORTED THAT BOMBING AND HOSTILITIES CONTINUE ALONG EASTERN RIDGES OF LAKE TIBERIAS

/SHORES IN SYRIA,

SHORES IN SYRIA, AS WELL AS ON THE EASTERN BANK OF JORDAN RIVER, NORTH OF LAKE TIBERIAS, AND THAT DAMASCUS HAS BEEN BOMBED BY ISRAEL AIR FORCE.

''2. THERE IS STRONG INDICATION THAT KUNEITRA HAS BEEN TAKEN BY ISRAEL TROOPS BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR UNTSO TO CONFIRM.

''3. OUR OBSERVERS IN DAMASCUS HAVE BEEN CONFINED IN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION HOUSE AT SYRIAN REQUEST FOR SAFETY REASONS.

''4. OUR OBSERVERS IN TIBERIAS CANNOT FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.

''5. NO REPLY RECEIVED REGARDING RETURN OF UNTSO GOVERNMENT HOUSE.''

2) FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF ISMAC AT 11.25 GMT IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST TO CONFIRM HIS REPORT OF AIR ATTACKS ON DAMASCUS:

''CONFIRM AIR ATTACK AT Ø735 GMT IN AREA REPEAT AREA OF DAMASCUS AIRPORT. A SECOND AIR ATTACK SOUTH OF DAMASCUS AT Ø855 GMT AND A THIRD ATTACK AT Ø919 GMT NORTH AND NORTHEAST OF DAMASCUS. ALL STRIKES APPEAR TO BE OUTSIDE CITY OF DAMASCUS AND BASED ON UNTSO OBSERVATION.''

4. WHEN THE COUNCIL RESUMED AFTER A SHORT RECESS ABOUT 7.45 A.M. THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE INFORMED THE COUNCIL THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE ARRANGING AN URGENT MEETING BETWEEN GENERAL DAYAN AND GENERAL BULL SO THAT APPROPRIATE STEPS COULD BE TAKEN FOR A CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILITIES.

AT ABOUT 11.3Ø A.M. RAFAEL READ OUT AN ACCOUNT OF THIS MEETING. THIS SAID THAT DAYAN WOULD ACCEPT ANY PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY GENERAL BULL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE, AND FOR ARRANGEMENTS TO SUPERVISE THE CEASE-FIRE. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NOT DERIVE FROM THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS, BUT WOULD BE AD HOC. BULL AGREED TO THIS AND SAID THAT A PERIOD OF ABOUT ONE HOUR WOULD BE NEEDED, AS HE HAD TO CONSULT DAMASCUS. HE WOULD MEAN-

COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES. DAYAN PROMISED ALL NECESSARY ASSISTANCE. IT WAS LEFT THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT ANY TIME FOR A CEASE-FIRE PROPOSED BY BULL, AFTER BULL HAD COMPLETED ARRANGEMENTS WITH DAMASCUS.

5. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF JORDAN DREW THE COUNCIL'S ATTENTION TO REPORTS FROM AMMAN THAT REFUGEES WERE ARRIVING THERE IN LARGE NUMBERS AND THAT THE SITUATION WAS BAD. HE ACCUSED THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OF USING THE SAME TACTICS THEY HAD USED IN 1948 TO TURN OUT THE ARABS. SPEAKING PERSONALLY I EXPRESSED MY CONCERN AT THIS NEWS AND URGED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD START TO THINK AT ONCE ABOUT WHAT COULD BE DONE TO HELP. (FULL TEXT SENT SEPARATELY).

6. NUMEROUS STATEMENTS WERE MADE THROUGHOUT THE DEBATE IN SUPPORT OF SYRIA BY USSR, BULGARIA, INDIA AND MALI BASED PARTICULARLY ON THE REPORTS OF AIR-RAIDS ON DAMASCUS. THEY DEMANDED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD CONDEMN ISRAEL'S BREACHES OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE SPOKE STRONGLY ACCUSING ISRAEL OF HAVING DECEIVED THE COUNCIL. IN A LATER INTERVENTION HE ALSO INFORMED THE COUNCIL THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD WARNED THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THAT IF IT DID NOT PUT AN END TO ITS AGGRESSION THE SOVIET UNION WITH OTHER PEACE-LOVING STATES WOULD HAVE TO APPLY SANCTIONS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN VIEW OF ISRAEL'S CONTINUED AGGRESSION AND VIOLATION OF THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS, THE SOVIET UNION HAD TAKEN A DECISION TO BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

7. SEYDOUX (FRANCE) IN A CONCILIATORY STATEMENT SAID THAT REPORTS REACHING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOWED THAT BATTLES WERE CONTINUING IN BORDER AREAS, WHILE THERE HAD BEEN INTENSIVE ACTION IN SYRIAN AIR SPACE. REPORTS HEARD

/BY THE

BY THE COUNCIL SUGGESTED THAT DAMASCUS ITSELF HAD NOT BEEN ATTACKED, THOUGH ITS SUBURBS HAD BEEN. URGENT FURTHER APPEALS TO THE PARTIES TO OBSERVE THE CEASE-FIRE WERE NECESSARY: HE HOPED THAT THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE ABLE TO REASSURE THE MEETING SOON THAT HIS COUNTRYMEN WERE HEEDING THE COUNCIL'S CALLS.

8. GOLDBERG (USA) LED THE FIELD IN THE EARLY PART OF THE DEBATE IN ARGUING THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT REACH DECISIONS ON INCOMPLETE EVIDENCE. HE ALSO CATEGORICALLY DENIED CHARGES BY TOMEH (SYRIA) OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT, FROM AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, IN THE HOSTILITIES. HE POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS HAD BEEN SHADOWING UNITED STATES WARSHIPS IN THE AREA AND THAT NO CONFIRMATION OF ARAB ALLEGATIONS OF COLLUSION HAD YET COME FROM THE SOVIET SIDE.

9. JUST BEFORE THE MEETING ADJOURNED AT 11.15 A.M. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL READ OUT , AS HIS SEVENTH ORAL REPORT, A FURTHER MESSAGE FROM GENERAL BULL. THIS SET OUT INSTRUCTIONS SENT BY BULL TO THE CHAIRMAN OF ISMAC, AS FOLLOWS:-

1) THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE TOLD BY ISMAC THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD CO-OPERATE IN IMPLEMENTING A CEASE-FIRE, WITH NO FURTHER MOVEMENT OF TROOPS, PROVIDED THAT SYRIA DID THE SAME, AND THAT UNITED NATIONS OFFICERS WERE DEPLOYED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CEASE-FIRE LINE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE:

2) GENERAL BULL HAD PROPOSED A CEASE-FIRE FOR 1630 HOURS GMT TO-DAY:

3) CONFIRMED THAT CHAIRMAN, ISMAC WAS PREPARED TO RE-ESTABLISH A CONTROL CENTRE AT QUNEITRA, AND TO POST UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVERS AND SYRIAN LIAISON OFFICERS AT OBSERVATION SITES ON THE SPOT. IT ASKED ISMAC TO ADVISE ON TIME NEEDED FOR MOVEMENT AND POSITIONING OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS:

/4) DIRECTED

4) DIRECTED OFFICER IN CHARGE, TIBERIAS TO MAKE SIMILAR DEPLOYMENTS THERE OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS.

10. THE MEETING ADJOURNED AT 11.20 A.M. ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT MEMBERS WOULD STANDBY FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND A FURTHER MEETING WHEN NECESSARY, IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW NO.143, PARIS NO.147, TEL AVIV NO. 154, COPENHAGEN NO.76 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO.56, NEW DELHI NO38 AND CAIRO NO.70.

LORD CARADON

SENT 10/1936Z
RECD 10/1936Z

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CYPHER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 1294 10 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1294 OF 10 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW , PARIS AND TEL AVIV.

M.I.P.T. SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.

MIDDLE EAST.

THE ABSORBING AND FLUCTUATING DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL LASTED FROM 4.00 AM TO 11.30 AM THIS MORNING. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KEEP UP WITH THE QUICK CHANGES.

2. THE PRESIDENT HAD CALLED THE COUNCIL ON THE BASIS OF THE SYRIAN ACCUSATION THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE HEADING FOR DAMASCUS, BUT THE COUNCIL WAS IN GREAT UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHAT WAS ACTUALLY HAPPENING ON THE GROUND. THIS WAS NOT HELPED EARLY ON BY SOME ABBREVIATED AND OVER-CRYPTIC REPORTING BY THE CHAIRMAN ISMAC IN DAMASCUS OF ISRAELI AIR ACTIVITY THERE. THE IMPRESSION LEFT BY THIS REPORTING THAT AN ISRAELI AIR-RAID ON DAMASCUS CITY ITSELF WAS IN PROGRESS LED THE INDIANS, SPURRED ON BY THE SOVIET UNION AND HER FRIENDS TO PRESS FOR SUPPORT FOR A ONE-SIDED DRAFT RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE ISRAELIS. THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, HOWEVER, AND IN PARTICULAR THE LATINS WERE NOT PREPARED TO PUT THEIR NAMES TO A ONE-SIDED CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL ON THE BASIS OF SUCH FRAGMENTARY REPORTS PARTICULARLY WHEN IT WAS CLEAR THAT FIGHTING WAS ALSO IN PROGRESS IN THE HILLS NORTH OF LAKE TIBERIAS FROM WHERE SYRIAN GUNS, SO THE ISRALEI AMBASSADOR REPORTED, WERE FIRING ON JEWISH VILLAGES IN THE VALLEY BELOW IN ISRAEL.

/ 3. THEN THE

3. THEN THE FEELING IN THE COUNCIL BEGAN TO SWING AGAINST THE ISRAELIS AS THE IMPRESSION BEGAN TO GROW THAT THEY WERE NOT TELLING THE FULL STORY ABOUT THE AIR ATTACKS ON DAMASCUS. IT BEGAN TO APPEAR THAT ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NOT ATTACKED THE CITY THEY WERE PROBABLY ENGAGED IN RECONNAISSANCE OVER DAMASCUS AND POSSIBLY IN ATTACKS AROUND THE OUTSKIRTS NEAR THE AIRPORT.

4. IT WAS ONLY WHEN THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE WAS ABLE TO REPORT THAT GENERAL DAYAN HAD INVITED GENERAL BULL TO TEL AVIV TO WORK OUT WITH HIM THE ARRANGEMENT FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE SUPERVISED BY UNTSO THAT THE BALANCE IN THE COUNCIL WAS RESTORED, AND AT THE END OF GENERAL BULL'S REPORT SUGGESTED THAT THE BALL WAS FINALLY IN THE SYRIAN COURT. THE KNOWLEDGE THAT BOTH ISRALEIS AND THE SYRIANS WERE NOW KEEN TO CO-OPERATE WITH GENERAL BULL IN ESTABLISHING A CEASE-FIRE WAS THE BASIS ON WHICH THE ADJOUNRMENT OF THE DEBATE WAS FINALLY ACHIEVED WITHOUT ANY RESOLUTION BEING TABLED.

5. IT MAY NOT BE AS APPARENT FROM THE RECORD OF THE MEETING AS IT WAS TO THOSE OF US SITTING IN IT HOW MUCH THE MINUTE TO MINUTE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND INFLUENCED ITS COURSE. IF THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN ARRANGING THE MEETING BETWEEN BULL AND DAYAN WHEN THEY DID THE FEELING IN THE COUNCIL COULD WELL HAVE SWUNG STRONGLY AGAINST THEM AS A RESULT OF THEIR AIR ACTIVITY OVER SYRIA. UNDOUBTEDLY GENERAL BULL'S MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO ESTABLISH THE BASIS FOR A CEASE-FIRE ON THE GROUND MADE ALL THE DIFFERENCE. THROUGHOUT THE LONG MORNING WE SEEMED CONSTANTLY LIKELY TO FACE THE CHOICE OF CONDEMNING ISRAEL ON THE BASIS OF NOT VERY SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE OR APPEARING TO CONDONE ISRALEI ATTACKS ON DAMASCUS BY OUR FAILURE TO DO SO. BUT WHEN WE FINALLY DISPERSED WE ALL FELT THAT THERE WAS A SPORTING CHANCE THAT GENERAL BULL HAD SAVED THE DAY.

/6. WE MAY

6. WE MAY LATER WANT TO ASSESS MORE CAREFULLY THE RUSSIAN INTENTION. WE WONDERED THROUGHOUT THE WEARY FILIBUSTERING DEBATE YESTERDAY WHAT THEY WERE GETTING AT AND AGAIN EARLY THIS MORNING THEIR TACTICS AND PURPOSE SEEMED OBSCURE. NOW IT LOOKS AS IF THEY WERE TRYING TO BUILD UP A MYTH THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE BENT ON TAKING DAMASCUS AND THAT IT WAS TOUGH RUSSIAN DETERMINATION TO SUPPORT THE ARABS THROUGH THICK AND THIN THAT SAVED SYRIA. BUT IT MAY JUST BE THEY REALLY THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS IN FACT INTENDED TO GO TO DAMASCUS. INDEED PERHAPS AT ONE TIME THEY DID. BUT IN ANY EVENT I DOUBT IF THE BELATED ST GEORGE AND THE SYRIAN MAIDEN ACT DID MUCH TO RESTORE THE DAMAGED SOVIET IMAGE.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 144, PARIS 148 AND TEL AVIV 155.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 2135Z 10 JUNE 1967

RECD AT 2136Z 10 JUNE 1967

[REPETITION TO NOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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FLASH U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1298 10 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1298 OF 10 JUNE

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN AND OTTAWA.

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION TABLED THIS EVENING.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING HEARD THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE CURRENT SITUATION,

GRAVELY CONCERNED AT REPORTS AND COMPLAINTS IT HAS RECEIVED OF AIR ATTACKS, SHELLINGS, GROUND ACTIVITIES AND OTHER VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE FIRE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA,

1. CONDEMNS ANY AND ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE:

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ORDER A FULL INVESTIGATION OF ALL REPORTS OF VIOLATIONS AND TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

3. DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES SCRUPULOUSLY RESPECT ITS CEASE-FIRE APPEALS CONTAINED IN RESOLUTIONS 233, 234 AND 235:

4. CALLS ON THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO ISSUE CATEGORIC INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL MILITARY FORCES TO CEASE ALL FIRING AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES AS REQUIRED BY THESE RESOLUTIONS.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 147, PARIS 151, TEL AVIV 158, COPENHAGEN 78.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0528Z 11 JUNE 1967

RECD AT 0529Z 11 JUNE 1967

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL -DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1300 10 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1300 OF 10 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, RIO DE JANEIRO, BUENOS AIRES, ADDIS ABABA, NEW DELHI AND TOKYO, AND SAVING TO AMMAN, JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1293: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.

THE COUNCIL MET AGAIN AT 9.35 P.M. AT THE REQUEST OF THE SOVIET UNION WHO ALLEGED THAT ISRAELI AGGRESSION HAD CONTINUED IN SYRIA AFTER ACCEPTANCE OF A CEASE-FIRE BY BOTH PARTIES. A NEW JOINT DRAFT RESOLUTION ON TREATMENT OF CIVIL POPULATION AND PRISONERS OF WAR TABLED BY ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND ETHIOPIA WAS ALSO BEFORE THE COUNCIL (TEXT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, NOT TO ALL).

2. FEDERENKO (USSR) IN A VIOLENT STATEMENT ALLEGED THAT IT WAS NOW CERTAIN THAT DAMASCUS HAD BEEN BOMBED SOON AFTER THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED THAT MORNING. ISRAELI MINISTERS HAD DECLARED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NEVER REVERT TO THE BOUNDARIES ESTABLISHED BY THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS: THE LUST FOR LEBENSRAUM WAS TOO GREAT. HE CALLED ON THE COUNCIL TO CONDEMN ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND INSIST ON HER WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY FORTHWITH.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THEN GAVE HIS EIGHTH ORAL REPORT (SUMMARY IN MY SECOND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, NOT TO ALL).

4. FEDERENKO (USSR) AND TOMEH (SYRIA) COMMENTING ON THE REPORT POINTED OUT THAT THE RAID BY DELTA WINGED AIRCRAFT ON DAMASCUS

../OCCURRED

OCCURRED 17 MINUTES AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE AGREED BY BOTH SIDES FOR 1630 G.M.T. SECONDLY, IT WAS NOW CONFIRMED THAT QUNEITRA HAD BEEN OCCUPIED, IN SPITE OF COPIOUS DENIALS OF BOTH THESE FACTS BY THE ISRAELI DELEGATE. THE INDIAN DELEGATE REPEATED THESE POINTS AND ENDORSED THE PRESIDENT'S SUGGESTION FOR A RECESS DURING WHICH U THANT'S REPORT COULD BE STUDIED BY DELEGATES. EL KONY (UAR) DESCRIBED THE U.S. AND U.K. AS QUOTE DASTARDLY ATTACKERS UNQUOTE OF HIS COUNTRY WHO WANTED TO FACE THE ARAB STATES AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI. IF EVIDENCE WAS NEEDED, IT WAS TO HAND IN THE AMERICAN TACTIC OF PARALYSING THE PRESENT DEBATE. TABARANOV (BULGARIA) REITERATED HIS CHARGES THAT ISRAEL WAS CONTINUING TO AGGRESS AGAINST SYRIA. HE POINTED OUT THAT THIS MORNING WHEN HE HAD SAID THAT ISRAELI TROOPS HAD OCCUPIED QUNEITRA THIS WAS DENIED BUT NOW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE THERE. THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL KNEW EXACTLY WHERE THESE TROOPS WERE ALL THE TIME. THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER POWERS HAD AN EXTENSIVE NETWORK IN ARAB COUNTRIES TO GIVE THEM INFORMATION. AS A RESULT OF ISRAEL'S ACTIONS BULGARIA, AS HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS, HAS NOW BROKEN RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS ALSO BROKEN RELATIONS AND SOON OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WOULD FOLLOW SUIT.

5. GOLDBERG (U.S.A.) STATED THAT THE COUNCIL'S AIM WAS TO FIND PEACE AND EVERYTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO EXPEDITE THIS TASK BUT MUCH TIME WAS BEING DEVOTED TO DIATRIBES AGAINST THE U.S.A. ACCUSING HIS COUNTRY OF BEING INVOLVED IN THE DISPUTE. THIS DID NOT SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND HE STATED AGAIN CATEGORICALLY THAT THE U.S.A. WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT. HE WELCOMED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORTS PARTICULARLY THAT BOTH SIDES HAD NOW GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD IMPLEMENT THE CEASE-FIRE. HE THEN TABLED A RESOLUTION (SEE MY TELEGRAM NO. 1298).

../6. THE

6. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THEN READ OUT A CABLE WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED FROM MR. EBAN, THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL IN WHICH EBAN REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CABLE AND INFORMED HIM THAT ORDERS HAD BEEN ISSUED TO COMPLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE INSTRUCTION WITH EFFECT FROM 1800 HOURS LOCAL TIME 10 JUNE. THE CEASE-FIRE WENT INTO FORCE AND HAD CONTINUED SINCE WITHOUT INTERRUPTION. ISRAELI FORCES WERE SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVING IT.
7. AT 1055 HOURS NEW YORK TIME INDIA MOVED A SIMPLE ADJOURNMENT FOR HALF AN HOUR. THIS WAS SUPPORTED BY FRANCE WITH A REQUEST THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BE ASKED TO SUPPLEMENT HIS INFORMATION BY ANYTHING ELSE HE RECEIVED IN THE MEANTIME.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 148, PARIS 152, TEL AVIV 159, COPENHAGEN 79, RIO DE JANEIRO 32, BUENOS AIRES 26, ADDIS ABABA 24, NEW DELHI 41, TOKYO 27, AND SAVING AMMAN 57, JEDDA 36 AND CAIRO 71.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0940Z 11 JUNE
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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE FROM UKMISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1301 DATED 10 JUNE, 1967
UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1301 OF 10 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS BUENOS AIRES RIO DE JANEIRO AMMAN AND ADDIS ABABA

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE JOINT DRAFT RESOLUTION TABLED TODAY BY ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND ETHIOPIA.

BEGINS

'THE SECURITY COUNCIL',

'CONSIDERING'THE URGENT NEED TO SPARE THE CIVIL POPULATIONS AND THE PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE AREA OF CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM ADDITIONAL SUFFERINGS,

'CONSIDERING' THAT ESSENTIAL AND INALIENABLE HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE RESPECTED EVEN DURING THE VICISSITUDES OF WAR,

'CONSIDERING' THAT ALL THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR SHOULD BE COMPLIED WITH BY THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT,

1. 'CALLS UPON' THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY, WELFARE AND SECURITY OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE AREAS WHERE MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE:

2. 'RECOMMENDS' TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED THE SCRUPULOUS RESPECT OF THE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES GOVERNING

.//THE

U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO.1301 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, CONTAINED IN THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949.
ENDS

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS TO TEL AVIV NO 160, MOSCOW NO 149, PARIS NO 153, BUENOS AIRES NO 27 RIO DE JANEIRO NO 33 ADDIS ABABA NO 25 AND AMMAN NO 90.

LORD CARADON

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE
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IMMEDIATE FROM UKMISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1302 DATED 10 JUNE, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1302 OF 10 JUNE

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON

MY TELEGRAM NO 1300: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.

FOLLOWING ARE POINTS IN U THANT'S EIGHTH ORAL REPORT ON STATE OF THE ISRAELI/SYRIAN CEASE-FIRE ADDITIONAL TO THOSE IN MY TELEGRAM NO 1297, BASED ON TELEGRAMS FROM GENERAL BULL, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNTSO.

1. GENERAL BULL ALSO REPORTED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ISRAEL-SYRIA MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION:

1. GENERAL BULL ALSO REPORTED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ISRAEL-SYRIA MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION:

"FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM THE SENIOR SYRIAN DELEGATE (SIC) ON 10 JUNE AT 1953 GMT: ISRAELI PARATROOPS DROPPED AT TSIL (APPROXIMATELY 30 KILOMETRES EAST OF LAKE TIBERIAS) AND AT RAFID (APPROXIMATELY 20 KILOMETRES SOUTH-SOUTH-EAST OF QUNEITRA) FROM HELICOPTERS".

2. LATEST CEASE-FIRE IMPLEMENTATION REPORT RECEIVED FROM GENERAL BULL STATES:

(I) PROPOSED A CEASE -FIRE TOGETHER WITH NO FURTHER MOVEMENT OF TROOPS TO BE EFFECTIVE AT 1630 GMT, 10 JUNE. THIS PROPOSAL WAS ACCEPTED BY BOTH PARTIES.

(II) INSTRUCTED CHAIRMAN OF THE ISRAEL/SYRIA MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION TO RE-ESTABLISH QUNEITRA CONTROL CENTRE IN THE AFTERNOON OF 10 JUNE AND INFORMED ISRAEL AUTHORITIES ACCORDINGLY.

CHAIRMAN DESPATCHED AN ADVANCE GROUP OF OBSERVERS ACCOMPANIED BY THREE SYRIAN LIAISON OFFICERS TOWARDS QUNEITRA FOR THIS PURPOSE BUT WHEN THEY ARRIVED AT SASA (APPROXIMATELY 40 KILOMETRES FROM QUNEITRA) IT WAS LEARNED THAT THE LATTER TOWN HAD BEEN INVESTED BY ISRAEL FORCES. IT WAS THUS IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THIS FIRST STAGE OF DEPLOYMENT OF OBSERVERS AS PLANNED.

/(III)

(III) AS OBSERVERS COULD NOT BE POSTED BEFORE NIGHT FELL, IT IS INTENTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE COMMENCING MORNING 11 JUNE TO ARRANGE FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF OBSERVERS FROM BOTH SIDES IN AN ORDERLY FASHION INTO THE BATTLE AREA. UNTIL OBSERVERS CAN BE DEPLOYED UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION IN PALESTINE IS WITHOUT DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE REGARDING THE TROOPS ON THE GROUND AND HAS NO ABILITY TO OBSERVE ANY DEVELOPMENTS. ISOLATED POCKETS OF RESISTANCE ARE LIKELY TO EXIST WITHIN WHICH TROOPS MAY NOT BE UNDER THE CONTROL OR EVEN IN COMMUNICATION WITH THEIR NATIONAL AUTHORITIES. UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISIONS ORGANIZATION IN PALESTINE IS IN NO POSITION TO PROVIDE DEFINITE INFORMATION OR USEFUL OBSERVATION ON THE CEASE-FIRE SITUATION.

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE FROM UKMISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1303 DATED 10 JUNE, 1967
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1303 OF 10 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV OTTAWA COPENHAGEN RIO DE JANEIRO BUENOS AIRES ADDIS ABABA NEW DELHI TOKYO SAVING TO AMMAN JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

MY TELEGRAM NO 1300

THE COUNCIL RESUMED AT 0045 HOURS LOCAL TIME 11 JUNE.

2. SEYDOUX (FRANCE) SAID THAT HE HAD STUDIED THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND WOULD LIKE TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS TO SEEK CLARIFICATION. THESE WERE:

(A) WERE THE INCIDENTS MENTIONED AS HAVING OCCURRED SOON AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE REPEATED THEREAFTER?

(B) WAS THERE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO IDENTIFY MORE CLOSELY THE ARTILLERY FIRE WHICH WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN FIRED FROM SYRIA INTO ISRAEL AND HAD IT CONTINUED?

(C) COULD THE TIME OF THE OCCUPATION OF QUNAITRA BE STATED MORE EXACTLY AND WAS THIS THE LAST POINT OF THE ISRAELI ADVANCE?

(D) REGARDING THE STATEMENT THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF ONE PARTY WERE DEEP INSIDE THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER, WAS THERE ANY INCURSION IN OTHER SYRIAN SECTORS APART FROM QUNAITRA:

(E) HAD GENERAL BULL SUFFICIENT ELEMENTS IN THE AREA TO UNDERTAKE THE INVESTIGATIONS ALLOTTED TO HIM BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL?

../(F) COULD

(F) COULD GENERAL BULL COUNT ON FURTHER ASSISTANCE FROM MEMBERS OF THE OTHER ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS WHO WERE POSSIBLY NOT SO HEAVILY EMPLOYED?

(G) COULD THE QUNAITRA CONTROL CENTRE, WHICH GENERAL BULL HAD FAILED SO FAR TO RE-ESTABLISH NOW BE THE SUBJECT OF A FURTHER EFFORT TO RE-ESTABLISH IT?

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN REPLY STATED THAT HE HAD NO FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING THE QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE GROUND AND IN THE AIR: AND AS THERE WERE NO MILITARY OBSERVERS IN QUNAITRA THERE WAS NO WAY OF CHECKING WHEN IT WAS ACTUALLY TAKEN. WITH REGARD TO STAFF, HE WOULD UNDERTAKE TO ASK GENERAL BULL WHAT FURTHER ASSISTANCE HE REQUIRED, BUT IT WAS HIS OPINION THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THE SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF THE EXISTING OBSERVERS THAN TO ENLARGE THE FORCE. THE QUNAITRA CONTROL CENTRE WAS HE HOPED BEING RE-ESTABLISHED AND HE WAS EXPECTING A REPLY ON THIS ISSUE SHORTLY.

4. FEDORENKO (USSR) IN ACRIMONIOUS STATEMENT ATTACKED THE UNITED STATES FOR THEIR REPRESENTATIVE'S EARLIER STATEMENT, WHICH LAUDED THE BENEVOLENT POLICIES OF WASHINGTON BUT MADE NO CONDEMNATION OF THE MONSTROUS AGGRESSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND OMITTED ANY DISCUSSION OF THE REAL QUESTIONS AT ISSUE BEFORE THE COUNCIL VIZ. THE BOMBING OF DAMASCUS AND THE SEIZING OF QUNAITRA. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT CLEARLY INDICATED THAT THE BOMBING OF DAMASCUS AND THE SEIZING OF SYRIAN TERRITORY HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT BY ISRAELI FORCES. HE ASKED THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE IF HE CONDEMNED THE BOMBING OF DAMASCUS AND THE MISLEADING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL, WHO HAD DENIED SEIZING QUNAITRA WHEN ALL THE TIME IT WAS IN ISRAELI HANDS.

../5. GOLDBERG

5. GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES) IN A SHORT REPLY STATED THAT HE CONDEMNED ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE ORDER AND HOPED THAT THE USSR WAS WILLING TO DO THE SAME.

6. FEDORENKO (USSR) CONTINUING STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE HAD AVOIDED HIS DIRECT QUESTION, AND IN INTRODUCING HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS CONNIVING AT THE ISRAELI SEIZURE OF A LARGE PART OF SYRIAN TERRITORY. HE WOULD LIKE TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES DRAFT RESOLUTION. DID IT REALLY INTEND TO IGNORE THE AGGRESSION, AND WAS IT TRYING TO LEGITIMIZE THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB COUNTRIES? HE TAUNTED GOLDBERG, ALLEGING THAT HE HAD NOT THE COURAGE TO CONDEMN ISRAEL!'S SHAMEFUL AGGRESSION AND HER VIOLATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS. HE HOPED THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD SPEAK OUT UNEQUIVOCALLY, CONDEMN THE ''MONSTROUS AGGRESSION'' AND TAKE MEASURES TO CONTROL THE ISRAELI INTERVENTIONISTS ONCE AND FOR ALL.

7. RAFAEL (ISRAEL) STATED HE WOULD NOT BE BROWBEATEN BY FEDORENKO AND HIS ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR (TARABANOV). NOTHING HAD BEEN SAID ABOUT AIR RAIDS ON CAIRO TODAY. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EIGHTH REPORT FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE AIRCRAFT SAID TO HAVE BOMBED DAMASCUS. AS REGARDS THE PARATROOP DROP AT TSIL, THE SOURCE OF THIS REPORT WAS SYRIAN

8. EL FARRA (JORDAN) SAID THE MAIN POINT WAS THAT THE QUESTION BEFORE THE COUNCIL HAD SO FAR RECEIVED MOST UNFAIR TREATMENT. IT WAS SCARCELY IN DISPUTE THAT ISRAEL HAD COMMITTED AGGRESSION ON THE ARAB COUNTRIES. YET NOBODY, OR RATHER NOT ENOUGH PEOPLE IN THE COUNCIL, WOULD STAND UP AND SAY SO. THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS NOW VERY SERIOUS. THE JORDANIAN RED CRESCENT HAD TODAY GATHERED INFORMATION SHOWING THAT ISRAEL WAS DRIVING WEST BANK REFUGEES ACROSS THE CEASE-FIRE LINE INTO TRANSJORDAN . TOMEH (SYRIA) MADE A SPEECH ON SIMILAR LINES, ADDING CURIOUSLY THAT

../THE ISRAELI

THE ISRAELI INVASION WAS THE DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENTS QUARREL WITH THE IRAQ PETROLEUM COMPANY OVER OIL TRANSIT DUES SIX MONTH'S AGO.

9. GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES) IN REPLY TO FEDORENKO (USSR) REITERATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD JOIN IN ANY CONDEMNATION OF VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS INTENDED TO SHOW THIS. TARABANOV (BULGARIA) REFERRED TO THE SOVIET UNION'S REQUEST FOR CALLING THIS EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL IN ORDER TO EXAMINE THE FLAGRANT VIOLATION BY ISRAEL OF THE CEASE-FIRE. HE POINTED OUT THAT AFTER A LENGTHY DISCUSSION THE COUNCIL HAD NOT ARRIVED AT A CONCLUSION TO CONDEMN ISRAEL. ISRAEL HAD BEEN ARROGANTLY MANOEUVERING BECAUSE HER REPRESENTATIVE KNEW THAT HE HAD ACCOMPLICES AMONGST MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

10. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THEN PROVIDED SOME SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED IN TWO REPORTS FROM GENERAL BULL:

(A) THE FIRST REPORT DESPATCHED AT 0305 HOURS GMT FROM JERUSALEM STATED THAT (ONE) THE BOMBING INCIDENT REPORTED EARLIER WAS ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF ISMAC CARRIED OUT BY TWO AIRCRAFT OF DELTA WING TYPE FLYING TOO HIGH FOR MARKINGS TO BE OBSERVED. THERE WAS HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE AT THE TIME AND THE SOUND OF BOMB EXPLOSIONS FROM AN AREA 7-10 KMS. SOUTH OF DAMASCUS. THE NOISE WAS NOT THAT OF A SONIC BOOM. THE PLANES WERE NOT PHOTO-RECONNAISANCE AND THE OBSERVERS WERE TRAINED UNITED NATIONS MILITARY PERSONNEL.

(TWO) THERE HAD BEEN NO OTHER BREACHES OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

(THREE) MR SASSON (THE ISRAELI CHIEF OF THE ARMISTICE DEPARTMENT IN JERUSALEM HAD CATEGORICALLY AND REPEATEDLY

../DENIED..

DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY BOMBING BY ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE.

(FOUR) STEPS HAD BEEN TAKEN TO POSITION OBSERVERS TO ENFORCE THE CEASE-FIRE AND THOSE AT DAMACUS HAD BEEN MOVED FORWARD TO SASA FROM WHERE THEY WOULD DEPLOY AT FIRST LIGHT 11 JUNE TO QUNEITRA. OBSERVERS FROM TIBERIAS WOULD MOVE EASTWARDS TO QUNEITRA AND RE-ESTABLISH THE CONTROL CENTRE THERE.

(B) THE SECOND REPORT FROM GENERAL BULL DESPATCHED FROM JERUSALEM AT Ø447 GMT STATED THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE OBSERVERS FROM TIBERIAS HAD BEEN DELAYED PENDING A DECISION BY THE ISRAELI MINISTER OF DEFENCE. HE EXPECTED THIS DECISION AT Ø8ØØ HOURS GMT. THE OBSERVER TEAM FROM SASA HAD BEEN DEPLOYED TOWARDS QUNEITRA AND AT Ø33Ø HOURS GMT HAD REPORTED HAVING PASSED THE VILLAGE OF FANIA.

11. ON THE PRESIDENT'S SUGGESTION, THE COUNCIL THEN ADJOURNED AT Ø3ØØ HOURS NEW YORK TIME.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW NO 15Ø, PARIS NO 154, TEL AVIV NO 161, AND ROUTINE TO COPENHAGEN NO 8Ø RIO DE JANEIRO NO 34, ADDIS ABABA NO 26, BUENOS AIRES NO 28, NEW DELHI NO 42, TOKYO NO 27 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO 58 JEDDA NO 37 AND CAIRO NO 72.

LORD CARADON

SENT 1Ø3ØZ 11 JUNE
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FLASH U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1304 10 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1304 OF 10 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, RIO DE JANEIRO, BUENOS AIRES, ADDIS ABABA, NEW DELHI AND TOKYO, AND SAVING TO AMMAN, JEDDA AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1294: MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS CALLED BACK INTO SESSION AT 9.00 P.M. THIS EVENING BY THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE, WHO BEGAN WITH A VIOLENT STATEMENT ABOUT ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST SYRIA.

2. THE UNITED STATES, BELIEVING THAT THE SOVIET AIM WAS TO GET THROUGH A RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL FOR THE ATTACK ON SYRIA, TABLED A RESOLUTION CALLING IN GENERAL TERMS FOR CONDEMNATION AND FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF BREACHES OF THE CEASE-FIRE (TEXT IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 1298). FOLLOWING THE STATEMENTS BY THE COMMUNISTS, INDIA CALLED FOR A RECESS AND DURING THIS RECESS SOUGHT SUPPORT AMONG THE NON PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL FOR A RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL (THE TEXT OF THIS DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN TABLED AND IS, THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO CHANGE IS IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 1305). THIS CONDEMNS ISRAEL FOR THE BOMBING OF THE DAMASCUS AREA AND THE OCCUPATION OF EL QUNEITRA AND LEAVES FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION THE REFERENCES IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORTS TO OTHER BREACHES OF THE CEASE-FIRE E.G. SHELLING BY SYRIA.

3. THE INDIANS THIS EVENING WERE NOT ABLE TO MUSTER SUFFICIENT VOTES FOR THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION. THE SOVIET UNION, BULGARIA, MALI AND INDIA WOULD CLEARLY VOTE FOR. SUBJECT TO INSTRUCTIONS

../BRAZIL,

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BRAZIL, DENMARK, CANADA AND ARGENTINA BELIEVED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD NOT SUPPORT IT. THE ATTITUDES OF ETHIOPIA, NIGERIA, JAPAN AND CHINA WERE NOT DIVULGED. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE WAS CLEARLY DISTURBED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF ISRAELI AIR ACTIVITY AND THE MAJOR ISRAEL INCURSION INTO SYRIA TERRITORY AT QUNEITRA. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT VOTING FOR SOME FORM OF CONDEMNATION.

4. THE AMERICANS SEEM CONFIDENT THAT THE INDIANS WILL BE UNABLE TO SECURE NINE VOTES FOR THEIR RESOLUTION OR ANY SIMILAR CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL. THEY MAY BE RIGHT BUT I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF NIGERIA AND ETHIOPIA JOINING THE INDIANS, AND FRANCE, CHINA AND JAPAN MUST ALSO BE COUNTED AS POSSIBLE FAVOURABLE VOTES. IT IS, THEREFORE, NOT ALTOGETHER BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF POSSIBILITY THAT THERE WILL BE NINE VOTES FOR THE INDIAN RESOLUTION OR SOMETHING LIKE IT AND EVEN IF THERE ARE NOT I WOULD NOT PUT IT PAST THE INDIANS TO PRESS FOR A VOTE IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE WHICH COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO CONDEMN ISRAEL AND WHICH ARE NOT.

5. THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH TOOK PLACE AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE CAME INTO EFFECT AT 1630 G.M.T. COULD WELL HAVE BEEN ATTRIBUTABLE TO ORDERS NOT HAVING REACHED THE COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD.
IT IS, HOWEVER, NOT SO MUCH THIS ASPECT WHICH HAS DISTURBED SOME MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AS THE CLEARLY DELIBERATE ISRAELI CAMPAIGN TO INVEST THE QUNEITRA AREA WHICH TOOK PLACE AFTER THE COUNCIL HAD TWICE CALLED FOR A CEASE-FIRE.

6. BOTH DRAFT RESOLUTIONS WILL PROBABLY BE AMENDED BUT IF THE INDIANS PRESS SOMETHING LIKE THEIR PRESENT RESOLUTION TO A VOTE IT WILL FACE US WITH AN AWKWARD DECISION. THE AMERICANS WOULD CLEARLY BE VERY PUT OUT IF WE VOTED IN FAVOUR AND WE COULD WELL PART COMPANY WITH CANADA AND DENMARK AND THE LATIN AMERICANS IF THEY

../MAINTAIN

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UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1304 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT POSITION. IF WE ABSTAIN THIS WILL BE EXPLOITED AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF PRO-ISRAELI SYMPATHIES. SINCE PRESUMABLY THE BASIS FOR OUR DECISION MUST BE WHETHER WE CONSIDER THAT THERE WAS SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ISRAEL ATTACK ON SYRIA AFTER FIGHTING ELSEWHERE HAD COME TO AN END AND THE EFFECT OF OUR VOTE IN THE AREA IT IS DIFFICULT TO RECOMMEND WHICH WAY WE SHOULD VOTE. I AM BOUND TO SAY HOWEVER THAT MY OWN VIEW IS MUCH THE SAME AS THAT OF SEYDOUX (FRANCE). THAT IS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY TAKING EL QUNEITRA AT THIS STAGE AND THAT THE BOMBING OF THE VICINITY OF DAMASCUS TODAY IS STILL MORE DESERVING OF CONDEMNATION. I SHALL MAKE A RECOMMENDATION WHEN WE SEE THE FINAL TEXT.

7. THE U.S. RESOLUTION (MY TELEGRAM NO. 1298) SEEMS HARMLESS ENOUGH BUT WILL PROBABLY BE OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS BY SUNDAY MORNING. IF, HOWEVER, IT IS PRESSED TO A VOTE I PRESUME YOU WOULD SEE NO OBJECTION TO MY VOTING FOR IT.

8. THE ETHIOPIAN/BRAZILIAN/ARGENTINIAN DRAFT ON THE TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS AND WAR PRISONERS (MY TELEGRAM NO. 1301) ALSO SEEMS UNEXCEPTIONABLE AND I PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR IT.

9. NO TIME HAS YET BEEN SET FOR THE NEXT COUNCIL MEETING.

F.O. PASS PARIS 155, MOSCOW 151, TEL AVIV 162, COPENHAGEN 81, RIO DE JANEIRO 35, BUENOS AIRES 29, ADDIS ABABA 27, NEW DELHI 43, TOKYO 29 AND SAVING AMMAN 59, JEDDA 38 AND CAIRO 73.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0850Z 11 JUNE
RECD 0853Z 11 JUNE

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV
REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION,
REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

TELNO 1077 10 JUNE 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELNO 1Ø77 OF 1Ø JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS KUWAIT JEDDA BAHRAIN BEIRUT.

YOUR TELNO 589 PARA 4: KING HUSSEIN.

THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME THIS AFTERNOON AT HIS OWN REQUEST. I TOLD HIM THAT WE UNDERSTOOD AND SYMPATHISED WITH THE POSITION OF KING HUSSEIN AND THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AFTER THE RECENT CALAMITY WHICH HAD BEFALLEN THEIR COUNTRY. I SAID THAT I TRUSTED THAT THE KING DID NOT BELIEVE THE CANARD THAT BRITISH AND AMERICAN AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING AND I HOPED THAT HE WOULD SAY SO. THE AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED THAT THE KING DID NOT IN FACT BELIEVE THIS STORY.

2. I WENT ON TO DISCUSS THE MANY PROBLEMS WITH WHICH JORDAN WAS FACED IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE AMBASSADOR TOOK THIS AS A CUE TO MAKE A PLEA ON CUSTOMARY LINES ABOUT THE ARAB REFUGEES, BUT I INSISTED THAT THIS WAS ONLY ONE OF A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER IN WORKING OUT A NEW SETTLEMENT FOR THE AREA. I SPOKE SOME ENCOURAGING WORDS ABOUT THE WAY THE JORDANIAN ARMY HAD FOUGHT WHEN LEFT ON THEIR OWN WITHOUT AIR COVER, AND I URGED THE AMBASSADOR TO TELL THE KING THAT WE WISHED TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH DURING THE INEVITABLY DIFFICULT DAYS AHEAD.

../3. BEFORE

3. BEFORE THE AMBASSADOR LEFT I AGAIN STRESSED THE URGENT NEED FOR A CLEAR STATEMENT FROM THE JORDANIAN SIDE DISASSOCIATING JORDAN FROM THE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS ABOUT BRITISH AND AMERICAN AIRCRAFT. I SAID THAT SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE RESTORATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE AMBASSADOR UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THIS TO KING HUSSEIN AND HIS GOVERNMENT.

4. YOU SHOULD NOW TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK SIMILARLY TO THE KING (AS RECOMMENDED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) DRAWING ALSO ON THE FOLLOWING. WE UNDERSTOOD WELL THE EXTREME DIFFICULTY OF THE POSITION INTO WHICH THE KING WAS PUT BY PRESIDENT NASSER'S FOLLIES IN RECENT WEEKS, AND THE AGONISING NATURE OF THE DECISIONS THAT HE HAD TO TAKE. IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAS NOW HAPPENED, HE WILL PERHAPS BETTER UNDERSTAND THE EFFORTS THAT WERE BEING MADE BY H.M.G. AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT UNTIL LAST WEEKEND TO STAVE OFF THE CATASTROPHE THAT HAS NOW FALLEN ON JORDAN.

5. THE JORDANIAN FORCES, HAVING BEEN LED INTO AN UNNECESSARY WAR BY NASSER, SEEM, AS IN 1948, TO HAVE ACQUITTED THEMSELVES A GOOD DEAL BETTER THAN THE EGYPTIANS. BUT IT IS NECESSARY TO BE REALISTIC ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRUSHING DEFEAT WHICH THE ARABS HAVE BROUGHT ON THEMSELVES. WE STILL THINK THAT A STABLE AND PROSPEROUS JORDAN CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE WELL-BEING OF THE WHOLE AREA, BUT IT WOULD BE ILLUSORY TO THINK THAT THE CLOCK CAN NOW BE PUT BACK TO 14 MAY. IN PARTICULAR, THE KING SHOULD HAVE IT IN MIND THAT THE TIME IS COMING WHEN HE MAY HAVE TO JOIN WITH OTHER ARAB LEADERS IN FACING THE FACT THAT IT IS TIME TO END THE TWENTY YEARS' WAR.

6. I REALISE THAT THERE IS NOT A GREAT DEAL OF COMFORT FOR KING HUSSEIN IN THIS, BUT I ALSO THINK THAT THIS IS A TIME AT WHICH WE

/..SHOULD

SHOULD TRY TO GET ALL ARABS TO FACE REALITIES. MOREOVER, OUR POLICY OF SUPPORTING JORDAN HAS HITHERTO BEEN BASED PRIMARILY ON THE BELIEF THAT THIS WAS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR IN PREVENTING AN ARAB/ ISRAEL WAR. NOW THAT THE WAR HAS TAKEN PLACE, WE SHALL NEED TO RECONSIDER WHAT ROLE JORDAN HAS TO PLAY IN OUR MIDDLE EAST POLICIES HENCEFORWARD.

SOSFA SENT 1534Z 10 JUNE 1967

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MR. MARSH IS EXPECTED TO SPEAK AT ABOUT 4 P.M.

MR. RICHARD MARSH, MINISTER OF POWER
SPEAKS ON OIL SUPPLIES

"OPTIMISTIC, BUT NOT KEEPING FINGERS CROSSED
AND HOPING FOR THE BEST"

Speaking today (Saturday, 10th June), at the Annual Picnic at Bedlington (Northumberland) of the Northumberland Area of the National Union of Mineworkers, Mr. Richard Marsh, Minister of Power, said:

The situation in the Middle East is still changing too rapidly for me to be able to give any specific information about the oil position. I am very hopeful that these countries who so mistakenly turned off the tap will turn it on again quickly, although in the highly charged atmosphere in the area I can understand the pressure operating on these Governments. But even if they do so to-day the facts are that there will have been some disruption in our supplies. This however would be a relatively minor inconvenience which could be absorbed without affecting the public.

As Minister of Power, however, I cannot take a gamble and since the outbreak of war in the Middle East, the Ministry has been extremely busy drawing up contingency plans and ensuring that the emergency arrangements are well able to meet any possible development, taking into account the extent of our stock position - which is good.

I have had talks with leaders of the major oil companies, and my Ministry has been - and is - in the closest touch with their officials. We are also in close consultation with the U.S. Administration and, since their supplies also are affected by the closure of the Suez Canal and the pipelines, we are having consultations on Monday with our friends in Europe and elsewhere through the machinery of the O.E.C.D. in Paris.

We have not therefore been keeping our fingers crossed and hoping that something will turn up. I am optimistic that the interruption in our oil supplies will amount to no more than a temporary inconvenience. But we are ready if it turns out to be something more than that. Meanwhile, the moment for any drastic action has not yet arrived. Of course, in the unlikely event of a miner (or anyone else) who is taking his family and friends to the seaside for the day in his 'E' type Jag and Mini, asking my advice, I would say take one car but not both. This does not amount to an appeal for economy, but is simply a hint that so far as oil supplies are concerned, although the signs are promising, we are not yet out of the wood.

Information Branch
10th June, 1967